UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

SLU

Martin Westin

Rethinking power in participatory planning

Towards reflective practice

Rethinking power in participatory planning

Towards reflective practice

Martin Westin

Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences
Department of Urban and Rural Development
Uppsala

Acta Universitatis agriculturae Sueciae

2019:78

Rethinking power in participatory planning: Towards reflective practice

Abstract

High hopes for democracy and sustainability are placed on participatory planning. Policy makers and scholars argue that broad participation can revitalise democracy and tackle sustainability challenges. Yet, critics claim that power asymmetries stand in the way of realising the potential of participatory planning. In the everyday practices of planning, this controversy comes to a head. Here, planners interact with citizens, politicians and developers around making choices about places and societies. Planners' practices are contested and they are challenged by the complexity of power relations. They need conceptual tools to critically reflect on what power is and when it is legitimate. Reflective practice is a prerequisite for making situated judgements under conditions of contestation.

Yet, the planning theories, which are most influential in practice, have not been developed with the intention of conceptualising power. Rational planning theory, which still is influential in practice, largely reduces planning into a technical power-free activity. Communicative planning theory, which underpins participatory practices, instead suggests that expert power ought to be complemented by inclusive dialogue. This theory criticises hierarchical power relations as domination, without providing elaborated understanding of other facets of power. Hence, the conceptual support for reflective practice is too reductive.

The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective practice. I draw on power theory and explore the utility of treating power as a family resemblance concept in participatory planning. Applying this plural view, I develop a family of power concepts, which signifies different ideas of what power is. The usefulness of this "power family" is tested through frame analysis of communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice.

The result of the research is a family of power concepts that can enable reflective practice. *Power to* signifies a dispositional ability to act, which planning actors derive from social order. This ability can be exercised as consensual *power with* or as conflictual *power over.* The latter is conceptualised as an empirical process which, on a basic level, can be normatively appraised as *illegitimate* or *legitimate.*

This thesis contributes to planning theory and environmental communication by problematising reductive notions of power and, as an alternative, rethinking power as a family resemblance concept. This theoretical contribution matters to planning practice as it can enable planners to develop their ability to be sensitive to what a situation requires, i.e. to acquire practical wisdom (phronesis).

Keywords: participatory planning, planners, power, reflective practice, frame analysis, participatory processes, participation, phronesis, communicative planning theory.

Author's address: Martin Westin, SLU, Department of Urban and Rural Development, P.O. Box 7012, 750 07 Uppsala, Sweden/ Uppsala University, Swedesd, P.O. Box 527, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden.

Att tänka nytt om maktrelationer i medborgardialoger: På väg mot reflekterande praktik

Abstract

Det finns höga förväntningar på medborgardialoger. Politiker, forskare och planerare argumenterar för att medborgardeltagande i samhällsplanering kan förnya demokratin och bidra till hållbar utveckling. Kritiker hävdar dock att ojämlika maktrelationer står i vägen för att förverkliga förväntningarna. För dem är medborgardialoger naiva eller till och med manipulativa. I medborgardialogens vardagspraktik ställs maktrelationer på sin spets. Här interagerar planerare med medborgare, politiker och andra aktörer med avsikt att förbereda och fatta beslut om platser och samhällen. Planerare ställs inför svårtydda och omstridda situationer i sin praktik. Sådana situationer kräver gott omdöme (fronesis), som kan utvecklas genom kritisk reflektion över maktrelationer.

Men de planeringsteorier som är mest använda i medborgardialogspraktiken har inte utvecklats med avsikt att konceptualisera makt. Rationell planeringsteori, som fortfarande har stort inflytande över planeringspraktiken, reducerar samhällsplanering till en teknisk och värderingsfri aktivitet. Medan den kommunikativa planeringsteorin, som underbygger medborgardialoger, istället föreskriver att experternas makt behöver kompletteras med inkluderande dialoger. Denna teori kritiserar hierarkiska maktrelationer, men tillhandahåller inte djupare förestäelse av andra aspekter av makt. Det konceptuella stödet för reflekterande medborgardialogspraktik är således begränsat.

Målet med den här avhandlingen är att tänka nytt om maktrelationer i medborgardialoger genom att utveckla koncept som kan möjliggöra reflekterande praktik. Jag använder maktteorier och prövar idén att makt kan ses som ett familjelikhetsbegrepp. Detta pluralistiska synsätt använder jag för att utveckla en familj av koncept som betecknar olika föreställningar om vad makt kan vara. I vilken utsträckning "maktfamiljen" är användbar i reflekterande praktik prövas genom ramanalys av föreställningar om makt inom kommunikativ planeringsteori och svensk medborgardialogspolicy och praktik.

Forskningen resulterar i en familj bestående av koncept som kan möjliggöra reflekterande praktik. Konceptet *makt att* definieras som en dispositiv förmåga att agera som planeringsaktörer får från social ordning. Denna förmåga att agera kan utövas i konsensus som *makt tillsammans* eller i konflikt som *makt över.* Det senare konceptualiseras som en empirisk process som, på en basal nivå, kan värderas normativt som *legitim* eller *illegitim makt över.*

Avhandlingen bidrar till planeringsteori och miljökommunikation genom att problematisera ensidiga föreställningar om makt och istället definiera makt som ett familjelikhetsbegrepp. Det här teoretiska bidraget spelar roll i medborgardialogspraktiken genom att möjliggöra för planerare att utveckla situationskänslighet och gott omdöme (fronesis).

Nyckelord: medborgardialog, makt, planerare, samhällsplanering, ramanalys, reflekterande praktik, kommunikativ planeringsteori, fronesis.

Acknowledgements

Doing this thesis has been a privilege. Learning to see the world through theories of planning and power has been inspiring. It has been meaningful to do research, which potentially, might make a difference to the participatory practices intended to deal with the immense challenges of our time.

Sometimes the work has been difficult, giving me a sense of what it feels like to practice on the edge of my ability. Other times, I have experienced the joy of working in an effortless flow, without even noticing how the hours passed by. Through it all, I have learned to do research in a way that I find meaningful. The best thing was to develop relationships with creative and engaged people. I am grateful to all of you who have, in your own valuable ways, contributed to this thesis.

Special gratitude goes to the supervision team. Thank you for supporting me throughout the process. Kaisa Raitio, Associate Professor in Environmental Communication at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), I appreciate how you have both challenged me to develop my thinking and always been supportive. Tim Richardson, Professor in Urban Planning at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), I am grateful for how you have helped me to find my own way to do research. Camilo Calderon, Researcher in Environmental Communication at SLU, thank you for all the creative talks over these years and for, in the beginning of it all, opening the door to an academic community populated by warm-hearted and engaged scholars.

This PhD project was made possible through collaboration between the Swedish International Centre of Education for Sustainable Development (Swedesd) at Uppsala University and the Division of Environmental Communication at SLU. A extraordinary thanks goes to these two institutions. I would especially like to thank Director Eva Friman at Swedesd, former Directors Hanna Bergeå and Stina Powell and Director Lotten Westberg at SLU for your support over the years. A special thanks goes to all the good people at Swedesd

We do not learn from experience...we learn from reflecting on experience.
- John Dewey

Contents

Prologue

This thesis grew out of practical puzzles. It all started with the work I did to facilitate participatory processes. I worked in the public sector in Sweden with dialogue processes intended to improve educational policy and also within development cooperation in view of poverty reduction in Africa and South East Asia. Besides being inside the policy machinery, I have also worked within civil society as a consultant and in academia. I have practiced "hands on" with facilitating participatory processes, as well as taken more of a supportive role with training, advising and researching facilitators' work.

