Development Delayed

Exploring the failure of a large-scale agricultural
investment in Tanzania to deliver promised outcomes

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Cover: Promised outcomes of the large-scale sugarcane investment in Bagamoyo, Tanzania (left; photo by www.ecoenergy.co.tz) as opposed to achieved outcomes (right; photo by Linda Engström).

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Abstract

Since the early 2000s, large-scale agricultural investment has experienced a revival on the agenda for rural development in Africa, purported to bring, for instance, efficient agricultural production, reduced import expenditures and poverty alleviation. This new wave of large-scale agricultural investment has been described as more extensive in scale than previous attempts to promote such large farms. However, closer scrutiny reveals that in many countries, the expected flood of investments has so far been only a trickle. So far, few studies have been conducted to investigate this trend of failure.

The overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to the knowledge about how and why this new wave of large-scale agricultural investment failed to deliver proposed outcomes. This is done by exploring the empirical trajectories of, and the reasons behind, the failure of a planned public private partnership, a large scale sugar-cane investment in Tanzania, to deliver promised outcomes.

In interviews with project proponents and rural residents targeted by investment, the thesis shows how project proponents simplified complex contexts in order to 'sell' narratives of imminent success. Such simplifications interacted with context to produce delays in project implementation and subsequent failure of the project to materialise. Importantly, these delays had severe negative impacts on local communities. Despite delay being a common feature in development projects, it has been little discussed. Combined, these findings suggest that delay is an important, but overlooked, factor when understanding development failure, and that delay should not be conceived as inevitable and innocent.

Through discourse analysis and drawing on the concept 'resilient narratives', I analyse discursive practices used by proponents to sustain the image of success, in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities.

Mainly drawing on post-development and post-colonial theory, I then position my findings in debates on development narratives and development failure, and advance some reflections on the influence of close collaboration with a private actor in development assistance in relation to these findings.

While the context of the case study is highly complex and to a certain extent unpredictable, I argue that proponents have a responsibility to understand this context, and address it in their policies and projects. Finally, I argue that more attention must be paid to the impacts of delayed or non-materialised projects in both academia and policy debates.

Keywords: simplification, delay, development failure, development narratives, large-scale agricultural investment, land grabbing, privatisation of development

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Sammanfattning

Sedan början av 2000-talet har storskaliga jordbruksinvesteringar återinförts som utvecklingsstrategi för Afrikas landsbygd, som en reaktion på globala livsmedels-, klimat och finanskriser. Investeringarna sägs bidra till exempelvis effektiv livsmedelsproduktion, arbetstillfällen och fattigdomsbekämpning. Den nya investeringsvågen har beskrivits som snabbare och mer omfattande än historiska försök med storskaligt jordbruk. En närmare granskning visar emellertid att bara ett fåtal av alla förväntade investeringsprojekt har genomförts. Hittills har det dock gjorts få studier med fokus på just detta.

Den här avhandlingen ska undersöka hur och varför ett planerat offentligt-privat partnerskap – ett storskaligt sockerrörsprojekt i Tanzania – inte har lyckats uppnå utlovade resultat. Utifrån intervjuer med beslutsfattare och den lokalbefolkning som berörs av investeringarna visar avhandlingen hur projektets förespråkare presenterar förenklade budskap om en komplex kontext i syfte att "sälja in" ett narrativ om nära förestående framgångar. Avhandlingen visar också hur dessa förenklingar samspelar med kontexten och ger upphov till upprepade förseningar, som orsakar stora problem för lokal-befolkningen och i slutändan leder till att projektet läggs ned. Trots att förseningar är ett vanligt inslag i utvecklingsprojekt har de hittills inte fått någon större uppmärksamhet. De är dock en viktig förklaring till att utvecklingsprojekt misslyckas, och bör inte ses som ofrånkomliga och harmlösa faktorer.

Genom diskursanalys och utifrån begreppet 'resilienta narrativ' visar jag hur projektförespråkarna vidmakthåller bilden av ett lyckat projekt, trots en mängd motstridiga narrativ och problem på plats. Slutligen analyserar jag hur narrativ som stöder investeringen skapas, sprids och konsumeras mellan projektförespråkarna.

Med användning av post-development och postkolonial teori positionerar jag mina resultat i debatten om utvecklingsnarrativ och utvecklingsarbetets misslyckande att leverera utlovade resultat, samt reflekterar över eventuella konsekvenser av privatiseringen inom biståndet.

Min avhandling visar att även om kontexten där dessa projekt ska implementeras är komplex och delvis oförutsägbar, så har förespråkarna av storskaliga jordbruks-investeringar ett ansvar att förstå och ta hänsyn till kontexten i policybeslut och projekt-planer. Slutligen argumenterar jag för att effekterna av nedlagda eller försenade projekt förtjänar mer uppmärksamhet i både den akademiska och den policyrelaterade debatten.

Nyckelord: simplification, delay, development failure, development narratives, large-scale agricultural investment, land grabbing, privatisation of development

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Preface

This thesis grew out of a sense of puzzlement: Why would Sida officers, who specialise in contexts in 'developing' countries and who work at an agency with the stated objective to fight poverty and social injustices, decide to support a large-scale agricultural investment in rural Africa, after barely talking to the local people affected and with little acknowledgement of the overall complexity of rural life and policy implementation.

Many experiences guided me towards this puzzle. I gained one of the most important ones as a Master's student in zoo ecology studying orangutans in Indonesia, with focus on the impacts of logging on the forest and orangutans in the Bornean peat swamp: I learnt that protecting rainforests is a *social* endeavour.

To mention but one experience that contributed to that insight: One day, after splashing our way between stilt roots, climbing over fallen trees, regularly pulling our rubber boots from the deep soggy peat and sometimes 'saved' by man-made logging trails, we arrived back at the stilt house *Lubuk Kuali* – a Harvard University-funded camp for investigating forest resources and experimenting with so-called 'reduced impact logging'. While the sun was setting and huge fruit bats were flying overhead, dressed culturally appropriately in our sarongs, my Swedish friend and I were just about to jump into the brown, winding river. At that moment, a local canoe, a *ketingting*, landed by the small decaying wooden jetty. A team of loggers, all men, living in villages downstream, had also finished their day's work – cutting down selected hardwood trees for the timber market, in the same forest where we were doing our research – and needed somewhere to stay the night. I felt provoked, since they were cutting down the forest we were trying to save. However, the camp manager invited them to eat and stay the night in our camp. I later learnt that these loggers were all employed by the local head of police, who took most of the money earnt from selling the timber. With the local head of police in charge of illegal logging activities, any confiscation of chainsaws by the local police force proved in vain, since they were frequently returned to their 'rightful owner' – himself. Through this experience, and many other similar to it, I went from viewing environmental protection as mainly an issue of conservation of species diversity with little need for considering local people, as I had done during my university biology training, to realising the importance of understanding, and focus on, the complexity of socio-political structures and drivers behind deforestation, and of investing in relations with the people who perform it. I

gradually learnt about the non-linear, unpredictable and complex context in which local people lived and acted.

This experience, seven months of living inside the rainforest in West Kalimantan, and later returning for another 1.5 years, to East Kalimantan, all the while working and living with the local people, learning their language, culture, personalities, values and ways of seeing and thinking, in many ways different to Sweden, would become an important reason for me initiating this thesis about 12 years later. By that time I had also taken a degree in journalism, learnt the 'language' of the journalist and started working as an advisor to Sida on environmental integration into Swedish Development Aid, employed at the Sida Helpdesk for Environmental Assessment. There, I learnt yet another language, that of policy. As part of my job, I followed the process at Sida leading up to the decision to engage in large-scale land investments in Africa, where the Sida Helpdesk was assigned to provide comments on risks and opportunities concerning the environment in various documents and processes. Due to my previous experience from Indonesia and challenges related to large-scale palm oil production, these assignments were often delegated to me.

The Swedish company involved in the case study in this thesis applied for Sida support twice. On the first occasion, in 2009, its application was rejected, partly with reference to an assessment I had performed identifying, for instance, controversial changes made in the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for the Bagamoyo project. However, following the second application, in 2012, the project was granted financial support by Sida. Nevertheless, it never managed to deliver proposed outcomes.

At that time, although risks and opportunities with large-scale agricultural investments were fiercely debated, there was very little empirical evidence on the impacts of these investments. It was not known what actually took place on the ground where these investors were given access to land and the *real* (not only the anticipated) positive or negative impacts. In collaboration with researchers at Nordic Africa Institute and Sokoine University of Agriculture, I wrote a successful application for funding to study this topic.

From a background as a natural scientist, with experience from studying breeding behaviour among guillemots on the island of Stora Karlsö, catching Barnacle geese at sunrise in Gotland and working in the Kalimantan rainforest, and then as a print journalist and a policy advisor to Sida, I now had to learn yet another new 'language', that of the social scientist.

This thesis presents my findings about how and why the Bagamoyo project failed to achieve what was proposed and how and why it nevertheless maintained strong support. In a sense, I was uniquely placed to write it, as I had already been following the project, and the debate around it, for several years before I started

my PhD studies. Importantly, the research presented is based on an ample selection of project documents and strengthened by the opportunity to follow the Bagamoyo project over many years, but does not claim to tell the whole story about this development project, nor does it claim to provide an exhaustive account of why it, or why many other investments in many African countries, have failed. Rather, it sheds light on one investment in one particular context, and from one particular angle. However, the thesis findings does contribute to a general discussion about why so few of the planned large-scale agricultural investments since early 2000's have delivered proposed outcomes.

Uppsala, June 2018

Dedication

To Leya, Lars and everyone else who made this thesis possible

Interview with a smallholder farmer living on the land targeted for large-scale sugarcane investment, 12 April 2014:

Me:	Why is large-scale agricultural investment promoted?
Farmer:	Because it gives economic development, employment for young people and production instead of imports.
Me:	Where did you learn this?
Farmer:	In training provided by consultants hired by the company
Me:	Is it true in practice as well?
Farmer:	I don't think so, because I read in the newspapers about Kisarawe [jatropha project] where they were promised 8000 jobs but only got 200 jobs, with low salaries.

Acknowledgements

Having spent seven months inside the Indonesian rainforest in 1999, collecting data for my Master's thesis, I was convinced no more research was needed – we knew enough about the global challenges and we needed action!

So, first I would like to express my gratitude to those who steered me back towards research: Tuija Hilding-Rydevik, the PES pilot study group and Emil and Örjan at the Division of Rural Development, LAG, all contributed to planting a seed and nourishing it. In particular, I am grateful to Kjell Havnevik who engaged me at the Nordic Africa Institute and headed the research application to Formas and Sida U-forsk (currently Vetenskapsrådet) in 2011. Thank you also, Kjell, for sharing your extensive knowledge and literature on Tanzania with me and valuable comments on texts.

I am grateful to the Nordic Africa Institute for employing me for this project and offering such a supportive and friendly work environment. Special thanks to Mats, Susanna, Annika T, Eldridge and Terje for support and fun. Not least, thanks to everyone at NAI for participating in great floor ball games throughout my PhD!

This research would not have been possible without financial support from Vetenskapsrådet (Sida U-forsk), Formas, Helge Ax:son Johnsons Stiftelse, the Society and Landscape Research School, KSLA and Department of Urban and Rural Development at SLU - I am very grateful.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Lennart Salomonsson, Flora Hajdu, Tim Richardson and Klara Fischer. Lennart, you have always helped me keep my feet on the ground, even after you retired. Flora, you are the most dedicated and supportive supervisor one could ask for. Tim, thanks for your excellent skills in guiding me through the research process. Klara, many thanks for stepping in towards the end and contributing important input to enhance the quality of my thesis.

I'm grateful to all the great workmates at the department for support and scientific inspiration: Seema, Emil, Andrea N, Opira, Kaisa, Erica, Tomas E,

Contents

List of publications

This thesis is based on the work contained in the following papers, which are referred to by their Roman numeral in the text:

I   Abdallah, J., Engström, L., Havnevik, K. & Salomonsson, L. (2013). A critical analysis of practices and dynamics of large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania. In: Zoomers, A. & Kaag, M. (Eds.) *The Global Land Grab – Beyond the Hype*. ZED Books, London, UK, pp. 36-53.

II Engström, L. Land deals in limbo: Exploring simplification, delay and development failure in a large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania. *Manuscript.*

III Engström, L. & Hajdu, F. (2018). Conjuring a win-world – Resilient development narratives in a large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania, *Journal of Development Studies*[1] (1-20). https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388. 2018.1438599

IV Bluwstein, J., Friis Lund, J., Askew, K., Stein, H., Noe, C., Odgaard, R., Maganga, F. & Engström, L. (2018). Between dependence and deprivation: the interlocking nature of land alienation in Tanzania. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12271.

Papers I, III and IV are reproduced with the permission of the publishers.

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[1] This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article published as the version of record in The Journal of Development Studies on 1 March 2018. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2018.1438599

My contribution to the papers:

I I undertook the empirical work together with the first author, identified the empirical scope, performed the empirical analysis and wrote the findings. I contributed to writing conclusions and commented on the other parts of the text.

II I developed the conceptual idea, undertook the empirical work and the analysis underpinning the paper, and wrote the text.

III We developed the conceptual idea together. I participated in all empirical work, while some interviews were performed together with F. Hajdu. I performed the analysis and wrote the majority of the text. F. Hajdu contributed ideas on structure and particular text sections and provided repeated feedback.

IV I contributed empirical data on (repeated) impacts on rural residents of *stalled or failed* large-scale agricultural investments. I also contributed data on reasons behind this trend of failure and provided comments on drafts.

List of tables

List of figures and images

Close-up pictures of people are deliberately avoided to protect informants from any potential repercussions.

Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
BEE	Bagamoyo Eco Energy Ltd
BRN	Big Results Now
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CCRO	Certificate of Customary Rights of Occupancy
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
ERP	Economic Reform Programmes
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC PS	International Finance Cooperation Performance Standards
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LSAI	Large-Scale Agricultural Investment
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NARCO	National Ranching Company Limited
NEMC	National Environmental Management Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PIM	Project Information Memorandum
PPP	Public Private Partnership
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute

SEK	Swedish Crowns
SEKAB	Svensk Etanol Kemi AB
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TIC	Tanzanian Investment Centre
Tsh	Tanzanian Shilling
UN	United Nations
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USD	US dollars
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum

Figure 1. The Bagamoyo project site, located in Bagamoyo district, Tanzania.

1   Introduction

I look out through the open car window over the widespread, flat grasslands. The hot wind, carrying light sand, touches my face. The grass is brown, awaiting the upcoming rainy season, and sparsely sprinkled with trees. We have stopped to make way for cattle crossing the dirt road, herded by a young Barabaig boy. As we continue north along the road transecting the area, we see scattered sheds and houses, and pass larger congregations of houses, where by now I have stopped many times to talk to the people living there. A *dala-dala* (mini-bus) overtakes us. It is overloaded with people and goods from Bagamoyo town and Dar es Salaam. We, the driver, the interpreter and I, are driving through the project site, the area where 20 374 hectares of land were selected for investment by a Swedish investor in 2006, through a Memorandum of Understanding with the Tanzanian government. In 2013, the company was provided with its Right of Occupancy, a 99-year lease, to develop 7800 hectares of sugar plantation and a processing plant on this ranch, situated a two-hour drive north of Dar es Salaam. Promises were made to produce hundreds of thousands of tons of sugar, millions of litres of ethanol and electricity for the national grid, provide the state with 30 million US dollars in yearly tax revenues, create 12 000-15 000 jobs and add at least 10 million US dollars per year to the local communities. Resettlement was to take place in line with international best practice. Yet, more than a decade after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, no sugarcane plants are in sight. None of the residents has yet been resettled. Instead, people have been awaiting resettlement for many years, with increasing uncertainty about when and where to move, how to plan their agricultural production and the rate of compensation, and suffering from a range of livelihood impacts.

The Bagamoyo project (see Figure 1) planned for the Razaba Ranch, which is the case study examined in this thesis, enjoyed unprecedented political support in Tanzania. Since its initiation in 2006, key actors within the Tanzanian government, development banks, agri-business partnerships and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), among many others,

expressed high expectations as to its overall outcomes, including its poverty alleviation effects. Yet, over a decade later, the gap between proposed and achieved outcomes is striking. What happened?

Since the beginning of the 2000s, large-scale agricultural investment (LSAI) in biofuel and food production has experienced a revival in rural Africa, as a response to multiple global crises of food and energy, climate change and financial instability (Borras Jr, Franco, Gómez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012; Hall, 2011). This new wave of LSAIs has been described as more rapid than previous attempts to promote LSAI as a strategy for rural development (Kaarhus, Haug, Hella, & Makindara, 2010) and has entailed an 'unprecedented surge' for large tracts of farmland, not least in Africa (Schoneveld, 2014:34). The trend for setting aside large tracts of land for monoculture plantations has been backed by a range of influential global actors, including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nation Food and Agricultural Organisation, the World Bank, bilateral development agencies and transnational companies such as Syngenta, Monsanto and Unilever, and facilitated by governments in many African countries.

The initial debate on LSAI was divided between two rather distinct camps. Proponents suggested a range of beneficial outcomes, such as tax revenues, reduced imports costs for fuel or food, widespread employment opportunities, technology transfer to smallholders and improved food security (Deininger et al., 2011; SAGCOT, 2011; Sida, 2012a; WB, 2012). In the other camp, some international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics feared environmental damage and dispossession of smallholders and there were outcries from international civil society organisations (CSOs), mainstream media and research institutes. The message was that millions of hectares in Africa were now in the hands of foreign investors, depriving rural residents of their land and livelihoods, and that food security was at risk when biofuel crops would replace food crops in food insecure areas, the so-called food or fuel-debate (GRAIN, 2011, 2012; Oxfam, 2011). As will be outlined in Paper II, estimates of the land area targeted by foreign investment range from 56 million hectares (ha) by the World Bank (Deininger et al., 2011) to 227 million ha (GRAIN, 2011). Africa was the main target for these investments.

Thus, both camps built on figures indicating huge transfers of land, current or imminent, and speculations about risks or opportunities. Yet, as I will return to in Paper I, at closer inspection, many planned investments never went beyond the paper stage and many investors who managed to access land have left their sites or investments are delayed (Anseeuw, Alden, Cotula, & Taylor, 2012; Burnod, Gingembre, & Andrianirina Ratsialonana, 2013; Cotula, 2013;

Deininger, 2013; Hall, 2015; Maltsoglou, Koizumi, & Felix, 2013; Teklemariam et al., 2017). Tanzania is no exception.

During this recent wave of LSAI, Tanzania has become a major target for investment (Schoneveld, 2014). As in Africa in general, there have been huge expectations. For instance, the major agricultural partnership Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) envisaged the development of 350 000 ha of land into irrigated large-scale agriculture and 330 000 ha into out-grower schemes within the corridor (SAGCOT, 2011; NewAlliance, 2014). SAGCOT was launched at the World Economic Forum in 2010, aiming to 'foster inclusive, commercially successful agribusinesses that will benefit the region's small-scale farmers, and in so doing, improve food security, reduce rural poverty and ensure environmental sustainability'[2].

At the onset of this research, the numbers presented by Sulle and Nelson (2009) on the status of LSAI were the most frequently quoted: Four million hectares (ha) had been requested by external investors for biofuel investments, 640 000 ha had been allocated and 100 000 ha had been granted rights of occupancy. As will be outlined in Paper I, through a review of NGO reports and statistics in 2011, I identified more than 30 companies that had requested more than 2000 ha of land in Tanzania since 2003, primarily for biofuel crops. In total, they had requested 1.1 million ha and required approximately 200 000 ha. Yet, our first finding was that a majority of the planned investments had not materialised and that many were delayed or stalled, without delivering proposed outcomes. All biofuel investments had gone bankrupt or switched to food crops, but were struggling to become operational, like the Bagamoyo project at Razaba Ranch.

Indeed, the expected flood of projects has so far been only a trickle in Tanzania too, a fact that has been recognised in various academic publications (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Cotula, 2012; Deininger, 2013; Maltsoglou et al., 2013; Neville & Dauvergne, 2012; Segerstedt & Bobert, 2013) and by development banks. For example, a World Bank report argues that many of the investors it surveyed were in financial and/or operational difficulty, and that it is difficult to make LSAIs a success, especially in a developing country context (Deininger et al., 2011). However, few studies have investigated the reasons behind, and the empirical trajectories of, the failure of the new wave of LSAIs in Africa to deliver proposed outcomes, and a closer 'scrutiny of failed projects' has been called for (Edelman, Oya, & Borras Jr, 2013:1517). This thesis presents one such scrutiny, based on empirical research on the large-scale sugarcane investment in Bagamoyo.

A few possible explanatory factors behind the limited implementation of LSAIs have been proposed, for instance the financial crisis, inadequate

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[2] http://www.sagcot.com. Accessed in February 2018.

infrastructure, technology and institutions, failure to obtain free prior, informed consent from targeted local communities or local resistance (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013; Burnod et al., 2013; Deininger, 2013; Deininger et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2015; Klopp & Lumumba, 2014). While offering perfectly legitimate analyses of factors influencing the implementation of LSAIs, none of these studies provides an account of failed land deals.

As regards reasons behind the limited number of materialised LSAIs in Tanzania in particular, available studies point to, for instance, difficulty in accessing village land (Sulle, 2017), lack of legal frameworks and ineffective policy formulation processes (Hultman, Sulle, Ramig, & Sykora-Bodie, 2012), lack of infrastructure for roads, electricity and irrigation (Coulson, 2015) and fluctuations in oil prices and access to finance (Anseeuw et al., 2012). Once again, however, none of these studies has been performed with the particular aim of investigating the dynamics of failure. For the particular case studied in this thesis, explanations for its failure include local community resistance and environmental risk (Sulle, 2017) and uncertainties about compensation and resettlement (Chung, 2017; Curtis & Mbunda, 2015).

Implicit in many of the studies above is a tendency to root the explanation in the context in which LSAIs were to be implemented. This diverts attention, and responsibility, away from those who construct and implement LSAI policies. Thus instead of arguing that the proponents of a policy or project should know, or find out, about the context, and consider this information in order to devise a policy or project design that makes it feasible to implement and deliver promised outcomes, the problem is identified as lying in the local context.

Instead, in this thesis I 'reverse the gaze'[3] (Arora-Jonsson, 2009:215) from the local context to the LSAI narrative and the actors producing and sustaining it in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities[4]. What I call 'the LSAI narrative' in this thesis is a development narrative, a story, with a beginning, middle and end, outlining a range of promised development outcomes, provided

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[3] Arora Jonsson (2009) reversed the gaze from the Global North to the Global South, in order to study perceptions of gender equality in rural Sweden and India. In her study, reversing the gaze meant using the Indian case as the frame of reference, rather than frames of reference seen as natural in the Global North. Thus, I use it differently. However, similar to Arora Jonsson (2009), I criticise that 'Northern' principles are often, by default, used as reference points.

[4] As will be described more in detail in section 4.1, I draw on the critical realist perspective that only some transformations are possible through discourse (Fairclough, 2010). Thus, what I call 'contradicting materialities' are events or phenomena that cannot be transformed through representing them in a certain way, for instance whether a court case took place or not, whether sugarcane has been planted or not, or whether a majority of past LSAIs in Tanzania failed to deliver expected outcomes or not.

that a certain sequence of events occur as expected, with the objective of getting those who listen to act (Roe, 1991). I argue here that the proponents producing the LSAI narrative and interlinked policies and projects have key responsibility for the failure of the new wave of LSAI.

While the narratives of the LSAI proponents are not completely homogeneous, they more or less converge around a simplified, linear story about: 1) the problems in rural Africa (*e.g.* inefficient agriculture) and their causes (*e.g.* ancient agricultural methods performed by underdeveloped farmers), 2) the appropriate solution to address these (efficient, large-scale investments in agriculture) and 3) the promised outcomes (*e.g.* employment opportunities, technology transfers, poverty alleviation). LSAI is presented as a natural solution in this narrative. This way in which a certain narrative gains influence over others and has 'socially constructive effects', by proposing what should be seen as natural while concealing potentially complicating evidence, can be seen as a manifestation of power (Fairclough, 2010:5).

The LSAI narrative underpins policy documents at a more general level and particular projects, such as the Bagamoyo project. In the latter case, the story about problems, causes and solutions is largely the same, but the part where outcomes are outlined is more specific to the particular project. In addition, beyond *investment*, LSAI is promoted as delivering tangible *development* outcomes, as indicated above. Thus, in the narrative, LSAI is portrayed as a *development strategy* for rural Africa.

Importantly, reversing the gaze towards the dominating LSAI narrative does not render the local context irrelevant or exclude actors from less influential social positions, such as rural residents targeted by intervention. As I will show, it is in the *interaction* between the construction of dominant narratives and a complex context, including contradicting narratives and materialities, that important processes are shaped. Not least, rural residents produce a major contradicting narrative, in relation to which I analyse the dominating LSAI narrative.

In this thesis, I use the concept 'large-scale agricultural investment', although I could have used other more common terms such as 'large-scale land allocation', 'land grab' or 'green grab' – 'the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends' (Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012:238). However, none of these concepts reflects my research focus on investment in agricultural production. While Marx mentions 'land grab' in *Das Kapital* (White, Borras Jr, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012), it was first used in relation to the *recent* rush for land in 2008, by GRAIN (Larder, 2015; Wolford, 2015). Since then, the term has become quite ambiguous, used in many different ways, even though it was carefully defined in the Tirana Declaration in 2011. Furthermore, as pointed out by Ribot and Peluso (2003), the term land grab only refers to the initial process

of gaining (grabbing) access to land, while land grabs deserve much wider attention, including a scrutiny of 'the narratives of legitimisation' (Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013).

As indicated above, the LSAI narrative is backed by a multitude of actors who present it as a 'win-win' solution for private and public sectors. There are at least two aspects which make this narrative interesting. First, LSAI has been promoted previously as a development strategy for rural Africa (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013; Bush, Bujra, & Littlejohn, 2011), including Tanzania (Coulson, 2013; Iliffe, 1979; Ponte, 2002), and many past attempts have failed (Coulson, 2013; Ponte, 2002). Yet this development strategy is being pursued again. Second, as indicated above, there is increasing evidence that the recent wave of LSAI is not achieving the proposed results, yet the LSAI narrative and the vision of imminent success remain intact. In this thesis, I explore how such resilience to past and present contradicting narratives and materialities is possible.

As I will return to in Paper III, in line with neoliberal logic, one of the new elements of the current LSAI development strategy, promoted as the key to success (compared with previous LSAI), is the close collaboration with the private sector (Collier & Dercon, 2009). For instance, contemporary LSAIs are pursued through public private partnerships, portrayed as the 'ideal' combination of private actor efficiency and state regulation and facilitation of land deals (Kragelund, 2004). This is promoted in Tanzanian agriculture policy. Such support for public-private partnerships in large-scale agriculture, such as the Bagamoyo project, also fits 'hand in glove' with the current trend for privatisation in development assistance.

1.1 Earlier studies of development narratives and failure

Based on the premises outlined above, in this thesis I investigate how the LSAI narrative around the Bagamoyo project is constructed in relation to complex local contexts with a main focus on contradicting narratives and materialities. Using the words of Li (2007b), I investigate 'what ways of thinking, what practices and assumptions are required to translate messy conjunctures, with all the processes that run through them, into a linear narrative of problems, intervention and beneficial result'? (p. 4). Moreover, I investigate how narratives supporting the project are sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities. Substantial attention has already been paid to such 'remarkably resilient narratives' (Li 2007), which have persisted over decades in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities, in critical analyses of development. Of particular interest to my analysis were those scholars who perform critical accounts of development

failure. Due to the nature of these studies, based on rich empirical investigation of development practitioners' representations and practices, they are sometimes referred to as 'aidnography' (Büscher, 2010:29), development ethnographies (Watts, 2001) or ethnographies of aid (Mosse, 2005). They include the works of Tania Murray Li (*e.g.* 2007b, 2010), James Ferguson (1990) and David Mosse (*e.g.* 2005), who all put forward theoretical explanations for why and how development interventions fail by analysing development narratives and linking them to the practical implementation of development projects.

A key lesson from these aidnographies that was important for this thesis was their findings about the 'disjuncture', the disconnectedness, between 'the "ideal worlds" that development actors aim to bring about through the execution of proper policy and project design and the social reality they have to relate to' (Lewis & Mosse, 2006:2), and the role this disjuncture plays in understanding development failure. The inherent logic is that a policy or project is based on simplified assumptions and representations, and therefore fails when overlooked, complicating events and processes interfere with the implementation process. As so eloquently argued by Tania Li:

> The sets of relations and processes with which government is concerned present intrinsic limits to the capacity of governmental interventions to rearrange things. There is inevitably an excess. There are processes and interactions, histories, solidarities and attachments that cannot be reconfigured according to plan. To examine those processes, the excess, we need to attend to the particularities of conjunctures – specific times, places and sets of relations. (Li, 2007a:277)

I investigate this 'excess' to show how simplified project plans promising efficient large-scale sugarcane production, thousands of jobs and poverty reduction were traversed by a range of complicating events and processes. I examine where project plans met the resistance which delayed them, in what ways they were grinded down to produce almost nothing of what they promised, in the course of project implementation. I also advance some reflections on *why* these simplified representations, resilient to contradicting narratives and materialities, were produced.

My scrutiny of failure is not restricted to this body of literature, however. For instance, Scott (1998) is an important contribution to the debate on failure, with particular focus on simplification as a discursive and material practice behind

the planning of large schemes[5] over centuries, in order to render complex contexts legible for intervention.

As I will outline in Chapter 3 and Paper III, the interlinkages between simplified development narratives and failure have also been studied within post-colonial literature, with particular focus on certain colonial 'discursive homogenisations' (Escobar, 1993:8) of 'the Other' (Said, 1978:1). This body of literature on development narratives and their underpinning colonial legacies, was also important for analysing the LSAI narrative, and its immunity to counter-evidence that I observed in the case study[6].

Importantly, the accounts of failure outlined above have paid little attention to delay – the lagging behind of project implementation in relation to the proposed timeline – as a consequence of simplification and have not linked it with development failure. One of the most important messages of this thesis is that delay is important, as an empirical feature, and through contributing analytically to understanding development failure, as will be outlined in Paper II and in Chapter 6.

As with 'resilient narratives', the gap between policy and context in development intervention has also been extensively studied, including the rationales behind this gap. However, the question of *how* win-win narratives are able to thrive despite major contradictions has received less attention. As stated by Wolford (2015), 'not enough attention has yet been paid to the ways in which different forms of knowledge are mobilised and circulated in defence of large scale land allocations or in support of alternatives' (p. 226). Similarly, Büscher (2014) argues that little research has been conducted to investigate how 'policy success' is 'produced, distributed and consumed' (p. 79). This is, he continues, especially important in 'contexts of sharply contradictory realities' (p. 81), a context relevant to the present case.

Apart from giving little attention to delay, literature on development narratives and development failure has paid little attention to the context where governments and development agencies enter into close collaboration with private sector actors. However, there is an emerging body of literature on how the neoliberal context influences conservation and development projects and their underpinning narratives more broadly (for instance Büscher, 2013, 2014; Green, 2015; Lund, Sungusia, Mabele, & Scheba, 2017). Here, development

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[5] The term 'large schemes' is adopted from Scott (1998), who uses it to refer to a wide variety of state-backed large-scale interventions, including forest plantations, rural development initiatives and the construction of cities. A large-scale agricultural investment is a type of large scheme.

[6] There are of course other relevant conceptual frames within which my findings could have been situated, such as governance or global capitalism. However, I applied existing concepts sparsely in order to avoid expectations of positioning my findings within the vast debates and literature on these topics.

narratives promising change are portrayed as 'discursive commodities' (Lund et al., 2017:125), biased towards 'selling success' as 'capital', only useful when they are spread and consumed by others (Büscher, 2014:79).

Since collaboration with profit-seeking private companies is purported to deliver more efficient development aid, it is relevant to better understand the implications of these types of collaborations. Therefore, in this thesis I advance some reflections on the possible influence of private sector collaboration on the LSAI narrative and its practical implementation, with reference to this emerging body of literature. In all, post-colonial theory, post-development and other studies of development in particular those focusing on privatisation of development, and land grab literature constitute the main bodies of literature with which this thesis engages.

In summary, there are two knowledge gaps which this thesis addresses. In relation to literature on the failure of the new wave of LSAIs, often referred to as 'land grab literature'[7], this thesis intends to contribute to the knowledge about how and why these LSAIs fail, by studying the interlinkages between simplified narratives, delay and failure. It also addresses the production, circulation and consumption of such narratives in a context of private sector collaboration, including an analysis of how and why they are sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities.

1.2 Aim

The overarching aim of the thesis was to contribute to the knowledge about how and why the recent wave of LSAIs has failed to deliver proposed outcomes. This was done by exploring the failure of a planned public private partnership, a large-scale sugar investment in Bagamoyo, Tanzania. Through a case study approach, including discourse analysis, it explored the gap between the simplified LSAI narrative produced by project proponents, on the one hand, and complex contexts of contradicting narratives and materialities at the Bagamoyo investment site, on the other. It also analysed how the LSAI narrative was produced and sustained in the face of such contradicting narratives and materialities, in a context of close collaboration with a private actor. Lastly, I reflected on findings and their contribution to understanding development failure, concentrating largely on the role of delay.

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[7] Land grab literature includes studies of land deals for agricultural purposes (LSAI), but also grabs of land for, for instance, mining, tourism and conservation purposes.

1.3   Research questions

In order to guide the work in this thesis, I formulated three research questions (RQ) based on the knowledge that few LSAIs in Tanzania have materialised (presented in Paper I). RQ1 required both empirical investigation and theoretical reflections, RQ2 was mainly empirical and RQ3 considered the need for theoretical development in the field of development failure. The questions gradually developed alongside an iterative research process described in section 4.6.

RQ1: How and why is the LSAI narrative about the Bagamoyo project produced and sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities?

RQ2: How does the LSAI narrative contribute to failure of the Bagamoyo project?

RQ3: What do the findings from RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the current understanding of development failure?

1.4   Outline of the thesis

This thesis consists of a cover essay (kappa) comprising six chapters and four appended scientific papers (Papers I-IV). Paper I formed the entry point for setting up the research questions. Papers II and III constitute the core of the thesis in terms of addressing the research questions, while Paper IV situates the research in a wider context of land alienation in Tanzania and provides an important illustration of the complex context of land governance. Figure 2 outlines the contribution of each paper to the thesis. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides background to the case investment and interlinked narratives, including a description of the origin of the Bagamoyo investment and how it gained the support of Sida and key Tanzanian actors. Thus, it helps explain the unprecedented support gained by the project and some important characteristics of the case. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework, divided into a conceptual framework (section 3.1) and post-colonial and post-development theory (section 3.2). The methodology chapter (Chapter 4) starts with a brief description of my epistemological position (section 4.1), and goes on to present research design, methods for data collection and analysis, and reflections (sections 4.2-4.7). Chapter 5 presents a synthesis of the findings in Papers I-IV, while in Chapter 6 these findings are discussed in five different sub-sections and general conclusions are drawn (section 6.6).

Figure 2. Thesis overview: Papers I-IV in relation to the research questions.

2 Setting the context

Rather than blaming the *context* for project failure to deliver proposed outcomes, I reverse the gaze to *project proponents* and analyse how and why they did not pay more attention to context in planning and implementing the Bagamoyo project. In this chapter, I describe some of the complex context of the case, starting by outlining the setting of contemporary neoliberal agriculture and development policy. Thereafter, I provide an outline of the LSAI narrative in order to show what it contains. I then list complex features of Tanzanian land governance, before moving on to illustrating the socio-economic and environmental context of the Bagamoyo project. This context proved to be highly relevant for project implementation, but was overlooked by proponents to various degrees. I end by outlining the story of the Swedish sugarcane project and its many elements of controversy later neglected by project proponents.

2.1 From socialist self-reliance to neoliberal partnerships

Since independence, Tanzania has moved from what is often referred to as African socialism, towards increasingly liberalised rural development policies. Detailed accounts of this development have been given elsewhere (see for instance Boesen, Storgaard Madsen, & Moody, 1977; Havnevik, 1993; Havnevik & Isinika, 2010; Iliffe, 1979; Ponte, 2002) and are beyond the scope of this thesis. In this section, I only provide a brief account of early independence socialism in order to situate contemporary Tanzanian agriculture policy in the current neoliberal agenda.

In stark contrast to the contemporary neoliberal agenda, rural state interventions in early independence were shaped by President Nyerere's socialist vision of nationalising the country's assets in order to achieve self-reliance and social equality, as reflected in the Arusha Declaration (Boesen et al., 1977; Havnevik, 1993; Havnevik & Isinika, 2010; Ponte, 2002). In line with this

agenda, Nyerere launched Operation Ujamaa vijijini (*Eng.* socialist or brotherhood villages) and resettled rural populations into villages, in order to increase agricultural productivity and provide schooling, healthcare and water for everyone.

As will be outlined in Paper I, the socialist era began to decline in the 1980s, when President Nyerere reluctantly launched liberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), as a consequence of a number of co-emerging crises and under strong pressure from the neoliberal 'revolutions' in Britain and the US (Harvey, 2007:23), the 'heartlands of neoliberal discursive production' (Peck & Tickell, 2002:380). Promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, SAPs built on the core argument of neoliberalism about the failure and inefficiency of the state and other 'non-private modes of social organization of production', combined with the necessity for increasing the influence of private actors (Swyngedouw, 2005:82). In line with this way of seeing, neoliberal reform is assumed to deliver, for instance, more efficient and flexible management and poverty alleviation (Stein, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2005), an important assumption underpinning the LSAI narrative and the Bagamoyo project.

As will be outlined in Paper I, since Tanzania launched its SAPs, there has been an increasing focus on privatisation, a process through which the role of the government and public sectors is downsized, combined with increasing space for private actors, in order to achieve well-being (Savas, 2005; Shivji, 2006). For the agriculture sector in particular, the neoliberal agenda is proposed to bring poverty alleviation through, for instance, efficient production, processing and marketing of crops, more investment and new technology to increase yields (Stein, 2010). As indicated in Papers I, III and IV, neoliberalisation has had a major influence on current agriculture policy in Tanzania, in this thesis represented by three key agriculture policies and strategies; Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First), the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) and Big Results Now (BRN), combined with associated donor-funded programmes such as The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa[8]. According to President Kikwete (2005-2015), who strongly promoted foreign investment and creation of a conducive business environment in Tanzania, Kilimo Kwanza 'properly anchored the involvement of the private sector in the development of agriculture' (SAGCOT, 2011). In addition, it has been stated that, with Kilimo Kwanza, 'official agricultural

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[8] Grow Africa is a partnership comprising over 200 companies and governments in 12 countries, out of which 10 countries are part of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Grow Africa was founded jointly by the World Economic Forum, African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2011. It works to increase private sector investment in agriculture and promote inclusive and responsible investment. Source: www.growafrica.com.

policy took a sharp turn towards large-scale investment in agriculture' (Cooksey, 2012). Indeed, one explicit aim with Kilimo Kwanza was to increase general land to about 20 percent by converting village land and to amend the Land Act of 1999 in order to facilitate access by investors to land (see section 2.2. and Papers I and IV for an overview of Tanzanian land law).

SAGCOT, a public private partnership[9] launched after Kilimo Kwanza, is one of two growth corridors in Africa (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013), designed and implemented under significant influence of corporate actors (Bergius, Benjaminsen, & Widgren, 2017; Byiers & Rampa, 2013; Kaarhus et al., 2010). The concept of 'African Agricultural Growth Corridors' experienced a revival on the development agenda for Africa during the financial crisis in 2008, presented at the World Economic Forum in Davos and engaging major corporations, high-level government officials and bankers together representing billions of dollars (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013). Moreover, as pointed out by Green (2015), public private partnerships were introduced as a 'new development order' (p. 635) and promoted as a means through which capital can be safely invested and generate returns in times of crisis. The concept of growth corridors has more recently been supported by a group of similar actors in the so-called New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (hereafter referred to as the New Alliance) supported by the G8 countries, donors such as USAID, African governments and 45 companies. According to the New Alliance, SAGCOT is an example of how Tanzania is 'a showcase for public-private partnership in agricultural growth' (G8, 2012). The Bagamoyo company is a partner to SAGCOT, even though it was initiated five years before the launch of SAGCOT and even though its location is somewhat outside SAGCOT's geographical scope, an indication of its importance as a flagship project for the Tanzanian government.

A final example of the increased emphasis on private actors, as mentioned on page 5 in Paper II, BRN clearly views the private sector as the key to achieving development. It has an ambition to develop 25 commercial farming deals, on 350 000 hectares, mainly on newly irrigated land, by 2015 (BRN, 2013), an ambition that has not yet been fulfilled. In contrast to Kilimo Kwanza, which has a wider focus as regards crops, BRN entails a strategy focusing on three target crops: maize, rice and sugar. The focus on sugar aims to fill a demand gap and

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[9] SAGCOT is a public private partnership between the Government of Tanzania, large multinational companies and multi- and bilateral donors, partnering with, for instance, the United Nations, the World Bank, bilateral donors from the UK, Norway and the Netherlands, Syngenta, Monsanto, Yara and conservations NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy. The corridor covers approximately one-third of mainland Tanzania, extending from the port of Dar es Salaam through the Southern Highlands of Tanzania to the borders with Zambia and Malawi (SAGCOT, 2011 and www.sagcot.co.tz).

thus reduce import costs; in 2014-15, Tanzania produced 300 000 tons of sugar annually, while the demand is estimated to be more than 500 000 tons annually. The government has set the aim to increase sugar supply by 6 percent annually[10]. Thus, the Bagamoyo project is an important way to fulfil this aim and company executives have maintained close contact with the BRN implementation agency throughout the implementation process. Kilimo Kwanza, SAGCOT and BRN are now all included as important take-off points in the ongoing development of a new National Land Policy (URT, 2016), a process in which attempts have been made to further increase the leverage of private investors to access village land (Stein, 2017). During field work, I interviewed top officials in both SAGCOT and BRN's implementation agency.

2.1.1 A neoliberalised development agenda

The trend of an increasingly neoliberal agriculture policy in Tanzania dovetails with the privatisation trend in development assistance, the context in which the Bagamoyo project gained financial support from Sida in 2014. As will be indicated in Papers I and III, while collaboration with the private sector in development aid has been part of development thinking since the late 1950s, it has been increasingly placed at the forefront of the development agenda since the 1980s (Kragelund, 2004). Making more space available for private actors to influence development policy is justified by the claim that the state or the development community can no longer perform the work alone, and that businesses have access to much larger financial flows (Faye, Gajigo, & Mutambatsere, 2013; NewAlliance, 2013). Thus, engaging with private investment is promoted as a means to increase the efficiency of aid, contribute to income equality and accelerate poverty alleviation (Peluso & Lund, 2011; Stein, 2010).

While this agenda has been lingering for over half a century, the past decade has seen a 'paradigm shift', with reference to a number of changes in the development architecture. According to three Swedish journalists who have assessed Sida's collaboration with large companies (not including the company in focus of this thesis), this paradigm shift has provided private actors with much more space to identify and design development projects, that is, they have come 'closer to the "joystick"'. This means that private actors have gained 'unprecedented influence' to identify and implement projects independently (Omvärlden, 2017). Indeed, the Bagamoyo project was identified, initiated and designed by a private company.

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[10] http://www.tic.co.tz/agriculture accessed 11 April 2018.

Green (2015) and Kindornay and Reilly-King (2013) point to a new closeness between bilateral development agencies and investors through new, business-orientated policies. In all, the paradigm shift influences the constellations in which knowledge is produced, circulated and consumed.

An interlinked input to the emerging debate about the meaning of neoliberalism in a context of development is offered by Büscher (2014), who argues that value statements about development projects, such as success, have turned into commodities, to be 'sold' (p. 87) as 'capital' (p. 80) to a wider audience in order to gain value. In a similar vein, Green (2015) points to a re-arrangement in which knowledge is deemed adequate and trustworthy, where increasing emphasis is being put on growth, employment, investment and modernisation, simultaneously marginalising narratives focusing on the public sector's responsibility to re-distribute resources and provide basic services and other priorities more in line with Millennium Development Goals. Thus, there has also been a rearrangement of how one defines what should be considered 'developmental' (Green, 2015:629).

In parallel to increasing emphasis on privatisation, public-private partnerships have been increasingly emphasised, broadly defined as a 'cooperative institutional arrangement between public and private sector actors' (Hodge & Greve, 2007:545; Kragelund, 2004; Savas, 2005). Such partnerships can be seen as a kind of neoliberal 'roll-out', the active construction of modes of governance involving a neoliberalised state (Peck & Tickell, 2002:384). As will be indicated in Papers II and III, the Bagamoyo project was part of two private public partnerships, but not part of such a partnership with Sida.

Following the privatisation trend, many bilateral donors, including Sweden, have increased their focus on private sector collaboration and support (Bergius et al., 2017; Havnevik & Haaland, 2011; Tomlinson, 2012). A letter from the British Department for International Development (DFID) to the Swedish Minister of International Development Cooperation in 2011 shows that DFID encouraged bilateral donors, such as Sida, to mutually 'pioneer transformational new approaches', including the strengthening of partnerships in the private sector, in order to use development assistance 'to greatest effect' (DFID, 2011:1). Indeed, the conservative government ruling Sweden from 2008-2016 intensified efforts to collaborate with the private sector. As I will show, this was important for the case study in this thesis. In 2017, eight percent of Sida's budget was allocated to private sector collaboration (Omvärlden, 2017)[11]. Through a Business for Development (B4D) approach, Sida, similarly to DFID, portrays

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[11] It is important to note that the 8 percent includes a range of support to, and collaboration with, small, medium and large companies in various forms and not only support to projects identified and implemented by large companies.

private sector collaboration in development as a way to achieve 'more development impact' (Sida, 2012b).

One of the tools for private sector support particularly relevant to this thesis is Sida's guarantee instrument, which aims to reduce risk for the private investor. The (loan) guarantee[12] means that Sida, and by extension the Swedish state, pays the lender (usually a bank) if the borrowing investor fails to make their payment. Thus, the guarantee is a tool that explicitly introduces private capital into Sida's work. Since 2008, guarantees have been heavily pushed by the conservative government and Sida needed to strengthen its capacity to understand and analyse business reports and related financial conditions.

2.2 A brief overview of Land governance in Tanzania

2.2.1 Land categories and land allocation to investors

Already when attempting to outline the broad picture of Tanzania's land and land use, one encounters confusing and conflicting information on land: The public figure on Tanzania's total land area is 885 800 km^2 (NBS, 2017) and the official area of arable land, available for agriculture, is 440 000 km^2 (SAGCOT, 2011). Moreover, the forested area is estimated to 460 000 km^2 (URT, 2016), which, combined with agricultural land, add up to more than the total land area.

