Home About Browse Search
Svenska


On strategic incentives and the management of stochastic renewable resources

Hennlock, Magnus (2005). On strategic incentives and the management of stochastic renewable resources. Diss. (sammanfattning/summary) Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniv., Acta Universitatis agriculturae Sueciae, 1652-6880 ; 2005:124
ISBN 91-576-6923-6
[Doctoral thesis]

[img]
Preview
PDF
143kB

Abstract

The thesis consists of four theoretical articles that can be read independently of each other on the common topic - strategic incentives in the management of natural resources. Article I concerns biodiversity conservation of essential species in sustaining the ecosystem. The issue is what forces that may explain why a natural resource stock declines although the government is running a conservation programme in a second-best solution. The focus is on the government's strategic behavior against the industry being a polluter. Ten forces are identified that explains why a resource may decline under a conservation programme. One result is that an increase in the variance of the natural growth process does not lead to an increase in investment in the emission-generating industry in the second-best solution, as in the first-best solution. In article II, a marine natural resource stock is exposed to harvest as well as damage by pollution from N countries. Each country has four decision variables: harvest effort, domestic production (generating transboundary pollution), abatement and research in environmental technology. It is shown that the marine resource is damaged `twice' as a result of a `chain effect' in the strategic incentives among the countries. A harvest function is introduced, which results in `tough' harvest efforts, implying that agents' effort increases the smaller the expected stock size as an extreme case of the `tragedy of the commons'. In article III, the classical upstream-downstream case is analyzed under the assumptions of the Coase theorem in a dynamic model. Different assignments of rights to determine the level of externality are compared to the case of no-cooperation. It is shown that the `efficiency proposition' does not necessarily hold. Specifically, a bargaining outcome may not be possible when downstream society has the right to determine the level of externality in the dynamic model as it may violate individual rationality of upstream society. In the fourth article - a technical note - it is shown in a that in most models with private provision of public goods, there exists a simple mechanism determining the reaction functions of the players.

Authors/Creators:Hennlock, Magnus
Title:On strategic incentives and the management of stochastic renewable resources
Year of publishing :January 2005
Volume:2005:124
Number of Pages:21
Papers/manuscripts:
NumberReferences
ALLI. A Differential Game on the Management of Natural Capital Subject to Emissions from Industry Production II. An International Marine Pollutant Sink in an Asymmetric Environmental Technology Game III. The Coase Theorem in a Stochastic Growth Model IV. Technical Note: Response Aversion in Games Involving Private Provision of Public Goods
Place of Publication:Uppsala
ISBN for printed version:91-576-6923-6
ISSN:1652-6880
Language:English
Publication Type:Doctoral thesis
Full Text Status:Public
Agris subject categories.:P Natural resources > P01 Nature conservation and land resources
E Economics, development, and rural sociology > E10 Agricultural economics and policies
Subjects:Not in use, please see Agris categories
Agrovoc terms:economic analysis, statistical methods, mathematical models, resource management, nature conservation, renewable resources, sustainability, biodiversity, pollution
Keywords:renewable natural resources, pollution, biodiversity, international environmental problems, bioeconomics, stochastic differential game theory, Coase Theorem, public goods
URN:NBN:urn:nbn:se:slu:epsilon-866
Permanent URL:
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:slu:epsilon-866
ID Code:1018
Department:(NL, NJ) > Dept. of Economics
Deposited By: Magnus Hennlock
Deposited On:11 Jan 2006 00:00
Metadata Last Modified:02 Dec 2014 10:09

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Downloads

Downloads per year (since September 2012)

View more statistics

Downloads
Hits