To work alongside engaged and dedicated people towards important ends is a blessing. Still it is far from an easy ride to attempt to realise the potential of participatory processes. In my experience, participants and also facilitators, frequently have different views about what the processes should be like and preferable outcomes. It is rather difficult to talk through the differences, due to conflicting world views and time limitations. Therefore, I have frequently experienced how participatory processes remain ambiguous and contested.

The puzzle I address in this thesis originates from the manner in which facilitators deal with ambiguity and contestation. Over the years, I have heard facilitators, including myself, say things like, "We must trust the process", "We ought to make the road while walking it" or "We should not control the process". At the time, when I entered into PhD training, I had become uneasy about such expressions. I felt that this language suggested that ambiguity might just resolve itself, if only facilitators took a step back. My own experience seemed to indicate that this might not be the case. I therefore found the unwillingness to acknowledge the need for direction puzzling and, honestly, also irritating.

At the onset of my thesis work I elicited and analysed stories about my experiences of participatory processes. I came to use the concept of power as an analytical lens. When I analysed the stories, I realised that my puzzle might be about facilitators' understanding of power. Up until this point, power had been a central yet illusive concept to me. As far as I recall, I rarely talked in depth about power with other facilitators before entering into PhD training. Yet, I assumed that we tacitly shared a desire to level power asymmetries or perhaps even replace power with collaboration. It seemed to be what this practice was all about. It was the decent thing to do, due to the inequalities and injustices of this world. Could it be that facilitators' tacit notions of power explain why they are unwilling to provide direction?

The thesis grew out of that question. Through engagement with power and planning literature and empirical investigations into Swedish planning policy and practice, I learned that there was much more to this puzzle than I originally thought. It is that story I tell in this thesis.

But a thesis is not only about a practical puzzle. It is also about making it less puzzling through researching and theorising. I have throughout my professional life been interested in research. When I started to work at Swedish agencies around the millennium shift, I found the prevailing understanding of the relationship between research and practice problematic. Management was pushing hard for Results Based Management (RBM) and evidence-based methods. At meetings colleagues and directors referred to evidence and claimed that research told us "what works".

I was not convinced by this way of seeing the relationship between research and practice. When I looked at how experienced practitioners worked, I couldn´t see that they were applying any evidence-based methods. Reading the reports, which were supposed to provide the evidence, did not convince me. Instead, I saw that experienced practitioners were flexible and used their intuition−their gut feeling−in their practice.

Over the years, and increasingly since entering into PhD training, I have read about the relationship between research and practice and talked to people who I felt had similar concerns. Gradually, I have started to engage in counter practices, exploring alternative ways of practicing, where we draw on theory for reflection, while also trusting our situated judgements.

I have thus come to see how the boundaries between research and practice and researchers and practitioners are blurred. I pay attention to how practitioners develop (practical) theories and how researchers perform practices. I also see how many practitioners have, like me, one foot in academia and the other in facilitation practice.

Yet, this does not mean that facilitating and researching are the same kind of practice. Instead, I recognise how these two practices require different logics. Practicing facilitation requires both analytical skills and swift practical situated judgments, while practicing research is a slower process, which requires much more explicit attention to how knowledge is developed. With this thesis, I hope to show how research practice can enrich facilitation practice. I set out to develop concepts of power that can enable reflective practice.

1 Introduction

High hopes for democracy and sustainability are placed on participatory planning. Policy makers, scholars and planners argue that broad participation is needed to revitalise democracy and address sustainability challenges (Abrahamsson, 2016; Innes and Booher, 2010; SOU 2016:5). Since the 1980s, participation has been mainstreamed in planning and governance frameworks all over the world. Planning processes bring together a variety of actors, across differences in understanding and values (Fung, 2015; Hajer, 2003; Hertting, 2017).

Yet, critics claim that power asymmetries stand in the way of realising the high hopes for democracy and sustainabilty. They see participatory practices at best as naïve and at worst as manipulative. They argue that the theoretical underpinning of participatory practices is weak in explaining power, and thereby weak in guiding planning action (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002). The practice of participation is accused of constituting a "new tyranny" (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), depoliticising planning (Metzger et al., 2014) and securing consent to unjust power relations through token participation (Purcell, 2009).

In the everyday practices of planning, planners are responsible for realising the democratic potential of participation. They interact with developers, politicians, activists, experts and ordinary citizens in making choices about places and societies (Campbell, 2002). Their practice is contested and they are challenged by the workings of power (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2016; Grange, 2017). Power relations in planning are situated and dynamic, they take different shapes in different situations (Hillier, 2002). The most influential forms of power frequently work under the surface to shape agendas, desires and realities (Lukes, 1974, 2005). Hence, planners are tested when they attempt to understand "what is going on with power" as a basis for deciding how to act (Flyvbjerg, 2004). On top of that, the legitimacy of power relations is contested. Actors come to different conclusions about what kinds of power are desirable. Therefore, planners are faced with vexing questions pertaining to their own, as well as other actors' roles in power relations.

Theory has a function in the power-laden everyday practices of planning. But it is not merely, as conventional wisdom would have it, to supply evidence-based methods. The role of theory is also, and arguably more importantly, to provide a basis for planners' critical reflections (Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2016; Grange, 2017; Richardson, 2002). In planning practice, academic planning theory resides alongside the "theories-in-use" that planners develop and apply (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön, 1983). Deeper notions of power often remain tacit in both kinds of theories.

Through processes of socialisation, planners learn certain ways of understanding and valuing, which leads to specific ways of framing problems and solutions (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön, 1983). They internalise certain notions, which are embedded in their practices from past interactions (Healey, 1997). If such notions remain tacit they may work to block learning and stabilise power relations by rendering them taken for granted (Haugaard, 2003).

> When practitioners are unaware of their frames for roles or problems, they do not experience the need to choose among them. They do not attend to the ways in which they *construct* the reality in which they function; for them, it is simply the given reality (Schön, 1983, p. 310)

In contrast, if notions of power are made explicit, they become accessible for the kind of reflective practice that is required to learn by doing in relational and political practices, such as planning (Bornemark, 2016; Campbell, 2012; Fridlund, 2017; Schön, 1983). Hence, a key task for theories in participatory planning is to supply conceptual tools for critical reflection on the manner in which power relations and planners' roles are framed.

Planning theory is seemingly well suited for this task. But, the two planning theories that are most influential in participatory planning practice, rational and communicative planning theory, have not been developed with the intention of theorising power. Rational planning theory−still influential in practice despite sustained academic critique−serves to build up a basis for a planning practice, which aspires to be scientific in a positivistic fashion. Consequently, little attention is paid to understanding the intricacy of power relations (Allmendinger, 2009; Friedmann, 1998). Planning is instead seen as a technical and value-free activity for defining problems, generating options for solutions and choosing between them to achieve an unambiguous, rather than contested, common good. Planners are thereby conceptualised as value-neutral experts whose influence over planning processes are left largely unquestioned.

Communicative planning theory, which has been influential in practice since the 1980s, challenges rational planning by criticising hierarchical expert-driven planning processes. Instead its scholars promote egalitarian, consensual and inclusive dialogues by, implicitly or explicitly, promoting symmetric power

relations (Forester, 1989, 1999; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995; Sager, 1994). Originally drawing on Habermas' (1984) theory of communicative action, communicative planning tends to cast planners as facilitators in deliberative democracy, rather than rational experts in representative democracy. Power is thereby largely seen as a problem, which planners ought to do away with.