As will be shown in all papers, particularly in Papers I and IV, land governance in Tanzania is complex and rests on partly contradicting figures, laws and regulations concerning the governance of three land categories: village, general and reserved land. According to one of the key land laws (Village Land Act No. 5, 1999), village land can be defined in multiple ways, including with consideration to how the land was used and managed before the Land Act came into force in 2001 (URT, 1999:40-45). However, as we show in Paper IV, even where rural residents refer to how the land was used previously, in line with the Village Land Act, they rarely gain formal recognition for their claims. Similarly, due to inconsistent land laws, what is considered village land, that is, under the management of the village as opposed to the government, becomes ambiguous and subject for negotiation and interpretation in each specific case, generally underpinned by unequal power relations (Odgaard, 2002). As a consequence, since the 1990s, there have been frequent transfers of village land in order to create protected areas, successively reducing the proportion of village land in the country. This was an important dynamic also observed in the Bagamoyo case.

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[12] This instrument was initiated for a test period in 1998 and had been made permanent by 2009.

On top of these challenges, amendments to the current land laws add further complexity through a continuously changing legal framework. In addition, Ujamaa entailed physically reshuffling approximately two-thirds of Tanzania's rural residents and has generally contributed to overlapping and contested claims to land in the country. Thus, as we argue in Paper I, it is questionable whether there is anyone who is knowledgeable and updated on the process in detail in its entirety. For instance, overall data on LSAI seem to have been lacking. In fact, in 2012, when I showed a review of the status of LSAI in Tanzania to a Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC) officer, he asked if he could make a copy.

The complex land governance and inconsistency in data and representations regarding available land constitute a major challenge in the context of land allocation to investment. As will be demonstrated in Paper I, the processes through which land can be identified and allocated to an investor are multiple and complex. One requirement for investment was especially important for the Bagamoyo project and is worth mentioning, namely the Environmental Assessment Certificate. According to the National Environmental Management Act of 2004, large-scale projects such as the Bagamoyo sugarcane investment require an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). This ESIA should present baseline studies on the socio-economic and environmental context and the potential impact on these of the project. As outlined by Havnevik and Haaland (2011), there are several steps in this process. Initially, a feasibility study, providing information on the investment site and detailed project plans, should be provided to the agency responsible, the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC), which decides whether a full ESIA is required or not. Based on this, Terms of Reference must be developed and approved before the ESIA process can start. If the completed ESIA is approved, NEMC will advise the vice-President's Office for Environment to issue an Environmental Assessment Certificate.

Thus, the Bagamoyo case is situated in a context where the processes described above resulted in a significant lack of clarity of regulations, roles and responsibilities, thus posing major challenges. As I will show, conflicts concerning rights to land in the project site clearly reflect these overlapping and inconsistent regulations, which were largely overlooked in project design, including proposed timelines.

2.3 Past LSAIs in Tanzania and the new rush for land

As will be outlined in Paper III, experiences gained from past efforts to implement large-scale agriculture in Tanzania show a mixed track record (Coulson, 2015). Not least, these past LSAIs have frequently displaced pastoralists and smallholder farmers. For instance, the wheat scheme in Hanang displaced Barabaig people from their prime grazing land (Lane, 1994), causing ongoing problems for Barabaigs in identifying new grazing grounds. Barabaigs constitute the majority of pastoralists in the Razaba Ranch area.

The new rush for land has been launched with little reference to these past LSAIs. While drivers behind this new wave of LSAI have been widely debated (Oya, 2013), many scholars view the LSAI development strategy as a response to multiple global crises of food and energy, climate change and financial instability (Borras Jr et al., 2012; Hall, 2011; Kaarhus et al., 2010; Matondi, Havnevik, & Beyene, 2011). Given this setting with parallel financial, food, energy and climate crises in which LSAI policies in Tanzania and other African countries have been developed, this seems a highly plausible explanation. Studies investigating past waves of LSAI in Africa have shown that international crises are a common setting in which they re-emerge (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013). Bergius et al. (2017) outline another way to explain these dynamics. Drawing on Harvey (2006), they argue that in times of declining rates of profit in any sector, restructuring of capital becomes necessary. This can take place through, for instance, capitalisation of non-capitalist spaces and geographical expansion, in order to solve the 'crises of accumulation' at hand (p. 17).

The new wave of LSAIs in Africa started out partly for production of renewable feedstock for biofuel production, as a response to climate change, peak oil and a projected increase in energy need world-wide (Ministry for Agriculture, 2009). The biofuel agenda was driven not least by the need to reduce the use of fossil fuel within the European Union (EU), aiming at a 10 percent mandatory proportion of biofuels or other renewables in the transport sector by 2020 (EC, 2009; Näringsdepartementet, 2008). While waiting for the second generation of biofuels based on, for instance, cellulose, to become economically viable, land-based investment in bioenergy crops was promoted as an interim solution. A multitude of actors showed interest in supporting biofuels, where Africa appeared as 'the ultimate investment frontier, a new paradise where an unlimited supply of land and labour can yield profits in times of crisis' (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:1559). This is the setting in which the Bagamoyo project was 'born' and marketed in 2005-07.

However, as indicated, the biofuel agenda was met with fierce resistance by, for instance, global CSOs and NGOs. Moreover, the increased interest in

biofuels was blamed for the rising food prices in 2008 (Guardian, 2008), resulting in demonstrations world-wide[13]. The gain in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was also increasingly questioned and there was growing concern about the social and environmental impacts of the EU biofuel policy in general. All of this, together with reduced global oil prices, reduced the interest in land-based biofuel production within a few years[14].

Tanzania was by no means excluded from this hype surrounding biofuels. On the contrary, Tanzania was perceived as a major target for large-scale biofuel production (Chachage & Baha, 2010; Cotula, 2013; Schoneveld, 2014), with a plethora of proponents involved in its promotion. For instance, in a report by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the use of sugar and cassava to produce ethanol was said to provide a new opportunity to enhance economic development in Tanzania (Arndt, Pauw, & Thurlow, 2012).

While the idea of growing biofuels was increasingly promoted in Tanzania, local and international NGOs, CSOs and researchers pointed to the lack of policy and legal frameworks and the potential risk of biofuel production to the environment and to rural livelihoods (Kamanga, 2008; Mwamila, 2009). Sida became a key actor in the process to address these concerns. In 2006-2009, Sida supported a range of initiatives in Tanzania in relation to large-scale biofuel production. For instance, together with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Swedish Energy Authority, Sida supported the installation of a National Biofuel Task Force in 2006, set up with representatives from all relevant ministries, organisations and private actors, including the Swedish investor involved in the Bagamoyo case. The main aim was to develop the legislation needed, including a biofuel policy, to secure sustainable production. As indicated in the Preface, the Sida Helpdesk for Environmental Assessment[15] (hereafter referred to as the Sida Helpdesk) was involved in several steps in this process and was asked to deliver comments.

However, the process was delayed. In 2008, the work of the National Biofuel Task Force was at a standstill, allegedly due to lack of resources. Therefore, in 2010, Guidelines for Sustainable Liquid Biofuels Development were presented

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[13] Estimates of the proportional influence of biofuel production on food prices range from 5 to 65 percent, by actors such as FAO, OECD, Oxfam, Action Aid and the World Bank (Engstrom, 2009).

[14] For more detailed descriptions of the rise and fall of biofuel policies, see for instance Humalisto (2014), Widengard (2015) and Harnesk (2018).

[15] The Sida Helpdesk for Environmental Assessment, currently called the Sida Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change, is an advisory unit funded by Sida, situated at the Swedish University for Agricultural Sciences, Sweden, whose main task is to provide Sida with advice on how to integrate environmental consideration, including links to socio-economic issues, into development projects and programmes and sector support.

as an interim solution (MEM, 2010). However, during my fieldwork in 2012, none of the informants, including an officer for agricultural investment promotion at TIC and employees at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), had heard about these guidelines. This points to the problems with assuming adherence to regulations, particularly when considering that MEM is responsible for implementation of these guidelines. In 2012, when the final biofuel policy was made public, all large-scale biofuel investments had already seized activity for various reasons (see Paper I). At that time, Sida had decided to take another step towards supporting LSAI. Instead of focusing on legal frameworks only, Sida now wanted to collaborate more closely with private actors, as expressed in a concept note:

> It is important that development cooperation adapts to this new reality [of increasing number of large-scale national and foreign land investments in Africa] and support people in poverty to benefit as much as possible from good land related investments. These investments are difficult and risky. However, if development cooperation does not dare to deal with sensitive and complicated matters, there is a risk that Africa is industrialised without benefitting the poor. In addition to support to national governments and civil society, Sida has therefore decided to explore possibilities to collaborate around land related investments as part of the Business for Development-programme. (Sida, 2012a:1)

As this quote reveals, policies are often formulated in a way that makes them appear pragmatic (Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005), an issue that will be put into more context on p. 73. Moreover, the quote clarifies that, while most efforts have so far been allocated to providing legislation for biofuel production, Sida's support encompassed support to LSAIs in general, for both biofuel and food production.

2.4 Outlining the LSAI narrative for Africa and Tanzania

In this section, I provide a brief account of key arguments in the narrative about LSAI as a development strategy for Africa, and for Tanzania, drawing on the definition of development narratives from (Roe, 1991), indicated on page 34, as stories having a beginning (problems and their causes), middle (solution: LSAI) and end (a range of proposed development outcomes). The account is based on documents produced by key actors in promoting LSAI in Africa and Tanzania. Where relevant, I also include quotes from key interviewees in my case study. The problems invoked and causes naturalised in a development narrative are of

particular interest, since they often determine which solutions are presented as 'inevitable' (Bacchi, 2009).

As indicated, problems that large-scale biofuel production claimed to address included peak oil, dependence on oil imports and growing energy demands. However, the general problem descriptions in the narrative about LSAI as a development strategy centre on the argument that investment in agriculture is required to achieve poverty alleviation (Deininger et al., 2011; Faye et al., 2013; NewAlliance, 2013; Takavarasha, Uppal, & Hongo, 2005). This reasoning was largely shaped by an influential World Development Report from 2008 emphasising the importance of investment in agriculture to move away from the 'meager bounty of subsistence farming' (WB, 2008:1), identifying problems in agriculture such as 'underinvestment', 'misinvestment' and low productivity (WB, 2008:2).

For Tanzania, similar problem descriptions were presented. For instance, in a paper written by two IFPRI researchers, the persistent poverty in Tanzania[16] was attributed, at least partly, to slow growth in agricultural incomes (Pauw & Thurlow, 2011). This view was supported by the Tanzanian Ministry for Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (Ministry for Agriculture, 2009).

Another important argument concerns the availability of arable land. This 'fact' introduces a World Bank report on the topic, stating that 'many countries have suitable land available that is either not cultivated or produces well below its potential' (Deininger et al., 2011:xiii). A report by the African Development Bank advances similar statements, pointing to the unlocked potential of Africa's arable land, combined with a statement on the limited areas of arable land in 'developed' countries. With reference to two World Bank reports, the authors claim that possibilities to expand agricultural production outside Africa are limited because 'half of all the land suitable for cultivation that is currently uncultivated … is in Africa' and 'arable land is actually decreasing in industrialized countries' (Faye et al., 2013). Thus, the logic of investing in *Africa* becomes natural.

Again, similar arguments were advanced as regards abundant land in Tanzania, identified as being among the top 10 countries in Africa as regards abundance of arable land (Faye et al., 2013). Moreover, the SAGCOT Blueprint describes Tanzania as having 'immense opportunities for agricultural development since only 24 percent of the 44 million ha of arable land is being utilised' (SAGCOT, 2011:4). In interview, one TIC officer responsible for investment promotion in

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[16] While Tanzania's economy performed well since the turn of the millennium, with economic growth exceeding 5 percent per year, this was not reflected in the national poverty headcount during 2001-2007 (WB, 2009), based on 1.90 USD/day. During 2007-2012 poverty rates did show a decline from 34.4 to 28.2 percent (WB, 2017), but this could still constitute an increase in the *number* of poor people.

agriculture said: 'There is plenty of idle land. It is not being used because of the inability of smallholders to use the land' (26 March 2012).

A particularly influential paper was written by two professors of economics at Oxford University, Paul Collier and Stefan Dercon[17]. The main message of their paper is that the evidence for the hitherto exclusive focus on smallholders as the engine for growth and poverty reduction is weak, and that it is time to seriously consider altering the development model for agriculture in Africa. The paper reproduces colonial representations of 'the Other' (Said 1978) as lagging behind, since it describes an Africa as needing to catch up with the performance of other countries (Collier & Dercon, 2009).

Similar reference to the current dominating and backward agricultural practices of smallholder farming are expressed in SAGCOT's Blueprint:

> Tanzania's agriculture is predominantly smallholder, characterized with very low productivity due to very limited use of modern technology and techniques of production. As a result, therefore, the country's huge agriculture potential remains unutilized. (SAGCOT, 2011)

Interestingly, experiences from past LSAIs are referred to in this context, where previous megafarms are portrayed as being fundamentally different from the neoliberal strategy currently used. For example, (Collier & Dercon, 2009) argue that these state-led megafarms, with little concern for farming communities, exemplified by the notorious Groundnut Scheme in Tanzania, are history. Similarly, SAGCOT claims long-term commitment to smallholder farmers and that, 'the land farmed through SAGCOT investments will be developed as a partnership, where all sides will take part in a sustainable rural development process: and do so without regrets' (SAGCOT, undated:6-7). Thus, privatisation serves as a way to justify yet another wave of LSAI.

The problem descriptions outlined above (including their causes) pave the way to suggesting investment in (allegedly) highly productive, private-driven, agricultural production, based on modern technology and irrigation, with important emphasis on the public-private partnership character as described in section 2.1.1. The problems are thus turned into opportunities, inspiring identification of solutions to unleash Africa's untapped potential, where 'the agricultural sector presents a major opportunity for Africa given its share in most economies, as well as the region's comparative advantage' (Faye et al., 2013).

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[17] At the time of writing, Dercon is chief economist at DFID. While the paper was published in World Development 2014 (Collier & Dercon, 2014), an earlier version of the paper was written for the FAO expert meeting in 2009 on 'How to feed the World in 2050'. At that time, Collier was director of the Development Research Group at the World Bank. In 2010 and 2011, Collier was named by the magazine *Foreign* as one of the 'top global thinkers'.

Finally, as regards the 'end' of the LSAI narrative, LSAIs in Africa and Tanzania are proposed to deliver, for instance, increased agricultural productivity, new markets for smallholder farmers, employment opportunities, secure access to food, better living conditions, economic growth, poverty alleviation, reduced import expenditure and a more conducive business environment (Ministry for Agriculture, 2009; NewAlliance, 2013; Takavarasha et al., 2005; WB, 2012).

In a similar vein, in its decision to support the Bagamoyo project in 2014, Sida suggests that private investment in agriculture will solve many of the problems outlined above, emphasizing the mix of large- and small-scale, in line with Collier and Dercon (2009):

> The (agricultural) production increase is insufficient since it is only marginally higher (four percent) than the population growth (three percent). To achieve the country's poverty alleviation target and food security, a substantial increase in private investments in the agricultural sector is necessary. These investments need to include both small-scale agricultural and larger investments in agriculture. (Sida, 2014c)

In all, the LSAI narratives for both Africa and Tanzania follow similar patterns, invoke similar problems and naturalise similar causes, in a context where the agriculture sector is repositioned as the hub of African economic transition (WB, 2008), largely influenced by multilateral development institutions and private business interests. Ultimately, they also propose similar outcomes through the solution promoted: the LSAI development strategy.

2.5 A case description of the Bagamoyo project

2.5.1 Bagamoyo

> *"Bwaga–moyo"* (lay down your heart) or Bagamoyo is a small coastal town that …was the last major exit port for slaves before they were shipped to Zanzibar and the Arab countries. At this point, slaves were telling themselves to *lay down their hearts* because they would never see their land again. (Sosovele, undated)

Today, 140 years after the slave and ivory trade was abolished, Bagamoyo town, with its decaying, white-washed stone buildings and its vibrant harbour overlooking the turquoise waters of the Indian Ocean, continues to act as the centre of Bagamoyo district. Situated 65 km north of Dar es Salaam, the town was used as headquarters by the German colonial regime, before they moved to

Dar es Salaam (Sosovele, undated). While the interest in Bagamoyo declined after this move, it was re-ignited under the rule of President Kikwete, who was eager to 'deliver' to his home district before stepping down as President in 2015.

Bagamoyo district is one of six districts within the Pwani (coast) region (Gautum, 2009), with a relatively low population density of 32 people per km^2 (data from the 2012 census) (NBS, 2013). While the fishing industry is a large employer in the region, smallholder agriculture and fishing constitute the main contributors to the regional economy. Moreover, Bagamoyo district is a major supplier of charcoal to low-income areas in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, at a value of 340 million Tsh in 2004 (equivalent to 160 000 USD in current exchange rates). This can be compared to, for instance, 140 million Tsh from fish production (equivalent to 66 000 USD in current exchange rates) (NBS, 2008; Sosovele, undated). In general, the area has had high rates of unemployment and in 2008 there was rapid migration, in particular of young people, to urban centres in the region (NBS, 2008), which made the Swedish investor's promises on employment opportunities highly attractive. Since then, the tourism sector has expanded rapidly (Gautum, 2009; Sosovele, undated), which may have reduced unemployment rates.

Apart from the sugarcane investment examined in this thesis, President Kikwete has also initiated a number of other large projects in Bagamoyo, for example a harbour that aimed to become the largest in Eastern Africa. Linked to the harbour plans, an export processing zone was established on 9000 ha, to serve as a processing hub for the country. However, during my last visit to Bagamoyo in 2016, both projects had stalled; there were few active processing companies in the processing zone and the resettlement required for harbour construction had not yet been initiated.

2.5.2 Razaba Ranch - a description of the project site

It is early morning when we leave a cool, overcast Bagamoyo town behind us driving north-west towards the project site in Razaba Ranch. It will be our first visit and we – myself and two colleagues– want to talk to the people living on the land targeted by the project, to understand their perceptions of it and its implementation. The rainy season has just started and we expect a muddy, slippery trip. As we approach Razaba Ranch, we round a bend in the road and see that the Ruvu river has burst its banks, covering the bridge in slowly simmering, brown water. Two young men have seen the potential to make some money and are doing the important job of guiding cars through the water in order to avoid invisible rocks and to direct drivers to the shallow waters. Our car cannot pass through with us inside it. We pull off our shoes and start wading through the brown water until we reach across to the muddy road, surrounded by shouts and small-talk among other people passing by. Over the years, these floods will cause delays in project timelines, since

they reduce access to the project site, and they will be repeatedly omitted in new timelines. We stop at one sub-village on the left side of the road, the side that is promised to the investor. We greet the village chair, show our papers from the district and explain why we are there. People appear from nearby houses and some people travelling along the road stop, all gathering under a huge tree to talk to us about the planned investment, sitting on logs and, as the group expands, on yellow plastic containers. Outside the nearest house are rows of white plastic rice bags packed with charcoal. In the meeting, we are told, among other things, that due to restrictions on agricultural practices while awaiting resettlement, more people have become dependent on charcoal production for their livelihoods. People are hoping that, after the ongoing rainy season, something will progress as concerns the resettlement as the roads are opened up again.

The project site where the Swedish investor acquired rights of occupancy to 20 374 hectares of land in May 2013 is part of a larger area, called Razaba Ranch (Ranchi ya Zanzibar Bagamoyo). The ranch includes another approximately 6000 hectares to the east, along the coast. The area has been inhabited for at least 1500 years (Mwasumbi, Mligo, & Suleiman, 2007). As part of the idea during early independence of setting up large, state-owned farms, in 1974 the Tanzanian government granted 28 097 hectares of land in Makurunge village to the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, to be used as a cattle ranch[18]. In exchange, the Zanzibar Government paid approximately 260 000 Tsh (equivalent to 130 USD in current exchange rates) to compensate villagers for the loss of land (ORGUT, 2008). The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar used the land as a cattle ranch up until 1994, when the project was abandoned due to, for instance, tsetse fly attacks on the cattle and leopard attacks (Mwasumbi et al., 2007). The approximately 300 workers and their families were permitted to live on the land until the farm was re-purposed for other activities (Chung, 2017; Mwasumbi et al., 2007)[19].

In the north, the former Razaba Ranch is bounded by the Wami river which forms the southern border of Saadani National Park. In the west, the Uhuru railway line leading from Dar es Salaam to Tanga constitutes the border. In the south, the area borders Makurunge, and in the east it encounters the Ruvu river and the Indian Ocean (Figures 3 and 5). The rivers are important for the livelihoods of people in the entire district, as the flood plains are used for agricultural production and the rivers for both subsistence and industrial fishing. A road dissects the ranch,

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[18] The Razaba Ranch was a so-called NARCO, a National Ranching Company Ltd. Such NARCOs were established when President Nyerere decided to nationalise farms in the 1970s in order to increase state influence over rural development.

[19] In 2007, the Tanzanian government decided to allocate land to the sugarcane investment and the Zanzibar government agreed to allocate 22 000 hectares of its former Razaba Ranch to the investment, in return for compensation (ORGUT, 2008).

branching off the Bagamoyo-Msata road at Makurunge in the south, running north towards Matipwili and Saadani National Park (Figure 3 & 5, and Image 1). Although covered in coastal forest a long time ago, today the area is basically flat bushland and semi-natural woodland with some low hills, rising gradually from the coastal mudflats to about 30-40 m above sea level at the western border of the area (Mwasumbi et al., 2007; ORGUT, 2008).

As illustrated in Figure 5 below, there are five sub-villages in the Ranch area; one in the south, two further north and two on the southern banks of the Wami River, with a large number of scattered houses and huts in between. The exact population in the project area is difficult to estimate, due to a constant influx and outflux of people and contesting figures presented by different informants. In 2012, the number of people estimated to be impacted by the project amounted to 1374 (AfDB, 2012). Chung (2017) estimated the number of people living and working on the land in 2014 to be around 1400 people and pointed out that the people in the area represent a wide range of tribes including the original peoples of the Swahili coast, such as Zigua, agro-pastoralists such as Sukuma, and pastoralists such as the Barabaig. This reflects the mix of people in the district due to migration and settlement of different ethnic groups from longstanding migration since the slave and ivory trade (Sosovele, undated). The ranch is surrounded by three villages and four sub-villages, whose total population was estimated to be 6000 people in 2008 (ORGUT 2008).

None of the people living inside the project site have had their land rights formally acknowledged, and were frequently referred to as 'invaders' or 'settlers' by the company representatives, state officials and development staff. As outlined in Paper I, while project proponents represented the land as unambiguously general land, there were a range of contradicting narratives. For example, some of the Razaba Ranch residents insisted that they were not adequately compensated at the time when the land was granted to Zanzibar and questioned the allocation of the land in the 1970s. Other residents claimed they had never been never part of Razaba Ranch and therefore should not be included in any resettlement scheme targeting the ranch.

As outlined in Paper IV, in some cases when state farms were privatised in the 1990s, people advanced their customary rights of occupancy in accordance with part IV of the Village Land Act, allowing people who have being using or occupying the land for 12 consecutive years to claim formal land rights. However, their land rights were usually not recognised, although they were in line with existing land laws (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009).

Rwanda Kenya

Burundi

Dodoma

Democratic
Republic
of Congo

Zambia

Malawi Mozambique

Matipwili

Park boundary
adjustment area

Gama

Flood
Protection

Wildlife
Corridors

Bamboo &
Sorghum

Reservoir

Mill

Forestry

Centre Pivot
Drip
Sprinkler

Fukayosi

Grazing

Kidomole

**Nucleus estate
Land Use**

Tanga

Kweikonje

Masimbani

Mandamazingara

Mkange

Saadani

Miono

Kikaro

Kitame

Zanzibar

Kilemela

Mihuga

Gongo

Matipwili
1150 ha

Gama
400 ha

Hondogo

Rupuowi

Mandera

Mkoko

Kiwangwa
1850 ha

Biga
West

Kihangoaiko

Bago

Fukayosi

Msata

Masuguru

Makurunge

Bagamoyo

Mazizi

Msinune

Mwavi

Mtoni

Magomani

Kaole

Pande

Mlingoeni

Saba

Lunga

Bane
Minoukeni

Kidomole

Mkenge

Mataya

Kiromo

Kongo

Zinga

Kisanga

Msigi

Talawanda

Kidongozero

Chesimba

Nerege

Malivundo

Buyuni

Kwamatuku

Bwilinu

Pera

N

0   5   10
‖——‖——‖ Km

—— Rivers

⬥ Salt work

⬛ Potential resettlements

▲ Growth points

🏭 Mill

Wider Community

+—+ Railway

Paved road with flood risks

Paved road

Nucleus estate

Village status

Outgrower village

Inner circle villages

Outer circle villages

🌾 The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

IFAD *Map compiled by IFAD | 19-11-2014*

Figure 3. Map of the project site in Razaba Ranch and surroundings.

Instead, when privatisation of these farms was initiated, new investors could lease the contested lands from the formally recognised, owners, whether government or an investor, and attempt to evict the smallholders or pastoralists. This has happened in Kilombero (Maganga, Askew, Odgaard, & Stein, 2016), and it was also exactly what happened in Bagamoyo, where contesting claims led to a range of conflicts and court cases, as I return to in Papers II and III.

However, due to the condition set by the African Development Bank and Sida that the project had to adhere to International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 5 for involuntary resettlement (hereafter referred to as international best practice), a total of 1374 people within the site were identified as project-affected people and thus legible for compensation when resettled (AfDB, 2012). In the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) performed by the Swedish consultancy ORGUT in 2008, villagers from adjacent villages were found to use the land for temporary cultivation, firewood collection, hunting and charcoal burning. Moreover, there had been an influx of pastoralists, in particular Barabaigs, who used the land for grazing, especially during dryer periods. All these activities constituted important parts of local people's livelihoods (ORGUT, 2008).

In the hot, humid climate, averaging a temperature of 28° C, smallholder farmers[20] on Razaba Ranch grow many of the major Tanzanian subsistence crops, including maize, paddy rice and cassava. Moreover, many households grow perennial fruit trees and cash crops, for instance banana, avocado, mango, watermelon, sesame and cashew nuts (Chung, 2017; Kjellin, 2015). Income from these crops meets important household expenses, such as food, school fees and health services. Women frequently grow vegetables in their back gardens, which they cook or sell at local markets, such as the one we passed on our way to the ranch. Only a few households grow sugarcane, and then mainly for domestic consumption. In addition to smallholder farmers and Barabaigs, other groups residing in the project area include charcoal producers and seasonal fishermen (Chung, 2017).

As I return to in Papers I and II, although the project was to comply with international best practice, resting on principles of prior, informed, consent, throughout this research, there was much confusion among people living on and around Razaba Ranch about what the project actually entailed, what was happening or not, and why, findings supported by others studies of the same case (Chung, 2017; Curtis & Mbunda, 2015; Kjellin, 2015). In all, Razaba Ranch and the Bagamoyo project became entangled in the inconsistent,

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[20] While I have not conducted a study on the land holdings of farmers in the area, Kjellin (2015) points to an average land holding of 3-10 hectares in one of the adjacent villages. Kjellin also mentions some common other income generating activities among smallholders in the area, including working in a pharmacy, teaching or producing charcoal.

unequal land governance outlined earlier in this chapter, resulting in contradicting representations of land borders, land rights, compensation and progress of project implementation.

2.5.3 The Bagamoyo project or 'The Bagamoyo Saga'[21]

In this section, I outline the story of what I call 'the Bagamoyo project', which came to be referred to as 'state-of-the-art' by Sida, a 'flag bearing project' (Sulle, 2017:16) and an 'iconic project' (BRN, 2012:23) by the Tanzanian government, with a vision to become a 'role model' for agroenergy production (PIM, 2010:6).

This story shows that the paradigm shift in development assistance outlined above can provide substantial leeway for private actors to influence identification and design of development projects. A key character in the story is the chief executive officer (CEO) for the Bagamoyo company, Per Carstedt. In this section I outline how Carstedt, an award-winning lobbyist called 'Ethanol Jesus' in the Swedish press (Carlsson, 2011; Johannesson, 2014) with no previous experience in Africa, 'sold' the project to municipalities in Sweden. Moreover, he convinced Sida to support this high-risk project in a complex and partly unpredictable context, and despite a number of controversies.

Initially, the Bagamoyo project was to be implemented by a company called SEKAB (Svensk Etanolkemi AB). It took place at the peak of the biofuel hype outlined above, where Sweden had set the highest biofuel target of all EU countries aiming for a share of 49 percent renewable energy by 2020 (EC, 2009; Näringsdepartementet, 2008). As outlined, expectations on the project were huge, including the transformation of smallholders into entrepreneurs. This transformation process is illustrated on the company's website (Figure 4) and entails a smallholder farmer, using a hand hoe, becoming a businessman solely through 'doing business'. The view that smallholders needed to become business-minded entrepreneurs, was clearly reflected in statements by company representatives as will be shown in Paper III.

SEKAB[22], Europe's largest importer of ethanol at the time, played a major role in promoting biofuels as the future energy source in Sweden. In 2005, three Swedish municipalities[23] bought SEKAB, and Carstedt was installed as the CEO.

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[21] To the horde of increasingly critical spectators, this story has become known as 'the Bagamoyo Saga', a name coined by Ann Usher, journalist at Development Today, who has been following this project since it was made public in Sweden in 2007 (see for instance Usher, 2016).

[22] SEKAB was initiated in 1984 to produce ethanol from forest resources in the north of Sweden, but largely imported ethanol from Brazil. (http://www.sekab.com/sv/om-oss/).

[23] Umeå, Örnsköldsvik and Skellefteå municipalities.

Figure 4. The Bagamoyo company's vision of how smallholder farmers would become businessmen. Source: http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/home/.

Figure 5. Eco Energy's project sign in Razaba Ranch, illustrating the project area, adjacent villages and Ruvu and Wami rivers.

Through previous engagements in marketing ethanol in Sweden and Europe, and as the CEO of SEKAB, Carstedt became an influential force for the expansion of ethanol production, consumption and of necessary infrastructure. In addition, he was an advisor to the Minister of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, his former classmate. While awaiting results from ongoing testing activities on cellulose in Sweden, the CEO turned his focus to agricultural crop-based biofuel production abroad and engaged in persuading the three Swedish municipalities to support such projects. Within a year, projects in Tanzania and Mozambique, but also Poland, Hungary, Togo and Ghana, were in planning, all financed by the Swedish municipalities. These investments amounted to an estimated 1.4 billion SEK (equivalent to 155 million USD in current exchange rates) of Swedish taxpayers' money (Carlsson, 2011). However, after pressure to scrutinise SEKABs activities, not least from the local press, in September 2007 leading politicians in the three Swedish municipalities stopped all investments and Carstedt was fired as SEKAB's CEO.

Meanwhile, the CEO had started selling his ideas in Tanzania too, representing the investment as the first large sugar investment in the country in 40 years (Usher, 2017). The 'buy-in' of the Tanzanian government was institutionalised in at least three Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), indicating huge expectations, including more than one million jobs, billions of dollars in export revenues and offering Tanzania an opportunity to become independent of oil imports (URT, 2006). The company was also supported by other key actors in the Tanzanian government: As I return to in Papers I and III, the Minister of Lands, Housing and Settlement at the time initiated a shareholder agreement through a new 'Land for Equity' policy, where the Bagamoyo project would serve as a pilot project. Thus, this case entails yet another means through which investor can gain access to land outside the procedures outlined in the Land Act.

In 2007-08, SEKAB established an office in Masaki, Dar es Salaam, and hired a range of consultants, including a Sida officer who later returned to Sida and became a key driver of Sida support for large-scale land deals in Africa (for instance, she became a driving force to develop the Sida concept note on support to land deals quoted on p. 52). Moreover, through its local business partner, SEKAB gained access to 200 hectares of prison land (Kigongoni Farm)[24] outside Bagamoyo town to establish a seed cane farm where sugarcane varieties particularly suitable for the local climate would be refined. The seed cane farm was up and running rather quickly and produced seed cane every season (Image 6). Since the main estate was not prepared for planting, however, the seed cane crop had to be burnt down every season from 2007 until 2016 (Image 7). The

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[24] It has been estimated that public bodies such as the army and prisons control more than 2 million ha of general land suitable for agriculture (TNBC, 2009 in Kaarhus et al. 2010).

initial timeline as per 2007 that about 3000 ha of plantation would be developed in 2008 was repeatedly delayed.

In Sweden, two public seminars[25] arranged by SEKAB served the important aim of selling the Tanzania plans to Swedish organisations and individuals who would be willing and able to provide such support, with focus on the social and environmental sustainability of the project. At the time, SEKAB aimed for investment in two Tanzanian districts; Rufiji and Bagamoyo. At the seminars, Carstedt held one of his talks, which have been referred to as 'intense', 'missionizing', or 'charming' the audience (Johannesson, 2014). By referring to peak oil and population growth, Carstedt's story fitted well into the discourse on the need for ethanol globally, and the role that Africa could play, given, for instance, its vast tracts of available, unused land (Carstedt, 2014). Portraying the project as a highly risky development project, with an emphasis on how it could serve Africa's needs, it was presented as an ideal combination of aid and trade, worthy of support from development agencies and banks. At the seminars, Carstedt also repeatedly emphasised the sustainability ambitions of the company and pointed to the rising competition in Tanzania with companies based in, for instance, the US and China, implicitly drawing on the notion that a Swedish investor would have a relatively high sustainability profile.

At the seminars, SEKAB's ideas were supported by, for instance, the Swedish ambassador to Tanzania, who advanced some reflections on how biofuel was a priority for the Tanzanian government. Another important supporter was Professor Rockström, head of the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) at the time, one of the most influential lobbyists in Sweden concerning climate change and other global environmental challenges and a supporter of large-scale biofuel production in Africa[26]. Rockström's presentation identified similar problems as Carstedt's, and leaned heavily on scientific data on, for instance, energy efficiency of sugarcane relative to other biofuel crops and Africa's favourable climate for generating fivefold productivity.

Then followed one of the key controversies surrounding the project. A few months after being fired as SEKAB's CEO, Carstedt was hired as a consultant by SEKAB. His assignment entailed finding a buyer for SEKAB's investments in East Africa (SVT, 2014; Usher, 2009). However, he failed to find a new buyer, and after a seven-month paid consultancy, with an hourly rate of 700 SEK, he 'found himself' as the buyer. Thus, on 21 October 2009, after having made

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[25] The seminars were held on 20 November 2007 and 6 February 2008.

[26] For instance, his opinions were expressed in an Opinion Piece in Göteborgsposten on 13 March 2009, written as a response to an Opinion Piece written by myself earlier that year: available at http://www.gp.se/debatt. Accessed 9 May 2018.

approximately 1 million SEK on the consultancy assignment, Carstedt bought the Tanzanian branch of the company for 400 SEK (approximately 50 USD) (Häggqvist, 2014; SVT, 2014)[27]. The deal received substantial criticism in the local press in the three municipalities and a documentary broadcast on national television, in particular because it contributed to making one of the three municipalities the most indebted in Sweden (SVT, 2014).

A few months earlier, on 28 July 2009, SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania had sent a 2.5 page application letter to Sida, applying for funding of development costs (Sida, 2009), which would lead to another key controversy. In response to this application, Sida assigned the Sida Helpdesk to provide comments on the sustainability of the project and perform an assessment of SEKAB ESIA documents, assignments which I carried out. The Sida assignment entailed performing a comparison between the original ESIA version, which was approved by the Swedish consultant, and the version submitted by SEKAB to NEMC, from which the Swedish consultant distanced herself. The subsequent Environmental Impact Assessment Certificate was based on the latter. The process is outlined in detail elsewhere (Havnevik & Haaland, 2011), with substantial input from my report to Sida. While I refer to Havnevik and Haaland (2011) for a detailed outline of the whole ESIA process, suffice it to say here that I identified major changes in the ESIA (see pp 117-118 in Havnevik and Haaland, 2011 or Sida Helpdesk, 2009). These changes systematically downplayed environmental and social risks in the document, changes not approved by the Swedish consultant (Sida Helpdesk, 2009). Subsequently, the Swedish consultant stated that the report had been 'substantially altered' to present 'the conclusions in the best light' (Usher, 2009).

Furthermore, as will be shown in Paper III, criticism of the Bagamoyo project started appearing in the national news in both Sweden and Tanzania, with reference to, for instance, threats to rural people's livelihoods, the risk of displacement of local communities, overlaps with forest reserves in Rufiji and associated risks of increased greenhouse gas emissions (ActionAid, 2009a, 2009b; DN, 2009; Engvall, 2009; Östberg, 2008).

On 29 October 2009, Sida decided to reject SEKAB's application. While there is reason to believe that the decision was affected by all the criticism outlined above, the motivation provided in the decision included references to Sida Helpdesk's assessment, such as high environmental and socio-economic risk and lack of a legal framework, but also to that Sida does not support development costs, only specific projects (Sida, 2009).

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[27] The deal was that SEKAB (SEKAB International AB) and EcoDevelopment in Europe AB entered an agreement in which EcoDevelopment took over 100 percent of the shares in the two subsidiaries in Tanzania and Mozambique (Havnevik & Haaland, 2011).

Around this time, the new company, Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd (PIM, 2010:11)[28] (hereafter referred to as BEE) was registered in Tanzania, and the focus shifted from ethanol to sugar as the main product. This fitted well into Tanzanian policy with sugar as one of three target crops and high sugar import costs. Only a few months after the new company had been created, a new constellation of financers had bought into the project, including the African Development Bank (PIM, 2010:21). In the new project information memorandum (PIM), a new timeline was presented, according to which sugar production would be initiated in June 2013, that is, three years later than initially planned.

In order to access a loan from the African Development Bank, several conditions needed to be met. A condition particularly relevant to this thesis was that a credit guarantee had to be provided, given the high-risk profile of the investment. Therefore, in May 2012 Sida received yet another application, for a 94 million USD credit enhancement guarantee (940 million SEK[29]), which, if affected, would have been Sida's largest such guarantee ever.

While the project was run by a 'new' company, the company executives remained the same. Moreover, the project targeted the same land, with the same crop. The same people were targeted by resettlement and outgrower schemes, and the project was based on the same environmental certificate. However, the Rufiji plans, which had attracted the most substantial criticism in 2009, had been downplayed, although not removed. Another difference was that the project was marketed as a food project, rather than a (more controversial) biofuel project. Another difference from the SEKAB application was that there had been a change in the staff at Sida involved in handling the application. Finally, the project still enjoyed strong support from the Tanzanian President.

Most likely, these conditions all contributed to Sida deciding to go ahead with an assessment of the project, its relevance and potential impacts, in contrast to its response to the first application. This decision initiated a range of evaluations amounting to 1300 pages of documentation (Sida Helpdesk, 2012), indicating the much more complex deal involving the coordination of multi-million dollar loans and credit guarantees. These documents were important material for this thesis.

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[28] The new company, owned by Eco Development, operated in Africa through Agro EcoEnergy Africa Ltd. In turn, Agro EcoEnergy Africa Ltd was owned by Eco Energy Africa AB, registered in Sweden, and operating in Tanzania through registered 'special purpose vehicle', Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd (PIM, 2010:11).

[29] Sida used an exchange rate of 10 SEK per dollar at the time (Sida, 2015).

Image 1. The road intersecting the project site, surrounded by bushland and woodland. Photo: Linda Engström.

Image 2. I am wading through Ruvu River floods when entering the project site. Photo: Kjell Havnevik.

Image 3. Ongoing farming activities on Razaba Ranch. Photo: Linda Engström.

Image 4. Some Razaba Ranch residents have become more dependent on charcoal production for their livelihoods while awaiting resettlement. Photo: Linda Engström.

Image 5. A Razaba Ranch subvillage where I often conducted interviews under the large tree (right side). Photo: Linda Engström.

Image 6. Sugar cane varieties have been refined on the seed cane plantation since 2007. Photo: Linda Engström.

Image 7. Since no factory is in place, and existing factories are too far away, all harvested sugar cane has been burnt since 2007. Photo: Linda Engström.

FIELD: NO 16
AREA:
DATE PLANTED: 9/11/2011
VARIETY: NO 41
RATOON:
DATE HARVESTED:

In its assessment, Sida deemed the project relevant to both Swedish and Tanzanian policy. The ORGUT ESIA was not mentioned. Instead, a new ESIA performed by the African Development Bank was referred to (Sida, 2014b). When asked about the controversial ESIA process in interview, a Sida officer stated that Sida had decided to assess the project on its current merits, notwithstanding its history. Importantly, during this process, several Sida officers raised criticism of the project. For instance, in a procedural meeting where the project was discussed, one Sida officer asked if experience from the LSAI in Hanang, where Barabaigs were displaced, had been taken into account. Another important point raised was that risk reduction solely through communication with the investor, as suggested in the risk assessment, would not be enough. Nevertheless, following time-consuming and challenging paperwork, in February 2014 Sida decided to support BEE with a smaller guarantee of 16.2 million USD from its regular development budget (Sida, 2015), without reference to this criticism (Sida, 2014c). One important driver for BEE requesting a smaller (faster), early loan was that its partners were losing faith in the project due to repeated delays (Sida, 2014a) and it became pertinent to show progress. In all, as outlined in Paper II, delays constituted an important reason for this application.

As I will outline in Paper II, after having paid 54 million SEK (6.2 million USD) during 2014, Sida set a number of conditions before providing the next payment (Sida, 2015), which were not fulfilled. Therefore, in May 2015, Sida decided to stop any further payments to BEE.

As I will return to in Paper II and III, after a messy process of continued attempted implementation, on 15 April 2015 the newly elected President Magufuli decided to revoke BEE's Right of Occupancy[30]. This was done despite pressure from Sida to support BEE, due to the money it had invested. While one might imagine that this would be the end of the Bagamoyo Saga, it was not. As I will return to in Paper II, on 11 September 2017, BEE launched a lawsuit against the Government of Tanzania and submitted a request for arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, (ICSID)[31] in Washington DC, claiming to have lost 52 million USD. Thus, the Bagamoyo Saga continues.

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[30]In October 2016, the President granted 10 000 ha of land in Bagamoyo to the domestic company Bakhresa. One month later, BEE received a letter revoking its land title because the Government no longer 'have an interest' in the project, a decision finally made public four months later, in February 2017. According to national media, Bakhresa re-initiated activities on the seed cane farm in December 2017.

[31] ICSID was instigated by the World Bank in order 'to further the Bank's objective of promoting international investment' https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx. Accessed 24 April 2018.

In this chapter, I described the wider setting of privatisation of agriculture and development policies, followed by an outline of the LSAI narrative. I also provided a description of the local context within which the Bagamoyo project was initiated. From these descriptions, it is evident that the Bagamoyo project fitted well into the political agenda on privatisation of development. Moreover, it fitted well into the agenda on biofuels in Sweden and the EU at the time, partly created by CEO Carstedt himself. I reveal how a charismatic and skilled CEO was provided space to sell the Bagamoyo project to a wider audience and how the project has received criticism and involved a number of controversies.

3 Theoretical framework

3.1 Conceptual framework

This section outlines key concepts used in the papers. The concepts of discourse, narrative and resilient narratives are given little space in Paper III, and are thus described in more detail here. In contrast, the three interrelated concepts of simplification, delay and failure are outlined in detail in Paper II and thus more briefly outlined here.

3.1.1 Discourse and narrative

In this thesis, I use narrative as the object of analysis. This section starts by describing the broader concept discourse and then returns to narrative and describes how the two concepts are interlinked.

Discourse is conceptualised in many different ways in social science literature. In this thesis, I draw on critical discourse analysis (CDA), where discourse is defined as a practice in the form of written and spoken language expressed from social positions, and perceived as only one part of what shapes the social world (Fairclough, 2010; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In CDA, discourse is simultaneously constituted by, and shapes, the social structures within which it is produced. Moreover, in CDA, discourse is to be empirically studied within its social context (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

Discourse is made up of similar, but not necessarily identical, representations, however all sharing a particular way of seeing and describing the world, that are more or less naturalised within that domain (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Neumann, 2003). Thus, a discourse follows patterns, for instance in terms of shared knowledge, assumptions and representations of a particular phenomenon (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001).

Discourses often gain influence by conveying potent messages through simplifying complex issues and processes (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wolmer et al., 2006) in order to, for instance, shape policy decisions (Bacchi, 2009; Wolmer et al., 2006), gather or maintain political support (Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004, 2005) or generate a (continued) flow of financial resources (Lund et al., 2017, Mosse 2004).

As I will return to in Paper III, 'narrative' is used in this thesis as a story about a particular phenomenon *within* a wider discourse[32]. The message of a discourse is communicated through narratives (Adger et al., 2001), and analysing these narratives offers opportunities to examine how discourses 'filter through to the everyday' (Doughty & Murray, 2016:304). Such more localised expressions of discourse have also been framed as tales (Escobar, 1993) or storylines (Hajer, 1995). As I showed in Chapter 2, the character of a development narrative as having a beginning, middle and end, promising development outcomes and serving certain interests (Roe, 1991), is particularly relevant to the case analysed in this thesis. Thus, the LSAI narrative is a story about the particular phenomenon, LSAI, situated within the wider development discourse, whose producers share certain assumptions and representations of, for instance, what constitutes development. In this thesis, I analyse the LSAI narrative in relation to contradicting narratives, for instance provided by accumulated academic knowledge (as I will return to in Paper III) or by rural residents targeted by the project (as outlined in Papers I, II and III).

Drawing on Gramsci, the LSAI narrative can be conceived as a hegemonic discourse, dominating the way of seeing the world, where other perceptions and perspectives of that reality (about what is going on, why and with what effects) have been undermined to the extent that the hegemonic discourse appears natural (Hajer, 1995; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Moreover, a discourse is hegemonic when it has been enacted into institutional practices and regulations (Adger et al., 2001; Neumann, 2003), such as bureaucratic procedure, policies and strategies.

As I will show in section 3.2, key representations in the development discourse 'filter through' to the LSAI narrative. In turn, the LSAI narrative is enacted in policies such as SAGCOT and projects such as the Bagamoyo project, all part of 'the LSAI development strategy'.

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[32] In this thesis, the development discourse (see section 3.2) constitutes such a wider discourse.

3.1.2 Simplification

Simplification, reduction of complexity, is part of shaping any story in order to achieve legibility, but can be produced in different ways, in different contexts, with different effects. Simplification is an intrinsic character in any discourse or narrative intended to shape policy (Scott 1998, Bacchi 2009, Wolmer et al 2006). Broadly, narratives intended to shape policy can be simplified: 1) to achieve legibility for practical reasons, while knowing the context and with an awareness of what is likely to interfere with the policy and interlinked projects, or 2) from a belief that something will be very simple to implement due to lack of knowledge, lack of incentive to find particular knowledge, based on a political agenda or certain simplified values and assumptions. In this thesis, I analysed simplifications largely stemming from the second set of factors, which are rarely innocent. Rather, they constitute an important political tool in order to shape the LSAI narrative and the design of the Bagamoyo project.

Apart from achieving legibility, however, the simplifications under scrutiny simultaneously achieve other purposes. For instance, by disguising their fundamentally political nature they tend to appear functional and pragmatic (Wedel et al., 2005). A telling example of the pragmatic feature of policy is Sida's justification for engaging in LSAIs, despite strong global criticism and potential risks circulating in the public debate, as outlined on page 52 in Chapter 2. Sida pointed out that the new wave of LSAIs is already happening and that the only thing it can do is to 'adapt' to this trend and engage in order to maximise benefits for the poor.