Other scholars, drawing on Foucauldian power analytics, instead claim that power is ever-present in planning and hence must be placed in the centre of planning theory. They argue that communicative planning is weak in explaining what is going on in planning, due to its Habermasian aspirations for universal "power-free" communicative ideals (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Richardson, 1996). In line with the Foucauldian tradition, these scholars are unwilling to provide universal guidance for the role planners ought to play in power relations. Instead, they see their task as unmasking how planning works to normalise domination, through power/knowledge regimes, and thereby force planners to question what they take for granted.

More recently another kind of post-political and agonistic critique has been levelled towards communicative planning and the practices it supports. Here, participatory planning is seen as an instrument for legitimising the status quo and depoliticising planning. Communicative planning is thus accused of underpinning a practice, which maintains neo-liberal hegemony by drawing in alternative voices in well-choreographed processes of token participation. Some scholars within this tradition suggest that planners ought to, rather than being facilitators, be activists working from inside the system to promote the interests of those who lack power (Purcell, 2009). While others alternatively draw on the work of Mouffe (2005) and push for planners to repoliticise planning processes by invoking the political and move towards agonism: the respectful confrontation between opposing discursive communities (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010; Bond, 2011; Pløger, 2004).

Hence, planning theory provides a multitude of, more or less elaborated conceptualisations of power. All of which, in their own ways, supply useful tools for critical reflection. Yet, as is evident from the brief summary above, the treatment of power in planning theory is fragmented and deeper notions of power often remain tacit. Debates between the different camps in planning theory most frequently take shape as zero-sum competitions about the best approach to power.[1] This provides the impression that alternative ideas about power are mutually exclusive and that planners ought to choose only one. This is problematic since

---

1. The exchange between Flyvbjerg (2001a) and Forester (2001) is an example of the zero-sum debates.

planners, rather than one approach, need different concepts of power for reflecting on the situated and dynamic power relations in their practice.

In sum, the treatment of power in planning theory is fragmented. The two theories, which are most influential in practice−rational and communicative planning theory−supply a reductive view of power as either placed in the hands of experts and elected politicians or as wielded to unfairly exclude alternative voices from planning. This reductive conceptualisation of power is problematic since it limits the vocabulary available for planners to reflect on power relations and their own role in them. The following risk is that "unreflective practice" might stabilise undesirable power relations and block planners from learning by doing and reflecting.

1.1 Aim, research questions and relevance

The aim of this thesis is *to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective practice*. To reach this aim I pursue four research questions.

I.   What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning?
II.   Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?
III. To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?
IV.   How can rethinking power in participatory planning provide a set of concepts that can enable reflective practice?

RQ1 is warranted since conceptual tools are needed for researching and rethinking the notions of power, which often remain inferred in participatory planning.

RQ2 is intended to provide an account of the current understanding of power in communicative planning theory and participatory planning policy and practice. This question is necessary since explicating the notions of power in participatory planning is a precondition for rethinking them.

RQ3 serves to asses to which extent the current notions of power in participatory planning are providing support for reflective practice. This question assesses how useful the current understanding of power is for planners. Pursuing this question leads to identification of the conceptual voids that the rethinking must fill.

RQ4 is intended to synthesise the findings from the previous questions into a rethinking of power in participatory planning. Based on the conceptual tools from power theory (RQ1) and the explication and assessment of the current

notions of power (RQ2-3), this question leads to the development of a set of concepts that can enable reflective practice.

What is the normative position from which I set out to rethink power? In the prologue, I explained how this thesis grew out of practical difficulties experienced in my work with participatory processes. My normative position has evolved through these experiences, coupled with the learning during my PhD studies. In practice, I was puzzled—at times also irritated—with the manner in which facilitators seemed reluctant to provide direction for participatory processes. I gradually grew attentive to how this tendency came back to haunt us as facilitators. It led to ambiguity, ambivalence and perhaps even made facilitators disguise their exercises of power behind a language of power-free participation. Through my reviews of the planning and power literature, I have come to interpret facilitators' unwillingness to lead as originating from the notion of power as an evil, which seems to be embedded in participatory practices. I have therefore concluded that rethinking the theoretical underpinnings of participatory planning is required in order to support reflective practice.

Importantly, I do not assume a position as an advocate for a return to expert rule and hierarchical power relations. On the contrary, drawing on the tradition of reflective practice (Forester, 2013; Schön, 1983; Yanow, 2009), I take a position as a proponent of value-based situated judgements, rather than universal ideals. This is a position, which I believe is much more likely to move participatory processes closer to realising their promises. So, when I set out to rethink power, my normative ambition is to support planners' situated reflection by developing concepts, which can be used to critically scrutinise that which is taken for granted.

The aim of this thesis is highly relevant since we are living in times when participatory practices are questioned in Sweden, as well as in many other countries. Mixed experiences over several decades of participation in planning and governance have resulted in a situation where proponents of participation are struggling to regain their footing. Long-standing critiques from both academia and citizens' groups, and personal experiences resembling my own, have created ambivalence among those who practice participation (Bornemark, 2016; Westin and Hellquist, 2018). By rethinking power, I wish to upset the assumed understanding of power relations in participatory practices and thereby make a conceptual contribution that potentially can move the practice beyond the days of naivety, towards a situation where its practitioners are "usefully critical (rather than generally cynical) and appropriately positive (rather than naively optimistic […])" (Richardson, 2005, p. 342).

Hence, even if this thesis is positioned as a contribution to planning theory and practice, I aspire for the findings to be relevant for understanding participatory

practices more broadly. Hence, I strive to develop concepts of power, which can also be useful in fields such as environmental assessment (Blicharska et al., 2011; Kågström and Richardson, 2015; Larsen et al., 2017; Richardson and Cashmore, 2011); environmental governance (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006); adaptive governance of social ecological systems (Folke et al., 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2009); social learning (Blackmore, 2010; Borowski, 2010; Collins and Ison, 2010; Colvin et al., 2014) and collaborative natural resource management (Raitio, 2013; Schusler et al., 2003).

The aim of rethinking power in participatory planning is also relevant to the subject environmental communication, which this thesis contributes to. Environmental communication is a broad subject encompassing a variety of theories and methods concerned with understanding, as well as improving, communicative practices pertaining to the environment and sustainability (e.g. Alarcón Ferrari, 2015; von Essen, 2016; Pezzullo and Cox, 2017; Powell, 2016; Wibeck et al., 2015). The subject is frequently framed as a "crisis discipline" and many of its scholars, like me, aspire to make a difference in practice by addressing the greatest challenges of our times (Pezzullo and Cox, 2017). In environmental communication scholarship concerned with governance processes, participation is a core empirical and normative interest (Calderon, 2013; Fischer et al., 2018; Hallgren et al., 2018; Holmgren and Arora-Jonsson, 2015; Joosse et al., n.d.; Lööf and Stinnerbom, 2016; Raitio and Harkki, 2014).

Power is a recurrent theme in environmental communication research (von Essen, 2016). One of the main tasks that environmental communication scholars have taken on is to critique the manner in which expert power has a grip over environmental communication in governance practices and envision a different kind of more participatory practice (e.g. Lööf and Stinnerbom, 2016). A core intention with this thesis is to demonstrate how the long standing work to theorise participation, deliberation and collaboration in planning theory can be useful within the discipline of environmental communication (e.g. Forester, 1989, 2013; Healey, 1997, 2012).