As outline in Papers II and III, a common way to simplify in my case is through discursive practices of depoliticisation (Ferguson, 1990) or 'render technical' (Li, 2007:7). One example of where political decisions are represented as administrative or technical, rather than political, is through institutionalised bureaucratic procedures such as Sida's risk assessment, as outlined in Paper III. As I will show in Paper III, while Li's (2007) and Ferguson's (1990) accounts of such depoliticisation mainly entail *discursive* simplifications, rendering technical can also be achieved through *material* practice, concrete actions. These include 'tick-off exercises' and assessments, performed by authorities to adhere to bureaucratic procedure, that are presented as adequate to address complex, often political, issues. Thus, this thesis presents simplification as both a discursive and a material practice.

The practice of depoliticisation is given a slightly new framing in the emerging body of literature on neoliberalised development narratives. For instance, Lund et al. (2017) point to how policy models are dependent on narratives rendering contextual complexity technical to sell *market-based* development strategies as something new. While these observations largely

overlap with those of, for instance, Mosse (2005), literature on neoliberalised development narratives emphasises the importance of selling seemingly *competitive* solutions, particularly important within a neoliberal logic where profitable efficiency is key. Moreover, as outlined on page 47 in Chapter 2, the *kind* of knowledge that is likely to be consumed by a wider audience has changed, with increasing emphasis on growth and investment.

Apart from depoliticisation, I also analyse other types of simplifications, including the disregard of environmental complexities, external events and discursive homogenisations (Escobar, 1993) of the Other (Said, 1978) (see section 3.2.2, Papers II and III). Discursive homogenisations categorise and ascribe one or a few particular characteristics to a constructed group of people, simplifying not only their characteristics, but also relations between actors. As outlined in Paper III, this way of seeing smallholder farmers occurred in the case examined, expressed more or less explicitly among project proponents.

In my analysis, I compared the simplified LSAI narrative with the messy project realities on the project site, in order to investigate what complexities were disregarded.

As shown in Papers I-IV, simplified statements on land were key to understanding why the Bagamoyo project failed, where a sharp focus on productivity repeatedly disregarded, for instance, other ways of seeing and utilising land. For example, the simplified notion of vast tracts of unused land in Tanzania has frequently been observed in other studies (Coulson 2013, Maganga et al 2016, Bergius et al 2017, Walwa 2017). As outlined in Paper I, villagers living around Razaba Ranch dismissed the existence of unused land, referring to activities such as grazing, the collection of non-timber forest products or set-asides for future generations. Moreover, in Paper IV, we show that the narrative on vast tracts of available land proved to be at odds with repeated reports on conflicts over land and aggregated pressure on land from a number of sectors. Finally, as outlined on page 64 in Chapter 2, the CEO of SEKAB drew on a range of simplified representations of the state of the world. These included the abundance of land in Africa, the unused land in Razaba, perfect climate conditions and the simplified image that a Swedish investor would, by default, constitute a more ethical and sustainable option than companies from other countries.

In sum, I conceive simplification as a discursive and material practice that reduces complexity to achieve legibility, simultaneously creating potent messages used to sell success to a wider audience. Moreover, as will be outlined in Paper II, I use simplification as having effects, not only by shaping policy and creating networks, but also in the practical implementation of the Bagamoyo project.

3.1.3 Delay

Delay, that is, the lagging behind of project implementation in relation to the proposed timeline, is used in this thesis as an important *effect* of simplification, and an important contributing factor to failure. Thus, it constitutes an important link between simplified development narratives and development failure, and a key concept in the analysis of how the Bagamoyo investment fails to deliver proposed outcomes, as will be outlined in Paper II. Overall, in this thesis, delay is used as a process integral to understand how the Bagamoyo project fails to deliver promised outcomes.

As will be outlined in detail in Paper II (p. 7), delay is a frequent feature in development intervention, including LSAIs (Burnod et al., 2013; Folster, 2001; Hall et al., 2015; Holden, Otsuka, & Deininger, 2013; Li, 2007b; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017), although rarely discussed. Even though delay appears to have played an important, sometimes decisive, role in the implementation processes of development projects, and for actors involved, none of these scholars analyse delay any further, even though they sometimes implicitly link delay with disregards by project proponents (such as Hall et al., 2015). Nor do they explicitly link delay with development failure. Rather, delay is often treated as unexpected, innocent and inevitable.

However, in other bodies of literature, delay is referred to as 'purposeful friction' (Hiedanpää, Pellikka, & Ojalammi, 2016:18) or 'temporal uncertainty' (Griffiths, 2014) and is outlined as a strategy of either the subaltern, the bureaucrats, or both (Bedi, 2015; Griffiths, 2014; Hiedanpää et al., 2016; von Essen & Allen, 2017).

Thus, delay is discussed in this thesis as an important, but overlooked, feature of development intervention. Moreover, it is used as a concept in order to analyse the project implementation process. Overall, delay provides analytical leverage in the analysis of development failure.

3.1.4 Development failure

As opposed to delay, the concept of failure has been widely discussed in studies of development, where failure is defined in different ways. In this thesis, failure is used in two main ways: as an effect of simplification and delay, and thus part of the analysis of how the project fails (see Paper II), and as a means to understand how different actors relate to propositions that the Bagamoyo project has failed in order to sustain the image of imminent success (see Paper III).

Defining what failure *is* can be problematic; not least since what constitutes failure for some can mean success for others. Moreover, value statements such as failure, or success, are often based on vested interests. In this thesis, I adapt

the definition used by Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998), that is, 'failure to deliver expected outcomes', into failure to deliver *proposed* outcomes. I believe that this minor adaptation is necessary, since it is difficult to assess and that it varies, whether proponents behind a scheme actually *do expect* the outcomes they put forward. As a consequence, my conception of failure lies closer to that of Li (2007), as failure to deliver what was *promised*, since an outcome can be promised regardless of whether there is a belief that it *will* be delivered, or not. In the case study examined in this thesis, the failure to deliver promised outcomes eventually equalled the failure of the project to materialise at all. Many promised outcomes from the Bagamoyo project, such as creation of 12 000 jobs and the production of hundreds of thousands of tons of sugar, are listed in Table 1 in Paper III. In contrast, actually achieved outcomes were a few hundred jobs and no sugar produced. It is in relation to such concrete promises, and outcomes, that I conceive failure in this thesis.

I then focus my analysis on the ways in which informants relate to propositions of project failure in the course of project implementation. As indicated, there will always be contesting perceptions of whether a project has failed or not, and in what way, depending on whose perspective one applies and whose interest it serves. Along these lines, Mosse argues that even if a project fails in practice, it can still succeed as a policy argument in a wider arena (Mosse, 2005). Thus, value statements such as success or failure are labels given to development projects which can mask project realities in a way that serves the interest of the narrator (Mosse, 2004). In this thesis, such statements are analysed in order to understand development narratives, and the discursive efforts used to sustain them.

Importantly, the approach used in this thesis of focusing on simplification in underpinning narratives is just one of many possible analytical approaches to study development failure. Focusing on simplification is important for drawing attention to the responsibility of those producing (repeatedly failing) policies and projects.

3.1.5 Resilient narratives

As mentioned above, failure has been described in previous studies, but not all of these discuss *repeated* failure. However, a conclusion that can be drawn from reading post-development, post-colonial and other studies of development is that failure *is* repeated, over time and contexts. For example, the failed large schemes described by Scott (1998) took place over centuries and in differing continents. Furthermore, Kindornay and Reilly-King (2013) point to the 'cyclical nature' of the 'latest' development strategies, stating that privatisation in development aid,

underpinning the much criticised SAPs, is now being repeated (p. 538). Another example is Ferguson's (1990) conclusion from accounts of rural development projects in many African countries, including state interventions in rural Tanzania that 'again and again, projects have failed' (p. 266).

One important reason behind patterns of repeated failure is that narratives underpinning the projects disregard context and tend to resist criticism and other alternative ways of seeing the world (Shore & Wright, 2003). Even though there are always contradicting narratives in constant struggle over different ways people see the world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), certain narratives persist and others are more temporal (Svarstad, 2002).

There are many examples of discourses and interlinked narratives that have persisted over decades in the face of substantial contradicting narratives. Again, post-development and post-colonial literature provide relevant examples. For instance, there has been a dominant simplified discourse, based on science, technology and neoclassical economic models, which has marginalised other, 'non-Western', knowledge (Escobar, 1993:13). The agrarian transition narrative, closely linked to the LSAI narrative, is another persistent narrative, pointing to ancient farming models as opposed to modern, backward farmers as opposed to entrepreneurial, among others. Similarly, as shown in Paper III, values and assumptions underpinning the LSAI narrative have demonstrated remarkable persistence.

This phenomenon of the 'formidable durability of discourse' or its 'sheer knitted-together strength' (Said, 1978:6), its 'inertia' (Neumann, 2003:120) or its 'parasitic relationship to its own shortcomings and failures' (Li, 2007b:1) has been studied within many different domains, framed in different ways. In Paper III (p. 2), it is shown to exist behind a wide array of development strategies which have repeatedly failed.

Many studies of development failure show that development strategies and policies rarely reflect experience. Ferguson (1990) writes about how development repeatedly disregards previous experience, where 'many observations and lines of thought commonplace in scholarly literature on Lesotho are effectively excluded from the discourse of development' (p. 29). Nyamnjoh (2000) describes notions of modernity, what it entails and how it is superior to other development 'stages' as often 'turning a deaf ear to empirical evidence and confusing ideal types with reality' (p. 8).

Regarding LSAI specifically, a handful of authors have written about immunity to experience. For instance, the simplified assumption of unused land underpinning the LSAI narrative is described by Baglioni and Gibbon (2013) as 'exceedingly resilient over the years' (p. 1561).

In this thesis, what all these scholars have observed is called 'resilient narratives'. The concept is drawn from Li's (2010) account of the persistent and simplified claim in the agrarian transition narrative that there is a natural and linear development trajectory:

> Too often, hard thinking about the predicament of surplus population is avoided by the repetition of some remarkably resilient narratives about agrarian transition that assume a linear pathway, and a predictable set of connections. According to these narratives there will be—sooner or later—a transition from agriculture to industry, country to city, and peasant to entrepreneurial farmer or wage worker (p. 69)

Indeed, if contradicting narratives were acknowledged, the idea would seem less potent, less likely to deliver promised results. As noted by Büscher (2013), the gap between proposed and achieved outcomes, or the 'tensions between material realities and reified representations' (p. 5), are exploited by policymakers in order to gain competitive advantage.

The argument by Büscher (2014) that interpretations such as success should be seen as capital, defined as 'value in motion' (p. 80), means that they are only useful when spread and consumed by actors outside a narrow circle of project managers. Therefore, an idea, and its (upcoming or achieved) success, needs to be sold to a wider audience, that is, the message needs to be consumed. When a particular narrative is produced and reproduced through written and oral statements by a number of actors, Büscher (2014) refers to them as belonging to an 'epistemic community' (p. 80). Drawing on Haas (1989:384), an epistemic community is defined as 'a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied' (Büscher, 2014:80). Within an epistemic community, the actors have a common interest in selling success, 'notwithstanding any contradictory and unintended outcomes' (Lund 2017:126; Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004). While I mainly studied representations of success in an ongoing implementation process, not post-implementation as in Büscher's case, his findings are relevant to the Bagamoyo case study. For instance, the Swedish CEO managed to rapidly sell his ideas to a wider audience in both Sweden and Tanzania, as outlined in Chapter 2, and created an epistemic community within which success was produced and sustained (see Paper III). Thus, epistemic communities are important in understanding the workings of resilient success narratives in this thesis.

A number of rationales have been suggested for such an epistemic community to maintain success. Apart from legitimising a project, other rationales advanced by Büscher (2014) include the will to be associated with success rather than failure in order to, for instance, sustain one's own career.

Other rationales could include creating the image of a smooth and manageable implementation process (van Ufford, 1993), or producing and sustaining authority on behalf of the epistemic community, where authority is produced and reproduced when actors confirm each other's positions (Fairclough, 2003).

In this thesis, the resilient narrative concept was important because there are many experiences and so many research findings have been produced that could have informed the current LSAI development strategy, and not least, the design of the Bagamoyo project. Furthermore, the proponents of the Bagamoyo investment consequently marginalised the voices of rural residents and information about current problems and struggles on the project site. However, instead of being influenced by all this evidence in any radical way, the assumptions and representations underpinning the LSAI narrative, and the vision of the project as an imminent success, remained intact. Thus, resilient narrative is a useful concept to explain *why* a development narrative is resilient.

However, the concept also proved useful to analyse *how* the LSAI narrative was sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities. Sustaining a criticised narrative does not take place automatically. On the contrary, it requires considerable investment by its proponents. As stated by Neumann (2003), 'power and social effort … is needed to sustain dominating representations' (p. 63). Just like hegemony, resilience is created through discursive effort, where confirming propositions are repeatedly produced (Neumann, 2003). Thus, a dominant hegemonic narrative and a resilient narrative are not necessarily different things, since a hegemonic narrative is implicitly resilient. However, a resilient narrative is not necessarily hegemonic, since marginalised narratives can also be resilient.

I chose resilient narrative as a concept because I believe it is more illustrative when studying how a narrative is sustained. In its dictionary form, the word resilience means 'elasticity' or 'flexibility', which entails a notion of dynamics in a way that I think 'hegemony' does not. Thus, the resilient narrative concept opens the way for scrutiny of the dynamics of how resilience is challenged and sustained, and how the proponents behind the narrative deal with contradicting narratives and materialities, including an investigation of the practices that constitute this elasticity. This was useful for the analysis in Paper III of how a wide range of what I call 'deflection practices' were applied to shield the LSAI narrative from critique. Calling a narrative hegemonic steers the analysis into a more binary view of what is dominant and subdominant, which is less useful in the present case.

In sum, I use the resilient narrative concept to investigate *why* a narrative is resilient (since it serves certain interests), but also *how* it is resilient to contradicting narratives and materialities (through a range of deflection practices).

In the next section, I outline some of the changes at the end of territorial colonialism which formed the basis for the contemporary development discourse, including some of its highly resilient representations, assumptions and values.

3.2   Post-colonial and post-development theory

This section introduces the wider development discourse outlined in post-development and post-colonial theory. As will be shown in Paper III, these bodies of literature contribute to an understanding of how certain ways of seeing and interlinked representations and assumptions, filtering through to the LSAI narrative, have lingered on over centuries, showing 'remarkable resilience' (Li, 2010).

3.2.1 An introduction

In this thesis, I use the term 'post-colonial' with reference to the argument advanced by Fanon (2005) that the liberation from colonialism is divided into two parts: liberation from territorial colonialism, which is 'over and done with', and liberation from certain colonial representations and subject positions, which is not.

In brief, post-colonial theory sets out to explain the origins of values, assumptions and representations from pre-colonial and colonial eras which still linger in contemporary, powerful Western images of the 'non-Western', of 'the Other' (Said, 1978:1). In this thesis, I apply post-colonial theory to reverse the gaze from the local context to proponents of development and their representations and assumptions used to produce the contemporary LSAI narrative.

An interlinked body of literature often grouped under the heading 'post-development' takes a similar approach to colonial legacies, but with particular focus on how these are reproduced within the development apparatus. Due to my focus on development narratives and failure, this body of literature provides a relevant complement to post-colonial theory. As a matter of fact, these two bodies of literature partly overlap, in that they tend to see notions of development, progress and modernisation as rooted in the history of Western imperialism (Slater & Bell, 2002).

Moreover, scholars within both these schools of thought emphasise that development is not only a set of projects to alleviate poverty. Instead, they refer to the political aspects of how to deliver development to poor people (Nustad, 2001), inspired by a theoretical and methodological framework of discourse analysis (Pieterse, 2000) and engaging with the politics of knowledge; how knowledge is created and distributed (Escobar, 1993; Ferguson, 1990; Slater, 2002). Scholars within this field criticise how representations, assumptions and values underpinning the development discourse bring with them a whole mindset and way of seeing the world, and facilitate Western dominance rather than getting rid of it after colonialism (Matthews, 2017).

3.2.2 Important insights from post-colonial and post-development literature

This section outlines representations and practices relevant in this thesis, which originated before, during and after the colonial era, arranged along the interlinked themes of Eurocentrism, modernity and Western knowledge systems.

The Post-War development discourse

Escobar's (1993) post-colonial critique of development is an eloquent example of how post-colonial and post-development literature converge, as he uses a post-colonial lens to deconstruct the development discourse emerging at the end of the Second World War. This section focuses on what Escobar, among others, identify as representations emerging at that specific time, which became key for the formation of the development apparatus.

Like many other scholars, Escobar (1993) points to how the 'underdeveloped' subject was invented in 20 January 1949, when President Harry S. Truman held his famous inaugural speech. From that moment, the large majority of the world's population was no longer seen as diverse, but as a homogeneous group – the underdeveloped.

Apart from the simplified categorisation of the world into developed and un(der)developed populations and countries, another important shift was the representation of poverty solely as lack of money, rather than focusing on political structures and power relations, inevitably portraying economic growth as the necessary solution. The 'war against poverty' gained rapid support in Western Europe and North America by framing allegedly widespread poverty as a potential threat to global stability.

Another emerging representation at the time was that of the three worlds, the free industrialised nations, the Communist industrialised nations and the poor, non-industrialised nations. Truman's speech was a key factor in this re-

structuring of the world, where industrialised, 'first-world' countries were expected to support poor, 'third-world' countries with development aid through impersonal institutions, such as the World Bank, in order to enhance capitalist expansion and associated processes (Escobar, 1993:31). Importantly, this simplified categorisation equalled development with industrialisation, a representation that has remained at the core of the development discourse.

Eurocentrism, the evolutionary development ladder and the Other

In a Eurocentric perspective, development is defined as anything that strives towards or conforms to the ideas, expectations and state of progress of the developed West (Escobar, 1993), while anything deviating from it should adjust accordingly and strive towards it. A Eurocentric perspective, referring to the European way of seeing the world as the template, inevitably creates normative dichotomies, such as traditional-modern and primitive-civilised (Nyamnjoh, 2000). In addition, Eurocentrism codes historical processes in a way that presents Europe as the continent of 'reason, progress and modernity' (Prakash, 1994:1485), and has been described as an expansionist idea 'impatient with alternative systems of thought and practice' (Nyamnjoh, 2000:7). While the idea of progress emerged already during the Age of Enlightenment in the 18th Century, it enjoyed more legitimacy after the influence of publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* in 1859. Applied to society, the notion of natural evolution entailed all societies moving towards a predestined end-station, from the primitive to the more complex and modern society. The end-station was the modern Western nation-state (Eriksson Baaz, 2005).

More recently, the notion of Eurocentrism was fuelled by modernisation theory emerging in the 1950s-1960s, dominated by a belief that modernisation was the only process through which primitive relations and ways of thinking could be destroyed (Escobar, 1993). Underpinned by this notion of modernisation, the image of a linear development path evolved, coded through what Western countries judged to be a 'normal course of evolution and progress' (Escobar, 1993:26). This view was influenced by the Rostow (1959) model of the stages of economic growth, where he defined five distinct stages expected to occur, where traditional societies would mature in a direction towards mass consumption. Although criticised for decades, ideas about the evolutionary ladder are clearly expressed in the LSAI narrative, for instance in the way subsistence farmers are expected to 'move up the ladder', become entrepreneurial and evolve into more 'efficient', technologically more advanced, agricultural producers. Thus, development emerged as the process of transition from one specific position to another, taking place in a predictable manner. An intrinsic assumption in this way of seeing is that industrialisation will absorb

landless people from rural areas, for instance those rendered surplus due to LSAI. However, this adsorption has repeatedly been found to be minor, particularly in formal sectors. As indicated on page 4 in Paper IV, in Tanzania, landless people are mainly engaged in informal labour arrangements with minimum salaries, and the existing industry does not offer a large number of jobs (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). Seeing societies in undeveloped countries as still being on their way has been used to justify development failure. For example, Eriksson Baaz (2005) shows how failed development projects were justified by the claim that Tanzania was not yet ready for the intervention concerned. This way of representing the problem as being in the local structures, mindset and culture, rather than performing self-critical analysis and integrating insights about complex contexts from such an analysis into policies and project designs, is a practice that I observed among LSAI proponents in this study.

Another important point made by Eriksson Baaz (2005) is that, even if this development path was seen as intrinsic to all societies, different societies reflected different stages of development in the same evolutionary process. Thus, within the notion of an evolutionary ladder, the European and the African shared something – they were on the same path – and they were only separated by their stage of development, where the developing country needed to catch up, as reflected for instance in the paper by Collier & Dercon (2009). This created a structure where the European could know what the African is going through, because they (or their ancestors) had experienced that stage of development. This approach, referring to the era when Europe, or Sweden, was located at that stage, for example when hoes were used in tillage, and the path forward from there then becomes unproblematic, even natural. The most important implication of this reasoning was the representation of 'backwardness', of lagging behind (Eriksson Baaz, 2005:39). In the Bagamoyo case, both Sida officers and company representatives made statements that were clearly underpinned by this notion of an evolutionary ladder (see Paper III).

This strong notion of superiority of Europe(ans) in relation to the Other lingered and formed a fundamental characteristic of the development discourse from the onset (Escobar, 1993). In the words of Ferguson, 'in its extreme forms, development discourse sometimes even speaks as if the problem of poverty is all in the head – as if impoverished villagers could escape their condition by a simple change of attitude or intellectual conversion' (Ferguson, 1990:58). Thus, the underlying *causes* of poverty can be formulated as being intrinsic in the *character* of the poor (Nyamnjoh, 2000). Similar types of discursive homogenisations are described by Said (1978), who argues that the image of the Other is permeated by 'ideas about what "we" do and what "they" cannot do or understand as "we" do'

(p. 12). This way of portraying social relations is clearly expressed in the LSAI narrative (Paper III).

Through the mechanisms described above, the development discourse created the underdeveloped, backward or even lazy subject position, justifying it as a target of interventions suggested by the West (Escobar, 1993). All these representations enable the Westerner to be very self-confident in identifying what the Other needs, that is, to develop the underdeveloped. This notion of superiority is perceived by both post-colonial and post-development scholars as 'trusteeship', built into the construction of development already in the first half of the 19th Century (Cowen & Shenton, 1996), when 'those who saw themselves as developed took it upon themselves to guide the development of those who were not' (Nustad, 2001). Having the position of trustee means 'to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need' (Li, 2007b:4). This notion of superiority entails 'overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter' (Said, 1978:7). In other words, there is no need to ask them.

Western scientific knowledge

Another pivotal factor legitimising the idea of evolutionary development is a strong faith in modern Western science and its 'objective accuracy and fairness of representation' (Escobar, 1993:37). Development strategies based on such science were seen as more advanced, or even more 'true'.

However, as pointed by Haraway (1988) among many others, knowledge production, including scientific knowledge, is 'situated', produced by subjects with particular interests and values, and more a matter of 'power moves' rather than 'moves towards the truth' (p. 581). There are two particularly important scientific knowledge disciplines in producing the development discourse; natural science and economics. Great technical advance during the Second World War emphasised the importance of the expansion of technology and was perceived in the Four-Point Programme to deliver progress at a lower price (Escobar, 1993; Slater, 2002). For agricultural development in particular, technology was deemed important to achieve greater productivity and efficiency (Escobar, 1993). The view of technology as neutral and inevitably beneficial and the interlinked concept of 'transfer of technology' are consistently common in development projects (Escobar, 1993:36), and also proposed as an important outcome of the contemporary LSAI development strategy.

Importantly, however, embedded in the promotion of technology was an expectation not only to strengthen *material* progress, but also to change the mindset of undeveloped populations, as expressed by Escobar (1993):

'Modernisation technology was theorised as a moral force that would operate by creating an ethics of innovation, yield and result. Technology thus contributed to the planetary extension of modernist ideals' (p. 36). Thus, transfer of technology is described in a different light, encompassing subtle mechanisms to achieve changes in the mindset of the 'undeveloped', another clearly expressed objective of the Bagamoyo company.

There is a final way in which the belief in technology is problematic. The view of technology transfer as leading to development entails yet another simplification of complex contexts, since such transfers depend on context. Important social and environmental dynamics such as rainy seasons, soils, labour dynamics, household relations and the desire of smallholders are often treated as details, so the scientific procedures 'miss the point' (Scott, 1998:290). Such omissions can prove fatal for development projects. As stated by Scott (1998), ignoring such dimensions of local diversity, they 'all but guarantee their own practical failure' (p. 340).

Alongside the strong faith in science and technology, there is a second discipline that Escobar (1993) points out as the single most influential force shaping the development, namely Western economic models, whereby social, cultural and political progress only can be achieved through material advancement. As indicated above, this view generated the belief that capital investment and economic growth were the key ingredients to achieve development.

The professionalisation and institutionalisation of development practices

By now, it should be evident that certain representations of underdeveloped subjects have been produced and sustained until today, from the era of colonialism or before. This is possible because certain types of representations and ways of seeing become consolidated within the development apparatus, through two main processes: professionalisation of a certain kind of knowledge and institutionalisation of certain development practices. In brief, professionalisation is the process through which a 'politics of truth' is produced and sustained, that is, where certain knowledge is rendered objective and superior. Simultaneously, other knowledge is marginalised as less relevant and deviating opinions are rendered less trust-worthy or even threatening. In the resulting discourse, knowledge based on 'neutral' technology and economic theories becomes central to develop the 'third-world' countries.

Institutionalisation is the way in which this 'true' knowledge becomes consolidated into a structure that ensures its reproduction and operationalisation into policies and projects (Ferguson, 1990). In particular, this includes depoliticising practices which translate 'certain unmanageable sorts of facts into a

more acceptable register' (Ferguson, 1990:28), such as risk assessments and other bureaucratic procedures. Combined, these practices serve to support a certain way of seeing the world and enable the simplified development discourse to be sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities.

Indeed, despite a number of shifts in the way development has been conceived and performed, including the participatory turn, the emphasis on partnerships and a varying emphasis on economic growth as the overarching goal, the essence of development discourse remains intact. As stated by Nustad (2001):

> From the point of view of post-development, with its focus on the discursive formation of development, what appears to the practitioner as groundbreaking revolutions is instead seen as a different constellation of the same elements (p. 481).

3.2.3 Outlining some relevant criticism of post-development

The critique of post-development scholarship is diverse and sometimes tendentious, and there is no space to elaborate on details. Instead, in this section I draw attention to a few points of criticism that match some of my own critical reflections.

First of all, post-development literature has been argued to be simplified in the sense that it makes grand generalised statements without consideration of the particular (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Eriksson Baaz, 2005; Pieterse, 2000). The first example I would like to raise here concerns the concept of 'development' and the interlinked concept of 'development apparatus'. Crewe and Harrison (1998) and Pieterse (2000) emphasise the importance of not seeing the development apparatus as a monolithic body, but rather as an apparatus with great diversity in organisation and practical work habits. For example, Escobar's claim that 'the World Bank stories are "all the same"' disregards repeated shifts in the discourse of the World Bank (Eriksson Baaz, 2005).

Another critique is the generalisation of 'the West' and of 'European' – what is 'the West' and what is typical for a Western or European perspective? For example, referring to the development path of the West (often referring to Western Europe and North America) as one stereotyped way in which countries transitioned from peasant to industrial communities gives the skewed notion that, for example, all European countries industrialised in exactly the same way (Chibber, 2014). Along the same lines, Pieterse (2000) points to the need for nuancing the image of the West and non-West, and the Other, since protests against modernisation exist also in the West and proponents of modernisation are not confined to the West.

A final point of criticism is that general statements about development as something implicitly negative disregard any actual improvements that development has brought, for instance when it comes to life expectancy and other issues related to health (Pieterse, 2000). A related point of criticism, expressed by Matthews (2017), is that post-development has problems dealing with 'true' desires for development. She argues that a desire for development might not only exist due to the colonisation of the minds of the poor, but might reflect a desire for basic comfort, such as access to clean water, or a call for equality. Therefore, while acknowledging profound problems with past and current architecture behind development, one cannot disregard the fact that development can be desired or bring benefits in certain ways.

Nevertheless, knowledge about the development discourse, associated narratives and how and why they are produced is valuable in itself, since it helps understand why development often fails and what needs to change. As argued by Nustad (2001), critical analysis of development is important and should not be ignored, since it can reveal that 'some of the problematic premises on which development interventions are based do not hold' (p. 479).

While I share the criticism of how post-colonial and post-development thinkers sometimes homogenise certain phenomena, I believe their categorisations can still be useful in order to achieve legibility. Furthermore, they continue to raise important points about how certain representations repeatedly shape development interventions. Moreover, their theories on the contribution of the gap between development project design and local context to development failure provided valuable background to my research. Therefore, I apply these somewhat simplifying concepts in this thesis, while being aware of the complicating aspects outlined above.

To sum up, I showed in this section how findings from post-colonial and post-development theory outline historical trajectories of simplified assumptions and values underpinning the development discourse, filtering through into the LSAI narrative. I also showed that processes of professionalisation and institutionalisation can improve our understanding of how resilient narratives are sustained and that key concepts used in these bodies of literature have rightfully been criticised as sweeping and simplified.

4 Methodology

This chapter moves from outlining epistemological perspectives to a description of research design and methods for data collection and analysis. It also describes the field work, ending with a section on the research process, interspersed with some critical reflections.

4.1 Epistemological and ontological issues

In this thesis I apply a 'moderate' form of social constructivism, drawing on Fairclough (2010), who argues that discourse is only one part of what shapes the social world and that there is a real world which exists irrespective of how and why it is represented (p.5). This 'critical realist' perspective takes the position that certain events or objects are not dependent on being socially constructed in order to exist. Rather, 'the world is such that some transformations are possible [through discourse], others are not' (Fairclough, 2010:5). Thus, what in this thesis are called 'contradicting materialities' are events or phenomena which cannot be transformed through representing them in a certain way. For instance, the cover image on this thesis contrasts the vision of BEE to transform the Bagamoyo landscape into vast, straight lines of sugarcane plants (left side) with the material realities that Barabaig herders are still residing on the land, grazing and watering their cattle, and no bush has been cleared for plantation (right side). While the company executives discursively sustained the project as an imminent success, the reality is that not a single sugarcane has been planted and no-one has yet been resettled.

The approach outlined above is useful for the kind of analysis performed in this thesis, comparing proposed and achieved outcomes, since it shows the importance of analysing discourse *in relation* to 'other objects, elements or moments' (Fairclough, 2010:4). Similarly, drawing on Bhaskar (1998), McKee (2009) describes the possibility to 'contrast the discursive with a more grounded

focus on the empirical world and the active agents within it' (p. 478). This, McKee argues, opens up for a scrutiny of how policies are implemented, their material effects and 'their unforeseen and unintended consequences, as well as their outward limits' (p. 479).

In general, I analyse the LSAI narrative in relation to complex contexts, focusing on: 1) contradicting narratives and 2) contradicting materialities. Contradicting narratives refer to stories told by rural residents in Razaba about the project implementation process or project impacts, or stories expressed in academic literature on, for instance, what the causes of low agricultural productivity are. Contradicting materialities refer to findings from observations on-site of, for instance, unpredictable weather, the status of project implementation and ongoing land use and livelihood activities. In Table 1 in Paper III, these contradicting materialities are called 'real-world' outcomes, as opposed to representations created by project proponents.

Returning to the issue of contradicting narratives, to identify which narratives will ultimately have 'socially constructive effects', for instance by being implemented in policy or concrete action (Fairclough 2010:5), it is necessary to bring power relations into the analysis. Discourse is used as a means to gain influence, so those with more influence in society are more likely to gain socially constructive effects with their narratives. My research supports the perception that it is often impossible to identify *one* truth. Rather, stories overlap and diverge, sometimes creating an indecipherable mess. If one were to attempt to compare different narratives, one would need to consider the social positions from which they are produced (Inglis, 2012). Thus, when outlining conflicting discourses or narratives, representations produced by influential and resourceful actors should be more critically scrutinised (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). For instance, competing narratives on whether residents on Razaba Ranch are 'invaders', as stated by high-level officials and company representatives, or whether the land is actually rightfully theirs to use, as claimed by some residents, do not have equal opportunity to be considered 'real'. Thus, the dominating version of 'invaders' influences the actions taken, in this case leasing land to an investor and planning for physical displacement of the residents.

As indicated in on page 35 in Chapter 1, a focus on critically examining dominating narratives does not exclude actors from less influential social positions from the analysis. Even though rural residents in and around Razaba Ranch are not part of producing the dominating narrative under scrutiny, their actions are sometimes explicitly visible and they are also in between the lines, that is, they constitute a major share of the 'excess'; the 'processes and interactions, histories, solidarities and attachments that cannot be reconfigured according to plan' (Li, 2007a:277). Thus, the rural residents 'do not disappear

into discourse but appear in its interstices, subordinated by structures over which they exert pressure' (Prakash, 1994:1482). In fact, my initial interest in investigating the impacts of LSAIs on rural residents and their livelihoods was the very reason why I reversed the gaze to the more resourceful LSAI proponents and their narratives in my analysis.

4.2 Research design

Data collection and analysis in this thesis was guided by the three research questions and performed through case study methodology. Overall, I applied an explorative and iterative process, where empirical work served to identify relevant theoretical perspectives and orientate the thesis within theoretical debates, and where theoretical concepts discovered in the process informed upcoming empirical work and helped sharpen interview questions and analysis. According to Yin (2009), case studies which reflect theoretical propositions often have such an iterative nature, where the research focus is successively refined and established. In the final stage of reflection and clarification, the contribution of the thesis was distilled and the cover story took shape (an overview of the research process is provided in Figure 6, and it is described in more detail in section 4.6). With my natural science background, I applied a cross-disciplinary approach, having no set discipline from which I set out my investigation. This approach further enabled inductive research, since I identified relevant literature based on empirical findings and relevant themes of investigation, where ethnographies of aid and development failure in particular were the core literature, but where I also drew on other bodies of literature.

Figure 4. An overview of the iterative research process in relation to the papers and insights over time.

4.2.1 A case study approach

A qualitative case study is a useful approach to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its context (Yin, 2009). Moreover, a case study methodology offers a useful tool to explore different representations of reality (Flyvbjerg, 2006), where one can look for the complexity of a case and its interaction with contexts (Stake, 1995). Alternating between interviews with LSAI proponents, mainly based in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm and data collection on the project site allowed me to study the connections, or disconnections, between narratives supporting the Bagamoyo project in relation to contradicting narratives and materialities on site over time, in order to understand how this interplay produced delays and development failure. In addition, a case study approach fitted well with my iterative research design, since case studies are often inductive, where the approach is that one starts with finding out about the case and then proceeds to identify relevant theories to explain empirical observations (Gillham, 2000).

In order to investigate the case in relation to its context, I used discourse analysis as the main data analysis method (described further in section 4.6.1), investigating patterns of shared representations and assumptions across in the LSAI narrative and how the narrative was produced, circulated and consumed. Furthermore, discourse analysis made it possible to analyse the relationship between these statements and contradicting narratives and materialities (Fairclough, 2010).

Cases are commonly selected to serve one particular purpose, but when more is discovered they may prove to be cases of something else than originally intended. As stated by C. Lund (2014): 'Carefully selecting the cases poses no small problem. How and when does one know whether or for what a case is critical? How will one even know what it was about before it is studied?'(p. 227)

While the cases selected for this research were initially chosen in order to study impacts, they became cases of development failure. As outlined in Chapter 1, the pilot study in 2012 (empirical task 1 in Figure 6) showed that almost none of the reported investments had any project activities on the ground. At least two investors were allegedly 'progressing', however. Since it was no longer possible to investigate the impacts of materialised projects, which was the initial intention, there was an important shift in focus for the research project. However, the idea to study impacts still lingered when the two cases were selected: The Swedish investment in Bagamoyo district aiming for large-scale sugarcane production and the Belgian/Tanzanian investment in Kigoma Rural district (which later became Uvinza district) aiming for palm oil production on 4253 hectares. The Kigoma case was studied in data collection phases 2 and 3, during approximately 2.5 months living in a village affected by the investment.

However, for reasons explained later, this thesis is based solely on empirical data from the Bagamoyo case study, although my field work in Kigoma contributed some important methodological insights that are included in this section, where relevant.

The Bagamoyo case is a suitable case to address the research questions in at least three aspects: i) It provides a case of delayed investment that eventually failed to materialise. ii) The investment has received unprecedented political support, situated at the centre of Tanzanian policy development and closely linked to the Tanzanian government and Swedish development aid policy, which makes its failure to deliver proposed outcomes even more interesting to investigate. iii) The research benefited from my previous knowledge about the project obtained through my employment at the Sida Helpdesk. Thus, in this thesis the failed Bagamoyo project is the unit of analysis illustrating a case of the more general phenomenon of development failure.

4.2.2 An overview of field work and thesis data

The field work was divided into: 1) Observations and interviews with residents on and around Razaba Ranch and 2) interviews in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm. The field work consisted of six distinct periods of data collection in 2012-2017 (see Table 1), with the exception of interviews with Sida staff.

Table 1. *Overview of data collection phases and their main purpose.*

Phase 1	March 2012	Pilot study, validating status of LSAI
Phase 2	April 2013	Broad exploration of narratives of proponents of LSAI and of local communities
Phase 3	Feb-April 2014	General update on LSAI narrative, contradicting narratives and materialities
Phase 4	July 2014	Further exploration of LSAI narrative in the face of repeated delays, contradicting narratives and materialities
Phase 5	March 2016	Further exploration of LSAI narrative in the face of repeated delays, contradicting narratives and materialities
Phase 6	Mar-April 2017	Follow-up interviews to investigate the LSAI narrative after the company's loss of rights of occupancy

In total, this thesis builds on 79 interviews[33]. Of these, 10 interviews had the character of background interviews with, for instance, Tanzanian state officials

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[33] If field work in Kigoma is included, a total of 124 interviews were conducted, plus 14 focus group discussions and participatory exercises in Kigoma.

around more general issues on land, regulations and the status of LSAI nationally. The other 69 interviews were case-specific. Of these, 30 interviews (43 percent) took place in local communities in and around Razaba Ranch and 39 interviews (57 percent) were mainly conducted in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm. Throughout the research, I held interviews at the Sida headquarters in Stockholm and had informal discussions with Sida staff at seminars. This enabled me to collect data about Sida on a more frequent and irregular basis (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviews performed).

Apart from interviews, the thesis builds on analysis of key policy documents and corporate documents produced between 2006 and 2017. The scope of documents included documents which were frequently referred to, which enjoyed broad support and played a pivotal role in producing and reproducing the LSAI narrative (Neumann, 2003). Broadly, these can be divided into key Tanzanian policy documents, Sida documents (policies and concept notes, meeting notes, decisions, assessments), and corporate documents produced by SEKAB and BEE, the latter category being a hitherto underutilised source in research on LSAI (Kuns, Visser, & Wästfelt, 2016) (see Appendix 3 for a list of documents analysed). Documents related to the Sida assessment in 2012 were shared by Sida officers or requested from Sida's archives. When citing documents from Sida and the investor in particular, I was careful to ensure that these are the publically available versions, and not partly classified versions. Most other documents were downloaded from websites. Apart from these policy and corporate documents, NGO reports, Swedish and Tanzanian newspapers and, on occasion, TV documentaries, were important sources of data. They provided news related to LSAI and the Bagamoyo case, but also formed an important part of the analysis of key points of criticism regarding the project and proponents' responses to this criticism (deflection practices described in Paper III). Websites were used to obtain other information about the company, its vision and plans. Podcasts about Swedish Development Aid also provided important data.

4.3 Data collection methods

A key feature of case studies is multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). When trying to understand, for instance, complex land allocation processes such as the Bagamoyo investment and contradicting narratives of how and why these develop, use of multiple methods enabled an overall understanding and provided a means to maximise triangulation and validate data. This section outlines the three interview methods used to collect data on the LSAI narrative and

contradicting narratives, and observation as the method to investigate contradicting materialities, and reflects on some challenges in data collection.

4.3.1 Sampling of informants

Throughout, informants were selected by non-probability sampling, the opposite to random sampling, an appropriate method to gain rich information from in-depth studies of a few cases (Bernard 2006). Thus, given the research questions, investigating the LSAI narrative and contradicting narratives related to the Bagamoyo project, the selection of informants was biased towards individuals who supported, or were targeted by, the investment. Bernard (2006) divides non-probability sampling into three different categories: (1) Convenience (or haphazard) sampling, (2) purposive sampling, where different informants are interviewed for different purposes, and (3) snowball or respondent-driven sampling. While all informants were sampled through non-probability sampling, a mixture of snowballing, purposive and convenience sampling was used, as is indicated where appropriate.

4.3.2 Group discussions

Focus group discussions proved to be a particularly useful method, given the research questions, since they enabled collection of data about content and process, not about personal attributes (Bernard, 2006). However, instead of focus group discussions, here I call them group discussions given the convenience sampling method used, that is, grabbing whoever was available (Bernard, 2006). Thus, the groups did not have the planned composition and restricted number of participants which are key features of focus group discussions. In total, six group discussions were performed (Appendix 2).

(Focus) group discussions are also useful to obtain a range of responses in order to gain overview information on a selected topic, which can later be probed using other methods (Gillham, 2000). The discussions helped me gain an overview of residents' narratives about the project implementation process. I used these discussions to define questions for individual interviews in and around Razaba Ranch, in order to get a better understanding of certain events and processes. I also used these discussions to define questions for proponents of the investment, in order to get their response to local people's stories.

In one sub-village where we stopped each time we visited the ranch, we met with the chair every time. Other residents also usually joined us to discuss the current situation. However, the group that gathered had an over-representation of male informants and, when women were present, they did not say much. To

compensate for that, I deliberately encouraged women to speak and, when we stopped along the road for interviews, I mainly selected women as informants.

All discussions were recorded with the permission of the participants who were there at the onset of the discussion. However, due to the nature of the discussions, with many people talking simultaneously and sometimes far away from the microphone, they proved difficult to transcribe. This meant that I relied heavily on interpretation and my personal notes for analysis of this data.

4.3.3 Semi-structured interviews and informal discussions

In semi-structured interviews, the researcher asks open questions within themes that are selected beforehand (Gillham, 2000). Semi-structured interviews are commonly used when themes of inquiry are known, but when flexibility is needed regarding the order, how and for how long different issues are raised (Robson & McCartan, 2016).

Semi-structured interviews were the main technique applied in individual interviews and provided an opportunity to probe for detail, for example on issues previously raised in group discussions. In total, 57 semi-structured interviews were performed (Appendix 2). These interviews also served the important purpose of triangulating data from group discussions and other individual conversations. Topical themes and sub-questions were identified beforehand but applied in a flexible order depending on how the interview developed. If new relevant information was provided, the set-up allowed for improvised follow-up questions (see Appendix 2 for overarching topical themes for each of the data collection phases).

Semi-structured interviews in Razaba Ranch were performed with village chairs, people participating in the company's training of various kinds and other smallholders targeted by investment or outgrower schemes. A limited number of semi-structured interviews were also performed with the chair of the sub-village who we met more frequently[34]. The length of the interviews varied, where those with informants sampled by convenience tended to be shorter (see Appendix 1).

Semi-structured interviews were also the main method used to collect data from proponents of LSAI, since this approach is particularly useful for interviews with high-level bureaucrats, where the researcher is in control of the topics and can thus make efficient use of their time, but has the freedom to follow up leads (Bernard, 2006). Some additional data were obtained through questions and answers in email conversations with one Sida officer and one company

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[34] Informants and their residency in and around Razaba Ranch have been anonymised in order to protect them from repercussions.

representative throughout, and brief follow-up interviews over the phone during the last phase of data collection (phase 6 in Table 1).

Another important source of information was more informal discussions, or chats. For instance, when travelling between sub-villages in Razaba Ranch, a bridge was sometimes being repaired or a tree had to be removed from the road. People from a *dala-dala* (mini-bus) would get out, those on *piki-pikis* (motorbikes) would stop and others would join to observe, or help, which provided ample time for informal chats about the investment. Furthermore, we sometimes picked up hitchhiking residents within the ranch, which also proved to provide important opportunities for short conversations. Altogether, informal discussions provided pieces of information which added to my understanding of people's perceptions about the ongoing investment, and actually meant that, by the end, I had met people from most sub-villages within the ranch.

Likewise, informal chats proved important in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm. For instance, by staying at a hotel that was popular among expatriates in Dar es Salaam, I gained valuable information when bumping into key informants and other relevant actors in the courtyard. Informal chats with participants at Sida and NGO seminars arranged in Stockholm were also a valuable source of information.

4.3.4 Observations

In order to understand contradicting materialities, I made observations on the project site of, for instance, rural residents who had been employed by the company, new houses that had been constructed or substantial charcoal production. These observations helped confirm or reject representations from informants and guided my understanding of material realities. Most importantly, I repeatedly observed that no land preparation had been initiated and no sugarcane had been planted, thus empirically confirming the relationship between proposed and achieved outcomes, as outlined in Papers I-III.

4.4 Field work in and around Razaba Ranch

The village chair, *mwenyekiti*, sits next to me and the interpreter. Our sticky, red plastic chairs are placed on the grass, under a big tree outside the village council offices – two barracks facing each other. I ask about the resettlement process and the chair reports that approximately 50 villagers who had moved to Razaba Ranch to farm will be resettled by the project. They have been promised that they can choose between compensation in kind, that is, new houses on new sites, or compensation in cash. However, the villagers have become sceptical about the timeline. From watching the progress of a new house in the village, funded by the

investor as part of a construction training programme, they could see it took a very long time to build. Therefore, the chair tells us, the villagers are not convinced that compensation in kind is a preferable option.

He also tells us that the villagers perceive the 3000 hectares of land in their area targeted by the investor as theirs, but the village land use plan, funded by the investor, demarcates it as general land. That particular area near the river, he says, has more fertile soils, so they would like to keep it. But, he says, when the district commissioner comes and you are the village chair, you have no power. 'We have been given orders'.

Later that day, we interview an old lady farming a three-acre plot on the land targeted for investment, growing mainly rice and maize. Even though she has been encouraged to only grow annual crops, awaiting resettlement, she tells us that she and her sister plant mango trees whenever they change plots, for the fruit, but also to leave a sign that someone is using the land.

After a while, another (young, male) villager joins our conversation. He works as a *boda boda* (motorbike) driver, and tells us that his father was hired as a forest guard in order to keep out residents who cut trees for charcoal production. He believes that the investment has been invented by the bordering national park – if there was an investor planning to plant sugarcane here, why would they not allow the residents to cut trees, he asks. It seems more likely, from his perspective, that the park wants to expand its area (which it has done repeatedly in the past).

Field work on and around the project site was carried out by me and interpreters[35], with two to three visits per year (apart from 2015) during data collection phases 1-5 in 2012- 2016 (see Table 1). This enabled me to follow the implementation process of the Bagamoyo project over time and compare the narratives of project proponents with narratives such as those outlined above by people targeted by the investment, and also with observed contradicting materialities.