Recently, a group of scholars and practitioners, with which I am affiliated, have, funded by the Swedish agency Mistra, initiated a research programme intended to reframe environmental communication (SLU, 2019). One of the core issues in the reframing is to revisit the treatment of power in this discipline. The group of scholars takes a critically engaged approach to their research by paying attention to how their practice includes dilemmas, which require reflection (Joosse et al., n.d.). I draw on these ideas and wish for this thesis to contribute to substantiating what it means to approach environmental communication as a critical yet engaged researcher.

1.2 Research design

To pursue the aim and the research questions, I have designed an abductive research process. By abduction I refer to the kind of research where the researcher moves back and forth between empirical observation and theory.

> […] the researcher tacks continually, constantly, back and forth […] The back and forth takes place less as a series of discrete steps than it does in the same moment: in some sense, the researcher is simultaneously puzzling over empirical materials and theoretical literatures. (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013, p. 27)

Starting with the puzzle about power described in the prologue, I have abductively moved between planning theory, power theory and empirical investigations into planning policy and practice. Notably, this means that the research has been a cyclical process. Whereas when the research is reported upon in this thesis, I adhere to more linear storytelling, which is better suited to communicate the findings.

To design the research process, I have drawn on the interpretive research tradition (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Interpretive research analyses actors' meaning-making in the contexts where they are active. To operationalise this research focus I have chosen to apply frame analysis as the core methodology (Schön and Rein, 1994; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). In this methodology frames refer to thought styles and knowledge structures, which guide actors meaning-making. Frames provide a diagnosis of situations and thereby predispose actors for certain actions. Frame analysis has been chosen since it offers a useful methodology for identifying and explicating the notions of power, which are embedded in participatory planning (cf. Dewulf et al., 2009; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016).[2]

Drawing on the interpretive research tradition, I have designed the research as displayed in Table 1.

---

2. See Chapter 3 for an elaborated discussion on the application of frame analysis in the thesis.

Table 1. The research design

Task	Research question	Method	Study object	Chapter presented in
1. To develop conceptual tools from power theory	RQ1	Literature review	Scholarly publications within power theory	Chapter 4
2. To analyse notions of power in communicative planning theory	RQ2-3	Frame analysis	Publications from leading communicative planning scholars	Chapter 5
3. To analyse notions of power in Swedish participatory planning policy	RQ2-3	Frame analysis	Written planning guidance from Swedish authorities	Chapter 6
4. To analyse notions of power in Swedish participatory planning practice	RQ2-3	Qualitative interviews, practitioner profiles and frame analysis	Transcripts from interviews	Chapter 7
5. To synthesise the findings in order to rethink power in participatory planning	RQ4	Conceptual development through abduction	Findings from the previous research tasks	Chapter 8

Research Task 1 is to review power theory in order to develop the conceptual tools needed to research and rethink notions of power in participatory planning. This task originates from the idea that the reductive and fragmented treatment of power in planning theory can be addressed through conceptual tools developed from power theory. Through this task I answer RQ1 by developing conceptual tools intended to: i) make it possible to explicate and assess tacit notions of power in participatory planning and ii) in the final step of the research, rethink these notions. The usefulness of these tools is tested through empirical investigations (Tasks 2-4) and then validated in order to develop concepts during research Task 5.

Research Task 2 is to analyse notions of power in communicative planning theory. I chose this theory for analysis since it is influential in participatory planning practice. Notably, I use the term communicative planning theory to signify a theory that seeks to explain, influence and support participatory planning. But I do not, as some scholars (e.g. Sager, 2012), dissolve the difference between this theory and participatory planning practice. The reason is that I see that participatory planning is influenced by alternative theories. Even if I have decided to focus the analysis on communicative planning, I also make use of the Foucauldian and the post-political planning theories when I, in the final research Task 5, rethink power in participatory planning.

To analyse communicative planning theory, I focus on the work of its leading scholars, John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes from the 1980s to the present. I subscribe to the view that planning scholars do not merely describe and

analyse planning practices, they are also engaged in "world making" by suggesting that certain ways of making meaning are more useful than others. Therefore, they are to be viewed as planning actors, rather than objective observers. Thus, I see the analysis of communicative planning theory, not as a conventional literature review, but as a frame analysis of scholars' meaning-making. Through the engagement with the leading communicative planning scholars this research task provides part of the answer to RQ2 and 3 by explicating the notions of power, which frequently remain tacit, in this theory and assessing the extent to which these enable reflective practice.

Research Task 3 is to analyse notions of power in Swedish participatory planning policy. To study Swedish planning is an important task in itself, due to the need to scrutinise assumed notions of power. Importantly, in line with interpretive research, studying Swedish planning means that I "dig where I stand". My practical knowledge about the Swedish context provides possibilities to go under the surface to explicate and assess unspoken notions of power.

I also assert that Swedish planning is a case that potentially provides insights of value for other planning contexts. Trust in Swedish democracy is still relatively high and political institutions stand comparatively strong (Andersson et al., 2018) and participation is mainstream in spatial and societal planning (Isaksson et al., 2009; Strömgren, 2007). Hence, Sweden is a "friendly context" for realising the dialogical notions of power in communicative planning theory. Studying Swedish planning is putting my assertion that rethinking power in participatory planning is required for the hardest test and can potentially provide insights of value for other planning contexts (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2006 discussion of critical and most-likely cases).

To analyse notions of power in Swedish planning policy, I chose to study planning guidance issued by two influential Swedish authorities, The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) and the Association for Swedish Municipalities and Counties (SALAR). Planning guidance documents are suitable study objects in view of my interest in clarifying and assessing notions of power in participatory planning. Governments and agencies use guidance in their attempts to steer the implementation of planning policy and to influence planning practices in the direction they prefer. Thus, as Cashmore et. al., (2015, p. 85) argue, "guidance plays a prominent role in contemporary governance". Given my interest in reflective practice, guidance is especially relevant to study, since it is intended to help planners make sense of the difficulties they face.

Through the analysis of planning policy, I get access to notions of power from within the machinery of Swedish public agencies and organisations. This is expected to enable clarification and assessment of alternative notions to those

within communicative planning theory and complementary findings feeding into answering RQ2 and 3. The end result of this task is that additional notions of power are explicated and assessed.

Research Task 4 is to analyse notions of power in Swedish participatory planning practice. Inspired by John Forester's (1999, 2009a) method for practitioner profiles, I illicit practice stories through interviews with Swedish planners. I have chosen to interview planners who are reflective and engaged in their practice. This selection is expected to provide access to rich practice accounts where notions of power become accessible for research. The planners' stories are analysed through frame analysis to explicate and assess the understandings of power, which often reside under the surface of the narratives. Thereby, a full answer is provided to RQ2 and 3. The result of this task is insights into how the notions of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish planning guidance enable and constrain planners' meaning-making.

Research Task 5 is to synthesise the findings from the previous tasks in order to rethink power in participatory planning. At this final stage of the research process, the conceptual tools developed through reviews of power theory have been tested through investigations into communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. The notions embedded in participatory planning have thus been explicated and assessed. Hence, this final research task is about responding to RQ4 by synthesising the findings from the previous research tasks. It is about developing concepts based on the findings from the abductive research process. The end result is a rethinking of power, which provides a set of power concepts that enable reflective practice.