Since people live dispersed in several sub-villages within Razaba Ranch, this made it difficult to get an overview of all aggregations of houses. Moreover, certain sub-villages were inaccessible during the rainy season. Therefore, group discussions and individual interviews were performed almost exclusively through convenience sampling. We therefore met with partly different constellations of people representing different social positions each time we visited; those who were present and/or joined the discussion when we arrived in a sub-village, or when we stopped by a house along the road intersecting the estate. Even when using convenience sampling, only individuals who are relevant to the study in question are interviewed (Bernard, 2006).

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[35] Most interviews in Bagamoyo were interpreted by our Tanzanian colleague from Sokoine University of Agriculture. On one occasion a district officer assisted with interpretation, and in the field work in 2016 a Tanzanian friend helped translate.

Within the villages adjacent to Razaba Ranch we sampled purposively, for instance targeting the village chair because he was most likely to provide us with information about the status of the implementation process and the overall dynamics between the village, the government and the investor. Furthermore, we interviewed people who took part in outgrower training and training to prepare for resettlement, with the purpose of understanding their representations of the training provided and whether they understood the outgrower programme, its potential risks and opportunities. The village chair was often asked to provide us with names of these informants, that is, snow-ball sampling was applied. Since people in official positions were predominantly male, the gender aspect was skewed in the sampling. This is one of the drawbacks of applying convenience sample, that subgroups which are more accessible are likely to be over-represented. As indicated above, I tried to compensate for this in various ways.

4.4.1 The use of interpreters and recordings

Performing field work in another culture and in another language posed major challenges in making sense of what people said, how they acted and why. I applied three strategies to compensate for this and adapt to local customs and norms: First, I took courses in Kiswahili, which enabled me to greet people properly (which is a key social feature in Tanzania). Therefore, I was always able to introduce myself and pose initial interview questions in Kiswahili. Rather quickly, I learned enough Kiswahili to recognise whether key parts of the informant's reply were translated. Second, I was careful to adhere to the local custom of always initiating our visits by obtaining permit to conduct field work from the District Executive Director. On arriving in local communities, we always started by greeting the village chair and the village council members, showed the permit and carefully presented ourselves and the project. Third, I selected some key informants who I revisited on each field work occasion, in order to get to know these informants better. While the ideal situation would always be to speak the local language fluently, an actual *benefit* with interpreters was that translation allowed time for me to reflect upon relevant follow-up questions in the interview situation.

4.4.2 Note taking

Another benefit with having an interpreter was that it provided space for noting down valuable reflections during the interview. These reflections about what the informant said, and how, later became an important input to the analysis. In addition, since sitting down with one person usually ended with a whole group

joining in, I made sure to take notes about whether the response from the key informant changed in any way, in order to understand whether the other people joining in could have had an impact on the data. In between interviews, I also made notes of relevant observations on-site and from informal chats, in order to remember a maximum level of details. In the evenings, I went through the notes and revised them. As pointed out by Bernard (2006), recording never replaces note taking, since notes cover matters that recordings do not, for example environmental descriptions, the context of the interviews and reactions among informants.

4.4.3 Reflections on field work in rural areas

As indicated in the beginning of this Chapter, I performed field work in rural Kigoma and rural Bagamoyo. In particular, the 2.5-month field work, living in a village in Kigoma confirmed that performing field work in another culture and in another language is challenging in many different ways. Therefore, I draw on the following anecdote in order to provide some methodological reflections:

After having spent three weeks in the village in Kigoma, we (a Swedish Master's student and I) were informed by one of our interpreters that there were rumours about us. Some people thought that we were Belgian inspectors looking for land, others thought that we were doctors. One of the more surprising rumours was that we were Germans searching for beacons from the time of German colonial rule that allegedly marked resource-rich village sites. Getting access to this information was valuable for us, for many reasons.

First, we realised that, despite our sincere and well-planned efforts to introduce ourselves and why we were there, these rumours had been sparked and spread. Accordingly, we adapted our introduction of ourselves and our research. For instance, instead of using the word *utafiti*, which in Kiswahili means research *or* investigation, we introduced ourselves as *wanafunzi*, students, to avoid the risk of being thought of as investigators of land. All villagers were familiar with the word *wanafunzi* from sending their children to school, and it also became clear that students were perceived as having quite low status and were not perceived as a threat. For example, one village informant said 'You are only a student, how could you respond to this question?'.

Second, the information revealed that the relationship between researcher and informant is rarely unproblematic. The researcher is always recognised and trusted by some, taken advantage of by some, and not by others. People may want help on an issue, may say what they think the researcher wants to hear or exaggerate the negative impacts in the hope of support. I was seen as a teacher, a doctor, someone who can give them a voice, and also as 'only a student', or as

an inspector or land grabber. On many occasions, people's expectations of what I could bring very likely increased due to the fact that I am white.

What these rumours also revealed was a mistrust of 'outsiders'. Obviously the suspicion towards us stemmed partly from the fact that our questions focused on land, access to land and village borders, only a few years after the villagers perceived they had been robbed of land by the investor. This story confirmed that it takes time to build rapport and trust, and the importance of triangulation, since it is important to understand the rationale behind the answers obtained. This was particularly important to me as a female Swedish researcher, familiar with other norms and ways of seeing. All these insights assisted me in relating to data collected in the Bagamoyo case.

Another particularly evident risk as a Swedish person interviewing people in Bagamoyo was of course being perceived as aligned with the Swedish investor. However, I found that visiting the Bagamoyo site repeatedly over time resulted in some informants recognising me and, over time, learning that I was independent from both the Tanzanian state and the investor.

4.5 Interviews in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm

Interviews with key proponents of the LSAI development strategy took place almost exclusively in offices in Stockholm, Sweden, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with the main aim of outlining the LSAI narrative, for LSAI in general and for the Bagamoyo investment in particular. Key informants included Sida officers involved in handling the company's second (granted) application to Sida, and other Sida officers, both at Sida headquarters in Stockholm and at the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Through our Tanzanian collaboration partner, I was privileged to access two state officials positioned close to President Kikwete, in top positions within Big Results Now and SAGCOT. Other key informants included two company executives and three foreign consultants they had employed. At least one interview, or often more, with informants from Sida, the Tanzanian government and the Bagamoyo company was performed in all the first five phases of field work (see Table 1). In phase 6, I interviewed a Sida official and a company representative, but was never able to obtain an interview with state officials.

Apart from these interviews, I also performed what I call background interviews, with one minister, employees in several ministries and authorities, national and international NGOs, university professors and researchers (see Appendix 2). This material mainly informed Paper I, Paper IV and the kappa, and provided important understanding of, for instance, matters related to land.

In my very first meeting with the managing director of the company, he knew who I was and that I had authored the critical Sida Helpdesk assessment. He was, understandably, hostile towards me. However, during that interview, I managed to improve our relationship by thoroughly describing the scope of the assignment from Sida, and described the changes that I had found in the ESIA. He seemed surprised and understood why I had been critical, and the atmosphere improved substantially. After refusing to let me record interviews, at my third interview, he did agree to recording, much owing to the CEO, who also participated and wanted to be open with opinions. Most Sida and state officials agreed to recording without much discussion.

Interviews with company representatives were performed in Swedish, apart from when my Tanzanian colleague or hired foreign consultants participated. Just like at Razaba Ranch, I prepared topical themes and sub-questions beforehand (Appendix 1), but applied them in a flexible order in line with how the interview developed. Informants were usually contacted beforehand via email or telephone with a request for interview. As shown in Appendix 1, many of these interviews were rather long (2-3 hours) and could thus be considered as being of a more in-depth nature. In the few cases where interviews were not recorded, I took notes on my laptop during the interview and revised the notes directly afterwards. Fewer quotes are presented from these interviews, due to the difficulty in remembering exact phrases, but it was still possible to cover the essence of the responses.

As indicated, email correspondence was used, particularly with the managing director of the company and one Sida officer, to pose a number of follow-up questions in between my Tanzania visits.

One advantage with performing these 'policy level' interviews was that no interpreter was needed since they were performed in English, or even Swedish, my own and the company executives' mother tongue.

Reflections on interviews with policymakers

'I have been cheated many times. People come here and we have good discussions. Then they twist it behind my back' (interview, top state official, March 2016).

As indicated by the quote, interviews with policymakers sometimes entailed friction and emotion. This section briefly outlines some related methodological implications.

One interview, with a different top state official than that quoted above, illustrates an aggressive response to information perceived as threatening. Before the interview, the officer had asked for a project description and I had emailed our research application (written three years earlier), which basically set

the scene of poorly substantiated statements that millions of hectares of land being grabbed and our intention to investigate the actual impacts on the ground. While we were critical of the exaggerated statements about grabbed land, the state official interpreted the document as though we uncritically believed in these numbers. When we came to his office, he was furious and he had invited another top state official and two TIC officers to join the conversation. Most of the interview comprised his upset monologue about our (outdated) research aim, despite my repeated attempts to explain the shift in our research focus. He walked around in the room in anger, his face flushed. Given the one-sidedness of the interview, with the informant being quite oblivious of any other questions, the data at first seemed rather useless. However, when subjected to discourse analysis, the interview ended up providing highly relevant data and interesting quotes regarding his perceptions about the critique of the LSAI development strategy in Tanzania, as outlined in Paper III. Furthermore, this over-heated interview situation had made him invite another top state official, whom I subsequently met with repeatedly and who provided important data, and it provided me with the representations of the TIC staff.

Furthermore, after the interview, the top state official called the managing director of the Bagamoyo company and asked 'Who are these people?' (which the managing director himself told me when we bumped into each other at the hotel courtyard later that day). This provided interesting data about the investor-state relationship, as discussed in Paper III.

In another heated interview with the state official invited to the interview just outlined, my questions about failure provoked him to the extent that he aggressively started listing all the ongoing projects within SAGCOT, data I had tried to access through more 'neutral' questions about the status of LSAIs in Tanzania earlier in the interview. In addition, his critical responses to such provoking questions also helped me revisit and clarify my arguments.

In summary, provoking questions or information most likely provided more elaborate data from the informants and valuable means to scrutinise the solidity of my own research questions and claims. However, if information sent beforehand is outdated and/or misinterpreted, such transparency can become an obstacle to performing constructive and useful interviews, depending on the research aim. Nevertheless, even though a detailed description is outside the scope of this thesis, relations with some informants have deteriorated and more relationships will perhaps be negatively impacted when this thesis becomes public. Perhaps Mosse (2006) was right when he stated that 'what anthropologists know is inseparable from their relationship with those they study – the epistemology is relational – but ethnographic writing breaks fieldwork relations, cuts the network, and erects boundaries: it is necessarily anti-social' (p. 935).

4.6 Data analysis

Data analysis largely consisted of discourse analysis of interviews and policy documents (see Appendix 1 and 3), with the main aim of addressing RQ1, about how the LSAI narrative was produced and sustained in relation to contradicting narratives and materialities, including an analysis of how knowledge about the project was produced, circulated and consumed between the LSAI proponents. In addition to discourse analysis, in this section I describe how I analysed the empirical trajectories resulting from simplified narratives, interlinked delays and failure.

4.6.1 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis was performed, inspired by different approaches to discourse analysis and post-colonial and post-development theory, selecting tools and concepts I found methodologically relevant to analyse the LSAI narrative and the design of the Bagamoyo project in line with RQ1. In summary, I performed the analysis of the LSAI narrative along the following three themes:

1 Analysis of representations.
2 Analysis of practices and value assumptions.
3 Analysis of circulation and consumption of knowledge.

Across these themes, I analysed the influence of the private actor on how representations, practices and assumptions were produced and consumed.

Analysis of representations

A narrative is constituted by representations, statements about what or how something or someone 'is', produced from social positions. Investigating representations is an important part of discourse analysis, since they reveal how something is perceived from within a particular discourse (Neumann, 2003). The analysis was divided into two parts: i) Investigating representations among project proponents in relation to contradicting narratives and materialities from past research and experience and ii) investigating representations among project proponents in relation to contemporary contradicting narratives and materialities at and around the project site.

The first part of the analysis, mainly outlined in Paper III, identified contradicting narratives and materialities from development studies, post-colonial theory and past experience of LSAI in Tanzania. This is referred to in Paper III as 'accumulated academic knowledge', showing how similar ideas have not worked historically, and compared with the LSAI narrative.

The second part of the analysis was performed in a similar manner, but instead of comparing the LSAI narrative with accumulated academic knowledge, it was compared with contradicting narratives and materialities in and around Razaba Ranch. Combined, these two parts thus examined to what extent past and current contradicting narratives and materialities were reflected in project design, and the underpinning LSAI narrative.

There was another particular kind of representation that required further inquiry. As shown by Li (2007b) and Ferguson (1990), a core element of constructing development discourse includes the process of 'problem description'. This approach to discourse analysis emphasises that discourses and their associated policies actively construct problems, they do not passively address them (Bacchi, 2009). As outlined in Chapter 2, such 'problem representations' (Bacchi, 2009:xi) are particularly interesting since problems and their assumed causes often 'determine' which solutions are presented as inevitable. Thus, they form the basis of any development narrative. Paper III investigated such problem representations in the LSAI narrative and whether these matched academic literature and statements from local people.

As discussed in Paper III, drawing on Bacchi (2009), to study problematisations can be about teasing out the implied problem in a policy, where the problem is identified through reading off the suggested solution. For instance, when the SAGCOT policy suggests effectivisation of agriculture, it implicitly points to inefficiency of existing agricultural practices as the problem.

Analysis of practices and value assumptions

Discourses are created and sustained through social practices; everyday practices, expressions and interactions (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Within this theme, I investigated discursive and material practices used to produce and sustain the LSAI narrative in general and the Bagamoyo project design in particular. It entailed three strands of investigation: i) Analysis of simplifications underpinning the LSAI narrative and the Bagamoyo project design. ii) Analysis of what I call 'deflection practices', used by the LSAI proponents to sustain the narrative and the image of the project as an imminent success. iii) Analysis of shared value assumptions underpinning the LSAI narrative.

First, I analysed discursive practices of simplification, written and spoken statements reducing complexity. In this analysis, I focused on what proponents selected and disregarded in order to create: a) the linear narrative about LSAI as a development strategy and b) the project design of the Bagamoyo project.

To identify simplifications in the LSAI narrative, I iterated between literature, policy documents, interviews and observations on-site, progressively

identifying simplified representations, as described in Papers II and III. This analysis helped confirm a disjuncture between policy and complex contexts.

In the analysis of simplifications in project design, Scott (1998) was particularly helpful. As I will return to in Paper II, using this book, I identified different types of simplifications in the planning of large schemes, which helped me structure my data into themes. Moreover, I drew on findings within the post-development literature on depoliticising (Escobar, 1993; Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007b) in my analysis of what was being selected and disregarded.

Second, while I explored simplification as a *discursive* device, I also wanted to investigate *material* practices of simplification, which can provide an important complement to linguistic analysis (Wedel et al., 2005). In particular, I analysed bureaucratic procedures such as guidelines and assessments and how these were used to render socio-political matters technical. Moreover, I analysed how they were referred to in order to deflect critique. For example, Sida referred to its risk assessment to show that substantial risks facing smallholder farmers had been considered (see Paper III). Thus, material practices simultaneously reproduce simplified bureaucratic processes, and are shaped by them, by conforming to prevailing regulations and norms (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Altogether, the analysis of discursive and material practices contributed to my findings about both the simplified and resilient character of the LSAI narrative.

After my analysis of simplification in the LSAI and project narratives, in the second strand of my investigation of practices, I wanted to investigate the practices used to deflect contradicting narratives and materialities towards LSAI as a development strategy and towards the Bagamoyo project. As outlined in section 3.1.5, resilient narratives draw on the notion that discourses tend to render certain ways of seeing natural and others irrelevant. However, rather than just stating that fact, I studied *how* this resilience was discursively produced and sustained. Maintaining the image of dominating representations as natural requires a 'comprehensive discursive effort' and therefore analysis of how certain discourses delimit and dominate others is an important part of discourse analysis (Neumann, 2003:57).

I wanted to investigate this discursive effort, what it consisted of and the dynamics taking place. For the analysis performed in Paper III, I extracted main points of criticism advanced over the course of planning and implementing the Bagamoyo investment. To map the LSAI proponents' responses to this critique, I analysed public statements specifically written in response to criticism and statements in media articles and interviews where the proponents had been confronted with contradicting narratives and materialities. I identified a range of deflection practices, which I categorised into nine categories. I then selected the

types of deflection practices used by the proponents to respond to key points of criticism, as outlined in Paper III.

The third and final strand of investigation entailed an analysis of another pattern discerned in the LSAI narrative, namely patterns of shared value assumptions, 'particular meanings about what is good or desirable' (Fairclough, 2003:55) among the proponents. Value assumptions render certain types of knowledge irrelevant, while promoting other types of knowledge. They thereby facilitate various practices applied to deflect contradicting narratives and materialities described above, and help sustain the narrative. Assumptions were analysed through teasing out implicit understandings underpinning statements in policy documents and interviews, using post-colonial literature and other critical studies of development, as will be outlined in Paper III.

The circulation and consumption of knowledge

All the above helped me understand how certain representations and knowledge about the LSAI development strategy, and the Bagamoyo project, were produced, and by whom. I then focused on how that knowledge was circulated and consumed among LSAI proponents. As stated by Escobar (1993), discourse analysis offers a way to explore both the production and consumption of discourse. The analysis traced proposed beneficial results of the project and other statements about the project's imminent success back to the initial sources of this information, and to what extent and how they had been circulated and consumed by other LSAI proponents. The analysis paid particular attention to the extent to which production, circulation and consumption of knowledge was influenced by the close collaboration with a private actor.

4.6.2 Investigating empirical trajectories of failure

The findings from the discourse analysis addressing RQ1, how the LSAI was produced, formed the basis for investigating RQ2, that is, what role the LSAI narrative played in the failure of the Bagamoyo project. The aim of the analysis presented in this section was to understand how simplified representations in project plans were traversed by unexpected events, how they 'intersect[ed] with other processes, creating particular conjunctures' (Li, 2007b:1), causing unpredictable chain of events, repeated delays in relation to set timelines and, ultimately, failure of the investment to materialise.

Following a case over time is a useful way of comparing what was intended with a policy and what was actually established (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Along these lines, my overarching approach was to iterate between interviews with proponents of the Bagamoyo investment, on the one hand, and observations

and interviews with people on and around the project site, on the other, in the course of project implementation (Appendix 2). On each visit to Tanzania, I was able to update current promises and timelines from the proponents' horizon and contradicting narratives and materialities on and around Razaba Ranch. One finding gradually growing in importance was the repeated delays in relation to timelines. While some delays and their causes were mentioned by proponents in interviews, other delays and their causes were identified through studying the investment over time.

My iteration between actors and sites over time, triangulating statements within and between different groups and individuals, assisted in analysing the interlinkages between simplification, delay and failure. With time, delay grew into being used as an analytical concept, as outlined in section 3.1.3 and Paper II.

4.7 Research process

This section describes the research process, with the purpose of providing a transparent account of how and why the research focus shifted and narrowed down throughout the thesis work, and how I explored theoretical directions in line with the iterative research design (see Figure 6 for an overview). In order to better explain the logic of the research process, this section also lists some key empirical findings that influenced the scope and direction of the thesis.

4.7.1 Submitting a successful research application

As mentioned, at the time of initiation of this research, few empirical studies of the impacts of LSAIs had been performed. Collaboration with researchers at SLU and the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala resulted in a successful research application in 2011, with the title '*Large scale agro-investments in Africa - impacts on land access and food security*'. In other words, this project started out with the purpose of investigating the impacts on local communities of the supposedly huge wave of LSAIs sweeping across Africa. The focus on Tanzania was a pragmatic choice, in that there was considerable experience from Tanzania, including the planned Bagamoyo project, within the team. Moreover, we had Tanzanian collaboration partners with access to important knowledge and a network of informants. Importantly, Tanzania was a relevant focus since it was one of the main target countries for large-scale agricultural investment (Schoneveld, 2014).

The pilot study (empirical task 1 in Figure 6) aimed to get an overview of the status of LSAIs and actors involved, before selecting investment cases. The

findings from the pilot study resulted in Paper I and enabled a more geographically focused case study approach for later empirical work.

4.7.2 Setting the theoretical direction of the thesis

After the pilot study and selection of the two cases in Bagamoyo and Kigoma, the empirical work in 2013 was performed in an exploratory manner, keeping interview questions open and broad (empirical task 2 in Figure 6, see also Appendix 2 for an overarching topical interview themes). The aim was to better understand representations and actions of LSAI proponents at national level, and of rural residents targeted by the investment. One finding that struck me already then was the general discrepancy between the perceptions of these two groups of what happened and why, and how a wealth of complexities on the ground, which contributed to the standstill of the investment, were often completely disregarded in the proponents' narratives. From then on, this discrepancy lingered as one potential research theme: How was this gap between the LSAI narrative on what LSAI would solve and how, and the complex context into which it would be implemented, possible?

In the work that followed, I explored a number of theoretical directions and found that ethnographies of aid focusing on development failure were especially relevant to my cases, in particular Li (2007b), Ferguson (1990) and Mosse (2005) (theoretical task 1 in Figure 6). While all these helped me to more clearly analyse what I observed in the LSAI narrative, and the gap between policy and practice, it was another seminal piece of work that caught my main interest at that point (late 2013). Scott's (1998) observations of simplification behind the planning of large schemes in previous centuries strongly resonated with my findings and helped me identify an abundance of simplifications in the LSAI narrative and the design of the Bagamoyo project. The work of Scott (1998), combined with ethnographies of aid and other bodies of literature (including land grab literature), helped me structure the data, since I was able to identify different *types* of disregards (Paper II; see also Chapter 3).

Later, a more thorough reading of Scott (1998) (theoretical task 2 in Figure 6) formed the basis for the conceptual ideas behind Paper II. I started to write these down and progressively revised them during the research. Eventually, I had plenty of empirical data on delays and it emerged that I could use delay as a way to empirically describe *how* the project failed to deliver purported outcomes. Consequently, delay became a more central concept in my work and increasingly used as an analytical concept.

Importantly, the more the thesis was directed towards analysing narratives, the more its focus was directed towards the Swedish investment in Bagamoyo –

the case where I had followed the proponents over a long time, in particular Sida, and where I had held repeated interviews with proponents and with the target population on and around the investment site over time. A review of land grab literature at this stage was also helpful in showing that little in-depth analysis of why so many LSAIs had failed had been performed.

The relevance to explain failure of LSAI was also tested in conversations with other researchers from different international contexts at several conference venues. They confirmed that this was a widespread trend in many other African countries. Moreover, I developed a network of PhDs in Tanzania and other African countries, which was useful throughout the process for a regular status check on other LSAIs, among other things. Furthermore, when the research was geared towards investigating development failure, the second case in Kigoma had also stalled, which served to strengthen the relevance of my research focus.

The Kigoma case also provided me with a helpful reference point for the Bagamoyo case that I might not have seen as clearly otherwise. For example, it became clear that SEKAB/BEE enjoyed very strong political support, while the Kigoma investment did not. For instance, SEKAB/BEE had considerable influence in governmental policy processes and was well connected to Tanzanian authorities and ministry staff, whereas company executives in Kigoma were not part of these processes and sometimes not even known to officials in important positions that we interviewed.

4.7.3 Investigating the subjectivity of failure

The main purpose of my fifth visit to Tanzania in 2016 (phase 5 in Table 1) was to investigate how different actors viewed 'failure', and if they would categorise the stalled investment as a failure. It became clear that not a single actor would admit that LSAI in general, or the case investment, had failed, despite its standstill for nearly a decade. Rather, it seemed pertinent for proponents to discourage me from using that concept and to prove that LSAI, and the project, were imminent successes.

4.7.4 An increasing focus on resilient development narratives

Paper II outlines the ways in which the LSAI narrative and Bagamoyo project design were simplified to the extent that this contributed to development failure, but it does not address the mechanisms through which the simplified narrative could remain resilient over time to contradicting narratives and materialities. This became the focus of Paper III, which also benefited from the wide time span over which I followed the investment, showing how a series of contradicting

narratives and materialities were dealt with over time. A number of empirical and theoretical studies were performed to inform Paper III (empirical tasks 4 and 5 and theoretical task 3 in Figure 6).

An important insight at this stage was that although there is a wealth of literature on the resilience of development narratives, less attention had been paid to *how* this was achieved. Moreover, I realised it had been little studied in the context of collaboration with a private sector. Another important insight was that even though delay was frequently mentioned as a feature in large projects, none of the publications I read discussed delay as an interesting factor in itself, or related it to development failure.

In the process of writing Paper III, an event in Tanzania demanded an empirical follow-up: The revoking of the investor's rights of occupancy, a decision made public in November that year. Surely, even the proponents would call the case a failure at that point? Follow-up telephone interviews with two key informants at policy level were performed to further analyse their relationship to failure, providing interesting data for Paper III (empirical task 6 in Figure 6). Moreover, the data analysis performed for Paper III made clear that post-colonial theory was an important overarching theoretical frame for the paper.

At this stage, I realised that, although the fact that most investments failed to materialise was increasingly recognised among policymakers and in the land grab literature, little attention was paid to the severe impacts of these land deals in limbo. Thus, my findings about impacts of the failed project are an important contribution of this thesis. One important input came at a Sida seminar. After briefly outlining my findings to an attending Sida officer, she said 'one has not heard anything about impacts from something which never happened'. The insight was further strengthened by a conference panel on this particular topic, describing the topic of impacts of land deals in limbo[36] as under-researched.

Around this time, I was invited to co-author a paper on aggregated impacts from different land pressures in Tanzania, where my research could contribute empirical findings on impacts of failed investments (Paper IV).

4.7.5 Cover story

In the final seven months, the research process entailed reflections on findings, clarification of concepts, development of conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and determination of the contributions of the thesis (theoretical task 4 in Figure 6). During this time, I also revised Paper II, after it had been rejected

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[36] For instance, a panel arranged by PhD students Brigitte Youjin Chung and Marie Gagné at the African Studies Association conference in Chicago, November 2016, both studying stalled land deals in Africa.

at first submission, and in line with other comments. This revision was very helpful for developing the conceptual work for the thesis as a whole, and for developing the discussion on the role of delay. Moreover, at this final stage, emphasis was put on positioning my findings in relation to literature on resilient development narratives in the context of private sector collaboration, or, more broadly, in a neoliberal context.

4.8 Reflections on research design and process

I believe that applying an iterative case study research design generally served well to investigate the research questions. It allowed me to follow the project implementation process over many years, and analyse dominant narratives vis-à-vis contradicting narratives and materialities over time. In particular, it allowed me to study repeated delays, including their drivers and effects. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) point out that what was intended to be established or put in place through a policy will be faced with a multitude of obstacles and that such processes can be addressed through qualitative work with a longitudinal perspective. While I do not claim to have performed a longitudinal case study, I believe that the relatively long time span of my work was important to address the research questions.

Nevertheless, had the final research questions been known at the beginning of the thesis work, and that I would not include data from the Kigoma case (where I performed a much longer field work in the rural areas), I would have preferred to conduct longer field work in Bagamoyo. Since the visits to Razaba Ranch were almost entirely day visits, these visits offered limited insights into the details of local context, at least compared with living on-site for a period. To compensate for this, I triangulated the data as much as possible, partly with other informants on and around the ranch. Moreover, I repeatedly discussed the data with one company consultant and one researcher who, through years of study, were well informed about the project, the project site and people living in and around it. For instance, through hearing people repeatedly talking about the elders' court case, triangulating this information with the other researcher and gaining access to court case documents, I could reliably confirm that a court case had been initiated. However, details on exactly what happened within that process, and why, varied. This variation also constitutes valid data, since these accounts 'demonstrated just how complex and uncertain these kinds of controversies are' (Roe, 1994:ix).

Throughout the research, I actively sought to minimise my influence on the trajectory of the project itself. For instance, I have not participated to any large extent in the public debate about the project since the onset of my PhD research,

even though opportunities have been plenty[37]. While this was a way to minimise my own effects on the project, I also wanted to avoid the risk of being rejected by key informants, or even prevented from collecting data altogether. Towards the end of the thesis work, in March 2017, when these risks were reduced, I published an opinion piece in *Development Today*.

Another strategy I applied in order to validate my data is that I constantly challenged myself to provide evidence for my claims and reflected on possible contradicting statements (Bernard, 2006). I often left policy interviews with a feeling of having been provoked by ruling techniques, or succumbed to being drawn into a debate, starting to express my own opinions instead of continuing with the interview as planned. However, reading through transcripts to get a picture of what questions I asked, and how, I found that my questions had usually been posed in a critical manner, but had remained open-ended and followed the topical themes identified beforehand.

Finally, I only used publically available documents and interviews performed since the onset of research, in order to avoid ethical dilemmas with using information accessed when employed at the Sida Helpdesk.

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[37] I agreed to being interviewed by Ann Usher for *Development Today*, and in one Omvärlden article.

5 Summary of Papers I-IV

In this section, I provide a brief review of the four papers on which this thesis is based. Each paper builds on empirical and theoretical work carried out during the six phases of the research process, and follows the progression of the PhD research.

Paper I builds on a review of reported planned LSAIs in Tanzania, combined with a pilot trip to triangulate the review, and was pivotal since it served as entry point for outlining the research questions. Papers II and III build on discourse analysis and form the core of the thesis, in the sense that they outline the LSAI narrative and investigate its character in relation to complex contexts and development failure. Paper IV was included with the main purpose to set the findings in a wider context of increasing pressure on land in Tanzania, building on empirical data collected within a range of research projects based at universities in Denmark, Tanzania, USA and Sweden over time.

5.1 Paper I: A critical analysis of practices and dynamics of large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania (published)

Paper I paints a broader picture of the status of LSAI, showing that the recent LSAI hype, and the criticism of it, was exaggerated and poorly empirically grounded. Based on statistics from the Tanzanian state and a review of NGO reports and scientific papers, I identified more than 30 planned deals larger than 2000 ha since 2003. However, the pilot study revealed a striking discrepancy between the extent of planned deals and the number of materialised LSAIs – most had never left the stage of being a paper product. Moreover, a majority of investors who *did* require land were struggling to start operations. Another important finding was that the rush for large-scale biofuel investment had seized completely – all biofuel

investments had gone bankrupt, left the site or attempted to shift to food production, but were still struggling to materialise.

Apart from forming the basis of the thesis, Paper I outlines some of the contradicting narratives from rural residents targeted by LSAIs in Bagamoyo and Rufiji districts. It also provides important background to rural development policy in Tanzania since independence.

5.2 Paper II: Land deals in limbo: Exploring simplification, delay and development failure in a large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania (manuscript)

In order to understand the failure of the LSAI development strategy to fulfil proposed outcomes, it was important to examine how the LSAI narrative was constructed. Paper II provides part of the answer to this question by investigating simplifications in the Bagamoyo project design and in the underpinning LSAI narrative.

Through discourse analysis of key policy documents and interviews, the paper outlines how simplification as a tool of governing shapes the LSAI narrative, rendering complex contexts legible. More specifically, the paper outlines how different types of simplifications, reflected in Bagamoyo project design, interact with complex contexts to produce repeated delays in relation to set timelines, arising as *an effect* of simplification. Finally, it shows that repeated delays contribute to failure of investments to materialise. Thus, the findings confirm claims of a link between simplification and development failure, as shown by, for example, Ferguson (1990) and Li (2007), where the implementation process is affected by factors that were disregarded in project design and underpinning narratives. However, Paper II shows how delay is a frequent but overlooked factor in literature on development failure. Thus the paper particularly emphasises the importance of delay, its drivers and effects, when understanding development failure.

An implication of the findings in Paper II, given the frequent observations of simplification in policy studies, is that simplification of different aspects of population and territory is being *repeated* over time and over socio-political contexts. Thus *how and why* knowledge is produced and consumed among project proponents in order to sustain such simplifications in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities was investigated in Paper III.

Table 2. *How Paper II contributes to answering the research questions*

Research Question	Findings
RQ1: How and why is the LSAI narrative about the Bagamoyo investment produced?	The narrative builds on simplified ways of seeing population and territory.
	Figures and facts produced by the company are severely simplified in order to attract, and maintain, political support and funding.
RQ2: How does the LSAI narrative contribute to failure of the Bagamoyo project?	Simplifications in narrative and project design interact with complex contexts to produce repeated delays, which contribute to the investment's failure to materialise.
RQ3: What do the findings from RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the current understanding about development failure?	Delay and its drivers and effects need to be given more attention in debates on development failure.
	Privatisation of development can contribute to increased risk of failure.

5.3 Paper III: Conjuring a win-world: Resilient development narratives in a large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania (published)

Paper III shows that the narrative supporting the LSAI development strategy in general, and the Bagamoyo investment in particular, is resilient to what we call counter-evidence (contradicting materialities). Thus, it presents another answer to research question 1, on how the LSAI narrative is constructed: apart from being simplified, the narrative is also stunningly resilient to counter-evidence (Table 3).

In addition, Paper III builds on Paper II by taking the investigation one step further: Paper II reveals that the Bagamoyo project design and the LSAI narrative build on simplifications, which contribute to development failure. Paper III shows how it is possible that the LSAI development strategy *repeatedly* fails to deliver proposed outcomes. It also outlines some of the assumptions and values that contribute to the simplified ways of seeing presented in Paper II.

Paper III begins by revisiting findings in development studies literature, literature on experiences from past LSAI in Tanzania and post-colonial literature, which repeatedly question assumptions and values underpinning the LSAI narrative. It then outlines 'criticism' and 'material realities' (contradicting narratives and materialities) in relation to the Bagamoyo project and compares proposed and achieved outcomes, what we call 'real-world outcomes'.

It then describes how three key proponents of the Bagamoyo project (the company, the Tanzanian state and Sida) respond when confronted with such contradicting narratives and materialities. These actors are shown to apply a striking range of discursive and material practices to deflect this unwanted knowledge, rendering it irrelevant through a range of practices. These 'deflection practices' enable the proponents to sustain the image of the Bagamoyo investment as an imminent success, despite substantial critique and slow progress. They also enable them to sustain the image of the LSAI development strategy as a success, even when the Bagamoyo project, and most other LSAIs, fail to materialise.

Paper III also identifies some implications of the close collaboration with a private actor. For instance, this actor had a very strong position in the production of the knowledge about the investment, based on relatively extreme notions of superiority and trusteeship. Moreover, this knowledge was rather uncritically consumed by other project proponents. Finally, Paper III advances some reflections on *why* contradicting narratives and materialities are repeatedly rejected in favour of simplified, sometimes inaccurate, notions of population and territory.

Table 3. *How Paper III contributes to answering the research questions*

Research Question	Findings
RQ 1 How and why is the LSAI narrative about the Bagamoyo project produced and sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities?	The narrative is resilient, immune to counter-evidence to the LSAI development strategy.
	Counter-evidence is marginalised through different 'deflection practices'.
	The narrative is sustained due to lack of knowledge, lack of interest, notion of trusteeship, vested interests, structural impositions *etc*., with strong influence from the private actor.
RQ 2 How does the LSAI narrative contribute to failure of the Bagamoyo project	The narrative is resilient to experiences that could informed project design and facilitate project implementation.
RQ 3 What do the findings from RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the current understanding of development failure?	Since the narrative is resilient to counter-evidence, the LSAI development strategy can be regularly 're-invented'.

5.4 Paper IV: Between dependence and deprivation: The interlocking nature of land alienation in Tanzania (published)

Paper IV situates the research findings in a wider context, by presenting an aggregated analysis of the quest for land in Tanzania. This is important, since smallholder farmers and pastoralists suffer from accumulated impacts from agriculture, conservation, tourism and mining. The overall message is that, while smallholders are still largely dependent on land-based livelihoods, they are simultaneously limited by immense expropriation of land for the purposes mentioned above and offered a limited number of alternatives. For instance, data on general, reserved and village land in the Tanzanian National Land Policy from 1995 are highly outdated: Rather than 28 percent reserved land for national parks and wildlife management, the figure will soon be more than 50 percent of Tanzania's land.

Paper IV outlines multiple processes of 'accumulation of rural dispossession' and provides a picture of the complex dynamics, unequal land alienation, conflict, migration and marginalisation in rural Tanzania. It also shows that landlessness is a growing issue in some regions, particularly among women, and that there are no vast tracts of unused, available land for expropriation, as stated, for instance, in the LSAI narrative. An important conclusion is that all these constraints placed on smallholder farmers deprive them of the opportunity to increase production, which in turn can fuel debate on inefficient smallholder farming and provide even stronger justification for development strategies such as LSAI.

Thus, apart from situating the thesis findings in a wider context, Paper IV provides solid empirical support for the claim that the LSAI narrative is underpinned by simplifications in relation to land governance and abundance (Table 4). My empirical findings proved important, since the initial message of Paper IV was that the new wave of LSAI largely failed to materialise and thus its impact on land tenure and land use was negligible. Thus, my findings concerning impacts on rural residents of *stalled or failed* large-scale agricultural investment was an important addition to the work. Finally, Paper IV includes some findings from my second case study in Kigoma. These findings support the conclusion in the thesis that failed investments can have widespread impacts, since the Kigoma investment was also repeatedly delayed, but nevertheless had severe impacts on local communities.

Table 4. How Paper IV contributes to answering the research questions

Research Question	Findings
RQ 1: How is the LSAI narrative about the Bagamoyo investment produced?	The narrative builds on simplifications on the availability of land, land tenure and the alleged linear development path towards industrialisation.

6 Discussion and conclusions

This chapter starts with some brief reflections on generalising from a case study and then revisits and discusses the research questions in light of the key findings (outlined as subtitles).

The takeoff point for the thesis was the finding in Paper I that very few of the planned LSAIs in Tanzania had materialised. Through a case study approach, the overarching aim of this thesis was to contribute to the knowledge about how and why this new wave of LSAIs has failed to deliver proposed outcomes.

I found that the context for the case, a failed large-scale sugarcane investment in Bagamoyo, is highly complex and to a certain extent unpredictable. Nevertheless, instead of blaming failure on this local context, I argue that the proponents of the LSAI development strategy have a responsibility to understand the context and address its complexity in their policies and project designs, in order to deliver the beneficial results they promise. Therefore, my analysis focused on proponents of the LSAI development strategy in Tanzania and the Bagamoyo project. The analysis largely revolved around what I have called 'the LSAI narrative' produced by these proponents in relation to contradicting narratives and materialities, in order to understand development narratives and failure in a context of close collaboration with the private sector.

6.1 Generalising from a case study

In most instances, cases studies are not performed with the aim of making universal declarations. As C. Lund (2014) states:

> Generalisation out of the close historical and geographical context is … to enter into a dialogue where one's research resonates with other works. The work of others may serve as a basis for a form of triangulation, not in order to establish actual validity but to suggest likelihood and probability (p. 227).

The discussion below is inspired by this approach to generalisation. As indicated, this thesis does not tell the complete story about the new wave of LSAIs or present the only way to analyse why it failed. Rather, it sheds light on one project from one particular angle. Moreover, there are many ways in which the Bagamoyo project might not be a representative case of a failed LSAI. For instance, as stated by Büscher (2014), whether or not the commodity of 'success' is actually consumed depends on the seller's 'marketing capabilities' (p. 81). In the Bagamoyo case, the seller's (CEO's) marketing capabilities were quite extraordinary. Moreover, the Bagamoyo project was not representative in that it reached *beyond* being a paper product, which most other planned investments have not. Nevertheless, the richer understanding I provide of the dynamics and tensions around a delayed and failed LSAI, and the rationales underpinning the selling of the Bagamoyo project as a success, add to existing debates on development narratives and development failure.

My findings are important since, even though the landscape for LSAIs has changed in Tanzania since the start of this thesis work, the Tanzanian government is still struggling to attract investors to mega-farms such as the Bagamoyo project, while small- and medium scale farms seem to materialise to a larger extent (Jayne *et al*., 2016). In addition, the pattern of failed LSAIs does not seem to be specific to Tanzania, but has been observed in other African countries.

6.2 The LSAI narrative is simplified and resilient to contradicting narratives and materialities

My answer to RQ 1, how the LSAI narrative is produced and sustained largely confirmed claims advanced in some of the important works in post-development literature. For instance, my finding that the LSAI narrative is underpinned by simplified representations, reflecting a strong Eurocentrism and an interlinked belief in a linear development path (Papers II and III), echoes observations made by Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1993) and Li (2007), among others. Moreover, simplification meant that a wealth of environmental and socio-political aspects of context was disregarded, confirming the gap between policy and context shown in, for instance, post-development and policy studies, land grab literature and studies of environmental governance. While this is not new, repeating a message emphasises that something needs to change. However, my finding that the LSAI narrative is resilient to contradicting narratives and materialities highlights the difficulties in changing certain representations, assumptions and values.

The second finding answering RQ 1, is that the LSAI narrative is resilient, overlooking various forms of contradicting narratives and materialities. This means that development strategies based on simplified ways of representing the world that have failed in the past can be re-launched, sometimes slightly re-packaged[38]. For instance, I found that simplified value assumptions and representations of population and territory underpinning the LSAI narrative linger on from colonial, or even pre-colonial times, despite being repeatedly questioned or even counter-proven, and despite the 'new' packaging as public private partnerships. Moreover, in the Bagamoyo project, with visibly few achieved outcomes in relation to those promised, many proponents interviewed still refrained from calling it a failure. Similarly, Büscher (2014) found that a project where only preparatory feasibility studies had been completed was nevertheless marketed as a success afterwards, in order to 'sell' the particular development strategy of Payment for Ecosystem Services as a winning concept.

While observations of such resilient narratives abound, few studies have examined *how* these narratives are produced, circulated and consumed (Büscher, 2014), including for land deals (Wolford, 2015).

My first key finding on this issue is that the private actor in the case studied had a very strong position in production of the narrative about the project, based on gross simplifications and relatively extreme notions of trusteeship (Papers II and III). This was combined with largely uncritical consumption by other actors, including the Tanzanian state and Sida, of the company's stories about project design, implementation process and effects.

My second key finding on how development narratives are produced and sustained concerns the range of deflection practices used to keep the LSAI narrative intact in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities. These include discrediting critics and the issues they raised, or re-directing the focus towards the grand visions of the project in order to avoid a discussion about issues such as substantial risks for smallholders or increased greenhouse gas emissions. A range of such deflection practices were used in order to sustain the image of imminent success of both the LSAI development strategy and the Bagamoyo project, produced in what is called 'win-world' in Paper III.

While the narrative remained robust in its underpinning key assumptions and representations such as the backward 'Other', or what development entails, I identified some changes to the narrative and project support, where contradicting narratives and materialities and changing global dynamics played an important

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[38] In my case, LSAI is repackaged as new with reference to the public-private character with focus on inclusive growth. Similarly, Lund et al (2017) point to the repackaging of community based forest management into REDD+, in the paper titled "Promising change, delivering continuity".

role. For instance, as outlined on page 65, the criticism from Sida Helpdesk regarding environmental issues was reflected in Sida's decision to reject the SEKAB application in 2009. Changing global oil prices and criticism regarding food versus fuel influenced the EU to change its sustainability criteria, all of which forced a change in the LSAI narrative away from promoting large-scale, agricultural production of biofuel crops (Paper II). For the Bagamoyo project, this led to a shift to 'selling' large-scale production of sugar, rather than ethanol. However, the overarching way of seeing the world remained intact.

When similar narratives are repeated and few lessons of past, failed attempts have been integrated, a *repeated* gap develops between policy formulation and complex contexts. This gap has enabled regular re-launch of the LSAI development strategy for rural Africa since the 19th Century. Understanding this repeated failure requires some reflections on possible rationales behind policymakers' reuse of previously failed development strategies.

6.3 Multiple rationales behind resilient narratives

While the section above addressed one part of RQ 1, *how* narratives were produced and sustained, this section addresses the second part of that question, *why* narratives were produced and sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities. There is rich literature on the rationales behind the production of resilient narratives in development (Paper III, see also page 78 in Chapter 3). However, the conclusions in this literature are largely a matter of interpretation and speculation, since data on the true rationales among proponents of a development strategy are elusive, with rare exceptions (offered, for instance, by Mosse (2005)). What simplified and resilient narratives actually *achieve* is discernible, however, providing important input to the discussion on possible rationales in this section. Thus, in a way, this section is as much about what simplification and resilience *achieves*, as about why the simplified and resilient LSAI narrative is sustained.

Rationales behind simplified and resilient development narratives include the purpose of 'sweeping people along' with simplified messages (Wolmer et al., 2006:10) and gaining legitimacy for intervention in order to obtain political support and create/maintain networks (Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004, 2005). In combination, these played an important role in the Bagamoyo case, where a wide network of supporters and contacts was an important result of Carstedt's mission to 'sell' the idea of large-scale ethanol production in East Africa. For instance, the Minister of Lands and the President in Tanzania bought into the idea, and the company developed close relations with both SAGCOT and BRN. In Sweden, the Swedish ambassador's presence at the SEKAB's first seminar in Stockholm

about the East Africa plans signalled support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs *and* the Tanzanian government, while important Swedish authorities, later involved in both financing and performing assessments, were also represented. Moreover, the shift in the company executives' narrative from selling ethanol to selling sugar was most likely in order to enable continued support. In particular, this shift contributed to Sida's change of position and decision to financially support BEE in 2014.

As outlined by Ribot and Peluso (2003), the repetition of similar narratives, ways of 'retelling a story notwithstanding counterevidence' (p. 171), serves as a means to 'maintaining access' to resources (p. 159). In the Bagamoyo case, as in other cases of 'land deals without investment' (Hall et al., 2015:6), access to, and control over, land has been consolidated with the Tanzanian state reconfirming the status of Razaba Ranch as formally general land. This formalisation replaces contested terrain, thereby erasing any potential legal claims to land from local communities that existed *a priori*.

An interlinked effect of the above is that the authority of the state is strengthened. As pointed out by, for example, Sikor and Lund (2009), there is an important relationship between property and authority: authority is required in order to grant legitimacy to claims of property, while gaining claims to property expands authority. Thus, in processes which include competing claims over resources, authority is reinforced, consolidated or eroded between the actors involved. In the Bagamoyo case this involved a strengthening of the Tanzanian state's authority and (at least temporarily) the authority of the company, at the expense of Razaba residents.

Apart from consolidation of land, there are other obvious gains in this story, not least massive financial flows, largely taking place in spheres far from Razaba Ranch and its residents. As argued by Lund et al. (2017), gaining and maintaining political support is not only about the support in itself. Rather, it serves as a means to justify continued financial flows, where the 'promise of change becomes a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced and used to generate value and appropriate financial resources' (p. 124). For instance, the company executives' monthly salaries (25 562 and 27 798 USD) amounted to 10 million USD over the course of the project, a highly 'real' effect of simplification and of sustaining a vision of imminent success for over a decade. This influx of funding benefited a wide range of actors, including Swedish and Tanzanian authorities, researchers and consultancies tasked with performing ESIAs, quality checks and assessments. Not least, it benefited the Tanzanian state (largely via SAGCOT and BRN). While I did not investigate in detail the financial flows created by the LSAI hype in general and the Bagamoyo project in particular, these findings point to substantial financial gains for many of the

actors involved. In brief, although proposed benefits largely failed to materialise, one could say that the Bagamoyo project and the narratives supporting it have been highly successful in selling success, thus making simplification profitable, mainly for LSAI proponents.

While Sida appears to be one of the losers in the deal, it is reasonable to believe that, at least for a time, it enjoyed enhanced diplomatic leverage in Tanzania when involved in such an 'iconic' and 'state-of-the-art' investment supported by the President and his nearest circle of government officials. So far, little public debate has surfaced in Sweden about Sida's loss of 54 million SEK from the Swedish development budget. Such a debate could well harm Sida's reputation. However, Sida still has a chance to regain this money, should the ICSID rule in favour of the company.

As regards plausible reasons why Sida decided to support the Bagamoyo project financially – the puzzle mentioned at the very beginning of this thesis – a number of rationales can be discerned. Apart from diplomatic gains, the trend among other development agencies to emphasise private sector collaboration was an important driver which fitted well into the ideology of the Swedish government at the time. Moreover, the project enjoyed strong support from the Tanzanian president and key ministers. Another important contributing rationale derives from the endeavour to make narratives appear apolitical and functional, for instance through referring to impersonal and neutral scientific knowledge. As outlined on page 64, when the project was 'sold' to a wider audience, the CEO, but in particular the SEI professor, leaned heavily on scientific data on, for instance, productivity increases in tropical climates and greenhouse gas emission savings in their presentations. Buying into, and reproducing, this naturalised, technical narrative may have offered an efficient means for policymakers to distance themselves from the people targeted by the policy or project. Furthermore, leaning on solid scientific data and well-known researchers could have served as a means to justify the lack of target people's perspectives in project design and Sida's assessments. However, a key mechanism at play, which enabled the near complete lack of target people's perspectives in project design and the few visits of development staff from the African Development Bank and Sida to Razaba Ranch, was a notion of trusteeship (see p. 84). This enabled the investor to design policies and projects without having to understand the people or places that would supposedly benefit from them, a gap that was not addressed in any significant way by Sida. This notion of trusteeship entailed marginalisation of any potentially contradicting narratives. In other words, there was no need to ask, for instance, the smallholder farmers about their views on the problem, its causes and potential solutions.

To understand why an individual Sida officer decided to approve, or at least not oppose, Sida support to the Bagamoyo project, it is necessary to also consider what happens when development workers themselves raise internal criticism. As stated by Neumann (2003): 'To understand why a certain sequence of practices take place, one needs to look at the sanctions should a deviating representation be advanced' (p. 48). In this context, it is important to recognise that development practitioners, just like any other actor involved in producing and reproducing simplified narratives, are both 'masters and slaves of language' (Barthes, 1982 in Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:17). Indeed, one reason for development officials to reproduce an image of imminent success in the face of non-implementation, or at least not contradict it, could be to simply adhere to social structures in order to sustain their careers, as suggested by, for instance, Büscher (2014). The criticism advanced at one important Sida meeting in relation to the project, related, for instance, to the displaced Barabaigs in Hanang, was not mentioned in Sida's decision to support the project in 2014. Thus, while I did not investigate any potential implications for that particular officer, her argument was marginalised. Based on that example and other indications of a similar kind, it may have been the case that Sida staff who wanted to question, or did question, Sida support for the project were restricted by social structures, such as political pressure, bureaucratic procedures and vested interests among people in prominent positions.

Another reason why donors may comply with, and reproduce, simplified and resilient policies could be that it has the effect of making them 'indispensable', providing opportunities to justify their continued support and operation, in a sense another means to sustain careers. For instance, both Sida and the African Development Bank referred to the ongoing trend for LSAIs, partly created by the development apparatus itself, in order to justify their support for LSAIs and related issues, referring to the need to adapt to ongoing developments (Faye et al., 2013; Sida, 2012a). At a more general level, decades of neoliberal structural adjustment drove development where the state was hollowed out, inviting other actors, increasingly from the private sector, to partake in an increasingly complex governance of resources (Büscher, 2014; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Wolford et al., 2013). This is another reason for not uncritically blaming the context for the failure of investments, since many of the proponents of LSAI have pushed for a form of development that has created the current situation of unclarity and complexity in the governance of land.

With all these plausible reasons for the engagement of Sida and other proponents in the Bagamoyo project, one can ask whether lack of knowledge is still a plausible contributing factor to them 'buying into' a simplified

project design. The role of knowledge in relation to supporting previously failed development strategies has been widely discussed in the aidnography literature. According to Hobart (1993), there is no lack of knowledge, only deflection of other knowledge than that naturalised within the domain. Ufford (1993), on the contrary, claims that policymakers *do* lack knowledge about the context, since their 'world' where policies are designed is so far away from the context in which projects are implemented. Two decades after these conclusions, Harwood (2013) was not as tolerant of lack of knowledge among development practitioners. He argued that knowledge about repeated failures of previous very similar development strategies must have been available to those proposing 'new' interventions and concluded that the problem is broader than a lack of knowledge – it is indifference. I argue that one does not exclude the other. In the Bagamoyo case, certain knowledge was certainly lacking, such as basic knowledge about Tanzanian land governance or context in general (Paper III), partly due to the relatively short contracts of Sida officials at the embassies. In particular, interviews with Sida officers and the Swedish company executives showed that they did not possess such knowledge beforehand, but described the past decade as a learning process (Papers II and III). Other knowledge initially lacking at Sida was understanding of complex financial reports and conditions, as outlined in Sida's internal audit (Sida, 2015). However, in interviews with project proponents, certain knowledge, for instance about conflict and uncertainty in Razaba Ranch, was deflected in various ways. For lack of knowledge about context to remain an issue over decades, it seems reasonable to argue, in line with Harwood (2013), that it is underpinned by a lack of interest and lack of incentive to find out. Importantly, however, structural impositions play an important role in sustaining lack of knowledge and restricting critical discussion. Thus, this thesis describes simplifications performed in ignorance and simplifications performed as a means to achieve certain ends, with blurred lines between the two.

A final reflection on why Sida supported the project is that, towards the end of the project, it had economic gains at stake. Overall, the rationales to support, maintain support and reproduce the image of imminent success seem to have changed over time.

6.4 Delay an important link between simplification and failure

In order to answer RQ 2 about the role of the LSAI narrative in the failure of the Bagamoyo project, the thesis emphasised the role of simplification. In particular, it showed how complicating factors in context – the 'excess' (Li, 2007a:277) – were disregarded, but would later interfere with the implementation process. However, in order to understand the link between simplification and failure, the thesis identified a need to consider delay, which constitutes an important *effect* of simplification, which can produce failure. Thus, delay is an important empirical descriptor of how a development project fails to deliver proposed outcomes. Moreover, delay can be a useful analytical concept to understand actions taken or avoided, and effects of a stalled or failed development project. For instance, as outlined on page 11 in Paper II, BEE's application to Sida in 2012 was a direct consequence of delays and the company's fear of losing support. Thus, the current debt of 54 million SEK owed to Sida is also indirectly an effect of delay. Delays in the Bagamoyo case produced action, such as the Sida decisions just mentioned. Another example is that the time lag between announcement of the project and the company gaining its formal right of occupancy provided space for elders in one sub-village to sell land to outsiders, and later sue the company and the government in a time-consuming court case. Moreover, delay produced non-action, contributing to 'protect' the investment from scrutiny of various kinds, because it seemed irrelevant to assess the outcomes of a project while it was not fully operational. Again, as outlined on page 11 in Paper II, the monitoring of socio-economic impacts of the project, which was mentioned as a mitigation measure in the risk assessment, was never initiated, with reference to 'nothing is happening'. This is highly problematic, as it renders stalled projects, and their substantial effects, invisible.

Meanwhile, this thesis and other studies of the impacts on people awaiting resettlement on Razaba Ranch show that they have been severe. For instance, some people have invested less in farm land and houses, some have become increasingly dependent on charcoal and some have followed the recommendation from the company to shift from farming perennial crops to annual crops (Paper II), even though perennial crops are often a fallback when annual crops are flooded (Kjellin, 2015). Furthermore, local people have suffered from increasing uncertainty about when and where to move and the rate of compensation. Finally, the lack of information and mixed messages about the upcoming resettlement have been 'psychologically and emotionally debilitating' for people dependent on land on and around Razaba Ranch (Chung, 2017:116). Thus, despite delays having severe impacts on the target people, these impacts were not monitored (due to delays) and thus given little attention by project

supporters. These findings show that while delay is in itself an effect of simplification, as an analytical concept it helps in identifying more effects of simplification. All the above improves understanding of development failure, its immanent dynamics and effects.

Interestingly, while conditions set by the funding development agencies constituted a major share of positive project outcomes for residents in and around Razaba, such as training, alternative livelihoods and better information flows, many delays were also caused by these conditions. For instance, as outlined in Paper II, the demand that the project adhere to international best practice severely complicated resettlement, by causing intra-state conflicts and demanding detailed socio-economic investigations. The requirement on the investor to find a strategic partner to invest a large share of the equity is another example. Thus, the ambition to achieve project sustainability contributed to important positive outcomes, but simultaneously produced delay, which in turn produced failure.

I have shown that, even though simplification has been widely discussed, the phenomenon of delay has been little discussed in post-development literature, even though delay is portrayed as a frequent feature of development projects (Li, 2007b; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017), including LSAIs (Burnod *et al.*, 2013; Folster, 2001; Klopp & Lumumba, 2014).

The purpose of this thesis was not to scrutinise other bodies of literature discussing delay. However, in other bodies of literature on disparate topics such as migration, conflict mediation and planning, delay is described as a conscious strategy to influence a policy or project, either by those supporting the policy, by those targeted by it, or both (Paper II, p. 7; see also section 3.1.3). In the Bagamoyo case, however, project proponents, in particular Swedish Sida officers and company executives, did not seem to anticipate or plan for repeated delays (Paper II). It is more likely that delay was used as a strategy by rural residents, since actions taken by them had direct, delaying effects on the implementation process.

Delay also had effects on the company, although more indirectly, for example it had time to gain more experience of Tanzania and avoided being hit severely by the financial crisis. Overall, however, delay was ultimately detrimental for the company, since it led to reduced support in general, including halted payments from Sida. Thus, delay was detrimental for both the company and rural residents, but in very different ways. Company executives continued to retain their 25-27 000 USD monthly salaries, money they now stand a chance of recovering in the ICSID lawsuit, but many rural residents lost livelihood opportunities and many families split up while waiting in uncertainty. Although they might now have a chance to stay on the land, given the withdrawn land title

of the company, the status of this land has now been re-confirmed, or re-formalised, as general land, and part of the area (10 000 ha) has been allocated to a domestic investor.

A final interesting observation in relation to delay is that there could be a link between repeated delay and the increasing discursive effort needed to sustain the image of imminent success. There is also a reverse relationship: one reason why the project was described as 'only' delayed (proponents maintained their will to implement it), and not closed down, is that project proponents could thereby sustain images of imminent success, notwithstanding their accumulated knowledge about, for instance, soil salinity, ongoing land conflicts or smallholder farmers becoming dependent on charcoal production for their livelihoods. Thus, delay can also be seen as an effect not only of simplification, but also of the resilience of the narrative, selling success in the face of non-implementation. Thus, in this thesis, I argue that delay is not necessarily neither unexpected, inevitable nor innocent.

6.5 Delay and privatisation of development has important implications

The answer to RQ3, what the findings from RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the current understanding of development failure, largely draws on the discussion about delay above. All the implications outlined above emphasise the role of delay in understanding development failure, its immanent dynamics and effects. They also show how delay can contribute analytically to understand actions taken, or not taken, in relation to failed investments.

Another finding that could shed new light on development failure, and interlinked development narratives, concerns how knowledge about the Bagamoyo project was produced, circulated and consumed following the paradigm shift in development assistance towards unprecedented influence of the private sector. This is a rather new focus in studies of development. Most ethnographies of aid so far have analysed development practitioners and, to a minor extent, state representatives, when studying narratives underpinning development projects (Ferguson, 1990; Hobart, 1993; Li, 2007b; Mosse, 2005; van Ufford, 1993). However, the Bagamoyo case involves a private actor. In the emerging body of literature studying 'success narratives' in a neoliberal setting (Büscher, 2014; Green, 2015; Lund et al., 2017; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017), there are few detailed accounts of how knowledge is produced, circulated and consumed. In particular, it seems few studies are available where a private actor was responsible for project design and production of primary information about the project. Moreover, this thesis is based on narratives from three different

proponents, which permitted comparison of the private actors' narrative in relation to the others.

This thesis contributes to the debate on privatised success narratives through two key findings, concerning: i) Production of a relatively extreme narrative by the private actor, and ii) uncritical consumption of this narrative by other actors, which made this narrative highly influential.

Company representatives, with no previous experience of Africa, expressed extreme colonial values of the undeveloped 'Other' in describing smallholder farmers as 'living in a black hole' (of ignorance) or in repeated comparison with Sweden as a model for development (Paper III). In general, company representatives showed striking resilience to past and present contradicting narratives and materialities, instead disseminating a narrative of linear development towards industrialisation and modernised, large-scale agriculture. In that process, they represented smallholder farmers as in need of assistance to pursue a linear path towards progress and fortune, where outgrower schemes would transform subsistence farmers into businessmen (see Figure 4). This could be seen as reflecting the kind of development knowledge emphasised in neoliberal ideology, where references to growth, industrialisation and modernisation are perceived as adequate and trustworthy (Green, 2015).

Thus, the private company in the Bagamoyo case was very close to the 'joystick' and had pivotal influence in identifying and implementing the project, a recurring feature of the current neoliberal shift in development assistance (Green, 2015; Omvärlden, 2017). Not least, the company designed the large project on Razaba Ranch, the seed cane farm and the outgrower scheme, and was given the responsibility to implement all these.

The above could indicate regression towards a more simplified, extreme narrative, influenced by colonial representations of population and territory, Western economic models and notions of development, and a stronger notion of trusteeship. That could create a growing gap between policy and context, and an enhanced risk of (repeated) failure. Such regression is particularly problematic in light of the findings in this thesis on the implications of close private sector collaboration – the company's substantial influence over project design and over narratives about its future outcomes and current status. This influence was largely due to uncritical *consumption* of this knowledge by a range of other actors sharing the company's way of seeing the world. From producing simplifications to achieve legibility, produce potent messages and gather and maintain support, it had become a matter of making simplification profitable, selling success rapidly to a wider audience, forming an epistemic community. While the case involved a charismatic and skilled salesman, the project was also situated in a context permitting closer relationships between private interests and

bilateral donors (Green 2015). Thus, while uncritical consumption of knowledge by, for instance, development actors has been observed elsewhere (Büscher, 2014), this thesis shows the potential influence of a private actor on the narrative being sold.

In the Bagamoyo case, the distance from the investor to Sida, or the Tanzanian state, was very short. Indeed, sometimes they were only an informal phone call away (Chapter 4, p. 104), a situation that does not necessarily apply in other cases. The close relationship between Sida and other Swedish authorities and consultants and the investor in this particular case was facilitated by the company's Swedish origin, with a CEO contributing to disseminate the LSAI narratives on biofuel production in Sweden, Europe and Tanzania in the mid-2000s. Moreover, the CEO paid regular visits to Sida in Stockholm and the Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam from the onset.

As pointed out in Omvärlden (2017), the influence of a company in selecting, and in this case even designing, a development project is problematic, since it renders the overarching aim of profit-making, perfectly legitimate. On a continuum from public to private, from non-profit organisations to for-profit NGOs and for-profit private actors, supporting private investors logically shifts the emphasis towards profit-making, or even profit-maximising, as the primary aim. This 'new' dimension of (private-run) development projects could have contributed to the uncritical consumption by Sida of knowledge produced by the company. Sida seemed not to have the capacity to handle complex financial deals (at least initially) or to consider that the private actor had a great interest in repeatedly presenting the project with highly optimistic timelines and rapid deliveries.

While the private actor had substantial influence on the narrative and while other actors consumed this knowledge uncritically, this does not necessarily mean that the project had different practical implications than for instance, a project designed and implemented by an NGO, apart from a theoretically increased risk of failure as indicated above. My findings resonate with other scholars who reported manipulation of local communities, delays, a primary focus on economic growth and making promises to states and smallholder farmers they do not fulfil. For example, Büscher (2014) found that South African consultants made the initial positive interpretation of the non-materialised project, not a private company, but these consultants still needed to produce success and sell it as a commodity. In Lund et al. (2017), projects were mainly donor-funded, but involved a range of actors such as conservation NGOs, ministries and private investors.

Regarding differences concerning the practical implications of private-run, rather than public/NGO-run, development projects, I see at least three problems with the neoliberal 'paradigm shift' in development assistance: i) There are issues of *transparency*, as observed in this thesis and by Büscher (2014) and Omvärlden (2017). For instance, in the Bagamoyo case, certain company documents had to undergo confidentiality checks before being made public, which contravenes the ambition of Sida, and many other bilateral agencies, to encourage transparency (DFID, 2011). ii) Public-private partnerships and other forms of close collaboration with private actors could entail *new ways of gaining* from development projects, for new actors and in new amounts. For instance, the total salary of company executives in the Bagamoyo case amounted to 10 million USD, one-fifth of the total amount allegedly spent on the project since the onset. Employing private executives at high salaries could be a major cost to development projects. On the same theme, the public-private partnership hype has generated huge financial flows benefiting the Tanzanian state. While I did not perform a wider analysis of the sums of money allocated to NGO- or state-led development projects, financial flows to the Tanzanian government associated with programmes advocating public-private partnerships, such as the New Alliance, seem massive. For instance, the G8 disbursed 367 million USD to the Tanzanian state (BRN) between 2012 and 2013, as part of a commitment to contribute 894 million USD between 2012 and 2015 (NewAlliance, 2013). Moreover, SAGCOT expects 2.1 billion USD in private investment between 2010-2030[39] and the Grow Africa partnership committed to over 10 billion USD, of which 1.8 billion USD had been paid by 2016 (WEF, 2016). On the same theme, the planned loans for outgrowers entailed large sums of money that were difficult to imagine for the farmers themselves, as outlined in Paper III. iii) Public private partnership-led investment involving foreign investors, as opposed to NGO or state-led development projects, can have a substantial impact on *bilateral relations*. Through the ICSID case, longstanding bilateral relations between Sweden and Tanzania could be jeopardised. This is the first lawsuit stemming from the new wave of LSAIs but it might not be the last, given the shift in Tanzania's political agenda towards supporting domestic companies as opposed to foreign, and the problems many materialised investments have in making a profit, due to, for instance, challenges in expanding onto village land or an unruly sugar trade. Importantly, although privatisation of development seems problematic, it was used both by economists and state officials to justify the new wave of LSAIs, since it differentiated it from past attempts to implement LSAI in Africa.

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[39] www.sagcot.com Accessed 31 May 2018.

The above shows possible implications of close collaboration with private actors in development assistance, which might not pose as great a challenge in other development projects. While collaboration with profit-seeking private companies is purported to deliver more efficient development aid, the Bagamoyo case contradicts this. Moreover, while it confirms that private sector collaboration could bring more resources, the financial flows identified have largely benefited the already resourceful, rather than achieving more development impact. Importantly, however, should BEE lose the ICSID case, this thesis shows that all actors involved will have suffered losses.

6.6   General conclusions

In this section, I revisit the thesis aim to contribute to the knowledge about how and why the new wave of LSAIs in Tanzania failed to deliver proposed outcomes, and to contribute to our general understanding of development failure.

The thesis has shown that core representations, assumptions and values underpinning the LSAI narrative and the associated LSAI development strategy are simplified and resilient to past and present contradicting narratives and materialities about territory and population. Combined, this creates a gap between policy and context that is likely to contribute to the widespread failure of LSAIs to deliver promised outcomes. Thus, in order to understand the trend of LSAI failure, we need to consider the way in which resilient and simplified narratives interact with context in producing failure.

By identifying the interlinkages between simplification, delay and failure, and emphasising the role of delay, this thesis makes a novel contribution to our understanding of development failure, its immanent dynamics and effects. The thesis has shown that delay can be an important, but overlooked, effect of simplified development narratives and a pivotal factor in producing development failure. Consequently, timelines should be carefully designed, in particular given the severe impacts of delay on target rural residents. The study also reverses the gaze regarding responsibility for failure from the context, instead emphasising the responsibility of proponents of the policies and projects.

The thesis has pointed to some new dynamics following the paradigm shift in development towards closer collaboration with private sector actors, which partly also relate to development failure. For instance, company representatives' narratives about population and territory were more simplified and resilient than those of other proponents, underpinned by strong notions of trusteeship. Combined with an uncritical consumption of these narratives by a wider audience, this created a larger gap between narrative and context and a greater risk of development failure. Because of that, and other potential impacts, major

influence of private actors in identifying, designing and implementing development projects, and their influence on development narratives, could add problematic dimensions to development.

The study indicates that land deals without investment may pose a greater threat to local people than exploitative materialised investments, since they tend to hover below the radar, with little incentive among proponents to prevent, monitor or manage impacts of delay, or provide compensation for these impacts.

Finally, it has also become obvious that the notion that 'nothing is happening' around a land deal without investment is far from adequate. Rather, the impacts of these deals require more attention, both in academic and policy-orientated debates.

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Popular science summary

Since the early 2000s, large-scale agricultural investment has been promoted as a development strategy for rural Africa. These investments have been promised to bring, for instance, efficient agricultural production of biofuel crops or food, employment, poverty reduction, and reduced import costs for African countries. However, in many countries, few investments have delivered promised results. The overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to the knowledge about how and why this 'new wave' of large-scale agricultural investment failed to deliver promised results. This is done by exploring the failure of a planned public private partnership, a large-scale sugar-cane investment in Bagamoyo, Tanzania to deliver promised outcomes.

I interviewed actors who support this development strategy in general, and the Bagamoyo project in particular, including development agency staff, state officials and company representatives. I also interviewed people living on the 20, 374 hectares of land targeted for investment, including smallholder farmers and herders. I then compared their perceptions about the investment and its implementation process. I found that the people supporting investment used simplified statements about the complex contexts in which the project was planned to take place. This made it difficult for the project to materialise, because many of the overlooked factors delayed the implementation process, and eventually contributed to that the investment failed to materialise. For instance, different views on who had the right to use the land resulted in land conflicts that delayed the project repeatedly. One important finding was that the project had significant impacts on the people living on the land, although it was at a standstill. For example, farmers were advised to stop growing certain important crops, and some people stopped farming and took jobs with little payment while waiting for resettlement.

The thesis shows that project supporters did not want to admit to these problems, and other criticism. Instead, they used many different ways to make criticism appear irrelevant. Overall, the company had a strong influence over the design, planning and implementation of the project. It also had a strong influence over the stories about how the investment would soon become successful, all of which is becoming more common due to the new trend of development agencies closely collaborating with private actors to achieve poverty reduction. This thesis shows how such close collaboration can be problematic in several ways.

Finally, this thesis shows that those designing development strategies and projects in rural Africa have a responsibility to learn about the context, and integrate this information, into policies and projects in order to deliver promised outcomes and avoid negative impacts of failed projects, instead of neglecting available experience or blaming the local context. Finally, the thesis shows that delayed or non-materialised large-scale agricultural investments can have substantial impacts on smallholder farmers and herders, and should be discussed more in both academia and policy debates.

Appendix 1. Interviews

Date	Interview method*	Informant	Place	Length (min)	Language	Transcribed
28 Mar 2012	Group	Rural residents	Razaba Ranch	61	Swahili	Yes
28 Mar 2012	Group	Rural residents	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	63	Swahili	Yes
28 Mar 2012	Semi	Bagamoyo district officers	Bagamoyo town	79	English	No
26 Mar 2012	Semi	TIC officer, land officer investment facilitation	Dar es Salaam	97	English	No
26 Mar 2012	Semi	TIC officer, agricultural investment promotion	Dar es Salaam	72	English	No
27 Mar 2012	Semi	Commissioner for Lands	Dar es Salaam	68	English	No
27 Mar 2012	Semi	Officials at Ministry of Energy and Minerals	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
26 Mar 2012	Semi	Company executive and employed consultant	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
26 Mar 2012	Informal	Haki Ardhi employee	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
27 Mar 2012	Semi	Seed cane, Farm manager	Seed cane farm	-	English	No
27 Mar 2012	Informal	Seed cane, Human resource officer	Seed cane farm	-	English	No
20 Mar 2013	Semi	Researcher, University of Dar es Salaam	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
15 Apr 2013	Semi	TIC officer	Dar es Salaam	46	English	Yes
15 Apr 2013	Semi	TIC officer	Dar es Salaam	27	English	Yes
15 Apr 2013	Semi	TIC officer	Dar es Salaam	97	English	Yes
16 Apr 2013	Semi	Action Aid employee	Bagamoyo town	91	English	Yes
17 Apr 2013	Semi	Commissioner for Lands	Dar es Salaam	82	English	Yes
17 Apr 2013	Semi	Lawyers' Environmental Action Team	Dar es Salaam	107	English	No
18 Apr 2013	Semi	Sida officers	Dar es Salaam	74	English	Yes
19 Apr 2013	Semi	Bagamoyo company executive and employed consultants	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
20 Apr 2013	Semi	Bagamoyo district officer	Bagamoyo town	-	English	No
20 Apr 2013	Group	Rural residents	Razaba Ranch sub-village	-	Swahili	No
21 Apr 2013	Group	Rural residents	Razaba Ranch sub-village	-	Swahili	No
22 Apr 2013	Semi	Bagamoyo company consultants	Bagamoyo town	-	English	No
22 Apr 2013	Semi	Bagamoyo district head of department	Bagamoyo town	49	English	Yes
23 Apr 2013	Informal	NORAD officer	Dar es Salaam	-	Swedish	No

16 May 2013	Semi	Sida officer	Stockholm	-	Swedish	No
27 Jan 2014	Semi	Bagamoyo company executive	Dar es Salaam	-	Swedish	No
26 Jan 2014	Informal	Sida officers	Dar es Salaam	-	Swedish	No
27 Jan 2014	Informal	Researcher, University of Dar es Salaam	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
28 Jan 2014	Semi	Rural residents	Razaba Ranch roadside	-	Swahili	No
28 Jan 2014	Informal	Seed cane plantation, Human resource officer	Seed cane farm	-	English	No
28 Jan 2014	Informal	Seed cane, Farm manager	Seed cane farm	-	English	No
02 Apr 2014	Informal	Sida officers	Dar es Salaam	-	Swedish	No
08 Apr 2014	Semi	Official, Ministry of Agriculture, former member of NBTF	Dar es Salaam	74	English	Yes
10 Apr 2014	Semi	Head of Haki Ardhi and employee	Dar es Salaam	102	English	Yes
10 Apr 2014	Semi	Deputy CEO BRN **, SAGCOT CEO, two TIC officers	Dar es Salaam	124	English	Yes
10 Apr 2014	Semi	Bagamoyo company executive and two employed consultants	Dar es Salaam	180	English	Yes
11 Apr 2014	Semi	TIC officer	Dar es Salaam	66	English	Yes
11 Apr 2014	Semi	Head of IDC*** and employed consultant	Bagamoyo town	131	English	Yes
12 Apr 2014	Semi	Two male rural residents from adjacent villages	Razaba Ranch roadside	-	Swahili	No
12 Apr 2014	Semi	Two female rural residents	Razaba Ranch roadside	-	Swahili	No
12 Apr 2014	Group	Rural residents	Razaba Ranch sub-village	91	Swahili	Yes
12 Apr 2014	Semi	Bagamoyo district officer	Bagamoyo town	-	English	No
12 Dec 2017	Semi	Sida officer	Stockholm	-	Swedish	No
1 July 2014	Semi	Bagamoyo district former head of department	Bagamoyo town	-	English	No
1 July 2014	Semi	AfDB officer	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
2 July 2014	Semi	SAGCOT Chief Executive Officer	Dar es Salaam	-	English	Yes
2 July 2014	Semi	Bagamoyo company executive	Dar es Salaam	-	Swedish	Yes
4 July 2014	Semi	Head of IDC consultancy, hired by BEE	Bagamoyo town	-	English	Yes
5 July 2014	Semi	Village Executive Officer	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	-	Swahili	No
5 July 2014	Semi	Village Executive Officer	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	-	Swahili	No
5 July 2014	Semi	Rural resident	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	-	Swahili	No
11 July 2014	Informal	Sida officer	Dar es Salaam	-	Swedish	No
12 Feb 2015	Semi	Sida officer	Stockholm	-	Swedish	No

16 Apr 2015	Informal	Sida officer	Stockholm	-	Swedish	No
9 Mar 2016	Semi	Researcher, University of Dar es Salaam	Dar es Salaam	-	English	No
14 Mar 2016	Semi	Sida officer	Dar es Salaam	75	Swedish	Partly
15 Mar 2016	Semi	SAGCOT Chief Executive Officer	Dar es Salaam	75	English	Partly
16 Mar 2016	Semi	Bagamoyo company executives	Dar es Salaam	120	Swedish	Partly
17 Mar 2016	Informal	PhD student studying same case	Bagamoyo town	-	English	No
18 Mar 2016	Informal	Head of IDC and employed consultant	Bagamoyo town	-	English	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (female)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (female)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
18 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (female)	Seed cane farm	-	Swahili	No
19 Mar 2016	Semi	Sub-village chair	Razaba Ranch sub-village	-	Swahili	No
19 Mar 2016	Semi	Village chair	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	-	Swahili	No
19 Mar 2016	Semi	Rural resident	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	-	Swahili	No
19 Mar 2016	Group	Rural residents	Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch	-	Swahili	No
3 Oct 2016	Informal	PhD student studying same case	Skype	-	English	No
29 Nov 2016	Informal	PhD student studying same case	Skype	-	English	No
13 Jan 2017	Email	Sida officer	Swedish Embassy	-	Swedish	
31 Mar 2017	Semi	Sida officer, Stockholm	Phone interview	-	Swedish	No
20 Apr 2017	Semi	Bagamoyo company executive, Stockholm	Phone interview	-	Swedish	No

*Group = Group discussion; Email = Email correspondence; Semi = Semi structured interview; Informal = Informal discussion; - = Not recorded

** Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Presidential Delivery Bureau, which oversees BRN's implementation on behalf of the government

*** IDC = International Development Consultants, a firm employed by BEE in order to prepare resettlement action plans in line with international best practice.

Appendix 2. Interview guide

Field work phase	Informant(s)	Overarching interview themes*
I (Mar 2012)	State officials **	What is the status of large-scale agro investment (LSAI)?
		What is the status of land available for LSAI?
		What kind of outcomes do you expect from LSAI?
		Which are the key policies regulating LSAI?
		What are the roles of various actors involved?
		Is there unused land in Tanzania?
	District staff in three districts	What is the status of investments in the district?
		Are there any issues regarding land in the district?
		What is the process of investment?
		What is your perception of the Bagamoyo project?
		Are there any impacts by the investment(s)?
		Is there unused land in Tanzania?
	Rural residents in three districts	Are there any LSAIs using land nearby?
		Have there been promises made by the investor?
		Has your access to land changed in any way?
		Are there local impacts, benefits or risks?
		What is happening related to the investment?
		Is there unused land in Tanzania?
	Investors	Why did you invest in Tanzania?
		When, what, how, for how long did you get access to land?
		What are your expectations from the investment?
		What is happening next?
		Is there unused land in Tanzania?
	NGO/CSO staff	What are the main issues in relation to LSAI?
		Describe the roles of the actors involved
		What are the regulations and how do they work in practice?
		Is there unused land in Tanzania?
II (Mar-Apr 2013)	Bagamoyo company	What is the status of the implementation process?
	State officials	Why is your government promoting LSAI?
		Where did it start, by whom?

	Rural residents in and around Razaba	What contacts do you have with the investor? District? Central government? Other actors?
		What potential and risks do you see with the investment?
		What is happening in relation to the investment at the moment?
	Sida (in between field work 2 and 3) ***	What does Sida's guarantee entail?
		What benefits and risks do you see with the outgrower programme?
		Did you consider the controversies around the ESIA in your assessment?
		What do you think about the financial support and loss in the municipalities?
III (Jan-Apr 2014)	Bagamoyo district staff	What are the key current issues in relation to Eco Energy's investment?
		What is the dynamics around/status of the resettlement process?
		How many people and sub-villages are there in Razaba Ranch who will be resettled?
		What is the dynamics around in-and outmigration in Razaba?
	Bagamoyo company consultant planning resettlement	What are the main issues in relation to the investment?
		What are the dynamics around the court case?
		What is your perception of the outgrower schemes?
		Does Eco Energy comply with international best practice?
	Investor	What is the status of the implementation process?
		What is the current timeline?
		What is the outline for the AfDB loan and Sida's guarantee?
		Where are you looking for additional land and what is the status of that process?
		What is the status of the Land for Equity deal?
		What is the status of the outgrower scheme?
		What is the status of the resettlement process?
		When the context is so different and complex, why do you promote such a policy?
	Rural residents in Razaba	What are the key current issues in relation to Eco Energy's investment?
		What is the dynamics around property counts, land use, compensation?
		What do you know about the company and their project?
		Why do you think they invest here?
		Would you be interested in working for the company?
	Rural residents in outgrower villages	What is the status of outgrower schemes?
		What is the process around identification of land for the schemes?
		What benefits and risks do you see?

	Sida	How do you perceive the difficulties in determining who in Razaba is legible for compensation?
		In what way can outgrowers avoid common risks associated with such arrangements?
		How do you perceive the difficulties for BEE in attracting workers?
IV (July 2014)	African Development Bank officer	What will be the outcomes of the LSAI development strategy?
		What is the status of you financing the Bagamoyo project?
		Did you anticipate the unintended consequences?
		Do you see any risks with the project? With AfDB supporting the project?
		Would you say LSAI failed in Tanzania?
		Why was the Due Diligence report delayed?
	State officials and Sida	What will LSAI bring to Tanzania?
		What challenges do you see?
		Did you anticipate the unintended consequences?
		Do you think the smallholders understand the LSAI idea?
		Is the new wave of LSAI different from historical ones? How?
		What in the villages do you seek to change?
		What does SAGCOT do to mitigate complications on the project site?
		How do you respond to criticism expressed in a range of reports?
	Bagamoyo company	What is the process of identifying land for outgrowers?
		What do you seek to change in the villages?
		Why did some elders sell Razaba land to outsiders?
		Did you anticipate the unintended consequences?
	Bagamoyo company consultant planning resettlement	What is the current status and timeline for resettlement?
	Sida	What is the current status of your payments to Eco Energy?
		What are your conditions for future payment?
		Did you discuss historical experiences of LSAI in the assessment of Eco Energy's application?
		Did you expect delays?
		Who are expected to win from a win-win policy?
		How do you weigh those who lose versus those who win?
		Do you see this slow progressing of LSAIs as a failure?
		Is too much responsibility left to the company?
	Rural residents in outgrower villages	What is the status of outgrower schemes?
		What is the land being used for currently?
		How will land be identified?
		How do you understand the benefits and risks with outgrower schemes?

	Rural residents in Razaba	What is the status of project implementation?
		What are the impacts of investment?
		What are the dynamics on the Ranch at the moment?
12 Dec 2014	Sida (in between field work 4 and 5)	What is the status of fulfilment of conditions posed by you and AfDB?
		If conditions are not fulfilled, will Sida stop its payments?
		What is the status of the Land for Equity policy?
		What is the status of resettlement process?
		What is the status concerning the financial agreements?
		What has happened since last time?
		What are the upcoming plans?
		What are the possibilities for outgrowers' payback of loans, reap of profit *etc.*?
12 Feb 2015	Sida (in between field work 4 and 5)	What is the status of fulfilment of conditions posed by you and AfDB?
		What is the status of Sida's payments to the company?
		Which actors are expected to win, in line with the win-win narrative on LSAI?
		What is your view on that some people lose, others win?
		What is the ideal relation between risks and benefits?
		Has the LSAI development strategy failed?
		What does development mean, and in what way will LSAI bring development to Tanzania?
		Has Sida discussed historical experiences of LSAI in Tanzania?
		Does the company's business perspective pose a problem?
		How do you see the implications with tax relief *etc.* for foreign investors?
		Has any assessment of those performed influenced Sida's work in any way?
		What is your view on the severe shifts in market dynamics that have impacted the project?
V (Mar 2016)	Bagamoyo company	What is the status of investment, funding, court case, resettlement *etc.*?
		Is LSAI failing?
		Is your project failing?
		Did you discuss historical experiences of LSAI?
		What is your response to criticism from residents in Razaba?
		When will you start paying land rent?
		What did you win or lose so far?
	Rural residents in Razaba	What does it mean to you if the investment fails?
		What did you win or lose so far?
		What are the impacts of the repeated delays?

	Bagamoyo company consultant planning resettlement	Why did you quit your employment with Eco Energy?
		What is the status of resettlement process?
		Are there any wins from the investment so far?
		Did you expect delays?
		Do you think the investor and government expected delays?
		Is LSAI failing?
		Is the Bagamoyo project failing?
	Sida	Can you confirm details about the financial deal with the company and AfDB?
		Do you think there is a risk that plans based on economic models could be simplified?
		What is your comment to that some people on Razaba are critical to the project?
		Did anyone win from the project so far?
		What is the status of sugar imports, agreements, Land for Equity, tax incomes for Tanzania?
24 Aug 2016	Sida (in between field work 5 and 6)	Why does Sida support LSAI?
		Why did Sida halt the payments to the company?
		Did you expect delays?
		How do you perceive the risks for smallholders engaging in outgrower schemes?
		Do you still believe that the company can achieve its outcomes?
VI (Mar-Apr 2017)	Bagamoyo company	Why do you think the President revoked the land right?
		Has LSAI in Tanzania failed?
		How do you see all the impacts on people and land since the onset of the project?
		From where have you gained information about what happens in Razaba?
		Why did Eco Energy fail?
		Which actors were you main collaborators in this project?
	Sida	Why do you think the President revoked the land right?
		Has LSAI in Tanzania failed?
		How do you see all the impacts on people and land since the onset of the project?
		Could you have used past experiences better?
		What is Sida's policy for support to LSAI in the future?
		Which actors were you main collaborators in this project?

*Overarching interview themes constitute the main topical themes used during that specific field work.

**State officials is a simplified category including central, region and district government officials, ministry employees and authority staff.

***As mentioned in Chapter 4, interviews with Sida officials were performed within the field work phases, and in between, as indicated where relevant.

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
THE GLOBAL LAND GRAB
BEYOND THE HYPE

Edited by **MAYKE KAAG** and **ANNELIES ZOOMERS**

2 | Large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania: a critical analysis of practices and dynamics

Jumanne Abdallah, Linda Engström,
Kjell Havnevik and Lennart Salomonsson

Introduction

This chapter presents the current status of agrofuel investments in Tanzania and uses empirical data from three cases of large-scale investments for agrofuel production in the Rufiji, Bagamoyo and Meru districts to provide snapshots of what is happening on the ground. The chapter also describes and analyses the history and trends in large-scale agricultural investments in Tanzania and key land acquisition processes, as well as the role of the state and other actors.

As in other agrarian developing countries, agriculture investments and modernization in Tanzania have been triggered by the increasing global demand for food and energy, as well as by greener global needs, and by a perceived win-win paradigm implying that these investments will bring benefits to all actors involved. The policy initiatives can historically be traced to the colonial era, when large-scale land alienation began to take place (Coulson 2013). An often referred to and ill-fated example is the Groundnut Scheme in the late 1940s (Iliffe 1979). Today, environmental protection interventions, through the expansion of protected areas, REDD[1] and other climate change initiatives, and the national *Kilimo Kwanza* ('Agriculture First') strategy implementing agricultural development corridors, are accelerating serious conflicts over land for many rural people. Concerned scholars and national and international NGOs have begun to argue against such large-scale investment plans owing to the emergence and escalation of problems and the evidence of risks connected to them. Investments have been growing in terms of scale, geographic spread, players involved and types of impact (Kaarhus et al. 2010).

Fieldwork was carried out in 2009, 2012 and 2013. Focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and the collection of secondary records were our main research methods. We interviewed investors, central government authorities (ministries of water, energy and minerals), a regional secretariat, and relevant officers at three district authorities. In addition, we carried out several focus group discussions within sample villages and with farmers' groups in the Meru, Bagamoyo and Rufiji districts.

Background to Tanzanian agriculture development and foreign investment

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Tanzania inherited an agricultural economy relying on cash crops for export, introduced by the German and British colonial states. In the first year of independence, 1962, the government attempted to modernize agriculture through highly mechanized community development initiatives and by raising agricultural productivity, in line with World Bank advice (World Bank 1961). Later, in the mid-1960s, the Tanzanian state introduced a 'progressive farmer' approach, which aimed at supporting innovative smallholder production. Agricultural exports increased during the 1960s, but inequality, state expansion and surplus appropriation threatened to undermine President Nyerere's philosophy of social equality and self-reliance (Nyerere 1962, 1966; Mbelle et al. 2002; Havnevik and Isinika 2010). This development triggered the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, which aimed at resettlement of the rural population into villages, with the objective of increasing agricultural productivity and providing education, water and health services for all – the so-called *Ujamaa* Strategy. These interventions led to the physical resettlement of about two-thirds of the rural Tanzanian population. Increasingly, and in particular between 1973 and 1976, force was employed by the government to move rural people into villages (Boesen et al. 1977). Adverse weather conditions and their negative consequences for agricultural production from 1973 onwards were important underlying causes of the economic stagnation of Tanzania during the second half of the 1970s. Tanzania had by the late 1970s entered an economic, social, and political crisis, fuelled by expansion and economic mismanagement in the parastatal sector, the war with Uganda and global economic stagnation (Havnevik 1993).

During the 1970s, development assistance was increasingly directed to the industrial sector, while support of agriculture declined (Skarstein and Wangwe 1986). In addition, the state's agricultural price and marketing policies involved heavy taxation on agricultural smallholders (Ellis 1983). Overvaluation of the Tanzanian currency also added to agricultural taxation. Given the undermining of the production conditions of smallholder agriculture, the agricultural surplus declined and smallholders became more involved in economic diversification in order to increase incomes and avoid the state (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990; Havnevik 1993).

In efforts to resolve the crisis, the Tanzanian government came into strong disagreement with the IMF concerning how the economy should be managed, which led to a breakdown in Tanzania–IMF relations in the period 1979–85. This contributed to decreasing levels of foreign assistance to the country, exacerbating the crisis further. Gradually, however, the relationship with the international financial institutions improved, and in August 1986 Tanzania signed economic stabilization agreements and reform programmes with the

IMF and the World Bank respectively. These took shape in a three-year Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), which aimed to reduce the role of the state in the economy and to remove subsidies for agricultural inputs and transport as well as consumer subsidies. In general, the pathway to be pursued by Tanzania was part of the new economic liberalization strategy of 'getting the prices right' and creating more space for the private sector (World Bank 1981, 1989). There was no longer any possibility of Tanzania pursuing a development strategy with a social profile. Hence, the then president, Nyerere, decided to leave the presidency in 1985, while he remained as chairman of the single-party CCM (Chama Cha Mapindugi – Party of the Revolution) until 1991.

The policy reforms that sought to revamp the agricultural sector through economic liberalization and to increase the efficiency of the economy by reducing the role of the Tanzanian state therein did not work as expected. The reform era of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985–95) saw increasing corruption in the economy, and the relationships between Tanzania and the international financial institutions and donors deteriorated.

One of the first initiatives of President Benjamin Mkapa, who came into office in 1995, was to initiate a presidential commission investigating corruption, led by former prime minister Warioba. Initiatives were also taken to mend the relationships with the donor community through the establishment of an economic commission, led by the Canadian economist Jeremy Helleiner, which looked into how the fiscal discipline of the government and government–donor relations could be improved.

During the era of President Mkapa (1995–2005) fiscal discipline was restored and sectors beyond agriculture took on an important role in the economy and the export sector. In particular the mining sector, including mining of gold and gemstones, and the tourist sector grew rapidly. Gradually the role of agriculture in total Tanzanian exports declined. The new dynamic sectors, however, were to a large extent owned and controlled by foreign interests and companies, albeit in alignment with domestic financial and political interests (Bryceson and Jönsson 2010).

In 1997, the Tanzanian government began to prepare the ground for increasing foreign investments. The Tanzania Investment Act of 1997 was one of the first steps in this direction. The Act established the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), with the main objective of 'coordinating, encouraging, promoting and facilitating investment in Tanzania and advising the Government on investment policy and related matters'. To guarantee the TIC as a 'one-stop agency' for investors, all government departments, agencies and other public authorities were instructed to fully cooperate with the new agency. One important service to be provided by the TIC, which was to grow during the first part of the 2000s, was to facilitate acquisition of land for foreign investors in Tanzania with a time frame of only thirty days.[2] The TIC was mandated to provide a

Certificate of Incentive, which is a basic document for land processing and land allocation to investors. Formal procedures for the land application are provided in the Land and Village Acts.

The next Tanzanian president, Jakaya Kikwete, who entered office in 2005, placed strong emphasis on improving the investment climate for domestic and foreign investors. His government requested all Tanzanian regional authorities to establish local investment promotion offices and create regional business councils in order to enhance the conditions for external investors.

The strong promotion of foreign investments in large-scale agricultural cultivation was further concretized in the *Kilimo Kwanza* (Agriculture First) Initiative launched in 2009. Also linked to this development is the plan by the Tanzanian government to establish an Export Processing Zone on the coast immediately south of Bagamoyo town.

Tanzania had earlier signed multilateral and bilateral agreements on protecting and promoting foreign investments in the country when it became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1992. MIGA, a member of the World Bank Group, has a mandate to promote foreign direct investments (FDI) in developing countries to help support economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve people's livelihoods. For example, MIGA provides political risk insurance guarantees against nationalization. In 1992 Tanzania also became a signatory to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), whose primary purpose is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes.

Kilimo Kwanza is a departure from previous agricultural strategies, which had emphasized smallholder agriculture, although increasingly in a market context, in the direction of large-scale agricultural activities, by actively mobilizing domestic and foreign investors. Agriculture First is a national strategy aimed at accelerating agricultural and rural transformation. The initiative comprises a set of pillars that address the agricultural sector's challenges and take advantage of perceived potentials that exist to modernize and commercialize agriculture. The Tanzania National Business Council was involved in the design of *Kilimo Kwanza* and strongly encourages private sector involvement in agriculture. In addition, it promotes the identification of priority areas for agro-based production in order to meet the growing domestic/external market demands and the need for employment creation in Tanzania, and it focuses on the need for legal and institutional change in order to provide the ground for foreign investors in large-scale agricultural ventures. It also emphasizes the need to amend the Village Land Act of 1999 to facilitate investors' access to village land for agricultural investments, and to make land available to the TIC. A plan, long awaiting fruition, is for the TIC to establish a Land Bank, which could make land easily available to investors. Land would be provided to the Land Bank by identifying and recording unused (or 'idle') village land

for agricultural investments. The perceptions of 'idle' land to be made available for investments vary between government agencies and villagers, however, and constitute an important cause of increasing conflicts over land.

Land laws and land acquisition processes

Reserved and village land In Tanzania, land is divided into three categories: *reserved* (about 30 per cent), *village* (about two-thirds of the land) and *general* land (about 2 per cent). Reserved land denotes forest reserves, game control and conservation areas, game reserves, etc., and is mainly regulated under the Land Act of 1999. Village land is under the management of approximately 12,000 villages in Tanzania and is regulated under the Village Land Act of 1999, which states that for village land allocation of more than 250 hectares, the relevant minister shall consider recommendations made by the Village Assembly through the Village Council, before giving his/her approval or refusal.