Throughout the research process, I have sought to realise three central qualities in research practices: being reflective,[3] being systematic and employing and attitude of doubt (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). For reasons already explained, reflective practice is an important ideal for me. In this PhD project it is particularly important since, as described in the prologue, my own practical experiences position me within the practice I research. This position gives the possibility to enrich the research through practical knowledge, but also comes with the risk of lacking the distance needed for critical scrutiny. By being reflective, systematic and doubting, I have sought to realise the possibilities and mitigate the risks throughout the research process.[4]

---

3. Notably, the term "reflexivity" is often used to signify researchers' scrutiny of their social position and guiding assumptions. I chose to instead use "reflective" to signify the same process because, if "reflexivity" had been used, the two similar terms might have caused confusion.

4. For a methodological discussion see Chapter 3.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

The argument unfolds as follows in this thesis. Chapter 2 positions the thesis in discussions about participation, planners and power. Chapter 3 discusses the interpretative research methodology applied in this thesis. In Chapter 4, I present a review of the power literature intended to develop conceptual tools to research and rethink power in participatory planning. Chapters 5-7 present the investigations into communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. In the closing Chapter 8, I draw together the findings and answer the four research questions in order to rethink power in participatory planning.

2 Planners, participation and power

> [...] practicing reflectively means learning by doing and learning from doing; at best, it means pushing the boundaries of one's field and questioning one's role in it. (Fischler, 2012, p. 314)

This chapter positions the thesis in the discussions about planners, participation and power and thereby explains why a rethinking of power in participatory planning is warranted.

The first section explores planners, power and participation. Through discussing power relations in planning, the nature of planning practice and situated judgment, I arrive at the conclusion that phronesis, (the ability to make value-based situated judgements), is required by the planners who are key actors in participatory planning.

Section 2 links the development of phronesis to reflection, and thereby makes the case for reflective practice. It is argued that massive amounts of practical experience are not sufficient for the development of phronesis. Reflective practitioners pay attention to difficulties they confront and use these to prompt critical scrutiny of what they take for granted and thereby learn to master their profession.

In Section 3, I review the discussion about power in planning in order to elaborate on the problem the thesis addresses. I take stock of the treatment of power in communicative planning theory and the critique posed towards this theory. The chapter concludes by arguing that the fragmented and reductive treatment of power in participatory planning is an impediment to reflective practice and thereby makes this thesis warranted.

2.1 Why do planners need concepts of power?

Scholars have long told us that the concept of power is central to understand planning. Few would object to Flyvbjerg's (2004, p. 293), characteristically dramatic, assertion that, "There can be no adequate understanding of planning without placing the analysis of planning within the context of power". For my purposes, it is obviously not sufficient to merely say that power is important, we must also ask why it is so. Why do planners need concepts of power (cf. Hayward and Lukes, 2008; Morriss, 2002)? To answer this question, let us consider the power relations that are performed in the participatory planning processes.

Planning is about making choices about places and societies (Campbell, 2002). In order to plan places and societies a power system, which orders social positions and actions, is necessary. A system of power provides planning actors such as politicians, planners, citizens, activists and developers with social positions, which confirms upon them (varying) abilities to act, which is to exercise power (Haugaard, 2003). Planning actors might in some planning situations use their power towards shared objectives. They might agree upon what is best to do. In such episodes, we get the kind of consensual power that Hanna Arendt refers to as "the human ability not just to act but to act in concert" (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). Yet, stakes are often high and interests collide. Planning becomes conflictual, contested in its process and/or in its outcomes (Campbell, 2006). Then we get the kind of power, which Robert Dahl (1957, pp. 202–203) referred to when saying that "A has power over B to the extent that he (sic) can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do." Hence power is, rather than merely an evil, ever-present and productive in participatory planning.

Planning processes provide arenas where power relations are performed. Planners interact with a variety of actors whose identities, world views and desires might be more or less aligned. In our multicultural societies, citizens from alternative walks of life share the same places and participate to varying degrees in planning these. In more or less close contact with citizens, experts from different professions with alternative knowledge systems and ways of practicing, play important roles in the shaping of places and societies. Developers and private interests are—especially in today's deregulated planning systems—key actors who provide resources and execute tasks throughout all stages of planning, often wielding a considerable amount of power. Elected politicians from different parties are involved in decision making, which may be more or less controversial throughout a planning process. When issues are contested, actors who have a stake in the outcome enter into the equation by pushing for their specific interests. Sometimes academics fill a function as stakeholders by articulating specific values and interests. In other planning

episodes they may merely assist with more conventional knowledge inputs or work alongside planners and other actors to plan places and societies.

Hence, a multitude of actors are involved in a planning practice, which is intended to better places and societies (Campbell, 2002). These actors frequently have different visions and alternative ideas about what "better" might be. Planning issues are contested in their process, as well as in their outcome. In participatory planning "different knowledge and lived experiences rub up against one another, raising questions about whose knowledge constitutes proof, and, indeed, what constitutes proof […]" (Campbell, 2002, pp. 277–278). Planning involves making choices that inevitably lead to exclusion of certain knowledge, values, visions and ideas (Connelly and Richardson, 2004; Mouffe, 1999; Wiberg, 2016).

The necessary art of exclusion is performed through power relations in different *spaces* and at various *levels* (cf. Gaventa, 2006). Spaces, can be seen as the locations, moments and situations where planning actors come together to communicate. Spaces where power relations are performed can be categorised as *closed spaces*, where the "powerful" insiders in a planning system make decisions without broader participation. While other kinds of spaces can be understood as *invited spaces* (cf. Ibid.). Then citizens and other actors are asked to join planning processes by those who are charged with convening power, either through regulated formalised consultations or on a more ad hoc basis. Finally, spaces can be *claimed* by less powerful actors who wish to open up new arenas for getting "their" issues into the planning processes.

The spaces for participation can be seen as located on different *levels* of planning systems. One distinction, which is often made, is the one between the power relations that take place *inside* a designed participatory planning process and those broader relations of power, which are influencing and influenced *outside* a formal planning process (Healey, 1997; Innes and Booher, 2010). One might additionally distinguish between power relations at global, regional, national and local levels. Participation takes shape on all four levels. Planning frameworks at different levels overlap, and at times compete in ways that influence conditions for power relations in participatory planning (cf. Armitage et al., 2010).

Let us return to the question this section started with. Why do planners need concepts of power? I argue that planners need concepts of power in order to *understand* what is going on in power relations between the actors who inhabit the participatory spaces at different levels of planning systems. As asserted by Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002, p. 14) "Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power".

I also make the additional claim that an important function for concepts of power are to enable *normative appraisal* of these power relations as a basis for planners' action.

> Actions cannot be value-free, so rather than hiding, implying or sidestepping such concerns, explicit consideration needs to be given to the nature of the ethical values that our processes and outcomes are seeking to promote. (Campbell, 2002, pp. 274–275)

Hence concepts of power are needed in order for planners to make sense of the ethical challenges in their practice.