Since most of Tanzanian land is under village management, investors need access to village land for their investments. The land acquisition process on the ground in Tanzania is complex. Land within village boundaries is managed by village authorities on behalf of the government and the Commissioner of Land. According to the Tanzanian land laws of 1999, foreign investors can access village land only after it has been transferred into general land status. This has to be approved by the Commissioner for Land on behalf of the president. Once it has been transferred, it will not revert to village land again.

Under the Land Act of 1999, a foreign investor may occupy land through 1) obtaining derivative rights from the TIC; 2) the granting of right of occupancy by the Commissioner for Land; or 3) subleases from the private sector, licences from the government, or purchase from other holders of granted right of occupancy. Rights of occupancy and derivative rights can be granted for short- and long-term periods. Long-term rights of occupancy and derivative rights and leases range from periods of five to ninety-nine years and are renewable, but not beyond ninety-nine years.

Acknowledging the danger of large-scale alienation of village land, one suggestion put forward in the 2012 draft biofuel policy is to limit the maximum area allocated to investors to 20,000 hectares (MEM 2012).

The investors' application for right of occupancy should declare all rights and interests in land in Tanzania of the applicants at the time. After consent of the local authority or other bodies where the law requires such, the application should be directed to the Commissioner for Land and be accompanied by a Certificate of Incentives granted by the TIC.

According to existing laws, a village land use plan (VLUP) is required before investments begin. The Village Land Act[3] requires that private disposition on village land should observe 'any land use plan prepared or in the process of being prepared by or for the village'.

There is, however, no clear process prescribed in the laws in cases where an investor fails to develop the acquired land according to the investment plans. The number of cases where investments are not being implemented is high, leaving uncertainty as to who has legal rights to the land concerned.

Proper village land use planning is based on village land surveys. Access to accurate data on land size and location would make it possible to estimate land rent. In Tanzania, land rents are collected annually and administered through the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development. The level of land rents is set by the central government, with 80 per cent of the proceeds going to the central government and 20 per cent to the local government. Under the terms of the property tax, rural land is essentially not taxed. In fact, for unsurveyed rural land (i.e. land which has not been surveyed for village land use plans), there is not even a requirement to pay land rent. This could be an incentive for investors to bypass village land use planning. If investment in rural areas takes place without proper land surveys and land use plans, a large portion of potential rural rents cannot be collected by the central government. Land is not taxed under property ratings of the local government, since land is public and belongs to the state. The complications related to land rents and village land use plans are compounded by a cumbersome process of obtaining environmental permits (ORGUT Consulting AB 2008). This could be one of the reasons for land rents in Tanzania being very low compared with market values: currently land rent is only US$0.3 per hectare per year.

General and idle land Section 2 of the Land Act defines general land as 'all public land which is not reserved land or village land and includes unoccupied or unused village land', while the Village Land Act does not include the phrase 'and includes unoccupied or unused village land'. The definition in the Land Act, we will argue, could be an important loophole for the Tanzanian state agencies at various levels to spearhead the transfer of 'idle or unused land' to the category of general land, from which it can be made accessible to large-scale agro-investors.

In all village group discussions connected with this research, the villagers dismissed the existence of idle land. They argued instead that land is not only used for farming, but also for other uses such as livestock grazing and the collection of non-timber forest products. They also showed us how they have set aside land for future generations.

Also included in the category of general land is land in urban and peri-urban areas, and land which belonged to state agricultural and livestock projects that became privatized during the 1980s and 1990s or has become non-operational for various reasons. Such land has to some extent been taken into use by livestock herders or through the establishment of rural settlements.

The Land Bank The Tanzania Investment Centre is mandated to establish a Land Bank in order to make land available to investors. Personal communication with a representative of the TIC in November 2008 revealed that the TIC lacked funds to finance the compensation to villages that would be required for the transfer of village land to the Land Bank. International donors were at the time also reluctant to provide assistance to the TIC to develop and administer a Land Bank, for fear that the process would lead to alienation of smallholders with weak land rights.

Instead, an ad hoc process of identifying land for foreign investors that is not specified in laws or regulations has emerged. Foreign investors are simply recommended by the TIC to identify and visit villages where land might be available for large-scale agro-production and investments. Such visits should, according to the advice of the TIC, begin with calling on the District Land Officer, who would guide investors to villages and their authorities for a discussion about possible leases of village land and what could be offered by the investor as compensation (Havnevik and Haaland 2011). This process necessarily leads to informal land discussions and negotiations that may lead to land acquisition processes. However, the cultural context of investors and villagers is usually profoundly different, which results in confusion as to what is actually agreed upon. The asymmetry in information and knowledge about laws and regulations connected with land and investments between villagers and investors usually casts villagers into the weaker role. This has become evident through reported cases of lack of understanding about what the lease of land involves and about the possibility of villages effectively gaining the compensation promised in discussions and negotiations.

Slow land use planning Village land use plans are mandatory before a village can provide land to external investors, as provided by the Land Use Planning Act of 2007. Land use plans are implemented at the national level by the Land Use Planning Commission (NLUPC). The establishment of the commission in 1984 was considered necessary after a realization that the policy, legal and institutional set-ups had not been effective enough. This was related in particular to the coordination of various land use activities and programmes undertaken by different sectorial organizations in the government, the private and the NGO sectors. The NLUPC assignment primarily includes preparation and implementation of the National Land Use Framework Plan. However, the NLUPC's capacity to develop village land use plans is weak. Currently only 10 per cent of the total of some 12,000 villages have had land use plans developed since the exercise started in 1984. It took twenty-four years before the village land use plan process was supported by law, but resources, more than laws, seem to be critical for speeding up the process.

Developments in the land policy and land acquisition processes

In fact, the Tanzanian land ownership and use systems were facing enormous problems at the end of the 1980s, when economic liberalization emerged in Tanzania. Rural people then began to reclaim the land they had possessed prior to villagization. In this process it was revealed that the villagization process itself had taken place without sufficient constitutional and legal backing. In order to avoid utter confusion and chaos in the national land management system, the state established the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters under the leadership of Professor Issa Shivji. A major conclusion of the commission was that significant problems related to land ownership, use and management were connected to the state ownership of land. The commission subsequently proposed diversifying the vesting of the radical title of land in village land administered by the Village Assembly and general land administered by the Commissioner of Land (United Republic of Tanzania 1994a and National Land Policy, draft of March 1995).

The recommendations of the commission were backed by a detailed investigation of land disputes across the country. The commission in fact submitted some twenty-six volumes of the record of evidence from twenty regions with the report. Some of this material is included in the second volume of the report of the commission, which also included a summary of 1,200 letters of complaint regarding land issues that were received by the commission. Although the second volume of the report was printed, it was given only very restricted distribution in Tanzania by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (United Republic of Tanzania 1994b).

The manoeuvring of the Tanzanian agencies in the process leading up to the National Land Policy in 1995 reaffirmed that the radical title to land should remain with the president (Sundet 1997). The Presidential Land Commission, also, was able to make legal proposals that held back the land reclamation process that had begun in the late 1980s (Havnevik 1995). The laws regulating land ownership, management and use were subsequently confirmed in the Land and Village Land Acts of 1999. These Acts, however, did not become operational until May 2003. Directly thereafter, pressures began for the amendment of the Acts. The most recent pressures to amend the Land Laws are moving in the direction of the Land Laws creating better and easier access to Tanzanian village land for foreign investors (communication with Swedish embassy, 2011).

The Land Laws of 1999 had developed from a decade-long process of investigation and negotiation. Before they had come into force and entered the process of implementation, demands for them to be changed occurred. For villagers and rural smallholders, given limited information and education, this continuously changing legal framework is difficult to grasp. This also makes it difficult for village institutions and rural landholders to know their

land rights. The large number of rules and institutions at the local level also leaves 'land rights negotiable' (Pedersen 2012: 279).

Do large-scale land acquisitions exist?

What's on paper – what's on the ground? A recent paper by Locher and Sulle (2013) states that the flaws in existing data create 'an unnecessarily blurred picture of the land deal situation in Tanzania and thus an inadequate basis for related political decisions ... and a misleading starting point for new research projects' (p. 2), and identifies several types of flaw in the documentation and reproduction of data. The issue of methodology and transparency of land deal data is not restricted to Tanzania, and has been described in various articles in a special issue of *Journal of Peasant Studies* (Scoones et al. 2013). It points to a 'profound uncertainty' about what is being counted, and the authors call for a 'second phase of land grab research which abandons the aim of deriving total numbers of hectares in favor of more specific, grounded and transparent methods' (p. 469). Our field research in 2012 was informed by the same concern of getting a better insight into what is actually happening on the ground.

In Tanzania, the changing legal frameworks regarding land ownership and management have created lack of clarity about the role of various institutions and the overall processes of land acquisitions and leases. This situation has also affected the accessibility of information from Tanzanian authorities on large-scale investments. Our visits to state agencies and district and village authorities have given the impression that no one has a full overview of the laws and regulations and how land is being allocated. Our research shows a striking gap between the number of investors requesting land and the number of investors that are currently operational. Our information and data were collected through field visits in the Rufiji and Bagamoyo districts in the Coast Region and the Meru district in Arusha Region. In addition, we collected information from literature listing investors who have required or acquired land in Tanzania (Kamanga 2008; TNRF 2008; ActionAid 2009; FAO 2009b; Sulle and Nelson 2009; Diaz-Chavez et al. 2010; Kaarhus et al. 2010; WRM 2010; FAO 2011b; Mousseau and Mittal 2011; Anseeuw et al. 2012; Massay and George 2013).

During our field visits in March 2012, our research could confirm only one operational large-scale agrofuel investment (Diligent Ltd in Arusha Region) and two investors with advanced plans (Agro EcoEnergy Ltd in the Bagamoyo district and Felisa Ltd in Kigoma Region); however, this latter company may focus mainly on sugar production. Felisa has since then shifted to food crops such as rice and sunflower, even though the oil palm plantations that had been planted are still there. Diligent Ltd went into voluntary liquidation in the autumn of 2012. Agro EcoEnergy had, by October 2013, still not reached financial closure. The company was still awaiting the decision on a large-

scale loan guarantee application to the International Swedish Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

We identified thirty-two investors who have requested more than two thousand hectares of land for agrofuel production in Tanzania during the last decade. The vast majority of them were foreign, and European companies predominated. In total, approximately 1.1 million hectares of land have been requested. Of the thirty-two investors, only nine actually did acquire land, of a total area of around 200,000 hectares. These figures are much lower when compared with the most cited information on land requests and allocations: more than four million hectares requested and 640,000 hectares allocated (Sulle and Nelson 2009).

We found that at least six of those nine investors to whom land had been allocated had started cultivation, and, at a certain moment, three of these six switched from agrofuel to food crops. Three of the six that started production have gone bankrupt. One of them – Sun Biofuels Ltd – was sold to a Mauritius-based investor in 2012 (Bergius 2012), but the new owner has not yet started production (Sosovele, personal communication, March 2013). One investor who was allocated land is now renting it to the villagers who used to manage the land for themselves (anonymous, Institute for Resource Assessment, personal communication). Two investors – Diligent Ltd and Prokon Ltd – based their business on out-grower models of production only. They have both gone bankrupt. However, according to Massay and George (2013), Diligent Ltd has been sold to a French company (Eco Carbon). Jatropha is the dominant crop for the companies that have gone bankrupt, and Nelson et al.

2.1 The number of new companies investing in agriculture, registered by the TIC annually, 2001–12 (*source*: TIC research and information division, 2013)

(2012) claim that the demand for land for jatropha cultivation has essentially evaporated during the last few years.

No in-depth analyses have been conducted on the reasons for these bankruptcies. Although they are to some extent context specific, several more general reasons have also been put forward, including loss of access to cheap credit and other forms of financing, due to the financial crisis, and the disappointing performance of jatropha (ibid.). Hultman et al. (2012) have compiled results from other studies on biofuel investments in Tanzania and state that the bankruptcies are related to poor planning and communication, the lack of a regulatory framework, and the pressure from NGOs not to allocate any more land to agrofuel investors before policies are in place.

The number of foreign and domestic agricultural companies registered by the TIC as investors in agriculture has increased from 2001 to 2012 (Figure 2.1). The stagnation in registration of investors from 2005 to 2007 depended on uncertainties related to the change of the presidency from Mkapa to Kikwete. The decline between 2008 and 2010 is probably explained by the global financial crisis. The increase in 2011 and 2012 is connected to food-related investments under *Kilimo Kwanza*. The TIC statistics include all investments with a Certificate of Incentive. Some of these have acquired land, while others have initiated the process of identifying land for investment.

Empirical evidence: Diligent Ltd The Dutch company Diligent Ltd operated a unique out-grower system with more than 100,000 farmers and was expanding rapidly towards central and west Tanzania when the liquidation of the company occurred in 2012. The CEO claimed lack of funds for the company's activities as the main reason. The company had not acquired any land; smallholders in the area already grew jatropha trees as hedges in some villages as far back as the 1960s. Diligent Ltd began to buy the seeds from already existing plants. Some women we interviewed complained about low payments. They were themselves peeling the fruits to be able to sell the seeds to the company. The seeds were collected in the villages by a middleman, a villager, who delivered the seeds to the factory and brought payment back to the village. Whether the right amount was paid to the individual village producer was difficult for Diligent to control. The high number of farmers required for the production made contract procedures complicated and costly. We consider this investment to have less risk of negative socio-economic and environmental impacts, since it was based on villagers' existing jatropha hedges. The attitude and ambition of the CEO were similar to those of NGOs.

The company had built a small factory in Arusha using technical equipment to extract the jatropha oil on site. The CEO claimed that by-products such as briquettes and billets were crucial for making the investment profitable. An American NGO supplied energy-saving stoves to villages and introduced

briquettes and billets for cooking, but faced some difficulties of adoption among women. Awaiting a more stable domestic market, the oil was exported to the USA for processing and subsequent export to Europe.

In the absence of a Tanzanian biofuel policy, jatropha oil is regarded as an agricultural product in Tanzania. Therefore, payments of fuel levy and custom tax were not obligatory for Diligent Ltd. The company paid only local government tax, which should not exceed 5 per cent of the respective producer farm's gate price (a so-called cess). This is different from petroleum fuel taxes in Tanzania, in which excise and custom taxes are charged as one of the measures for increasing government revenue (Mkenda et al. 2011).

SEKAB/Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania Ltd Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania Ltd (hereafter Eco Energy) is a Swedish company with a concession of 22,000 hectares of land within the Razaba Ranch[4] in the Bagamoyo district. The company plans to grow sugar cane mainly for the domestic market. The Razaba Ranch land has been under state management for decades and no village was located on the land. However, according to the Environmental and Social Impact Analysis (ESIA) from 2008, the ranch is surrounded by three villages and four sub-villages, with a total population of 6,000 people (ORGUT Consulting AB 2008).

The Razaba Ranch land (approximately 28,000 hectares) was given by the Tanzanian government to the government of Zanzibar for cattle production in 1974. However, the cattle ranch was abandoned in 1994. In 2007, the government of Zanzibar agreed to allocate 22,000 hectares of the ranch area to SEKAB Tanzania Ltd, a satellite company of a Swedish company, SEKAB, owned by three Swedish municipalities, on a ninety-nine-year lease (ibid.). Eco Energy gained the right of occupancy to the land in May 2013 (personal communication with Eco Energy management, September 2013). The environmental permit for the project was obtained from the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) in 2009. The land is planned for irrigated sugar cane production and processing of sugar, ethanol and power, mainly for the domestic market. Surplus ethanol will be distributed to Europe by SEKAB, according to a ten-year agreement (AfDB 2012).

Criticism emerged in Tanzania and Sweden related to the plans of SEKAB Tanzania Ltd, including the company's plans for investment in village land in the Rufiji district. There were also serious accusations regarding the ESIA process (Matondi et al. 2011; Sida Helpdesk 2009). SEKAB Sweden therefore decided to sell its Tanzanian and Mozambique satellite companies. SEKAB Tanzania Ltd was sold to Eco Development in Europe AB, which operates in Tanzania through EcoEnergy, basically under the same management as SEKAB Tanzania Ltd. The investment plan is essentially the same, although the current one comprises a slightly smaller area for sugar cane plantation and more forest plantation in order to supply the factory with wood chips.

When the cattle ranch, run by the government of Zanzibar, was abandoned in 1994, pastoralists moved in, and nearby villages began to use the area for cultivation, firewood collection, hunting and charcoal burning (ORGUT Consulting AB 2008). Some of these villagers now claim that they have rights to this land. While EcoEnergy management informed us that resettlement of these villagers takes place in accordance with International Finance Corporation Performance Standards on Resettlement, the narrative below shows how villagers are confused and claim to have been treated unfairly.

The sub-village we visited in March 2012 was inhabited by villagers who claim to have been resident on the territory of Razaba Ranch itself since the 1960s. Some of them were former workers on the cattle farm. They informed us of the following about their contacts with the district and EcoEnergy:

In October 2011, the Land Officer of the Bagamoyo district council notified the villagers about the intention to acquire land in the sub-village for the Eco-Energy investment. This was more than three years after the land acquisition process began at national level between the company and the government. The villagers were informed that those who were living in the sub-village would be compensated when leaving the land. The procedure for estimating compensation was conducted by the Bagamoyo district land valuer in October/November 2011. A special form was distributed to affected households to register types of immovable properties on their land. The forms were collected by a local government official, accompanied by company representatives. Two weeks later, a representative of EcoEnergy called a meeting with villagers whose properties were registered and informed them that the company intended to give them land inside the Razaba Ranch. However, the Tanzanian government refused and instead promised to provide the villagers with land in villages adjacent to the ranch.

Later, in another village meeting, the EcoEnergy resettlement officer announced that he had access to a satellite image that showed that only thirty-seven households existed in the sub-village. The villagers had not been shown the satellite image. A promise was therefore given to compensate only thirty-seven households and employ the rest of the villagers when EcoEnergy started activities within the ranch. Since the previous evaluation had included more than two hundred households, the villagers got upset and chased the company representative away. A group of villagers subsequently filed a court case against EcoEnergy for 'eviction' of community members from their land and demanded compensation of TZS10 billion[5] (US$6.45 million). The case proceedings were still taking place in July 2012. The villagers were still confused about which thirty-seven households will be compensated, and for how much. And they do not know what will happen to the other households in the sub-village.

According to Bagamoyo district officials, EcoEnergy has signed an agreement with the Tanzanian government that the government will be provided

with 25 per cent equity in the company but with anticipation of dividends and capital gains to be paid after eighteen years. According to information obtained through interviews during our field visit, the Tanzanian government has entered a shareholding agreement with EcoEnergy by providing land as its share for equity piloting a new national 'Land for Equity' policy, and the company will offer working capital in the form of the money that was originally invested, along with additional investments required to be made thereafter. According to the Tanzanian minister of land, Dr Anna Tibaijuka, the government is now discussing how these shares could be distributed and benefit the people of Tanzania. One idea discussed was to sell them to the middle class (personal communication with Anna Tibaijuka, October 2012). According to an official of Sida, the original plan was that shares should also be offered at district and village levels (personal communication, October 2012). A Bagamoyo district representative complained during interviews (March 2012) that the district personnel were not involved in the formulation of the agreement between the investor and the government, and it was also claimed that the Bagamoyo district had not received a copy of the agreement.

Subsequent developments have involved the African Development Bank (AfDB), which is coordinating the financial contributions from development institutions to EcoEnergy's Bagamoyo investment. The AfDB has produced a number of reports over recent years, including an extended ESIA and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). EcoEnergy is now awaiting a decision from Sida regarding an application for a loan guarantee. Connected with this, Sida has conducted an environmental assessment based on the reports produced by the AfDB and a visit to the company in Tanzania (Sida Helpdesk 2012).

African Green Oil Ltd 'I can feel in my heart this land is still village land. But we are not using the land, because there is no statement from the investor that we can.' This statement reflects the story told by five male smallholder farmers in one of the Rufiji district villages where African Green Oil Ltd (AGO) invested in oil palm plantations in 2009. Only a year later the company disappeared. In this village a 200-hectare oil palm plantation was still standing in March 2012. Nobody in the village knew who had the right to the abandoned land.

AGO is run by a Norwegian investor based in London. AGO engaged smallholders in establishing smaller oil palm plantations in several villages in the Rufiji district during 2009. AGO initiated the investments without the completion of village land use plans and without any contracts signed by village authorities. The main reason for this was related to the procedures of the district officer responsible. He encourages villages to provide land to investors without a contract, in order for the investors to prove that they are serious about their investments. After having proved this seriousness by real work on the land, a formal contract should be arranged. Thus, the AGO invested

without having a contractual right to access the land. According to Tanzanian law, the procedure should be the reverse.

The investor was accompanied by district officers when he arrived to negotiate with the village council. The village council accepted the request for land after the investor had listed a number of social services that he would provide if land were made available. AGO promised the village assembly that they would maintain the village water pump so that villagers could get access to domestic water. AGO also agreed to construct classrooms to improve the capacity of the village primary school, and to construct a dispensary in return for land being made available by the village for oil palm investment. However, when the investor received access to the land, he told villagers to show commitment first before the promised education, health and water services would be delivered. Villagers were also supposed to demonstrate to the investor that they were able to collect money and materials needed for development of the social infrastructure. The investor later refused to maintain the village water pump because it was very expensive.

AGO planted 200 hectares with oil palm on land previously used for collecting thatching grass, firewood and timber. The farmers told us about the working conditions during the clearing of land for planting oil palms. Villagers were organized in teams of ten, each team being assigned to uproot trees and pull out stems from one hectare per day. The land was later burnt to remove all vegetation. If the work was not finished in a day, the villagers were not paid the daily wage of TZS2,500 (c. US$1.5). Women especially needed more time for the tasks, and sometimes they earned only TZS2,500 for three days of work. This is not in accordance with the Tanzanian legislation on minimum wages and timing and payment of wages.[6] In 2010, AGO left the village, blaming scarcity of water. The villagers did not believe this: the palms the company left behind are growing and the fruit bunches will soon be ripe enough to harvest. But neither the villagers nor the relevant district officers were sure to whom the land and investment now belonged. The investor neither bought nor leased the land but used village meetings to acquire the land. Villagers have turned to the media to get national attention. They have also met with the TIC to ask questions and discuss their case. There, they learnt that AGO visited the TIC only once. The company then went to the Rufiji district upon the TIC's recommendation, but never came back with any report to the TIC.

Concluding remarks

Large-scale land acquisitions by external investors are not new to Tanzania or other places in Africa but date back to the colonial period. Alden Wily (2012: 1) calls the current wave of land acquisitions 'the continuing capture of ordinary people's rights and assets by capital-led and class-creating social transformation'. Many researchers describe the current land rush as larger in

scale and pace than before and state that the contemporary land struggles in Africa are different from previous land sales because they seem to be at the heart of a capitalist crisis of fuel, food and finance (Bush et al. 2011; Matondi et al. 2011; Margulis et al. 2013).

Large-scale colonial agricultural projects and foreign settler farmers were of more limited scale in Tanzania when compared with Kenya, Swaziland or Zambia. The Tanzanian post-independent government thus had a better opportunity than most other African governments to address land and rural matters. The Tanzanian government made use of this option when President Julius Nyerere, in the late 1960s, implemented a major restructuring of the rural areas – the so-called *Ujamaa* strategy. The process, however, was not anchored in the country's laws and constitution. This led to major confusions and conflicts when economic liberalization emerged in the late 1980s and weakened the power of the state. The subsequent policy and legal processes reaffirmed the land management role of Tanzanian villages, which should be based on village land certificates and village households' land certificates, in which the name of the spouse also had to be registered. However, according to the Land Laws of 1999, the radical title to the land continued to rest with the president and was to be managed on his/her behalf by the Commissioner of Land.

Village land use plans were to be followed and implemented by state agencies and ministries. These plans should guide village land use and should help to identify possible use of village land by others, including investors. Nearly two-thirds of Tanzanian land thus came under village management. Currently, Tanzania has about 12,000 registered villages, but only about 1,000 of these have village land certificates and village land use plans.

Our case studies comprise different organizational models: (1) where agrofuel is already being produced by villages (jatropha); (2) where village land is converted from food to agrofuel (oil palm); and (3) where state land is leased to a private company for sugar production (sugar cane plantation). In all cases the investors are European: British, Swedish and Norwegian/British.

During the last decade there has been a growing interest on the part of external investors in Tanzanian and African land for the production of energy (agrofuel) and food for export. The Tanzanian state, in cooperation with donors, had since the mid-1980s been focusing on structural adjustment, debt and poverty reduction, and democratization. Only from the latter half of the 1990s did the Tanzanian state begin preparations for an institutional and legal framework for attracting foreign investments.

In parallel, the Tanzanian state shifted its strategic emphasis concerning agricultural development from villages and smallholder farming to large-scale farming. Gradually, many stakeholders came to acknowledge that the Tanzanian village-based land management system posed obstructions to providing collateral for banks issuing agricultural credits and loans, as well as to freeing

land for foreign investors. Pressures to amend the Land Laws to accommodate these concerns consequently emerged even before the implementation of the Tanzanian laws had taken hold.

Overall, in our assessment, the historical and recent developments have pointed to a lack of clarity about Tanzanian land management, including a lack of clarity in procedures for identifying and freeing land for foreign investors. Our research confirms that the Tanzanian land management system and the institutions involved are facing major challenges in adhering to laws and regulations. A major problem is the limited implementation of village land demarcations and village land use plans, which should be in place before allocation of village land to external interests. These problems are related both to historical processes of land ownership and management and to the lack of capacity of the Tanzanian state to implement and enforce laws and regulations.

Our research shows that procedures for foreign investors to access land for investment have become ad hoc and that Tanzanian institutions do not have a full overview of what is going on in the sector, nor do state officials at various levels follow laws and regulations. Direct meetings and negotiations between investors and village authorities for identifying land for investors, which are encouraged by the TIC, often lead to high expectations, misunderstandings and conflicts which affect potential investment plans and their implementation.

Of the thirty-two investors that we identified who had requested large tracts of land (over two thousand hectares) for agrofuel production in Tanzania during the last decade, only ten investors actually acquired land, of a total area of approximately 200,000 hectares. This amounted to only about 20 per cent of the total land requested (1.1 million hectares). Our findings also show a large gap between the number of land allocations for investments (ten) and implementation of the investments. Hence, the overall tendency is for land requests not to be met and for implementation of investments based on land allocations to be very slow and/or unsuccessful. Our assessment is that this development is caused by a number of factors, including historical, institutional and efficiency problems, such as ineffective policy formulation processes, lack of financing and droughts, and governance problems, such as contradictory policies and inconsistent enforcement, also described, for example, by Hultman et al. (2012) and Nelson et al. (2012).

The detailed investigation of the case studies where implementation actually did begin made these problems more concrete. They related to conflicts over land and settlement rights (EcoEnergy), faulty procedures in land allocations (Rufiji district), lack of investor realization of promises (AGO), uncertainty as to who could manage abandoned village land (Rufiji district/AGO), and lack of profitability (Diligent Ltd). In addition to this global market conditions have changed. The EU recently decided to reduce its targets for future use of certain crop-based agrofuels (e.g. sugar cane), subsidies for ethanol are being

reduced, ethanol has to be produced sustainably, and the discussions about indirect land use change, which are still unresolved, may have a negative impact on the future global market for agrofuels.

The large-scale investments that are operational are investments in food crops such as rice and sugar cane for sugar production. The vast majority of investments, if not all, are in former state-owned land. For example, several of these estates gained access to the land in connection with processes of privatization of state farms in 2006.[7]

Managing expectations among local communities seems to pose a major challenge for investors. The importance of allowing enough time to perform thorough studies about soil quality, weather patterns and current and future impacts of climate change is also clear. It is crucial that investors have an in-depth knowledge about local culture and values, and the question is to what extent these investments really can use the current livelihood strategies and needs as a basis to build upon. And if they cannot use them, is a win-win situation really likely to be the result when these widely different cultures, market systems and technologies meet?

'*The Global Land Grab* represents an important break from the earlier wave of land grabs studies in at least three interlinked ways: in its look beyond the 'here and now' by historicizing analysis; in its grounded local-national studies; and in its comparative perspective across regions of the world. Researchers, activists and development policy practitioners ... should read this book.'
Saturnino M. Borras Jr, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague

'This collection provides a serious analytical contribution to our understanding of a phenomenon, which might seem to peak at the present, but which is deeply rooted in the past and will need steadfast scholarly and political attention in the future.'
Christian Lund, University of Copenhagen

'A uniquely well-informed and comprehensive analysis of land grabbing, describing developments across three continents and illustrating the variety of forms it has taken. It shall be of interest to anyone curious about the future of globalization and its impacts on the poor who rely on access to land for their livelihood.'
Olivier De Schutter, UN special rapporteur on the right to food

'This is an excellent, original collection, on the global land-grabbing phenomenon. It covers a number of interesting themes, including urban land grabbing, GM soy cultivation, residential tourism, water grabbing, new land conversions in Vietnam, and the Gulf States' investments.'
Robin Palmer, global land rights policy specialist, Mokoro

The last two years have seen a huge amount of academic, policy-making and media interest in the increasingly contentious issue of land grabbing – the large-scale acquisition of land in the global South. It is a phenomenon against which locals seem defenceless, and one about which multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, as well as civil-society organizations and action NGOs have become increasingly vocal.

This in-depth and empirically diverse volume – taking in case studies from across Africa, Asia and Latin America – takes a step back from the hype to explore a number of key questions: Does the 'global land grab' actually exist? If so, what is new about it? And what, beyond the immediately visible dynamics and practices, are the real problems?

A comprehensive and much-needed intervention on one of the most hotly contested but little-understood issues facing countries of the South today.

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II

III

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Conjuring 'Win-World' – Resilient Development Narratives in a Large-Scale Agro-Investment in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT   *Through a case study of a public-private partnership (PPP) for development in which the Swedish development agency Sida supported a Swedish company trying to implement a large-scale agro-investment in sugarcane in Tanzania, we unpack the underpinnings of what we call 'win-world', a resilient development narrative maintained by actors promoting the investment. Rich empirical descriptions show that this narrative was highly resilient to accumulated academic knowledge and current real-world problems. We found that the privatisation of development increased the resilience of the narrative to evidence of its own shortcomings.*

1. Introduction

To identify how the actors behind a development project manage to produce and sustain a narrative that is counter-proven by history and current real-world problems, and how close collaboration with private actors influences this narrative, we performed a case study of a public-private partnership (PPP) for development between the Tanzanian government and a Swedish company. The PPP, which was supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), planned to invest in sugarcane production in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, a so-called large-scale agro-investment (LSAI). A Memorandum of Understanding between the government and the company was signed in 2006, and ever since, the company's plans were strongly supported by key Tanzanian ministers. In total, 1374 local people were identified as affected by the project (AfDB, 2012, p. 85). Most of these were smallholders, residing or working on the 20,374 hectares of land targeted by the investment and scheduled for resettlement in line with international best practice. Moreover, approximately 70 Barabaig pastoralists would be compensated with land within the estate.

In May 2012, Sida received an application from the company for a 94 million USD credit enhancement guarantee (940 million SEK[1]), which was Sida's largest ever. Sida's decision on this guarantee was still pending when the Tanzanian government revoked the company's land title in 2016. However, in 2014, Sida granted a smaller guarantee of 16.2 million USD from its regular development budget (of which 6.2 million USD [54 mSEK] was disbursed) (Sida, 2015). That decision was based on various appraisals, which were important documents for our analysis. The investment planned to bring 2000 direct and 10,000–12,000 indirect jobs to the area and engage 1500–2000 local farmers in

outgrower schemes that would make an annual income of 13 million USD (Sida, 2014b). The initial aim of the investment, biofuel export to Europe, was later shifted to sugar production for the domestic market. From 2006, the company struggled to secure funding. It did not plant a single sugarcane on the designated land in the decade before the Tanzanian government revoked the land rights.

Events in 2008–2017 were studied by analysing documents and conducting interviews with three of the main proponents of the project and with local community members, in order to compare the proponents' narrative with social realities on the ground.

Resilience (immunity to counterevidence) of narratives has been observed in a wide array of development policies that fail to deliver expected outcomes, for example within rural development (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2010; Mosse, 2005; Roe, 1991; van Ufford, 1993) environmental policies (Leach & Mearns, 1996), land reform (Edelman & León, 2013; Wily, 2012), green revolution (Harwood, 2013) and conservation (Büscher, 2010, 2014; Lund, Sungusia, Mabele, & Scheba, 2017; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017). Regarding LSAI, strong resilience has been reported for narratives in Africa (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013), Latin America (Edelman & León, 2013) and globally (White, Borras Jr, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012).

The present case study is interesting for three reasons: 1) it contributes to an emerging body of literature on how constructions of success are 'produced, distributed and consumed' (Büscher, 2014, p. 79), an issue rarely addressed in ethnographies of development, and examines development narratives in close collaboration with a private company, another under-researched issue. 2) It provides novel insights on contemporary land deals, since insufficient attention 'has been paid to ways in which different forms of knowledge are mobilised and circulated in defence of large scale land allocations or in support of alternatives' (Wolford, 2015, p. 226). 3) The project received unprecedented support from powerful stakeholders, despite limited progress, permitting interesting discussions about dominant win-win narratives. In summary, this case demonstrates how resilient narratives are produced and sustained in privatised development and LSAI.

In the following sections, we introduce the case and review relevant literature on development studies and historical investments in Tanzania (what we call 'accumulated academic knowledge').[2] We then provide an empirical description of how accumulated academic knowledge and knowledge about current realities were lacking in project design and the LSAI narrative and how other types of knowledge were mobilised and circulated instead. We analyse the resilience of dominant narratives to criticism, including how various practices are used to deflect challenging counter-narratives to sustain its dominance. In a final section, we discuss how privatisation of development led to an especially resilient development narrative ('win-world') in the case and provide some brief reflections on *why* failed policies are repeated.

1.1. Privatisation of development

The sugar investment in Bagamoyo falls within a 'business for development' agenda re-emerging among development bodies in which private sector collaboration is viewed as a way to increase 'development impact' (Sida, 2012). Private sector support was heavily promoted in Africa as part of Structural Adjustment Programmes back in the 1980s (Stein, 2010), but now development agencies are actively partnering with private actors to achieve poverty reduction (Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013).

Privatisation can be seen as a process whereby activities and resources are transferred to private ownership or control (Swyngedouw, 2005). The current privatisation agenda in development is a core element of neoliberal ideology aiming for a 'reduction of the state', making more space available for private actors to influence policy (Corson, 2010). Involvement of market actors is assumed to promote more efficient, flexible management, counteracting the inefficiencies of state operation (Swyngedouw, 2005). However, PPP is based on the assumption that it is a win-win-win-win solution for recipient states, the private sector, donors and civil society (Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013). In the Bagamoyo case, the state was expected to gain, for example, dividends through piloting a new government 'Land for Equity' policy to increase state revenues from LSAIs.[3]

In the socialist period following independence, the Tanzania government prohibited state involvement in private enterprise, keeping public and private sectors segregated (Coulson, 2013). In recent

years, however, privatisation of development has had a major influence on agricultural policy in Tanzania, not least the PPP 'Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania' (SAGCOT) involving development agencies and multinational corporations (Bergius, Benjaminsen, & Widgren, 2017). The SAGCOT development model builds on ideas that more profitable economies of scale must be achieved, for example through PPPs with funding from development agencies (Maganga, Askew, Odgaard, & Stein, 2016). While privatisation of development is proposed as a means to accelerate the fight against poverty, critics point to the risk of further marginalisation of local communities through consolidation of land and other assets by powerful private and public actors (Peluso & Lund, 2011).

2. Background to the case: a decade of delays and failure of an LSAI

Our case LSAI was conceptualised as a development project with three key proponents: a Swedish company, the Tanzanian state and Sida. Other important actors included the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and local businessmen. The three key actors supported the project from the outset and consistently presented a positive vision in which different beneficiaries (investors, local communities in and around the investment site and the Tanzanian state) would all 'win' from the project. Moreover, supporting this PPP was in line with aid politics in Sweden at the time, which favoured collaboration with the private sector. Table 1 summarises the benefits proposed to accrue to the three beneficiaries, compared with real-world outcomes.

From the outset, the project was criticised in both Sweden and Tanzania. One serious criticism was that the company had altered the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), to the extent that the Swedish consultant in charge of the process distanced herself from it (Helpdesk, 2009). She claimed that conclusions in the report had been 'substantially altered' and 'wrote the conclusions in the best light' (Usher, 2009). She also claimed that her signature had been forged on the final version submitted to the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) in order to obtain the environmental permit. The international NGO Action Aid accused the company of land grabbing, chasing people away and failing to obtain free, prior, informed consent from affected communities (Curtis & Mbunda, 2015). In an opinion piece published in Sweden and Tanzania, the company was accused of, for example, dispossessing smallholders and threatening valuable forests, risking increased carbon dioxide emissions (DN, 2009).

Nonetheless, the project retained strong support from key actors, even when the grand visions failed to materialise (see Table 1). On 15 March 2016, the government revoked the company's land title, stating in a letter to the company that it had 'different plans for utilizing the land' (BEE, 2017).[4] At that time, no sugar cane had yet been planted. Nevertheless, the project had many consequences. A 200-hectare seed cane farm was established, but the cane plants it produced had to be burnt each year (from 2007), since the land on the estate could not be prepared for planting and no processing plant had been built. Moreover, local people had been waiting for over five years to be resettled, a delay which caused great loss of livelihood opportunities. At the time of writing, people are still waiting to see what will happen. However, around 300–400 villagers benefited from working on the seed cane plantation, some people were trained in a pilot irrigation project and some received livelihood training and health screening. Overall, the company achieved few of the proposed benefits and suffered severe financial losses (although three company executives were paid between 25,500 to 27,800 USD monthly) (Sida, 2015). The Tanzanian state as a whole gained little benefit and in September 2017 the company filed for arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement for Investment Disputes, a World Bank organ based in Washington, D.C. The company wants compensation from the Tanzanian state for 52 million USD in costs since the project onset (BEE, 2017).

3. Resilient narratives

Development narratives are stories that typically say what will happen, provided a certain sequence of events occurs as described (Roe, 1991). As indicated above, many accounts of narratives show that they are resilient in different ways, however, the term 'resilient narratives' is rarely used. Instead,

Table 1. Proposed and real-world outcomes from the project for three main beneficiaries (the investing company, local people affected and the Tanzanian state)

Proposed outcome	Real-world outcome
Investor	
Produce 130,000 tons sugar and 10 million litres ethanol annually	No sugar or ethanol produced
Launch a 450 million USD investment with a 300 million USD loan from African Development Bank	Credit enhancement guarantee obtained from Sida, cancelled in 2015 (after 6 million USD [54 million SEK] had been paid)
Make profit	In 54 million SEK debt to Sida, claims to have lost a total of 50 million USD
A 'long-term, stable, peaceful and beneficial relationship with communities and local government'	Court case against investor and state by elders living on estate.
Local people affected	
Reliable electricity supply to 100,000 rural households	No production or delivery of electricity to rural households
Employment of 2000 people and 10,000–12,000 jobs as spin-off effects	A few permanent positions, approx. 300 seasonal farm jobs, small number of farmers gained low-paid jobs while awaiting resettlement
25–35 companies registered as outgrowers	One company in the process of registering in 2014
1500–2000 farmers engaged in outgrower programme	100 people trained and engaged in pilot outgrower schemes for rice production, 59 farmers active in 2014
13–18 million USD in annual revenue for outgrower farmers	Outgrower members dropping out, or waiting due to problems in expanding schemes
Communities managing 3000–4000 ha of modern irrigated farms 'with greatly improved standard of living'	Some village level irrigation infrastructure in place, less than 8 hectares of rice harvested in 2014 from pilot rice project
'Become businessmen' and 'create wealth' through outgrower schemes	One company registered in 2014, some entrepreneurial training provided, a few settlers gained by selling land to speculators
1374 people resettled but amply compensated	No resettlement materialised, resettlement delays cause frustration, uncertainty and serious impacts on livelihoods
Local livelihoods enhancement through dedicated programmes	Some people received health screening, literacy classes and livelihoods training, for example for driving and construction. Lost livelihood opportunities[a]
Access to infrastructure	Apart from irrigation infrastructure for some, this has not materialised
More generous legislation for resettlement compensation	No changes in national compensation policy
Investment targets 'unused' land	Conflicts over land between and within villages and between villagers and the state
Tanzanian state	
Get benefits in line with 'Land for Equity' policy	'Land for Equity' policy process delayed.
Company pays tax (6 years after production starts) and land rent	Company produces no sugar – no tax revenue. No land rent paid, since land not free from encumbrance
Company produces sugar to reduce Tanzanian sugar import expenses	No sugar produced, import dependency still high
Company produces ethanol to replace 10% of Tanzanian gasoline imports	No ethanol produced
Tax incomes, for example from imported equipment	Some equipment imported for seed cane plantation
Rural development/poverty reduction	Stalled development at investment site, local people frustrated, conflicts over land with villagers.
Access to loans for extensive infrastructure development	None, since the investment never materialised

Table 1. (*Continued*)

Proposed outcome	Real-world outcome
Partnership between foreign company and government	Conflict between ministries over land within the estate. Company threatening to sue Tanzanian state to recover costs.

Note: ᵃSee Chung (2017) for a detailed account of livelihoods impacts.
Sources: Based on interviews and the following documents and websites: http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/outgrower-programme/outcomes/ Accessed 2 May 2017; http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/outgrower-programme/outgrower-areas/ Accessed 2 May 2017; http://www.swedenabroad.com/Pages/StandardPage.aspx?id=70052&epslanguage=en-GB Accessed 2 May 2017; Sida's Relevance Assessment 20140226, http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/cash-rich-nssf-ppf-invest-billions-risky-joint-venture Accessed 18 May 2017; Master's theses: Kjeller (2015) and Ohlsson (2015); IDC Q1 Newsletter March 2015.

development intervention is described as repeatedly disregarding historical experiences (Ferguson, 1990), or, as argued by Roe (1991, p. 287), 'development narratives persist through time and frequently in spite of evidence learned in the field'. More recently, resilient development and conservation narratives have been framed as being about 'constructing value' (Büscher, 2014) and where the promise of 'change' becomes a 'discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced' (Lund et al., 2017, p. 125).

Two previous studies use the concept 'resilient narrative' in a way that is relevant for the present analysis. Cairns, Sallu, and Goodman (2014, p. 14) describe resilient narratives as promising 'win-win-outcomes' backed by powerful actors and persisting over time. They claim that the 'resilient narrative' about the Galapagos Islands being pristine and uninhabited, although people have lived there for centuries, is applied in order to justify conservation activities (2014, p. 14). In a study on 'surplus populations', Li (2010) notes 'the repetition of some remarkably resilient narratives about agrarian transition that assume a linear pathway'. She argues that the ability to sustain the image of producing policy for protection, while simultaneously causing dispossession, stems from 'quotidian practices of compromise that enable […] a monstrous disavowal' (p. 80). Thus, both these studies portray resilient narratives as simplified, even inaccurate, truth-claims that disregard empirical realities.

Development narratives build on knowledge mobilised in order to define development 'problems' and justify interventions to solve them (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007). The fact that knowledge is inseparable from power and politics is now widely acknowledged in the social sciences (Sumberg, 2017). Thus, individuals or groups selectively produce or use knowledge to 'establish, maintain or enhance their vested interests' (2017, p. 10). Consequently, conflicting perspectives on development reflect the different types of knowledge underpinning them or lacking in them.

The following sections summarise crucial background knowledge to the case study project obtained from development studies, previous LSAIs in Tanzania and the current context. We then examine how this knowledge was addressed in the LSAI narrative and in project design.

4. Literature review: relevant findings within development studies

There have been some key advances in development studies since the first development projects were launched after the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. Below, we summarise some findings of relevance for the case project.

4.1. Solutions based on evolutionary development thinking do not work

A key lesson in ethnographies of aid concerns the 'disjuncture' between 'the "ideal worlds" that development actors aim to bring about through the execution of proper policy and project design' and 'the social reality they have to relate to' (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 2). This lack of attention to context

emanates from a lingering Eurocentrism and cultural imperialism where experts tend to view the people and practices they aim to 'develop' as inferior in various ways (Escobar, 1993; Scott, 1998). Li (2007) defines development workers as trustees, 'a position defined by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need' (p. 4). Interventions therefore often start with Western 'experts' assuming they know how to improve life in poor countries through referring to their own country's development path, implementing various schemes out of a 'will to improve' (Li, 2007). This often leads to problematisations of the local context that are inadequate (or even incorrect) and ineffective solutions, ultimately causing interventions to fail to deliver expected outcomes (Ferguson, 1990; Scott, 1998).

Eriksson Baaz (2005) describes the history behind the idea of 'evolutionary development', which holds that every society goes through development stages in a linear way, climbing up a ladder of pre-determined developments, eventually ending up on top with a 'developed', rich, capitalist system like that in the 'West'. She shows that, although long since deconstructed in development studies, this belief still lingers in many conceptions about development in Tanzania. Indeed, this simplified idea is a core element in an agrarian transition narrative which assumes that small-scale farming in Africa today is similar to that which prevailed in Europe before the Industrial Revolution and that measures which led to 'effectivisation' of European agriculture can be successfully applied to modernise African agriculture today, with the same result. This narrative misunderstands or disregards factors such as radically different soils, geology, climate, infrastructure and social, cultural and agricultural practices of various African regions, not to mention the radically different global context today, with international trade relations, tariffs and so forth (Patnaik, Moyo, & Shivji, 2011). The step on the ladder whereby farmers leave their land and get jobs in industry has also been repeatedly questioned (Li, 2011). Indeed, industry in Tanzania offers few employment opportunities for dispossessed farmers (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016).

Moreover, the idea that small-scale agriculture is implicitly inferior to large-scale agriculture has been repeatedly questioned. As pointed out by Coulson (2015), small-scale agriculture can outcompete large-scale agriculture in many contexts. Coulson refers to the seminal work by Chayanov (1986) describing important advantages small, relatively resource-poor farmers can have over large-scale agriculture. These include the smallholder practice of 'exploiting' the whole family as free labour in tasks such as building stone walls or irrigation canals, instead of having to hire expensive manpower (Coulson, 2015). Moreover, small-scale farmers can work in cooperatives, utilising technologies that are difficult to implement at large scale and avoiding costs of supervisory labour. However, the issue for smallholder farmers is not only efficiency and profit, but also the many other roles agriculture plays in their diversified livelihoods and overall lives.

4.2. Top-down interventions rarely work

As mentioned, the agrarian transition narrative is permeated by a lingering notion that 'underdeveloped' states and people are somehow inferior. Consequently, aid recipients are seen as 'passive', 'lazy', 'backward' and not sufficiently 'entrepreneurial'. However, smallholders have been found to be strategic and innovative in dealing with risk and unpredictability in their socio-economic and environmental contexts, which means they do not always opt for maximising profit (Hajdu, Jacobson, Salomonsson, & Friman, 2012). According to Eriksson Baaz (2005), the often-discussed passivity on the part of recipients is usually a sign of resistance to interventions that are rarely attuned to their most pressing needs. It can also be a sign of unequal relationships between development workers and local communities, with the latter risking more if projects fail.