> In the complex world of plural politics, planners charged with serving the public interest are often challenged by the frequently competing demands of various stakeholders […] Planning activities are intended to serve an entire community, but in reality can and do affect various constituencies differently, which poses multiple ethical challenges. (Lauria and Long, 2017, p. 202)

If concepts of power were to perform these tasks, to understand and normatively appraise power, they would play important roles in participatory planning practices as tools for planners' reflection and action. The problem I address in this thesis, is that the most influential planning theories in participatory planning fall short of supplying the variety of concepts needed for understanding and normatively appraising power.[5]

2.2 Planners and practical wisdom (phronesis)

Planners are in focus in this thesis. I chose to view this profession broadly, recognising that planners play alternative roles in different countries and in different kinds of planning processes. The tasks they perform range from providing expert inputs in the various stages of planning to facilitating dialogues with citizens, developers, activists, academics and other actors. In this thesis, I focus on planners within the public sector, while also recognising that planners can perform their duties from positions within civil society and the private sector. I also see how some planners might be concerned merely with spatial planning, but also recognise that planning is increasingly about linking spatial and societal issues. Hence, planners' work spans over broad areas of expertise.

Planners are frequently seen as value-free experts who merely supply their objective know-how to make planning rational. This view of the profession is an important basis for the legitimacy of planning. But it is too reductive since it neither recognises the variety of work planners actually do, nor opens

---

5. See Section 2.4.

possibilities for planners to make a difference in relation to political issues, which is the reason why many planners enter into the profession (Grange, 2013).

In this thesis, I see planning as a power- and value-laden practice and hence subscribe to an alternative view of the kind of knowledge planners need. Instead of merely recognising conventional expert knowledge as a basis for planning practice, I follow those who stress how planners make situated judgements based both on deep expertise and ethical considerations.

> Judgement between these [planning] options depends on the interplay of universal ways of understanding about better and worse and the particularities of place. It is about practical wisdom. […] Planning should be about a process of valuation and evaluation, not the imposition of fixed values and singular notions of the good life. (Campbell, 2002, p. 282)

To master their profession, planners need to develop "an appropriate basis for ethical judgement in planning based on a relational understanding of society which recognizes both difference and the common good" (Watson, 2003, p. 404).

Hence, good planners possess the kind of practical wisdom, which Aristotle called "phronesis" (Bornemark, 2016; Flyvbjerg, 2004). This is an intellectual virtue that is "reasoned and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man" (The Nicomachean Ethics, 1976, pp. 1140a24–b12, 1144b33–1145a11 cited in Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 284). Aristotle argued that phronesis is the most important of the three intellectual virtues: episteme, techne, and phronesis. Phronesis is about making value-based judgements and thus goes further than scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical knowledge or know-how (techne) (Bornemark, 2017).

Phronesis includes understanding the context as well as universal theories and normative principles. In practical wisdom "[…] the meaning of any universal, or any norm, is only justified and determined in and through its concretisation" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 40). In this sense, practical wisdom is about knowing what to do in a certain situation, which, involves understanding what is going on and making normative judgements about what is at stake in that situation. It is about knowing what is right to do, here and now. "We cannot say, in a general and abstract way, which action is just and which is not: there are no just actions 'in themselves', independent of what the situation requires" (Ibid.).

Phronesis is a powerful mix of deep understanding of the universal and the particular (Flyvbjerg, 2004). It is the ability to be sensitive to what the situation requires (Bornemark, 2016). "Abstract theoretical understanding of political institutions, for example, is far from irrelevant, but it must reside alongside a nuanced appreciation of the rules of the political game and the ability to judge correctly the best course of action" (McCourt, 2012, p. 36).

How do practitioners develop practical wisdom? According to Flyvbjerg (2001), practice is the key to acquiring phronesis. He refers to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) phenomenological studies and argues that developing complex contextual knowledge, which phronesis is, requires a lot of emotionally engaged practical experiences.

In Aristotle's original work on Phronesis, as well as in later work, power has largely been absent (Flyvbjerg, 2001b). Situated judgment and practical wisdom have been theorised without a conceptualisation of power. Given the centrality of power to planning practice, this is problematic. Like Flyvbjerg (Ibid.) I wish to contribute to charging phronesis with a clearer conceptualisation of power, for planners need concepts of power both to understand and to normatively appraise interactions between planning actors.

2.3 The case for reflective practice

The tradition of reflective practice provides a suitable theorisation of the learning process through which practical wisdom can be developed (Fischler, 2012; Forester, 2013; Schön, 1983; Yanow, 2009). The reason for turning to reflective practice, is that this tradition carries the potential to conceptualise the manner in which planners need to turn their gaze towards their assumptions of power, if they wish to learn from their experiences.

2.3.1 What is reflective practice?

It was Donald Schön (1983) who originally developed the ideas of reflective practice, which were later applied and developed by many scholars and practitioners (e.g. Fischler, 2012; Forester, 2013; Yanow, 2009; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009). Schön developed his ideas based on his own practicical experiences and close studies of how practitioners go about doing their work. Importantly, some of his most influential work was done with planners.

Schön drew on the work of Dewey (1933, 1938) and further developed some of his core ideas. Most notably, Schön subscribed to Dewey's view that learning occurs from the personal experience of puzzling, surprising and difficult situations, which require reflection on habitual ways of thinking and doing.

> In general, practicing reflectively means learning by doing and learning from doing; at best, it means pushing the boundaries of one's field and questioning one's role in it. Reflective practitioners consciously aim to improve their practice by analyzing their own experience. They improve their professional behaviour and ameliorate its effects by sustained inquiry into the causes, meanings, and consequences of their actions. (Fischler, 2012, p. 314)

Schön (1983) elaborated on his ideas of reflective practice by contrasting it to technical rationality. In technical rationality, professional practice includes instrumental problem solving through the application of scientific theory and technique. It involves selecting the best models and tools to tackle a given problem. In contrast, Schön saw how practitioners, who master their practice rather exhibit an "artful competence" whereby, instead of carefully selecting appropriate tools prior to action, they spontaneously apply their "knowing in action".

> When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the actions of everyday life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special way. Often, we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe it, we find ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are obviously inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our knowing is *in* our action. (Schön, 1983, p. 49)

As observed by Schön, our knowing in action is largely tacit. Even if we can put words on the logic underlying what we do, we are rarely inclined to do so in the midst of action. A competent planner might, for example, be capable of enabling a constructive conversation on a difficult planning choice with a citizen, but might not immediately be able to explain how they do it.

Yet, Schön (1983, p. 50) tells us how professionals, stimulated by surprise, puzzles and difficulties, "turn thought back on action and on the knowing, which is implicit in action". For example, if the the planner suddenly notices that the citizen seems troubled, they might in the moment pause their routinised behaviour, their knowing in action, and become attentive to the way they speak and what they say. In this pause, the planner might reflect-in-action. They might ask themselves and/or the citizen if their use of language is overly technical and thereby makes the citizen feel excluded. This kind of reflection-in-action is important for developing the sensitivity for what a situation requires, which is central to practical wisdom (Bornemark, 2017).

Schön, distinguishes between reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. The latter takes place after a situation when a practitioner thinks back on a situation and scrutinises the way he or she understood the situation. To Schön, this form of reflection was crucial for understanding how practitioners learn from their experience, by questioning habitual ways of thinking and acting and, if called for, change them (Schön, 1983).

In theories of reflective practice, the metaphors frame and framing are used to signify tacit thought models and ideas. These metaphors explain that there is a less visible foundation "that lies beneath the more visible surface of language or behaviour, determining its boundaries and giving it coherence." (Rein and Schön, 1996, p. 88). Through this language we can see how our frames of

meaning-making, like picture frames, set a boundary within which we focus our attention on what is inside as opposed to what is outside of the frame and thereby make sense of what is going on (Raitio, 2008).

To Schön, practitioners' artistry, which resembles practical wisdom and phronesis, originates from their ability to be sensitive to surprise and engage in reflection over the usefulness of the frames embedded in their practices. Surprises and difficulties show a lack of appropriateness between the practitioners' knowing in action, tacit ways of framing, and the situation at hand. Practitioners are in such situations, helped by reflecting upon their tacit frames and adjusting them to become more effective in their knowing in action.

According to Schön (1983, p. 50) it is the critical scrutiny of assumed ideas, the reflection-in and on-action "which is central to the 'art' by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict." In this thesis, I am interested in analysing and assessing the frames, which inform planners' understandings of power in participatory planning. By making these explicit I wish to develop concepts that can enable reflective practice.

2.3.2 Reflective practice and power

Notions of power often remain implicit in participatory planning. As research into meaning-making tells us, actors draw on their particular view of "the order of things" most often without making the underlying assumptions explicit to themselves and others (Schön, 1983; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009). As discussed in my own practice story in the prologue, unspoken differences in understandings might result in ambiguity regarding the purpose of participation and planners' roles in power relations. It might result in a kind of "unreflective practice" which, according to Schön (1983, p. 289), is equally "limited and destructive" regardless if practitioners follow the conventional ways of their practice or see themselves as progressively pursuing a mission to change their practice.

Arguably, an unreflective planning practice might be equally dangerous regardless of whether it is performed in the name of participation or in the name of technical expertise. Universal aspirations for participation or technical rationality are ill-suited in a practice that requires situated judgements. Presuming that certain understandings and normative aspirations are always valid might deter planners from being sensitive to the workings of power in a particular situation.

From the power literature, we learn that unreflective practice might stabilise power relations by rendering them presumed as a given reality. Thereby, unreflective practice is a vehicle for "reification", the process by which certain kinds of power relations are seen as given, as objective reality. In the power

literature, reification is a term used to signify one of the most important mechanisms through which power is created by ordering and stabilising social relations (Haugaard, 2003). Critical power analysis tells us that when reification, which is the construction of reality, remains tacit and unquestioned the risk for dominance by powerful actors increases (Lukes, 2005).

Following this reasoning there is a potential for reflective participatory planning practice to "unmask" what is taken for granted about power. Reflective practice provides the possibility to explicate and scrutinise the way that reification stabilises power relations. Opening the process of reification for critical examination carries the potential for assessing the legitimacy of power relations and, if deemed necessary, transforming them.

The links between reflective practice and power will stay in focus throughout this thesis. At this point, it suffices to reiterate that this thesis is intended to enable reflective practice, due to the potential this form of practice carries for developing phronesis by reflection, and for opening power relations to critical scrutiny.

2.4   The fragmented and reductive treatment of power in planning theory

This section zooms in on the treatment of power in planning theory. It thereby clarifies what this body of theories offers for reflections on power in participatory planning and what is missing. I first discuss the treatment of power in communicative planning theory and thereafter summarise the critique from other strands of planning theory.

2.4.1 Power in communicative planning theory

In the 1980s and 1990s, planning theory joined a larger communicative turn in social science through an increased analytical focus on language and sense-making in the micro-practices of planning. This analytical turn was intertwined with a normative desire to shift the power balances to benefit civil society and marginalised communities in order to democratise planning processes from the bottom up (Watson, 2002). The communicative turn in planning theory influenced, and was in turn influenced by, a move from government to governance in planning policy. Hence, communicative planning theory is arguably a theory that to some extent has been capable of challenging the dominance of rational planning theory in policy and practice.

Communicative planning theory is best understood as an umbrella concept, which covers a broad and diverse set of theories that have an analytical focus on communication and a normative preference for inclusive dialogues in common

(Sager, 2012). The theories included under the umbrella are given different names, which are used interchangeably and overlap, including but not exhausted by collaborative planning, argumentative planning, consensus building, dialogical planning and deliberative planning. Influential contributors include John Forester (1989, 1999, 2009), Patsy Healey (1992a, 1997, 2012), Judith Innes (1995; 1999, 2010) and Tore Sager (1994, 2012).

The communicative planning theories originate from a critique of rational planning theory, which was and still is, influential in planning policy and practice. Rational planning is criticised for being unable to explain how planning practice is performed in real life and for resulting in exclusion and injustices through its application in practice. Innes (1998, p. 53) articulates this critique as follows:

> […] the tidy process specified for analysis [in rational planning], […] is simply not a good description of the reality of planning […] nor does it appear that the model's [rational planning] neat divisions of labour among professionals and public officials are found in practice. […] Finally, the notion of value-neutral expertise is no longer widely accepted, either among the lay public or by philosophers of science and social theorists.

At the heart of communicative planning, is the view that reality is socially constructed. This body of theories pays attention to the social construction of meaning, the social embeddedness of ways of thinking and acting in varied discourse communities and the interpretive nature of the world (Healey, 1997; Innes and Booher, 1999). As Healey (1992b, p. 241) states, knowledge is then not seen as

> […] a pre-formulated store of systematised understandings [instead knowledge] is specifically created anew in our communication through exchanging perceptions and understandings and drawing on stocks of life experiences and previously consolidated cultural and moral knowledge available to participants.

From this social constructivist position, scholars in communicative planning theory level critique towards the epistemological basis of rational planning. The idea of rational planning is said to produce a practice in which knowledge is primarily developed through scientific analysis and deductive logic. Thereby, voices adhering to these ways of knowing are privileged, whereas those who appeal to other ways of knowing are marginalised (Healey, 1997; Innes, 1998).

According to proponents of communicative planning theories, the dominance of rational planning leads to the exclusion of a range of knowledge forms and value systems from planning practice. These include experiential, local, intuitive, tacit, and expressive knowledge, which draw on the moral or aesthetic realms rather than solely on the realms of scientific logic and empiricism (Healey, 1997; Innes, 1998).

Communicative planning scholars pay attention to planners' everyday practices both analytically and normatively. As argued by Forester (1999, 2009), focusing on what planners do provides important practical and theoretical insights. Communicative planning scholars combine their analytical interests in planners' micro practices with the normative idea that planners are capable of democratising planning from within, by creating more inclusive planning processes. Hence, communicative planning theory suggests replacing the rational expert planner with the planner as a facilitator of participation (McGuirk, 2001).

The normative idea in communicative planning is, as McGuirk (Ibid., p. 196) puts it, "dramatically opposed to instrumental rationality and its processes of creating knowledge and ascribing value". This view leads communicative planning scholars to criticise hierarchical power relations since these are seen as standing in the way of inclusive dialogue. The dominance of an expert-driven, top down planning process is seen as undesirable, whereas it is argued that an increase in community-based bottom up planning processes are desirable.

To theorise their normative ideas, communicative planning scholars in the early days in the 1980s and 1990s, turned to Habermas (1984) and argued that rational planning's "instrumental rationality" should be replaced with communicative rationality (Forester, 1980, 1989, 1993; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995). Innes (1998, p. 60) explained what communicative rationality would mean in planning.

> First, individuals representing all the important interests in the issue must be at the table. All the stakeholders must be fully-and equally-informed and able to represent their interests. All must be equally empowered in the discussion; power differences from other contexts must not influence who can speak or who is listened to, or not. The discussion must be carried on in terms of good reasons, so that the power of a good argument is the important dynamic.

Inserting communicative rationality in planning would, according to the scholars, create a new kind of practice, which would ensure that forms of knowledge, reasoning, and representation beyond instrumental rationality, were part of inclusive dialogues in planning.