Although the idea of participation in development has a long history, there was a significant shift in development policy in the 1990s as funding bodies increasingly started requiring participatory processes (Groves & Hinton, 2013). The idea that development interventions should be based on the needs expressed by local people and should ideally be 'bottom-up' and designed in a participatory manner has proven more difficult to implement than initially expected. One of the difficulties is finding out what people really want and need, rather than making assumptions. A

basic understanding of local contexts and local practical knowledge is also critical to success (Kragelund, 2004; Scott, 1998). In order to find out what people need and to understand local contexts, project designers would need to repeatedly visit project sites and develop close, trustful dialogue with local people.

5. Literature review: lessons learnt from historical LSAIs in Tanzania

The current wave of LSAIs in Tanzania is not the first. Support has shifted between plantation agriculture and smallholder farming in Africa, including Tanzania, since colonial times (Coulson, 2013; Iliffe, 1979). In Tanzania, three different waves of LSAI can be discerned.

In the early twentieth century, sisal, rubber and cotton were promoted as plantation crops by the German colonial power (Iliffe, 1979). Of these three, rubber and cotton failed within a few years due to, for example, falling global prices, while sisal proved highly suitable for the soils and precipitation patterns in the target regions and, despite fluctuations, is still a top agricultural export commodity (URT, 2016).

The second wave of LSAIs took place around 30 years later, under British colonial rule. It included the 8000-hectare Northern Provinces Wheat Scheme, 'a relative success' (Coulson, 2013, p. 79), and the notorious Groundnut Scheme of 1946, which was 'an abject failure in all three locations, technically and economically' (Coulson, 2013, pp. 79–80). This failure was mainly due to uncritical faith in large-scale agriculture and gross simplifications in project planning, for example, no thorough soil or rainfall analyses were performed and untried machinery was used.

A third, more extended wave of LSAI took place after independence, when the World Bank and the Tanganyikan government promoted a 'Transformation Approach' entailing various initiatives for rural development, with irrigation farming being the model most similar to contemporary LSAI initiatives. These irrigation schemes had little success due to delays, lack of interest from donors and highly saline soils (Coulson, 2013). In the 1970s, the Tanzanian state decided to nationalise large farms and set up parastatal organisations such as NAFCOs (National Agriculture and Food Corporations) to produce maize, wheat and rice (Bernstein, 1981). For decades, the Canadian-supported scheme in Hanang produced much of Tanzania's domestic wheat demand, but was heavily criticised for displacing Barabaig people from their prime grazing land, with severe negative social and ecological impacts (Lane, 1994). It has been concluded that this wave of LSAIs in sub-Saharan Africa 'largely failed' (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012).

To conclude, the track record of large-scale agriculture in Tanzania is 'to say the least, mixed' (Coulson, 2015, p. 63). Many projects have had difficulties achieving expected outcomes and the majority of plantations have contributed little to the local economy beyond the wages paid (Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2017) and have caused serious displacement of local communities. Our case study encountered several of the problems listed, so knowledge about these previous investments would clearly have been valuable for the actors involved.

6. Data collection and analysis

We analysed the narratives of three main actors (the investing company, the Tanzanian state[5] and Sida) in the case study investment, who together constructed the LSAI narrative. We then compared the results with observations on the project site and the narratives of affected local communities. Information about the main actors' viewpoints was obtained through analysis of policy documents and plans, repeated interviews between 2012 and 2017 (36 interviews), media articles and public statements. Two company executives and several company employees were interviewed, as were influential, high-level state officials in Dar-es-Salaam. Sida programme officials based in Stockholm and at the Swedish Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam were also interviewed. Information about real-world problems was gained through five field visits (2012–2016) with repeated interviews with people on Razaba ranch who were to be resettled, people in surrounding villages targeted for outgrower schemes

and who worked on the seed cane plantation, village and sub-village leaders and other villagers employed by the company (20 interviews).

In the work, we treated narratives as stories within the wider discourse. Through analysis of these more specific narratives, we can observe how overarching discourses 'filter through to the everyday' (Doughty & Murray, 2016, p. 304). Using different concepts from discourse analysis and ethnographies of aid, we analysed patterns in texts and statements from LSAI proponents. We also performed a critical evaluation of certain statements.

As shown by Li (2007) and Ferguson (1990), a core element of constructing development discourse includes the process of 'problem description'. By critical analysis of our data, we investigated the 'problem representations' (Bacchi, 2009) that underpinned the narrative and whether these matched 'problems' described in academic literature and by local people.

We also examined assumptions underpinning the LSAI narrative, that is, 'meanings which are shared and can be taken as given' (Fairclough, 2003, p. 55). Social communication by powerful actors is geared towards framing a certain 'common ground' (p. 55), based on such assumptions. Fairclough outlines different types of assumptions, for example 'value assumptions' as 'particular meanings about what is good or desirable' (p. 55). A particular narrative can be supported by various actors, in order to 'universalize particular meanings in the service of achieving and maintaining dominance' (p. 58). In the study case, the view that agrarian transition is about economic progress and should proceed in pre-determined steps was based on certain value assumptions about development shared by the actors promoting the LSAI development strategy. Our analysis examined how well academic knowledge was reflected in project design, the LSAI narrative and the underlying assumptions.

We also analysed the data for discursive and material practices applied by the proponents to deflect certain knowledge and create 'resilience [...] in [the] face of contrary evidence' (Mosse, 2008, p. 121), what we call 'deflection practices'. We systematically identified criticisms in published articles and reports and the practices applied by the three main actors in their responses to these criticisms in interviews and official statements. Finally, we examined how proponents gained and shared knowledge about the project, by analysing how they referred to each other and other sources of information.

7. Findings: little consideration of academic knowledge and lessons learnt

Below, we examine whether the knowledge outlined above, that is, lessons learnt in development studies, knowledge about previous LSAI in Tanzania and current realities, were applied in the LSAI narrative and project design for the Bagamoyo investment.

7.1. Lacking: knowledge about development studies

We found that lessons learnt in development studies over the past 50+ years were ignored. The actors seemed to have no knowledge about these lessons or dismissed them using various deflection practices.

The analysis revealed several problematic problem representations within the LSAI narrative and in the knowledge produced about the Bagamoyo investment. Indeed, a policy proposing LSAI as a modernisation of agriculture implies the 'problem' that smallholders' land use practices are out-dated. In a podcast, a Sida official framed the 'problem' as being smallholders' 'ancient' agricultural methods and equipment (Omvärlden, 2015). Moreover, the foreword to the SAGCOT Blueprint stated that: 'Tanzania's agriculture is predominantly small holder, characterised with very low productivity due to very limited use of modern technology and techniques of production.' (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 4).

Another, interlinked, problem representation was that of local people being undeveloped, passive or lazy, with the wrong attitude and clearly not in a position to know what was best for them, which was repeated more frequently and in more extreme forms by company representatives. In one interview, a company employee seeking to explain the company's 'way of conceptualizing things' stated that it

wanted to help local farmers 'rise up' and that farmers in the planned outgrower villages currently live in a 'black hole' from where 'you cannot see straight'. He added:

> You can look up and you might see an object moving, and *we* know it's an airplane, but if you were just in that hole you wouldn't know it's an airplane, you would just see *pshht!* You know what I mean? Cause you can't fill in the gaps (personal interview, 10 April 2014).

Therefore, he continued, one has to start from the basic things, and 'in the village context, simple things are food production, building a shelter, making children'. In a similar vein, one company executive stated that 'we need to change the mentality of the Tanzanian farmer, from subsistence to business man'. The same company executive said in another interview:

> The people down there, it is actually in general, but especially coastal people, they are often more lazy, because they work with fishing. They go out to fish and then they live on fishing and they don't need to work every day.

and 'I experience difficulty making people want to work – I know, on our seed cane farm, in the surrounding villages, they were not interested, it was too hard work' (personal interview, 2 July 2014). However, our interviews with local employees revealed that the 'problem' as perceived by the farmers was that they earned more working for their neighbours in the village than on the seed cane farm, which was one reason why they refused jobs on the farm. In this case, the problem representation of passive farmers was based on what the *company representatives* perceived as a problem, reflecting the top-down approach in project design.

Sida officials did not as bluntly describe people as lazy, but several statements indicated a perception of people needing to be moved up, in line with the evolutionary pathway: 'To move from subsistence to being part of a company in a relatively short time period is of course a great challenge. If you want to lift them to another level'.

If it had been based on existing knowledge about top-down interventions, the project would have considered the perceived problems and needs of local people, their local economy and livelihood strategies from the outset. This would have recognised findings emphasising the importance of paying attention to local context. In the absence of such a bottom-up approach, the next best thing would have been a participatory approach, where the actors visited the project site independently to discuss people's needs and how these matched the project plans. Instead, the intervention was designed by the company, based on its own perceptions. The outgrower scheme was a clear example of a top-down design, since taking 1.2 million dollar loans and risking their land was not the idea of local people. Asked whether local people actually *want* to run companies, one company representative said: 'Yes, I believe so. Some, I think. Well, we'll see. I think that they want to. I think many people [. . .] many today maybe don't even know what a company is [. . .]' (personal interview, 2 July 2014). Furthermore, officials at Sida and the AfDB visited the area infrequently, if at all, and generally had little or no experience of rural areas. Moreover, when Sida representatives did visit, they were often accompanied by company representatives, reducing the likelihood of them forming an unbiased opinion.

During an interview with a farmer in one of the villages targeted for outgrower schemes, it emerged that he did not understand the size of the loan he needed. The interpreter translated the sum involved (2 billion Tsh) into a much smaller number and, when corrected, explained that the farmer would not understand 'billion', so he said 'million' instead. It was therefore evident that the farmer did not understand the financial deal. Thus, local people were portrayed as 'backward', but the project plan still assumed that they could operate in the same way as a Swedish businessman. In an interview, a company representative revealed a very distinct 'business is business' perspective:

> Q: What is your 'worst case scenario' then, if they do this and [. . .] take a loan, what if they fail, then what?

A: They have [. . .] it is a risk they are taking. That is a fact. And the question is then: do they place all eggs in one basket, or what else do they do? How do they survive – but it is a business they are doing! It's not a grant.

This provides a good example of why privatisation in development is problematic. When small-holders become outgrowers, they are suddenly perceived and treated as equal partners to the company, when it is obvious that they are far from equal. This might be unproblematic from a 'business perspective', but is highly problematic from a development perspective where the aim is improving people's lives, not introducing great financial risk and unequal partner arrangements.

Reference to other 'modernised' countries was made by all actors, especially company representatives. One company executive compared the case with land consolidation in Sweden:

They just have to get modernised agriculture going. Part of that is what we did in Sweden in the 1860s. You need to create larger units. If you have one or two acres per person, you are locked in structural poverty.[6]

This view was also expressed at Sida, but not as often or as extremely. One Sida official stated:

It's hard to imagine Tanzania in 10 years remaining in a situation where every family lives on 0.5 acres. Just like Sweden changed with land consolidation. It goes hand-in-hand with natural development. Of course it cannot be forced.

As indicated above, this reasoning assumes an evolutionary, linear pathway, disregarding the radically different real-world environmental, social, political and global context of African agriculture today. Moreover, it is underpinned by assumptions on what is inferior and superior. Lastly, there are serious real-world environmental and social challenges as a consequence of large-scale agricultural systems, including in Sweden.

In summary, we found that all actors were lacking knowledge about, or were unwilling to adhere to, relevant findings in development studies.

7.2. Lacking: knowledge about previous LSAI in Tanzania

The actors also appeared to lack knowledge of lessons learnt in previous LSAIs in Tanzania, where many of the problems encountered in the project had already arisen. For example, late discovery of saline soils forced the company to reduce the planned plantation size and seek more land outside the estate, which delayed the investment, following similar trajectories as the Ground Nut Scheme. Plans were also repeatedly delayed because rainy seasons were not always considered in the time-line. From previous LSAIs, the company could have learnt about basic agronomy and poor commercial viability. Sida could have considered the overwhelming evidence that the LSAI development strategy has repeatedly failed to achieve expected outcomes and poses serious challenges for displaced pastoralists and smallholder farmers.

None of the company's core project documents mentions learning from previous LSAIs in Tanzania, apart from stating that sugarcane has been cultivated in Tanzania since colonial times (PIM, 2010, p. 19) (although not in the area targeted for investment). In interviews, Sida representatives mentioned their own lack of experience in Tanzania as a problem in handling the company's application. One Sida official repeatedly mentioned lack of previous experience of Tanzania and lack of time to gain insights into the complex case. Thus, in addition to lack of experience, there was a perceived lack of time to gather sufficient knowledge. When asked if there had been any discussion at Sida about past LSAIs, the reply was 'No, I guess we haven't [. . .] no, I can't say that we have' (personal interview, 12 February 2015).

The Sida official mentioned that a colleague had raised the issue of displaced Barabaigs in the previous Hanang scheme and a Sida document states that the experiences from Hanang should be

taken into account (Sida, 2013, p. 3). However, the issue was not addressed in Sida's decision to support the company, despite the Barabaigs again being at risk of losing access to grazing land and water.

In contrast, representatives of the Tanzanian state were well aware of previous LSAIs in Tanzania. In fact, one key SAGCOT documents begins:

> The large-scale mechanization schemes developed in some African countries in the 1960s and 1970s have been substantial failures; often only the roads survive to show that something was done. And the massive failure of the colonial Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme provides an immediate and eloquent example of large-scale agricultural development gone seriously wrong. (SAGCOT, n.d., p. 7)

The same document justifies the re-ignited belief in LSAI by claiming that supporting smallholder agriculture in Tanzania has also had very limited success. Interviews revealed that the SAGCOT design was perceived to provide 'very different guiding principles' with which investors had agreed to comply. In essence, there were two main, loosely defined, SAGCOT guidelines: i) Inclusiveness – by including smallholders as contract farmers and partners in PPPs, Tanzania can achieve equal growth; and ii) attracting private investment and the right kind of private actors, 'in a way that maximises social gains and allows smallholder farmers to become profitable producers and entrepreneurs' (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 12).

While the availability of large amounts of land for immediate agricultural development is described as 'not true' in a SAGCOT strategy document (SAGCOT, n.d., p. 2), it remained a core assumption, as shown by this quote from a high-level state official:

> For us in Tanzania we don't know anything about land grabbing. Because we've got so much land. If you try to grab our land, that's a big task. There's so much land which is unutilised. So we don't have any problem of land grabbing, as far as we are concerned.

Indeed, reports of vast tracts of land available for exploitation persist in the agrarian transition narrative (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013). This 'truth' stems from colonial times and assumes that land with no people is unused, disregarding real-world practices such as rotation cropping, seasonal grazing or villages' reservation of land for future generations. However, this 'truth' has frequently been challenged (Bergius et al., 2017; Maganga et al., 2016). In fact, there is evidence of increasing land scarcity (Börjeson, Hodgson, & Yanda, 2008; Tsikata, 2003), conflicts over land (Peters, 2004) and, in some areas, widespread landlessness (Stein & Maganga, 2017). Nevertheless, a company executive had strong convictions about the availability of land:

> There is no lack of land, dear Linda! If you have travelled so much in this country now, you have been here so many times and will be here this time for a month. If you travel around by car everywhere and fly over the country, you can see that there is no lack of land! (personal interview, 16 March 2016)

While deciding to support the initial loan with a guarantee, Sida took a rather critical stance on this issue, stating that 'there is no such thing as unused land', and suggesting in its final appraisal that the purported availability of land should be assessed later (for the larger credit guarantee) (Sida, 2014a, p. 1). Many studies of LSAI, both early (Lane, 1994; Shivji, 2006) and recent (Anseeuw, Alden, Cotula, & Taylor, 2012; Locher & Müller-Böker, 2014), have shown that conflicts over land are one of the major impacts of LSAIs. In our study case too, land conflicts became a major source of delays and frustration.

To conclude, more knowledge about, or willingness to seriously consider, past experiences of LSAI in Tanzania could have helped at two different levels, by prompting the questions 'Is the LSAI development strategy appropriate, given its historical difficulties?' and 'What is important to consider

in order to avoid past mistakes?' The latter question was indeed posed, by SAGCOT. It was also touched upon by Sida, but not elaborated upon in the decision to support the company. However, despite having different starting points, with the state showing more awareness of past experiences of LSAI and Sida showing near complete lack of knowledge, they both ended up with the same vision of LSAI as the solution. Where relevant knowledge did exist, mainly among state representatives, it was deflected, for example, by referring to privatisation in agriculture as novel.

7.3. Lacking: consideration of current project realities

While the LSAI narrative disregarded 'accumulated academic knowledge', it also failed to consider current realities at the project site. Such social realities included conflicts over land resulting in two court cases (one against the government and the other against both the government and the company) initiated by the local communities, conflicts over water and severe impacts of delay on people's livelihoods, such as losing out on planned state agricultural services because of planned resettlement (Jimwaga, 2017). Where knowledge of these problems existed, there was a strong tendency to deflect it through different practices and produce conclusions that maintained the image of future success. In particular, company representatives were given space to select the knowledge produced and circulated to other actors, giving them great influence over this image.

One leading character in the project was the charismatic CEO of the company, a former car salesman from northern Sweden. As the former CEO of the Swedish company SEKAB (until 2009), one of Europe's leading ethanol players, he had been a strong promoter of Swedish ethanol production and import. On initiation of the Bagamoyo project, he made spirited presentations in Sweden and Tanzania about the need for LSAI in a world plagued by climate change, poverty and population growth. Indeed, one Sida official stated that he had 'charmed Sida'. His persuasiveness may partly explain why Sida decided to trust the company's knowledge to a large extent. As pointed out by Büscher (2014), capturing the interest of donors and policy-makers is about 'selling success' (p. 79), portraying projects and ideas as valuable. Naturally, the company representatives needed to produce strong justification for the project and to depict the implementation process as smooth, which they did in interviews we held before visiting local communities. However, the contrast between the image presented at the company's office in Dar-es-Salaam and that observed on site was quite striking. For example, in March 2014, company representatives claimed that land use planning in one of the outgrower villages would be finished in July 2014 and that the land earmarked for outgrower schemes was currently lying idle. In fact, land use planning to prepare for the schemes was still not finalised by March 2016, while the village chairperson reported that the land intended for outgrower schemes was currently used for food crops.

Sida officials handling the company's application showed a striking lack of knowledge about the Tanzanian context. They did not know Tanzania had been a German colony, or basic facts about village and land governance. It also became clear that, despite the project being perceived by many Sida officials as 'complex and time consuming' (Sida, 2015, p. 7), officials allocated little time to visit the communities affected. Consequently, Sida largely lacked first-hand information about current project realities, and instead relied mainly on information produced by the company. For example, regarding the current use of land for food production, Sida had received the same information from the company as we did, but without cross-checking it with villagers. Moreover, Sida appeared to rely heavily on information from the company in both its socio-economic and financial assessments. Indeed, when asked about their main sources of information on practical realities for local communities, a Sida official listed the company itself, the government and IFAD. Regarding the financial dimensions of the project, an internal audit concluded that Sida had relied on the company's information about its own financial status and that of other companies in the corporate group, without making an independent assessment (Sida, 2015, p. 2). Other actors placed similar trust in the company, for example, when we asked the AfDB for their basic data supporting a contested statement about the company in the ESIA, they referred us back to the company for information. This provides evidence of the close relationship between them, with AfDB trusting the company to provide information.

Most importantly, the vision that the investment would create 2000 direct jobs and 10,000–12,000 indirect jobs for local communities was produced by the company, in cooperation with AfDB and IFAD. These figures were subjected to independent verification by Sida and deemed 'justified' compared with 'similar projects in the region', although with no details about these projects or any assessment of the quality of the jobs to be provided (MED, 2013). The envisioned influx of 13 million USD to the area was questioned in the consultancy report, but this figure was still used in Sida's decision to justify funding for the company (Sida, 2014b).

The project was designed to reduce the risk to the company, while there were huge risks for smallholder farmers, in particular those targeted for the outgrower schemes. Sida was aware of these risks and, in line with standard procedure, made a risk assessment:[7] 'We made the assessment that of course there were a lot of risks in many different areas, but still the potential benefits outweighed the perceived risks' (personal interview, 12 February 2015).

One of the more striking risks mentioned in the assessment was that households engaged in outgrower schemes could become indebted and lose their land:

> Every business unit of approx. 30–50 farmers will need to borrow 1.25 million USD, that is 20–30,000 USD per person/household. The loans are intended to be taken at local banks under commercial terms. The farmers will not have a guarantee if they can't pay. If their businesses for any reason would go bankrupt, or if the company for any reason is not able to buy their sugarcane, then these people will be severely indebted. USD 20,000–30,000 is very far from the assets a normal family in the area has today. Given the costs of loans and interest, it can be several years before there is a net income. Since their land is going to be used as collateral for this loan, there is also an uncertainty about the farmers' land ownership should the loans not be paid back. Weighed together, the planned outgrower model entails considerable risk-taking for the farmers. There is a risk that the capacity of the farmers is insufficient for forming and running their own companies. (Sida, 2014a, p. 35).

These serious risks were 'accepted' by Sida, with reference to two mitigation measures: i) clear instructions to the company that these risks must not materialise since 'a sound outgrower approach is key to Sida's support' and ii) close monitoring by Sida (with external support) to ensure that these risks were 'managed in an adequate manner' (Sida, 2014a, p. 36). Thus, a purely technical approach was taken, with the assessment appearing to be a checklist exercise to fulfil bureaucratic regulations rather than a true engagement to avoid harmful impacts on local people.

So far, our findings show that the LSAI development narrative was based on skewed problem representations, for example about 'backward' agricultural production and passive farmers living in a 'black hole'. They also reveal that the narrative largely excluded knowledge of 50 years of development studies, previous LSAIs in Tanzania and current realities. In general, the main actors deflected such knowledge, using various practices, underpinned by certain assumptions, to produce a highly resilient narrative.

8. Producing a resilient narrative

The design of the project and the narrative underpinning it did not reflect what we call 'accumulated academic knowledge' or current realities. In fact, the narrative proved stunningly resilient to counter-evidence. For over a decade, the three proponents, including a development agency aiming 'to create opportunities for people living in poverty [...] to improve their living conditions',[8] maintained an intact vision of the project as an imminent success.

Disregard for accumulated academic knowledge has played a key role in enabling regular re-emergence of the LSAI development strategy since colonialism. However, the problem extends far beyond lack of knowledge. Below, we outline value assumptions and deflection practices that were crucial for producing and maintaining the resilience of the narrative.

The resilience to counter-evidence in the case was underpinned by actors sharing strong value assumptions, particularly regarding how agrarian transition should take place, with implicit perceptions of smallholder farmers needing to 'move up the ladder' and of LSAI being more efficient than subsistence farming. Company employees in particular very explicitly expressed the notion of smallholders not knowing what is best for them. Moreover, the proponents portrayed themselves as knowing how to remedy this, that is, they showed a strong sense of trusteeship. Some of the value assumptions implicit in the LSAI narrative stem from neoclassical economics, for example that of equal access to, and understanding of, information and that of the rational, self-maximising person (Kanbur, 2002). These value assumptions were implicit in the world view of the three LSAI proponents who, instead of being receptive to academic knowledge reproduced their own 'self-legitimating knowledge' (Goldman 2005 in Wolford, 2009). Such assumptions are particularly inadequate in a cultural context that emphasises the collective over the individual and where poverty entails lack of information and choices. Poverty makes people want to optimise use of their scarce resources, rather than taking large risks to maximise incomes as required in the 'effectivisation' of agriculture. Value assumptions render certain types of knowledge marginalised, while promoting other types of knowledge. They thereby facilitate various quotidian practices applied to deflect counter-evidence and help maintain the narrative. Below, we outline the deflection practices applied by the LSAI proponents in relation to the main criticism mentioned above.

In the Bagamoyo case, the high risks for targeted smallholders were frequently deflected by the actors using technical standard procedures. A practice of rendering problems technical (non-political), excluding political-economic structures (Li, 2007, p. 7) was strongly pursued by all actors. Through performing risk assessments, and referring to guidelines and best practice, the actors depoliticised the issue of risk, rather than addressing it. As the debate around the investment was highly politicised, the deflection practice of 'rendering technical' proved highly important in keeping the narrative intact.

In risk assessments, the practice of rendering technical was combined with the deflection practice of transferring responsibility to business in general, and the company in particular, as a key implementer of best practice and other risk mitigation measures. For example, Sida's risk assessment stated that the company should be given clear instructions to prevent the high risks for outgrowers, but without specifying the type of instructions. Furthermore, state representatives claimed that previous LSAIs in Tanzania should not be confused with the current wave of land deals. They described PPP as something new, creating opportunities to avoid past mistakes, and took the sustainability guidelines signed by partner companies as a guarantee for their practices. These are two examples of how privatisation of development influenced the deflection practices used to shield the LSAI narrative.

When accused of having downplayed potential negative impacts in the ESIA (and even forging the Swedish consultant's signature) to obtain one of the key permits for investment, the company rendered the issue technical. In a public statement, it deflected these accusations by stating that it had simply followed the regulations in letting a Tanzanian consultant make changes to the document in line with comments from NEMC. While that may be partly true, compliance with regulations is a complex issue, and often a matter of interpretation. In this specific case, judging from the nature of the changes made in the final ESIA, which comprised systematically downplaying or even deleting critical points and forging the signature of the Swedish consultant, it seems highly unlikely that all regulations were followed. Reference to compliance with regulations was nevertheless one of the most frequent deflecting practices, especially in interviews with company executives and state officials.

Sida acted quite differently in relation to the ESIA criticisms, which influenced the decision by Sida to refuse the first application for a credit guarantee (in 2009). However, an application from the company a few years later was granted. In the interim, a few key changes had taken place. Most importantly, the company had changed its main end-product from ethanol to sugar, which removed it from the 'biofuel versus food' debate. Moreover, the geographical focus of the investment was shifted away from ecologically highly sensitive areas. When asked about the criticisms of the ESIA, one Sida official said: 'Sida judges every project on its own merit, what it can do today. History is not so important' (personal interview, 16 May 2013). Thus, Sida combined responding to criticism with rendering history irrelevant.

When challenged by local people on Razaba ranch (via our questions, the media or reports), one frequent deflection practice was to divert the focus to the vision, the bigger picture. This practice effectively rendered perfectly legitimate concerns irrelevant. For example, one Sida official said that some local people will always be affected when land is allocated for investment but, given the low population density in general, there was room for effectivisation of agriculture, which the project would achieve. The same practice was used by the company in a public statement written in response to the opinion piece. Instead of discussing the issue, that is the risk of dispossessing farmers, the company referred to 'biased' criticisms which they saw 'no reasons to discuss' and instead described the win-win vision they shared with the Tanzanian government. This effectively shifted the focus away from the real-world problems. This statement also exemplifies yet another deflection practice, namely discrediting the message, or the messenger. The deflection practice of 'discrediting' was most frequently applied by state and company representatives. For example, criticism from NGOs about the LSAI development strategy threatening food security was deflected by a state official as 'disturbance', communicated with evil intent, or as 'misinformation' (The Daily News, 2015). Similarly, questions we raised in interviews were dismissed as 'not professional'. When the critical Action Aid report was published in 2015, accusing the investor of land grabbing among other things, this report was also grossly discredited by the government as 'highly flawed' (The Daily News, 2015). Another practice used by the government in this instance was a more explicit show of power, where Action Aid staff were called to a meeting with more than 20 state officials and strongly encouraged to change their conclusions through talking to a range of government-related authorities and ministries. Moreover, Action Aid staff were banned from visiting the Bagamoyo site.

In summary, the three main actors used a remarkable range of deflection practices to nullify criticisms from other actors, while at the same time sustaining the LSAI narrative and the vision of the Bagamoyo project as an imminent success. There were some instances where critical voices had an impact, especially at Sida, but the vast majority of criticisms were deflected in some way by all three actors.

The ultimate proof of the resilience of the LSAI narrative is perhaps provided by how the three actors reasoned when the company's land rights were revoked by the Tanzanian government. The new Tanzanian president offered the land to another (domestic) investor, so the national strategy to support LSAI remains. In interview, a Sida official was reluctant to call the project a failure and instead used the deflection practice to transfer the responsibility to someone else, in this case the government for withdrawing the land title. This implied that the company and the project had actually not failed. In the same interview, the official stated that Sida still supports a combination of LSAI and support for smallholder productivity to alleviate poverty. A company executive had no problems with us calling the project a failure. However, when it came to the future of LSAI as a development strategy, he immediately mentioned the vision and claimed that future LSAIs are still needed to 'lift up' smallholders from subsistence farming and provide them with a market. Thus all three main actors sustain their faith in LSAI as a development strategy, thereby deflecting important experiences gained in the past decade from the case project.

9. Conjuring win-world and shielding it from contestation

On examining how a development narrative can be produced and sustained in the face of very strong counter-evidence and criticism, and the influence of private sector collaboration, we found three major mechanisms at work: 1) lack of certain types of knowledge among project proponents or inability to take such knowledge seriously; 2) deflection of criticisms using certain value assumptions and material practices and a wide range of deflection practices; and 3) 'accepted knowledge' about current realities, largely produced by a company seeking to portray the investment in a profitable light, was circulated and consumed by the other proponents of the project. Together, these three mechanisms produced a highly resilient development narrative that we call 'win-world'.

The idea of a development narrative becoming a world in itself has been observed by others. For example, Ferguson (1990) notes that 'development discourse seems to form a world unto itself' (p. 259) and Lewis and Mosse (2006) describe the 'disjuncture' between the 'ideal worlds' that policy-makers want to create and 'the social reality they have to relate to' (p. 2).

Win-world was co-produced by the main actors in our case and strongly influenced by the 'win-win' vision. This bubble of co-produced 'truth' was shielded from outside contestation through a range of everyday practices effectively applied to deflect criticism and real-world outcomes such as court cases and livelihood impacts. The company's influence on risk-taking by smallholders was especially evident. In win-world, the assumption that smallholders can take on a 1.2 million dollar loan in order to join an outgrower scheme and operate in the same environment as the company seems reasonable, or even necessary. In the real world, there is a striking difference in context between well-paid executives (regardless of success) and smallholders with limited resources who would bear the main risks. Moreover, misleading problem representations, for example of farmers as passive, produced inadequate solutions. For example, the company blamed a poor work ethic among local people, rather than uncompetitive wages, for labour problems. Together, biased value assumptions, skewed problem representations and persistent deflection practices created a project largely detached from real-world problems, which resulted in failure of the project to materialise and deliver proposed benefits.

What sets this case apart from many other ethnographies of aid is the privatisation of development context whereby development agencies closely collaborated with private actors. This resulted in specific new problems. While private business interests cannot be assumed to automatically coincide with the best interests of rural smallholders in a development perspective, Sida did not question much of the information provided by the company. Indeed, a Sida official listed the company and the Tanzanian government as Sida's main collaboration partners, together with IFAD and AfDB. The company identified the Tanzanian government as its closest partner. Thus rural smallholders were clearly not a first-hand source of information or seen as close collaboration partners. Instead, the project proponents formed an 'epistemic community' where sharing of values encouraged them to take one another's knowledge at face value (Büscher, 2014, p. 80). This, in combination with lack of time for investigations and lack of academic knowledge among staff, made Sida susceptible to selected and biased knowledge, filtered mainly through company representatives.

It is important to note that the disjuncture between ideal world and real-world problems is not unique to this project. Rather, project designers have repeatedly failed over time to integrate even the most basic facts about local context (Coulson, 2013; Li, 2007). However, the strong influence of the company on the narrative and project design strengthened this disjuncture and was particularly problematic in two ways. First, it allowed company representatives to sustain persistent elements of evolutionary thinking, which influenced the project's top-down design and the knowledge produced. Second, this knowledge contained *more extreme* expressions of these elements that were often based on Eurocentrism, a top-down attitude to local communities and a strong notion of trusteeship. As a private actor, the company had an implicit interest in, and talent for, producing figures proposing huge benefits and a smooth implementation process and in maintaining the image of success until the very end, in order to maintain political support and the interest of funders. Most importantly, this idealised knowledge was circulated by the company to other actors. A private actor has a different type of visioning than a development agency, since: 'in speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be extracted; the possibility of economic performance must be conjured like a spirit to draw an audience of potential investors' (Tsing, 2000, p. 84). Exaggeration or outright deception may be necessary, as 'conjuring is supposed to call up a world more dreamlike and sweeter than anything that exists' (p. 85). In our case, this dreamlike world was conjured up through relying on economic models and the company's knowledge produced to 'selling success', rather than knowledge about real-world problems.

Plans launched from within the win-world bubble do not take real-world complexities into account, but are instead based on the models and values that underpin win-world, where processes are simplified and predictable. An alternative is possible, for example the actors can portray a vision in which this unproblematic investment will succeed, but must simultaneously be aware that they will

need to navigate many different problematic hurdles in order to achieve it (van Ufford, 1993). Our impression is that Sida officials and the company strongly believed in the simplified narrative, but we also concluded that at some level, all three actors were aware that giving problems and criticisms too much space would question their legitimacy.

This leads us from discussing *how* the resilient narrative was produced and sustained to advancing some reflections on *why* the narrative was so resilient. The overall rationale behind a development narrative is of course that there are winners when a development strategy is being launched or re-introduced. Finding common ground on a joint vision was facilitated by the three key actors all standing to gain from the project and to lose if the project was perceived as a failure. One Sida official stated that Sida did not envision gaining anything from the project, but it is reasonable to assume it would in fact gain from supporting such a 'state-of-the-art' investment, not least through enhanced diplomatic connections. In addition to legitimacy, prestige and money also risked being lost, not least for Sida officials, while the investor was devoted to selling success to maintain financial and political support. By rendering political issues technical and furnishing the image of a smooth implementation process, all actors gained from creating a sense of manageability (van Ufford, 1993).

One strong reason for the Tanzanian state to re-ignite the LSAI development strategy was the potential to attract financial resources. Similarly to Lund et al. (2017), we observed that particular kinds of activities where state actors are able to attract significant external financial support had been promoted. For example, evaluations, feasibility studies and task forces to develop policies have been funded by development agencies such as Sida, the Norwegian Development Cooperation Agency and AfDB. Our findings are therefore much in line with Mosse (2004), who argues that the 'gap between policy and practice is constantly negotiated away' in order to sustain policy models and the resources they attract (pp. 663–664). As Fairclough (2003) states, a particular narrative can serve to 'achieve and maintain dominance' (p. 58). Authority is produced and reproduced when actors confirm each other's positions. One other crucial outcome of the LSAI development strategy is the consolidation of land under state management, regardless of whether the investment materialises or not. In other words, there are a range of 'wins' for proponents of the LSAI development strategy when it re-emerges on the political agenda. However, detailed data on the 'true' wins for different proponents of the LSAIs are elusive and further research is needed.

There are two general implications of our findings. First, if partnering private actors create a stronger resilience to accumulated academic knowledge and real-world problems, and thus a greater disjuncture between this knowledge and project design, it could increase the risk of development projects failing to materialise and to deliver proposed outcomes. Second, the privatisation of development has implications not only for the character of the narrative and risk of failure, but clearly also for *how* these investments are implemented. For example, smallholders are given exaggerated promises and involved in more serious risk taking, potentially devastating for their livelihoods, and their training is more permeated by a business agenda. Thus, the resilience of win-world is not only a theoretical technicality, but has real-world consequences for the people targeted by privatised development interventions.

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Notes

1. Sida used an exchange rate of 10 SEK per dollar at the time (Sida, 2015).
2. In 'academic' knowledge, we include knowledge gained by practitioners such as agronomists and development officers.
3. In a deal where the company would get land 'free from encumbrance' directly from the Ministry of Lands, the government of Tanzania would stepwise acquire 25 per cent of the shareholding and two board positions: it would get 10 per cent of ordinary shares once financing for the project had been secured, entitling it to 10 per cent voting rights and one board member. An additional 15 per cent of dividends, 15 per cent of voting rights and another board member would be granted after 18 years of operation (Nshala, Locke, & Duncan, 2013).
4. The company was not informed about this decision until 9 November 2016 (BEE, 2017).
5. We recognise that the state is not one monolithic actor although it is often treated as such, including in this paper. 'The state', or 'government' referred to in this paper are individuals who are by profession official representatives of the Tanzanian state/government, for example ministry staff, district government officials and employees at government authorities, and their actions.
6. All quotes from interviews and documents in Swedish were translated to English by the authors.
7. As part of the Relevance Assessment in the Final Appraisal of Intervention (Slutgiltig beredning av insats) 20140226.
8. Accessed at www.sida.se/English/how-we-work/about-swedish-development-cooperation.

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IV

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Between dependence and deprivation: The interlocking nature of land alienation in Tanzania

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Abstract

Studies of accumulation by dispossession in the Global South tend to focus on individual sectors, for example, large-scale agriculture or nature conservation. Yet smallholder farmers and pastoralists are affected by multiple processes of land alienation. Drawing on the case of Tanzania, we illustrate the analytical purchase of a comprehensive examination of dynamics of land alienation across multiple sectors. To begin with, processes of land alienation through investments in agriculture, mining, conservation, and tourism dovetail with a growing social differentiation and class formation. These dynamics generate unequal patterns of land deprivation and accumulation that evolve in a context of continued land dependency for the vast majority of the rural population. Consequently, land alienation engenders responses by individuals and communities seeking to maintain control over their means of production. These responses include migration, land tenure formalization, and land transactions, that propagate across multiple localities and scales, interlocking with and further reinforcing the effects of land alienation. Various localized processes of primitive accumulation contribute to a scramble for land in the aggregate, providing justifications for policies that further drive land alienation.

KEYWORDS
accumulation by dispossession, agriculture, conservation, land grabbing, Tanzania

1 | INTRODUCTION

> *It appears that Tanzania is now facing a potential crisis of internal displacement in which people are shunted from place to place as valuable natural resources are appropriated from communities for conservation, commerce, and increasingly both together (Igoe & Croucher, 2007, p. 553).*

There has been significant attention to the so-called African land rush (Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2015; Scoones, Hall, Borras, White, & Wolford, 2013), that is, the surge of foreign agricultural investments in Africa that started in the early 2000s. Many see Tanzania as an ideal country for large-scale agricultural land investments due to its record of liberal economic reforms and high growth rates in the last two decades. Tanzania's government has actively embraced this international interest in its land through the introduction of investment-friendly policies and institutions. The Tanzania Investment Centre was created in 1997 to facilitate foreign (and domestic) investments in, among other things, land. Several attempts were undertaken at creating a land bank of demarcated, titled, and investment-ready tracts of land with agricultural potential. In 2009, the Government of Tanzania launched the "Kilimo Kwanza"—or "Agriculture First"—initiative aiming to modernize the agricultural sector through public and private investments. Shortly thereafter, Tanzania's president at the time—Jakaya Kikwete—launched the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) initiative at the 2010 World Economic Forum Africa summit. In the SAGCOT investment blueprint, Kikwete asserted the official and widely circulated government position that "Tanzania has immense opportunities for agricultural development. There are 44 million hectares of arable land, only 24 percent of which is being utilized. ... [T]he country's huge agricultural potential remains unutilized" (SAGCOT, 2011).

This classic narrative of "unused land" also circulates in other parts of the African continent and dovetails with a discourse of neoliberal economic development and growth through land tenure formalization, modernization and commercialization of agriculture, and animal husbandry (Geisler, 2012; Lunstrum, 2016; Nalepa, Short Gianotti, & Bauer, 2017). However, the narrative is at odds with continual reports of land conflicts across Tanzania. Drivers of such conflicts are many and include stalled or entirely failed land deals in large-scale agriculture, growth in human and livestock populations, patterns of displacement and migration, various conservation and tourism initiatives, infrastructure development, domestic land acquisition for speculation and cultivation, land tenure formalization and tree-planting initiatives, and mining. Indeed, against official narratives of "unused land," government authorities have threatened land owners of large estates with expropriation, accusing them of not properly "developing" the land, calling for their property to be given back to poor or landless farmers in light of widespread land conflicts across the country (DailyNews, 2013; Guardian, 2016b). The narrative of "unused land" is also questionable in light of growing concerns raised by Tanzania's environmental-conservation complex (see Brockington, 2006) over an allegedly growing number of incursions by pastoralists into national parks and game reserves (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2016; Shekighenda, 2016).

In this article,[1] we go beyond exclusive attention to the agriculturally driven African land rush. Instead, we create an overview of the totality of land alienation processes in Tanzania by focusing on investments in agriculture, mining, conservation, and tourism. Given their mutual reinforcement, these different processes should not be studied in isolation (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Hunsberger et al., 2017; Lunstrum, Bose, & Zalik, 2016). We show how land alienation processes take place in a context of continued land dependency by Tanzania's rural population and how these processes are reinforced by a growing social differentiation and class formation. We also show how rural people respond to land alienation and dispossession to maintain their means of production, such as through migration, land tenure formalization, and land transaction, and how these responses, in turn, further reinforce the effects of land alienation.

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[1]This article is based on an extensive reading and analysis of relevant literature, decades of cumulative research experience on land issues, and years of field presence in rural areas across several of Tanzania's regions, including Dodoma, Iringa, Manyara, Mbeya, Mtwara, Lindi, Kigoma, Arusha, and Ruvuma.

We provide important evidence to policy debates about land in Tanzania and elsewhere, thereby countering paradoxical claims over "unused" or "undeveloped" land amidst growing pressures on rural livelihoods by various drivers of land alienation.

2 | AGRARIAN CHANGE AND LAND ALIENATION

Our contribution speaks to debates on agrarian change (Bernstein, 1977; Li, 2014; Moyo, 2008) and primitive accumulation, what Marx famously coined a "historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production" and enabling the appropriation of this freed labour for capitalist production (Marx, 1976, p. 875). David Harvey and many scholars after him built on this historical and still ongoing process of land enclosures in demonstrating how capitalism continues expanding its reach, creating new markets and property regimes, and changing social relations in the process of accumulation by dispossession (Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Harvey, 2003).

2.1 | Different forms of land alienation

Accumulation by rural dispossession takes many forms. It requires neither changes in formal property rights nor physical land grabbing by "extra-economic means" (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Hall, 2013). Rather, dispossession can be the result of more subtle processes of land *control* grabbing (Margulis, McKeon, & Borras Jr., 2013; Peluso & Lund, 2011) whereby access to use land for certain purposes is restricted. Conservation interventions, commodification of seeds,[2] contract farming, juridical capture, land use planning and demarcation, and land transactions can all result in land control grabbing (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018; Stein & Cunningham, 2017; Borras Jr, & Franco, 2012; Huggins, 2014; Oya, 2012; Prudham, 2007). Although none of these processes necessarily imply formal challenges to local land rights, they can have an effect similar to implying the loss of land altogether (Cáceres, 2015). Furthermore, accumulation by dispossession does not only involve the expropriation of land into *private* hands. It can also involve the transferral of customary or communal land ownership into the *public* domain (e.g., a national park), if third-party actors (such as conservation non-governmental organizations [NGOs] or tourism investors) can profit via this act of enclosure (Kelly, 2011).

Accumulation by dispossession can also involve the appropriation of labour of those who lose their land-based means of production. However, in the Global South and specifically in the Tanzanian context the appropriation of surplus labour through proletarianization—what could be called labour grabbing (Stein & Cunningham, 2017)—is limited to informal sectors where casual labour under highly exploitative arrangements is common (Mueller, 2011). Current patterns of land appropriation create only few formalized wage–labour opportunities (Meagher, 2016). Put differently, there may be no "proletarian future" for landless or land-deprived people in many parts across the Global South (Li, 2011, p. 296). Thus, many smallholders join the ranks of a growing landless labour reserve (in the Marxian sense), that is, they are rendered a surplus population without a prospect for employment (Ferguson, 2013; Li, 2010; Peters, 2013). Shivji (2009) conceptualizes this process of accumulation by dispossession in the Tanzanian context as a "disarticulated" accumulation, introduced through colonial or neoliberal regimes, and perpetuated by the state's disregard for the peasantry. Indeed, Marx's concept of primitive accumulation rests on the integration of the new labour force into circuits of capitalist production, which is a deeply transformative process (Glassman, 2006; Wood, 2002). In Tanzania, this process is ongoing and incomplete. Moreover, accumulation and dispossession are entangled with patterns of internal class formation, social differentiation, and social reproduction (Chung, 2017; Greco, 2015; Mueller, 2011). In the course of various processes of land (control) and labour grabbing, societies become stratified into (predominantly male) landlords and owners of large livestock herds who can extract rents and surplus labour, and land-deprived farmers (especially women) and impoverished pastoralists who must offer their labour, struggling

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[2]"Tanzanian farmers are facing heavy prison sentences if they continue their traditional seed exchange". Ebe Daems, 7 December 2016. (http://www.mo.be/en/analysis/tanzanian-farmers-are-facing-heavy-prison-sentences-if-they-continue-their-traditional-seed).

to survive. These agrarian transformations are not new to Tanzania (e.g., see Iliffe, 1979; Shao, 1986; von Freyhold, 1979) and continue even when recent foreign-led large-scale land deals stall or entirely fail to materialize (Hall, 2013; Oya, 2013).

In response to the growing land squeeze underpinned by different forms of land (control) or labour grabbing, rural people turn to migration, or occupation of land enclosed as protected area (Charnley, 1997; Hall, 2013; Hall et al., 2011; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Migration can create new forms of exclusion and increase land pressure elsewhere in the country where the arrival of migrants may contribute to land tenure formalization, as residents seek to protect their land against newcomers, whom they may be inclined to evict. Hall et al. (2011) refer to this interlocking nature of different processes of land alienation as primitive accumulation "from below." Another response in the face of land alienation is livelihood diversification (Hodgson, 2001; Mueller, 2011). Socio-economic diversification can be underpinned by production declines in agriculture or livestock husbandry (McCabe, Leslie, & DeLuca, 2010; Ponte, 2001) and tends to increase social differentiation and to promote informal sectors of wage labour (Bryceson, 2002; Lyimo, 2014; Peters, 2004).

2.2 | Tanzania, a land-dependent nation

Agriculture in Tanzania can be broadly characterized by a stagnant agricultural labour productivity (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015), and since the 1990s, a growing number of studies have reported a declining soil fertility (Baijukya, de Ridder, Masuki, & Giller, 2005; Kangalawe, Christiansson, & Östberg, 2008; Lindberg, 1996; Ponte, 2001; Snyder, 1996). This development was initiated by ill-conceived and coercive resettlement policies of the 1970s (villagization) that led to agricultural intensification (Kjekshus, 1977; Shao, 1986). It was then compounded by structural adjustment and liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which deprived a growing number of smallholders of agricultural inputs necessary to maintain or increase production (Bryceson, 2002). Lokina, Nerman, and Sandefur (2011) report that with the exception of rice, average yields of maize, sorghum, and beans—key food staples—declined in the 2000s, and total output could only be stabilized through agricultural area expansion. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) highlights that "with the exception of rice, the country has ... remained a net importer of food staples during the period 2007–2013." FAO attests that Tanzania has "one of the lowest levels of productivity in sub-Saharan Africa" due to a lack of irrigation and improved seeds and fertilizers (FAO, 2014, p. 1). Coulson (2013) points out that the present growth in agricultural outputs (around 4% per year) exceeds population growth (around 3% per year), yet he is sceptical that this level of growth (which is largely based on agricultural area expansion) can be maintained in the future. The competition for farmland across many parts of Tanzania is therefore set to increase.

Despite ongoing processes of deagrarianization or depeasantization (Bryceson, 2002) that echo social differentiation and socio-economic diversification, we contend that Tanzania's growing peasantry remains highly dependent on land and environment. A majority of income for rural livelihoods across sub-Saharan Africa and specifically in Tanzania is sourced from agriculture, livestock, environmental resources (forest and non-forest), or casual labour on other people's farms. Land and environmental dependency cuts across wealth, gender, and education, although poorer, less-educated, and female-headed households tend to be more dependent (Angelsen et al., 2014; Lund & Treue, 2008). Tanzania's population is expected to reach 137 million in 2050, having already grown from 10 to 53 million people in 1960–2015 (Figure 1).[3] Although Tanzania has seen substantial macroeconomic growth of late, the country remains a predominantly agriculture-based smallholder economy (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015). Industrialization has been limited and uneven, and economic growth has not resulted in greatly expanded opportunities for formal employment (Gray, 2013; Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). Although rural–urban migration will continue to shift the Tanzanian demographic landscape in the coming decades, in absolute terms, more people will likely have to live off the land in the future. In the absence of mass industries that provide employment opportunities (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016), urbanization and deagrarianization will not change the fact that land and land-based resources will remain the

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[3]World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Statistics, accessed April 27, 2017.

FIGURE 1   Population growth in Tanzania. Recorded until 2015, estimated beyond 2015
Source: World Bank Health, Nutrition and Population Statistics.

main means of (re)production for tens of millions of smallholders in the foreseeable future (see also Hall et al., 2011; Moyo & Yeros, 2005).

To further contextualize Tanzanian dynamics of agrarian change and land alienation, we present findings from two studies conducted across Tanzania by some of the authors of this article. The research project "Transformations in Poverty and Property Rights in Rural Tanzania"[4] randomly sampled 1,600 households in 33 villages between 2010 and 2016, yielding average rates of landlessness (understood as owning 1 acre of land or less per household) from 9.4% to 22.2% across the regions Kigoma, Mbeya/Songwe, Manyara, and Dodoma. This range illustrates the geographically uneven effects of different drivers of land alienation as they intersect with population density and growth and local land markets. Another, larger dataset, collected under the auspices of a research project on rural livelihoods and conservation,[5] illustrates that landlessness is also thoroughly gendered. On the basis of a sample of 945 female- and 1,924 male-headed households interviewed in 2014–2015 across the regions Arusha, Manyara, Ruvuma, and Lindi, female-headed households evince a fourfold prevalence in being landless (following the same definition as above). In the following sections, we illustrate how in the context of continued rural land dependency, and an uneven and gendered geography of landlessness, different drivers of land alienation interlock and jointly advance an ongoing and yet incomplete primitive accumulation.

3 | GOVERNANCE OF LAND IN TANZANIA

From colonial rule, Tanzania inherited a system of state-sanctioned land alienation through land laws (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 1994). From a legal perspective, all land in Tanzania is public land, vested in the president as trustee for and on behalf of all Tanzanian citizens. Three overarching land categories are defined to govern land use and land control: *reserved land*, *village land*, and *general land*. General land includes urban areas and large-scale investments. It falls directly under the Commissioner for Lands and is defined in Land Act No. 4 as "all public land, which is not reserved land or village land, and includes *unoccupied* or *unused* village land" (URT, 1999, p. 10, our emphasis). General land is therefore an ambiguous residual land category for lands that either are not clearly categorized otherwise (Sundet, 2005) or can be claimed as "unused," "unoccupied," "undeveloped," and so forth. Such claims are enabled by the lack of a national cadastre and inaccurate and disputed records of village and reserved land boundaries, and they are generally underpinned by unequal power relations that render migrants, women, and pastoralists particularly vulnerable (Odgaard, 2002).

Reserved land is governed by various statutory bodies. Forest reserves are for example governed by the Tanzanian Forest Service in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. The vast majority of reserved land in Tanzania is

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[4]https://www.udsm.ac.tz/node/492.

[5]https://www.ucl.ac.uk/pima/.

set aside for conservation and tourism purposes. Village land is governed by democratically elected village councils under the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999. The act formally recognizes customary land rights and has legal provisions to prevent discrimination against women and vulnerable groups. Smallholders are encouraged to further secure their land rights by obtaining certificates of customary rights of occupancy (CCROs), and male-headed households are encouraged to register land titles jointly with their wives (Odgaard, 2006), yet progress towards more equitable land registration is slow (Pedersen, 2015). For instance, only 3.4% and 5.8% of issued CCROs in Babati and Bariadi Districts were jointly received by a man and his wife (URT, 2010). Preliminary results from a 2014–2016 study show similar trends across the districts Chamwino, Kongwa, and Kasulu. On average, 11.4% of CCROs were held jointly by a man and a woman (Askew & Odgaard, in review). Through CCROs, rural people are expected to avoid land disputes, increase agricultural productivity, and become integrated in the formal banking sector, with the CCRO acting as collateral to receive a loan. CCROs are technically not to be issued before the village has obtained a certificate of village land from the Commissioner of Lands, which is conditioned upon the successful surveying and demarcating of village boundaries, an approved village land use plan and a village registry (Stein et al., 2016).[6]

Village land use planning (VLUP) has attained a prominent role in land tenure formalization policies that aim to identify "freely available" and "unoccupied" village land for large-scale agricultural investment or community-based conservation. VLUP exercises invite several actors to influence the process: They are sometimes facilitated by outsiders interested to acquire land, and they must be reviewed by district land and planning officers before approval by the National Land Use Planning Commission is sought (Walwa, 2017). Although ostensibly aimed at secure land rights and empowerment for village communities, VLUP processes have, in practice, resulted in physical or economic displacement and reinforced the very same farmer–herder conflicts that they proclaim to mitigate (Walwa, 2017). VLUP processes have been observed to enable a shift of authority into the hands of political-bureaucratic and economic elites and have furthered land alienation at the expense of both farmers and pastoralists in favour of investments in commercial agriculture, conservation, and tourism (Greco, 2016; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein & Cunningham, 2017). Farmers and pastoralists who are deemed migrants are particularly vulnerable to be rendered landless through VLUP exercises that do not recognize their residency in the village (Bluwstein, 2017; Walwa, 2017). Pastoralists with recognized claims are also vulnerable in land use planning exercises that fragment rangelands (Goldman & Riosmena, 2013) or result in limitations of livestock mobility to particular districts or villages (usually through branding of livestock) and/or forced sales of "excess cattle" (URT, 2013b, p. 193). The practice of land use planning therefore challenges provisions under the Land Acts that aim to protect people's customary land rights by recognizing their claims to village land vis-à-vis external investors, even when smallholders do not have a title or other forms of registration. When village land is acquired by outsiders under a granted right of occupancy that is governed by statutory law, local people's customary land rights and land claims can be overridden, because "unequal power relations lead to unequal recognition of customary and statutory law" (Locher, 2016, p. 393).

Given the evidence so far, it is therefore not surprising that the promises of land tenure formalization have been elusive, even in cases of countermapping of communal resources by local people (Hodgson & Schroeder, 2002; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein et al., 2016). Importantly, once land has been identified for commercial investment through village land use planning exercises, the land undergoes a legal shift out of *village land* status and village control to *general land* status and control by Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC). TIC secures a Certificate of Occupancy for the land and in turn subleases it to the investor for up to 99 years. Consequently, power over land control shifts from village to TIC (central government), regional authorities, and investors, and it remains in these hands even if the investment does not materialize. A draft of the 2016 National Land Policy proposes to limit leases to 33 years (URT, 2016a, p. 41) but suggests to allow investors to purchase "Unit Titles" in village lands that would further facilitate land alienation through highly capitalized investment (URT, 2016a, pp. 40–41). Therefore, we contend that

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[6]According to a 2016 National Land Policy draft, out of roughly 12,500 villages (nobody really knows the exact number), 80% have their boundaries surveyed and 13.1% have a village land use plan (URT, 2016a).

dispossession by formalization continues to be inscribed in official land policies from the outset, rather than being an unintended outcome.

Having situated the dynamics of agrarian change in the contemporary context of land governance through land use planning and land formalization in Tanzania, we now present evidence of multiple drivers of land alienation, starting with investments in commercial agriculture, continuing with mining, and finishing with conservation.

4 | INVESTMENTS IN COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE

Table 1 provides a historical overview of land alienation through commercial agriculture and ranching. The data reflect a poor state of information, showing an inconsistent and at times conflicting picture (Sulle, 2015; URT, 1994). Official data from 2008 suggest that around 1.5% of Tanzania's terrestrial land is under commercial large-scale investments (>100 ha) and 6.6% under medium-scale farming (5–100 ha, see Table 1). Locher and Sulle (2014) estimated around 10,000 km^2 of new land deals above 200 ha by foreign investors[7] for agricultural production[8] at the height of the land rush by the end of 2012. Locher and Sulle emphasized that only 10 deals with a total area of 1,450 km^2 could be considered *concluded*. Focusing on agrofuel investments since 2003, Abdallah, Engström, Havnevik, and Salomonsson (2014) identified 32 mostly foreign investors that had *requested* 11,000 km^2 of land above 2,000 ha. Yet only nine investors *acquired* land, totalling 2,000 km^2. A majority have gone bankrupt or have shifted to food production and are still struggling to become operational.

The recently updated Land Matrix database covers recent deals (contract size) amounting to 2,725 km^2, considerably less than initially reported (Table 1). These deals spatially correlate with the SAGCOT designation (Figure 2). The SAGCOT initiative envisages the development of 350,000 ha of land into large-scale agriculture and 330,000 ha into outgrower schemes within the corridor (NewAlliance, 2014; SAGCOT, 2011). This would entail the recategorization of village into general land, which is a declared objective of the SAGCOT initiative. In a 2012 presentation aimed to advertise the SAGCOT initiative to potential investors, the Minister of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement indicated that around 9,000 km^2 of village land in the SAGCOT corridor had already been identified ("freed up") for potential investments on the basis of a review of village land use plans (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements [MLHS], 2012).

In addition to foreign-led investments, smaller land deals and leases by domestic investors for investments in agriculture or forestry are taking place in different parts of the country (Olwig, Noe, Kangalawe, & Luoga, 2015). In a commissioned study for the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement, the University of Dar es Salaam evaluated agricultural land holdings (>50 acres) in mainland Tanzania in 2013 (URT, 2013a). Out of a purposive sample of 691 farms covering 3,651 km^2 across Tanzania, ownership of 666 farms could be determined. Tanzanian individuals owned by far the most farms (455), followed by Tanzanian companies (72). However, given the differences in average farm area between domestic and foreign property owners, proportionately few foreign individuals and companies (45 out of 666) owned more than a quarter of all sampled land area (Table 2).

Table 2 may already reflect a growing urban class of Tanzanian elites who drive investments in medium-scale commercial agriculture, seeking to reinvest their wealth in land (Jayne et al., 2016). Official Tanzanian statistics indicate that 28% of urban residents are engaged in agricultural activities (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Jayne et al. (2016) report a rise in Tanzanian land ownership by urban households from 11.8% to 32.5% of national landholdings in only five years from 2005 to 2010. Within the same period, urban households increased their share of landholdings of 20 ha or above from 17.2% to 78.9% (Jayne et al., 2016). This development disproportionally affects rural women in negative ways (Knapman et al., 2017), may "exacerbate land scarcity in rural areas" (Jayne

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[7]Or in collaboration between foreign and domestic investors.

[8]Including food, biofuels, timber plantations, and forestry carbon credits.

TABLE 1 Land under alienation through commercial agriculture in Tanzania

Period	Details	km²	Share (%)[a]	Source
Colonial land alienation	German rule (1880s–1916)	5,261	0.6	URT (1994)
	British rule (1923–1961)	14,125	1.6	URT (1994)
Nationalization following Arusha Declaration 1967	NAFCO farms as of 1984 (34 farms)	700	0.1	Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
	Ex-NAFCO farms as of 2009 (29 farms)	595	0.1	Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
	NARCO ranches as of 2008 (13 ranches)	4,736	0.5	Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
Land under medium- and large-scale farming 1990s–2000s	Land under "large-scale" farming (1992, "under granted right of occupancy")	3,247	0.4	URT (1997)
	Land under "large-scale" farming (1992, "under granted right of occupancy")	10,927	1.2	URT (1994)
	Land under "large-scale" farming (2002/2003, including livestock ranching)	11,051	1.2	URT (2012)
	Land under "large-scale" farming (2007/2008, including livestock ranching)	11,131	1.3	URT (2012)
	Land under "large-scale" farming (>100 ha, 2008 Agriculture Sample Census)	12,940	1.5	Jayne et al. (2016)
	Land under "medium-scale" farming (5–100 ha, 2008 Agriculture Sample Census)	58,610	6.6	Jayne et al. (2016)
New large-scale land deals since 2000s	Land Matrix (>200 ha, since 2000s, "reliable," April 2012)	20,000	2.3	Anseeuw et al. (2012)
	Land Matrix (>200 ha, since 2000s, "contract size," July 2017)	2,725	0.3	landmatrix.org
	New land deals since 2000s (>200 ha, *announced, ongoing,* or *concluded,* data from end of 2012)	10,000	1.1	Locher and Sulle (2014)
	New land deals since 2000s (>200 ha, *concluded,* data from end of 2012)	1,450	0.2	Locher and Sulle (2014)
	New land deals since 2003 (>2,000 ha, *requested,* data from end of 2013)	11,000	1.2	Abdallah et al. (2014)
	New land deals since 2003 (>2,000 ha, *acquired,* data from end of 2013)	2,000	0.2	Abdallah et al. (2014)
SAGCOT plans	Village land with a land use plan within SAGCOT (391 villages as of 2012, out of planned 700)	62,000	7.0	MLHS (2012)
	Village land already identified for potential land investments within SAGCOT (as of 2012)	9,000	1.0	MLHS (2012)
	Planned large-scale agricultural production within SAGCOT by 2030	3,500	0.4	SAGCOT (2011)
	Planned outgrower schemes for agricultural production within SAGCOT	3,300	0.4	NewAlliance (2014)

Note. NAFCO = National Agriculture and Food Corporation; NARCO = National Ranching Company; SAGCOT = Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania.

[a]100% = 885,800 km², Tanzania's terrestrial area excluding main water bodies, including islands Mafia, Pemba, and Zanzibar (source: World Bank 2016, Tanzania; accessed online at http://data.worldbank.org/country/tanzania).

et al., 2016, p. 197), and may also reconfigure social relations of property and labour. Land accumulation for production and speculation by urban elites is in some cases followed by the subsequent leasing of this land to the previous owners—often poor smallholders who cannot afford to cultivate their own land—who now find themselves as tenants working for the new landlords or co-owners. These gendered dynamics of class formation and labour grabbing tempted *The Economist* to blame the urban elites for "Africa's real land grab" (Economist, 2016).

To conclude, attempted, successful, and failed investments in large-scale land deals for agribusiness may all contribute to land alienation. Land tenure reconfigurations for medium-scale cultivation and speculation without any involvement of foreign investment constitute another important process of land alienation in Tanzania that is underpinned by and produces new dynamics of class formation and social differentiation. Importantly, agricultural investments—foreign or domestic—that do not materialize and might be excluded from official data and statistics,

FIGURE 2   SAGCOT (2011) and land deals for large-scale agriculture in Tanzania (Landmatrix, 2016)

TABLE 2   Farm ownership and size, compiled on the basis of URT (2013a)

Farm owner	Number of farms	Average farm size (ha)	% of total area
Tanzanian institution	63	829	16
Tanzanian company	72	1,203	27
Tanzanian individual	455	114	16
Tanzanian and foreign company (joint ownership)	31	1,251	12
Foreign company	31	2,550	24
Foreign individual	14	1,031	4

can have severe impacts on land access and control for both farmers and pastoralists. Overlapping claims to land and subsequent conflicts abound around investments that are initiated with little regard for local context, legal pluralism, and locally specific and gendered power relations around access to land. Because land must be acquired by the investor relatively early in the process, processes of resettlement, evictions, or fencing happen in advance of production. If the investment implementation is delayed or abandoned, land is alienated from smallholders even though nothing is being produced by the investor (Engström, 2013; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein & Cunningham, 2017).

5 | MINING

Mining has also increasingly affected land tenure in Tanzania in the past years. The government of Tanzania considers 90% of the country's terrestrial area (800,000 km^2) as potentially having mining resources (URT, 2015). Recent estimates suggest that 680,000 people are engaged in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in Tanzania and another 15,000 in large-scale mining (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016; URT, 2015). Although artisanal mining is dominated by men, local economies built around mining also attract women (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016). In the wake of the 1998 Mining Act, which strongly promoted foreign direct investment, Tanzania has experienced a mining boom, and gold has become a major export commodity (Bryceson & Jönsson, 2010; Schroeder, 2012). International mining companies'

FIGURE 3 Different mining concessions in Tanzania, overlaid with an incomplete selection of protected areas. Screenshot from FlexiCadastre. Accessed January 10, 2017
Note: ASM stands for Artisanal and Small-scale Mining.

large-scale investments and extraction methods are barely taxed by the Tanzanian state,[9] generate little employment, have led to displacement of hundreds of thousands of artisanal miners, and have polluted the environments of farmers and pastoralists living close to mines (Emel, Huber, & Makene, 2011; Holterman, 2014; Kitula, 2006; Magai & Márquez-Velázquez, 2011; Schroeder, 2012). Tanzanian mining laws are ambiguous and vest much power in the Commissioner of Mining, whereas villagers have little say in mining concession allocations (Lange, 2008). Once minerals are discovered, mining laws take precedence over land laws, challenging existing customary land rights of rural people (Pedersen & Jacob, 2017). At times, mining investors work with outdated maps, sweeping aside claims to land ownership and control by small-scale miners, pastoralists, and farmers, and even entire villages (Kulindwa, Mashindano, Shechambo, & Sosovele, 2003; Lange, 2008). The Geological Survey of Tanzania[10] maps 482 mines across the country, including 125 gold mines. According to the national mining cadastre, an estimated total area[11] of almost 140,000 km^2 (15% of Tanzania's terrestrial land area) is designated for prospect licenses for potential exploration (Figure 3).

Where mining interests collide with conservation and tourism interests, these geographic and economic intersections can lead to further expansion of conservation on village lands to compensate for mining activities in protected areas, as the example of Selous Game Reserve illustrates. Uranium mining in Selous was permitted on condition that the UNESCO World Heritage Site should not be reduced in size. Consequently, boundary changes to excise the mining area from the reserve have been proposed to include land outside the game reserve to compensate the losses

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[9]But see Pedersen and Jacob (2017) for the most recent changes to Tanzania's mining legislation.

[10]http://www.gmis-tanzania.com/.

[11]Own estimate, based on http://portal.mem.go.tz/map/.

to mining.[12] In return for potentially highly hazardous activities, the mining company is expected to support anti-poaching operations in and around the game reserve (Tairo, 2014). These novel intersections and alliances between conservation and mining interests can jointly challenge local land and resource control.

6 | CONSERVATION

Tanzania's colonial and post-colonial history is deeply intertwined with efforts to set aside land held in common for biodiversity conservation that would benefit tourism activities such as game viewing and hunting (Neumann, 1998). This fortress conservation approach (Brockington, 2002) was initiated in the end of the 19th century by the German colonial occupation, continued under the British rule and after independence, and was supplemented by community-based conservation initiatives since the 1990s in the course of neoliberalization of conservation (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). These two paradigmatic regimes of conservationist land control have produced an extensive network of protected areas (Figure 4). Since the late 1990s, conservation approaches in the Global South have morphed into what big international NGOs and their donors call landscape conservation,[13] a claim to vast territories spanning different conservation interventions and protected area categories, ecosystems and habitats, people, villages, and communities (Bluwstein, forthcoming; Clay, 2016). In the following, we show how large parts of Tanzania's land are to different degrees taken out of local control and production through the advancement of different conservation regimes.

6.1 | Community-based forest management

The first community-based forest management (CBFM) schemes on village land were reserved in the 1990s, and since then, implementation has proceeded under donor financing (Lund et al., 2017). By 2012, 1,233 villages were involved in CBFM, and the area of village land under reservation was estimated at 23,667 km^2 (URT, 2012b).[14] This estimate also includes CBFM areas in various planning stages (Lund et al., 2017). In reality, the area where CBFM has changed smallholder's access to land and land-based resources may thus be much smaller. Yet conservation "work in progress" may also imply "land alienation in progress."

Through CBFM, village councils are granted administrative powers to manage and benefit from forest reserves on village land, whereas the state can no longer exploit them and waives all royalties generated from them (Blomley & Iddi, 2009). However, with the reservation, village councils foreclose the possibility of changing land use away from it being a "forest." Farming and settlements are banned, as is livestock grazing in some areas. This change in property relations and land control implies that the forest bureaucracy gets a permanent say in determining the land use, whereas the village councils lose the right to independently change it (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Yet, in terms of *access* to forest-based livelihoods, CBFM, in principle, enables villagers to exclude others, such as urban elites, from exploiting their forest areas. Villagers gain legal access to retain all benefits from the use of the forest under the constraint that it is managed in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. In practice, this access is curtailed by various other pieces of legislation and bureaucratic procedures (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Thus, it took 20 years since the initiation of CBFM in Tanzania before the first larger volume of timber was harvested in a CBFM forest and substantial revenues started flowing (Khatun et al., 2015).

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[12]Interview with Ministry official, November 2016. Relevant United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decisions and documents available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/4814 and http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/199/documents/.

[13]For example, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), The Nature Conservancy, (TNC), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

[14]We do not mention Joint Forest Management here as it only applies to reserved forests under state authority (see Table 3).

FIGURE 4   Conservation territories in Tanzania. Geographic information system (GIS) shapefiles are sourced from the recent World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) dataset (see Table 3) and from several known protected areas that are missing in WDPA (seven game reserves, four wildlife management areas, and one forest reserve), provided by World Wildlife Fund. Community-based forest management is not mapped for lack of geodata

Formalization of villagers' rights to access forests, but also the responsibility to maintain them, has led to restrictions, increased enforcement, and policing of fellow villagers (Lund & Treue, 2008; Vyamana, 2009). This has constrained and criminalized the livelihoods of poor and forest-dependent smallholders while giving a small elite of village-level forest managers the possibility of benefiting from allowances and associated income opportunities (Green & Lund, 2015; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013).

6.2 | Wildlife management areas

Since the early 2000s, around 20 wildlife management areas (WMAs) have been established on around 30,000 km^2 of village land across Tanzania. This has happened under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, supported by various international donors,[15] and several international conservation NGOs, most prominently WWF, AWF, WCS, and FZS. A WMA consists of a contiguous village land area set aside by several neighbouring villages for wildlife conservation purposes. Often, WMAs are established in areas that are believed to serve connectivity or corridor functions for the movement of wildlife between core protected areas (Goldman, 2009). In WMAs, agriculture, settlements and, in some places, livestock grazing are banned or heavily restricted through village land use planning. Many other land-dependent activities, such as production of charcoal or the collection of firewood or construction materials, are also restricted or banned altogether. In return, villages are promised revenues from tourism investors who are invited to operate in WMAs under a contractual agreement with the community-based organization (CBO). A CBO manages the WMA jointly with a board of trustees[16] on behalf of the

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[15]For example, United States Agency for International Development, Danish International Development Agency (Danida), German Development Agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW) Agence Française de Développement, and Global Environmental Finance/United Nations Development Programme.

[16]That includes district government representatives.

member villages. The land administration powers bestowed on village councils by the Local Government Act of 1982 and reinforced with the 1999 Village Land Act No. 5 are thereby handed over to these newly established and weakly accountable institutions, resulting in often overly restrictive land use and management plans that foreclose alternative land use in WMA territories into the future (Bluwstein et al., 2016). CBOs are generally not willing to allow changes in WMA land use planning, and it is virtually impossible for dissenting communities or even entire villages to undo a WMA in practice, once it is established (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Bluwstein & Lund, 2018). WMAs thus, in many cases, erode the progressive features of land reforms inscribed in the Land Acts of 1999.

In many instances, the implementation of WMAs has spurred land and boundary conflicts, evictions, and displacement, despite the rhetoric of community-based participation and ownership. Restrictive WMA regimes tend to recentralize land and resource control, offering few employment opportunities in return (Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Green & Adams, 2014). Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable to WMA interventions, especially if they are poor (Homewood, Nielsen, & Keane, in review). Contrary to CBFM arrangements that allow village councils to protect village land against external interests and to keep revenues from resource use, in WMAs new actors—conservation NGOs, tourism investors, and local economic and political elites—are invited to control village lands in the name of community-based conservation. This undermines elected village councils and leads to the emergence of new forms of authority over land control, while promoting elite capture of WMA benefits (Bluwstein, 2017).

There are a few cases where local residents have chosen to create a WMA to protect their land rights against actual or perceived outsiders who may want to establish themselves in these villages (Bluwstein, forthcoming). Often the ones excluded are landless migrants searching for land, farmers in need to expand their activities but lacking inputs to intensify production, or urban or rural elites looking for capital investment opportunities. These cases of exclusion, too, tend to contribute to the growing land pressure across the country when communities or entire villages succeed in taking land out of production or investment.

6.3 | National parks and game and forest reserves

Most of Tanzania's core protected areas (national parks and game and forest reserves) were initially declared many decades ago, often involving evictions (Brockington, Sachedina, & Scholfield, 2008; Sunseri, 2009). However, their protection status and territories have not remained stable, often leading to recurring incidences of physical and economic displacement (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). Displacement reconfigures the gendered intrahousehold dynamics in complex ways, in many instances creating new burdens for women, but to some extent also offering opportunities to renegotiate entrenched gender roles (Brockington, 2002). Many parks and reserves have consolidated or expanded their existing territories in the past decades, often animated by the landscape vision of conservation NGOs and their donors (Bluwstein, forthcoming). With the introduction of GPS technology in the 2000s, several national parks have resurveyed their boundaries, which led to new claims against adjacent villages (Boerstra, 2017; Sachedina, 2008). Calls to resettle rural people or to relocate entire villages in order to "resolve" protracted boundary conflicts with protected areas are common and continue until this day.[17]

Similarly, forest reserves in Tanzania have been gazetted, expanded, diminished, or entirely degazetted over the past century since the German colonial period (Hurst, 2004; Sunseri, 2009). Furthermore, changing regulations and waxing and waning patterns of enforcement have implied that the role of forest reserves in rural livelihoods has been in constant flux. The forest reserve estate has grown throughout the post-colonial period, especially in the 1980s and 1990s (Hurst, 2004). Today, according to different sources, Tanzania features around 450–700 forest reserves (see Table 3). Since the formation of the state agency Tanzania Forest Service in 2010, there has been an increased emphasis on revenue generation from forest reserves, which has led to more enforcement and evictions, as well as to

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[16]That includes district government representatives.

[17]For example, nine villages adjacent to Ruaha National Park are to be "removed completely." IPP *Guardian,* June 15, 2017 (http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/act-environmental-degradation-samia-orders-dcs).

TABLE 3 Territories under different forms of conservation in Tanzania

Conservation initiative	abbr.	Introduced since	Official government data[a]		WWF[b]		World database on Protected Areas[c]			Min range	Max range	Min range	Max range
			n	km²	n	km²	n	km²	Share (%)[d]	km²	km²	Share (%)	
Game reserves	GR[T,L]	1890s	28	117,755	21	111,246	+ 19	94,666	10.7	94,666	117,755		
Forest reserves (excluding CBFM, including JFM)	FR[T]	1890s	455	142,500	523	88,389	+ 692	94,023	10.6	88,389	142,500		
National parks	NP[T,L]	1940s	16	57,366	16	44,342	+ 16	48,681	5.5	44,342	57,366		
Game controlled areas	GCA[T]	1940s	41	58,565			+ 19	71,369	8.1	58,565	71,369		
Ngorongoro Conservation Area	NCA[T]	1959	1	8,292			+ 1	8,305	0.9	8,292	8,305		
Nature reserves	NR[T,L]	1990s	12	3,097			+ 6	2,009	0.2	2,009	3,097		
Marine parks/reserves	MP, MR[T]	1990s			4	932	+ 5	1,489	0.2	932	1,489		
Community-based forest management (excluding JFM)	CBFM	1990s	1,233	23,667			+ na	na (use government data)		23,667	23,667		
Wildlife management areas (operational)	WMA[T]	2000s	19	29,518	16	28,568	+ 13	29,353	3.3	28,568	29,518		
Double counting (NPs, GRs, FRs, FPs, NCA, NRs, MPRs, GCAs, and WMAs), based on WDPA dataset							–	34,023	3.8				
Total area under protection (without OAs, with CBFM, without double counting)							=	**339,539**	38.3	315,407	421,043	**35.6**	**47.5**
Additional conservation designations, not included above													
Missing PAs[e]					12	22,414	+ 12	22,414	2.5	22,414	22,414		
World heritage sites	WHS[T]	1979			4		4	69,773					
Ramsar sites, terrestrial and marine	Ramsar[T]	2000	4	48,684			4	52,511					
Net Ramsar and WHS *terrestrial* area outside of PAs (without double counting), based on WDPA dataset							+	9,930	1.1	9,930	9,930		
Total area under protection (with missing PAs, with net WHS and Ramsar terrestrial areas, without double counting)							=	**371,883**	42.0	347,751	453,387	**39.3**	**51.2**

Note. JFM = Joint Forest Management; L = rural livelihoods fully prohibited; na = not available; OAs = open areas; PAs = protected areas; T = tourism allowed; WDPA = World Database on Protected Areas; WWF = World Wildlife Fund.

Bold emphasis is to indicate total area.

[a]URT (2012b), URT (2013c), URT (2013d), URT (2014), and Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2017).

[b]GIS shapefiles provided by WWF staff in 2014.

[c]United Nations Environment Programme–World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 2017. GIS shapefiles and CSV dataset available at https://www.protectedplanet.net/country/TZ. Accessed January 17, 2017.

[d]100% = 885,800 km², Tanzania's terrestrial area.

[e]PAs missing in WDPA dataset: seven GRs (14,701 km²), four WMAs (8,025 km²), and one FR (1,448 km²). Based on WWF shapefiles.

renewed efforts to re-establish firm reserve boundaries. Thus, rural people who in the past benefited from access to poorly defined, demarcated, and enforced reserve boundaries now find themselves under increasing scrutiny and policing.

6.4 | Hunting concessions

There are around 140 hunting blocks in Tanzania. A hunting block is neither a protected area nor a land category, but a concession to hunt in a bounded area inside a core protected area (game reserve [GR]), a game controlled area (GCA), an open area (OA), or a wildlife management area (WMA). GCAs and OAs have overlapped with communal lands since their establishment during colonial rule. The Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism can allocate a hunting block within a GCA or an OA, thereby challenging game viewing tourism activities on village lands that may have been agreed on with the approval of village governments. The Wildlife Division favours professional hunting outfitters' interests against the interests of village governments because—unlike game viewing activities—hunting concessions directly fund the Ministry's coffers, and rents can be captured directly by Ministry officials (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). However, OAs are not codified as a land category in land or wildlife laws. Similarly, many GCAs *de jure* also ceased to exist as a land category after the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act declared that GCAs cannot overlap with village lands (URT, 2009, § 16(5)). Nonetheless, until this day, the liminal category of GCAs—more so than of OAs—is used to assign hunting blocks against the will of village councils (Gardner, 2016) or to impose restrictions on settlement and livestock keeping (URT, 2013b). GCAs and OAs continue to be invoked in official government and NGO reports and statistics (World Database on Protected Areas; URT, 2013c). If villages are opposing the often highly restrictive hunting operations on their lands (Wright, 2016), the Wildlife Division might impose a false choice on village governments to either accept a restrictive WMA scheme or to see their land being reassigned as exclusive hunting grounds under a GCA or a GR regime, as the long-standing and ongoing conflict in Loliondo demonstrates (Gardner, 2016).

Most hunting blocks are controlled by foreigners (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2006), and some are directly linked to ultra-rich U.S. or Arab oligarchs or Asian–Tanzanian nationals (Wright, 2016), whose wealth and exclusive access to government authorities can corrupt individuals at all levels of government down to elected village officials (Packer, 2015). The U.S.-based Friedkin Conservation Fund alone claims an area of 6.1 million acres (24,685 km^2)—2.8% of Tanzania's terrestrial area—for conservation and tourism through exclusive hunting, game viewing, and lodging.[18] Hunting concessions on village lands are often subleased to other hunting operators (Packer, 2015) or even to mining companies (Noe, 2013) without any say by the village governments, whose land is traded as a commodity between private investors for significant sums of money, with negligible compensation for the villages (Kisembo, 2012).

In sum, foreign and domestic interests in tourism, wildlife and forest conservation constitute the major immediate driver of land tenure change and land alienation in Tanzania. By comparing the most authoritative yet incomplete and inaccurate sources, we conclude that around 42% of Tanzania's total terrestrial area is already enclosed for different forms of conservation (Table 3 and Figure 4).[19] Taking into account the widespread boundary uncertainties, overlapping claims, and different data sources, we provide a range of 39.3–51.2%.

[18]http://www.tgts.com/philanthropy/.

[19]There is no single accurate dataset of protected areas in Tanzania, but different organizations keep their own records, which they sometimes share with each other. Because many protected areas are in the process of being upgraded or resurveyed, or their boundaries remain poorly known to conservation authorities, any available datasets can show only an outdated, incomplete, and inaccurate snapshot. To counter this, in Table 3, we provide a spatial range of the total amount of land that is likely claimed for conservation. Our estimate builds on the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA, accessed January 11, 2017) and improves it by avoiding double counting and by including a number of known protected areas that are missing in WDPA. WDPA shows an area of around 361,000 km^2 under different forms of protection, yet it includes double counting, its WMA coverage is incomplete, and CBFM areas are entirely excluded.

This estimate differs significantly from often-repeated official statistics about land distribution in Tanzania. A recent draft of the National Land Policy, for instance, gives the impression that there is plenty of village land and underplays the extent of conservation enclosures by stating that "village land is estimated to be 70 percent, general land 2 percent and reserved land which includes forest and wildlife sanctuaries is 28 percent" (URT, 2016a, p. 19). Such misleading statistics become even more problematic if we also consider the many more WMAs that are currently planned across Tanzania.[20] If realized, Tanzania could claim to protect 50% or more of its terrestrial area in the name of conservation and tourism.[21] We do not think that all WMAs will be implemented as envisioned due to (a) local resistance (e.g., Loliondo and Simanjiro), (b) lack of investment interest (in most southern and western areas), or (c) too ambitious spatial planning (e.g., Lake Natron). However, the planning process in itself raises serious concerns over land alienation (Gardner, 2012). It is due to such contestations around planning and territorial claims in the name of conservation that we do not provide one fixed estimate for total land under conservation, but rather offer a corroborated estimate on the spatial extent of conservation *claims*. The widespread and vast boundary uncertainties, overlaps, and discrepancies among different data sources constitute a major driver of land conflicts, as rural communities have little say over the maps that prescribe whether people's actions and resident status are lawful or not (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018).

7 | THE INTERLOCKING NATURE OF MULTIPLE DRIVERS OF LAND ALIENATION

Many current land tenure conflicts are remnants of past processes of land alienation (Nelson, Sulle, & Lekaita, 2012; Sundet, 1997; URT, 1994). With the onset of colonial rule, agropastoral communities saw their territories diminished by land reservations and commercial agriculture, and were forced into less fertile territories with a lack of water resources for agricultural and livestock production (Hodgson, 2001; Neumann, 1998). Colonial land alienation gave way to policies of post-colonial villagization through resettlement and the nationalization of land through parastatals in the 1970s (Shivji, 1998; Sundet, 1997). Land alienation policies were again reconfigured during the transition from post-colonial socialism towards liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, when large swaths of communal lands were appropriated for agriculture, tourism, and mining (Igoe & Brockington, 1999; Richter, 1994; URT, 1994).

The history of dispossession is as complex as it is contested. For instance, large-scale agricultural investments through parastatals such as the National Food and Agricultural Corporation displaced many smallholders and pastoralists. Later, these people would be blamed for "invading" alienated lands (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009). After many parastatal companies had been dismantled and privatized by the late 1990s/2000s, the lands that remained without claimants were reappropriated by farmers or pastoralists. In some cases, people would advance their land claims in the form of customary rights of occupancy under adverse possession according to the Village Land Act 1999, having used abandoned land for more than 12 years. However, their claims and land rights have often not been recognized formally (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009), and years later, new investors would purchase the contested lands by paying the former—officially recognized—owners, and attempting to evict the farmers or pastoralists. Examples are a sugar plantation in Bagamoyo (Chung, 2017), a rice plantation in Kilombero (Maganga et al., 2016), and a tourism lodge and investment in Loliondo (Gardner, 2016).

The case of Kilombero is particularly insightful in illustrating how multiple and intersecting authoritative claims to land can converge into a powerful bulwark against the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. In 2006–2007, the government evicted thousands of pastoralists from the Usangu wetlands that were then incorporated into the Ruaha National Park. At least 15 villages had to be "moved" to make space for the park. According to Walsh (2012, p. 323), the expansion of the park was pushed by a small group of well-connected tourism investors that effectively lobbied

[20]Different sources suggest 38 or 39 WMAs to be eventually established on 125,000–136,714 km^2 (Mayeta, 2016; Sosovele, 2015).
[21]An accurate estimate is impossible, because some WMAs would replace some of the existent GCAs.

the central government to evict pastoralists by "disseminating the degradation narratives and fuelling the environmental panic." Many of the displaced people and their livestock ended up in the Kilombero valley. Kilombero had already been designated a GCA and a Ramsar site under the international Wetland Convention.[22] Backed by the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act, which introduced stringent restrictions on human activities in Game Controlled Areas, the state-run research institute TAWIRI[23] concluded that cultivation and settlement—51.4% of land use in the Kilombero valley in 2009—were "incompatible" with the GCA designation (TAWIRI, 2011, cited in URT, 2013b). Within the scope of Ramsar, 29 villages in the Kilombero and Ulanga districts had to prepare restrictive village land use plans (Axberg et al., 2011; Greco, 2016) that in 2011–2012 culminated in evictions in line with the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act (URT, 2013b). Soon thereafter, in 2013, the international consulting firm Environmental Resources Management (ERM) conducted environmental and social impact studies for SAGCOT in, among other places, the Kilombero valley (ERM, 2013; URT, 2013b). With reference to the earlier TAWIRI report, ERM highlighted how "the designation of the floodplain and surrounding areas as a Game Controlled Area, and also as a Ramsar Site, has seemingly had very little deterrent effect on encroachment" (URT, 2013b, p. 163). ERM staff also pointed out that efforts to evict pastoralists from Kilombero were not accompanied by a plan to identify an alternative location for the displaced (ERM, 2013). The most recent report on vulnerable groups and social impacts of SAGCOT—issued by the Prime Minister's office in 2016—omitted any references to Usangu evictions as reasons for immigration into Kilombero, and it failed to include the recent evictions from Kilombero (URT, 2016b). The same year, repeated calls to protect the "national heritage" against "invaders" were issued by regional government authorities (Guardian, 2016a).

Another prominent case of the interlocking nature of land alienation centres around the plight of Barabaig pastoralists, whose homeland in Hanang District was appropriated by a Canadian–Tanzanian wheat investment scheme in the 1980s and 1990s (Lane, 1994). The Barabaig have, since then, struggled to find other lands for livestock grazing and watering. In response to land alienation, some Barabaig have settled in neighbouring Babati District close to Lake Manyara, where their resident status is currently challenged by a European ecotourism investor and a village government in the context of community-based conservation, known as Burunge Wildlife Management Area (Bluwstein, 2017). Other Barabaig migrated to Bagamoyo District, where a Swedish company was promised land for sugar cane production in 2006. Years before the official allocation of 20,000 ha to the company in 2013, this investment intensified conflicts among Barabaig pastoralists, other pastoral groups, and farmers present in the area. Eventually, the investment has stalled and failed to plant any sugar cane. In November 2016, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development revoked the investor's title deed. This exemplifies that deals that do not materialize and fail to produce can also lead to land alienation (Chung, 2017). In another and similar case, both farmers and immigrant Sukuma pastoralists were dispossessed of land and water access due to a stalled biofuel–food investment project in Kigoma (Engström, 2013).

Yet another example illustrates the historical amnesia by conservationists who often perceive people living adjacent to protected areas as a threat, with little regard to histories of dispossession and land alienation that contribute to migration and to land conversion to agriculture. Markus Borner, the former director of Frankfurt Zoological Society, a prominent German conservation NGO, published an influential paper in 1985 suggesting that due to human activities such as agriculture taking place around Tarangire National Park in Northern Tanzania, Tarangire is becoming an "isolated 'island' park" for resident species only (Borner, 1985, p. 91). Some of the land conversion to agriculture was due to immigration of displaced farmers from the slopes of Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro to make space for European coffee plantations and national parks (Igoe, 2008). Regardless, Borner recommended to ban agriculture across 6,000 km^2 around the park and to destock the Maasai. Thus, previous dispossession and land alienation taking place

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[22]Ramsar sites are managed by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Ramsar sites overlap with village lands, game controlled areas, game reserves and forest reserves, lakes, and marine parks, representing an additional layer of land and water protection against subsistence use (see Table 3 and Figure 4).

[23]Tanzania's Wildlife Research Institute.

hundreds of kilometres away (around Meru and Kilimanjaro) created, years later, new justifications for land control and alienation in a new area (around Tarangire).

We have not touched upon land alienation in the wake of the establishment of refugee camps. However, as recently as in 2000, Tanzania hosted the largest population of refugees on the African continent with over 680,000 people from Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda.[24] Refugee camps were established across Kigoma and Kagera regions on land that was in most cases acquired from villages and converted into general land. Camps operated by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have all resulted in land loss to local communities and were not returned to the villagers even after most camps were eventually shut down (although recently some had to reopen due to the continuing conflict in Burundi). More research is needed to better determine the extent of land alienation in these cases.

In response to dispossession, many pastoralists and farmers diversify their income sources, continue migrating to other parts of the country, or turn to urban areas in search for wage labour (May & Ikayo, 2007; McCabe, Smith, Leslie, & Telligman, 2014; Nyenza, Nzunda, & Katani, 2013). However, the formal labour market in Tanzania absorbs only a fraction of those searching for work (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). The growing tensions between farmers and pastoralists, pastoralists and conservationists, or farmers and conservationists are exemplifying this development. To what degree are human population growth and migration intertwined with processes of land alienation and associated land conflicts that we have illustrated so far? Given the population projections as previously discussed, most Tanzanians will continue to depend on land as their primary means of (re)production due to lack of alternatives, although making a living in rural areas is becoming increasingly difficult for many (Coulson, 2013; Patnaik & Moyo, 2011). Coulson (2013) suggests that two opposing processes take place in Tanzania in parallel (and may be spatially unevenly distributed) and will likely shape the future of Tanzania's peasantry: On one hand, agricultural innovation can to some degree counteract population growth and a decreasing land availability (see Boserup, 1965); on the other hand, deagrarianization (see Bryceson's work) is another response to decreasing land availability and reduced agricultural productivity. Although it is difficult to pass a definite judgement on which of the two processes currently prevails, rural–urban and rural–rural migration dynamics and widespread land conflicts suggest that, in a context of projected population growth and a jobless economic growth, an increasingly land-deprived peasantry will suffer growing hardship in the future.

8 | CONCLUSION

Contrary to claims of unused land, we assert that the overall land pressure in Tanzania has increased substantially over the past 1–2 decades. Reinforced by continual land dependency of the rural population, population growth, and increasing social differentiation, this development is a consequence of Tanzania's embracement of neoliberal policies to attract and enable foreign and domestic investment for conservation and tourism, mining, and agriculture. Historical and present data on land under conservation, medium- or large-scale agriculture, and mining are incomplete and to some extent ambiguous. Moreover, many land tenure reconfigurations that we describe cannot be simply conceptualized, measured, and counted as physical land grabs. Rather, the rush to land use planning and titling, and pastoral and labour migration patterns are indicators of often indirectly experienced effects of an ongoing and incomplete primitive accumulation. Accumulation by dispossession comes in many shapes ranging from the complete alienation of land, to restrictions on the uses of land as a means of production. The processes underlying land alienation are underpinned by uneven power relations that particularly affect poor and female-headed households pertaining to land access and resource control. The effects further extend into the patriarchal household, leading to a locally specific and *a priori* unpredictable renegotiation of gender roles and relations in the wake of commercial agriculture, mining, or conservation interventions (Brockington, 2002; Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; Chung, 2017). Such

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[24]"Tanzanian refugee numbers drops below 100,000: UN," UNHCR/REFDAILY, November 29, 2009. Also, "Tanzania opens new camps for Burundian refugees to ease conditions in Nyarugusu Camp," UNHCR, October 7, 2015.

land tenure reconfigurations, of course, do not go unchallenged as demonstrated by some examples of failed invest-ments in large-scale agriculture or stalled implementations of wildlife management areas or hunting concessions.

The localized effects of all these reconfigurations are geographically contingent, unevenly distributed, not always associated with foreign investment, and they contribute jointly to a growing land pressure in Tanzania. As shown in this article, exclusive attention to foreign investment or a particular sector (such as agriculture) would unnecessarily narrow the analysis. Instead, an aggregated view across sectors, actors, institutions, time, and scales is needed to appreciate the interlocking nature of different processes of land alienation. The ongoing scramble for land in Tanzania pushes land-dependent, yet land-deprived, people to respond in ways that may look like voluntary choices, but end up further undermining the conditions of land-based reproduction.[25] Local processes of land alienation mutually rein-force one another, amplifying land tenure reconfigurations that at an aggregate scale mean growing land pressure overall. With these various processes jointly contributing to a scramble for land, we can begin to see a "simple repro-duction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1977), whereby the most vulnerable groups—rural poor, migrants, women, youth, pas-toralists—find it increasingly difficult to maintain or increase their consumption and production. This may, in turn, lend support to claims that rural livelihoods are less productive than large-scale investments, thereby further entrenching the arguments for land tenure changes that adversely affect vulnerable smallholders, who become increasingly trapped between land dependence and land deprivation. Ultimately, official policy objectives of poverty alleviation and inclusive development through land use planning, land tenure formalization, agricultural commercial-ization, mineral extraction, and community-based conservation and tourism will fail, as long Tanzania's political econ-omy advances an uneven development through land alienation.

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[25]In the Indonesian context, Li (2014) describes a similar apparently self-determined process of individualization of land rights and formalization of capitalist relations *from below*, where smallholders themselves are taking initiatives to improve their condition. To Li, the tragedy is that many do not become incorporated into commercial production but cannot go back to a "past condition" either, becoming a surplus population without land.

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