It is this move, to import Habermas' thinking into planning, that has been given the most attention in the power debates in planning (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Purcell, 2009). Whereas other approaches to power, within the broad umbrella of communicative planning theories, have attracted much less attention.

Although I share the critics' view that it is useful to discuss the import of Habermas' ideas to planning, I find this focus too reductive to fully assess the treatment of power in communicative planning theory. As pointed out by

Healey (2003, 2009) in her responses to her critics: there is more to this theory than Habermas.

At the core of communicative planning is, in addition to Habermas' critical theory, American pragmatism (Forester, 1999, 2009, 2013), new institutionalism (Healey, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2012) and attempts to theorise the practical knowledge developed through participatory practices (Innes and Booher, 1999, 2010). These three streams within communicative planning remain under-explored in the discussions about power in participatory planning.

John Forester is one of the scholars who has woven American pragmatism into the fabric of communicative planning theories. In his later work he has, mainly implicitly, distanced himself from Habermas and subscribed to a form of communicative planning, which emphasises situated action rather than grand theorising, and focuses on how planners deal with the practical problems of power.

> To do better in our applied fields, we need to beware of two dangers, those of naïveté and cynicism. The first assumes too easily the motivating power of abstract ideals; the second assumes too easily that those with power yesterday must prevail today and tomorrow. Assuming in many political settings that sincerity or reciprocity will independently motivate others can easily be a fool's errand, to be sure. (Forester, 2013, p. 7)

As evident in this quote, Forester's brand of American pragmatism provides another kind of perspective on power in planning, as compared to the ideas of Habermas' critical theory. Instead of emphasising universal ideals and communicative rationality, Forester's later work makes the case for pragmatic incremental action to shift power balances in micro practices. Yet Forester has after his Habermasian period in the 1980s and early 1990s, refrained from theorising power. Hence, the notions of power underpinning his American pragmatism remain to be explained. This is the task I turn to in the analysis presented in Chapter 5.

Another influential stream within communicative planning derives from new institutionalism's interest in the interplay between structure and agency. In this approach, which provides yet another perspective on power, Healey (1997, 2012) is one of the prominent scholars. She has used and further developed Giddens' (1984) structuration theory. Even if she has refrained from using power as a key concept, her work provides conceptual resources for understanding power beyond the Habermasian focus on power as a distortion.

> We live through culturally-bound structures of rules and resource flows, yet human agency, in our continually inventive ways, remakes them in each instance, and in remaking the systems, the structuring forces, we also change ourselves and our cultures. Structures are 'shaped' by agency, just as they in turn 'shape' agency. (Healey, 1997, p. 45)

As illustrated by this quote, even if Healey rarely elaborates on the concept of power, her work carries the potential for reflection on power relations. She draws attention to how social relations can be understood as an interplay between structure and agency. Hence, this stream of communicative planning theory might, as Healey (Ibid.) points out, teach us how power is embedded in social structures through "implicit and explicit principles about how things should be done and who should get what".

To Healey, structuration practices carry power relations from one period to the next. Thereby, she provides an approach to power, which is distinctively different from both American pragmatism and Habermasian communicative rationality. Yet, like Forester, Healey has not used power as a core concept and hence the notions of power underlying her work remain largely hidden. Therefore, I include her work in the analysis of communicative planning theory presented in Chapter 5.

In addition to American pragmatism and new institutionalism, communicative planning scholars have also drawn on the practical knowledge developed within the growing field of participatory practices. This work has attracted little interest in the debates about power in participatory planning. Judith Innes, often working with David Booher, is arguably the communicative planning scholar who has most influentially sought to theorise based on her own and others' practical experiences of facilitating participation (Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes, 2016; Innes, 1995; Innes and Booher, 1999). Hence, I have also included her work in the analysis presented in Chapter 5.

The treatment of power in communicative planning theories have endured sustained critique over the years. The critique has prompted communicative planning scholars to respond and it is to these debates we now turn.

2.4.2 The critique of the treatment of power in communicative planning theory

The first wave of critique towards communicative planning came from scholars who were inspired by the work of Foucault. Instead of importing Habermas' ideas, they set out to make use of Foucault's power analytics to theorise planning (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2004; Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Richardson, 1996). Scholars who draw on Foucault's work approach planning based on a conception of power as ubiquitous to human relations and thus planning practice. The approach to planning they have thereby developed has been, and still is, influential in planning theory (Metzger et al., 2016; Schmidt-Thomé and Mäntysalo, 2014).

Based on Foucault (1979, 1980), Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002, p. 46) succinctly formulate the core of their critique towards communicative planning.

> […] communicative planning theory fails to capture the role of power in planning. As a result, it is a theory which is weak in its capacity to help us understand what happens in the real world; and weak in serving as a basis for effective action and change.

The critique zooms in on the communicative planning scholars' affinity for the universal aspirations of Habermas' communicative rationality. Foucauldian scholars claim that communicative rationality is naïve and idealistic and put forward the real rationality of Foucauldian power analytics as an alternative. Instead of looking at what ought to be done in planning, we should pay attention to what is actually done.

> Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all-pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002, p. 52)

As illustrated by this quote, this critique towards communicative planning draws on Foucault's emphasis of "unmasking" the domination hidden in societal practices, such as planning. According to Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002) this is what Foucault offers when it comes to institutional change: to expose the mechanisms of power that produce inclusion and exclusion. By way of unmasking the practices and the techniques of governing, institutions can potentially be transformed in order to minimise domination.

> What Foucault calls his 'political task' is 'to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them' (Chomsky and Foucault, 1974, p. 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to institutional change. (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002, p. 55)

Following from this critical perspective, is a reluctance to provide universal solutions to how power should be approached in planning.

> […] there are few easy explanations and fewer model solutions. They [foucauldian scholars] rarely seek to provide procedural models for practice. Rather, they offer a set of reference points which can be used by planners and others to critically, reflexively, and ethically establish their basis for action. (Richardson, 2005, p. 345)

Thereby, the Foucauldian critique to communicative planning theory does not prescribe what planners should do with power. Instead scholars in this tradition see it as their task to critically scrutinise current planning practices and reveal

the hidden domination; and then leave planners to make situated judgements of what ought to be done (Flyvbjerg, 1998; McGuirk, 2001; Richardson, 2002). If any role of the planner can be derived from the Foucauldian approach, it is the critical and reflective planner, who based on power sensitivity, makes ethical and situated judgements.

> […] theory is not being used to provide answers to what is right or wrong, or to generate procedural theories about how planning should be done. It is a critical approach which intends to equip the planner to operate more effectively in challenging environments, through reflection. (Richardson, 2005, p. 346)

Thus, critique is seen as a basis for improving practice and Foucauldian planning theorists are suspicious of prescriptive theory.

> […] practitioners should build critique into their work. Critical understanding, supported by academic work, can maintain a perspective which is more aware of the clash (or subtle shaping) of ideas and practices than an approach which expects procedural models and norms to absolve the individual practitioner from responsibility. (Richardson, 2005, p. 362)

I find the Foucauldian approach to planning useful in many ways. In this thesis I especially draw on the view of power as productive, dynamic and situated, rather than universally destructive. I also adhere to the view that approaching planning from the perspective of real rationality is more useful than from a universal theory of right and wrong. Following this view, is my preference for reflective practice, which I view as related to the Foucauldian scholars' emphasis on situated power relations and the necessity of critique as a basis for change.

Yet, I differ with the Foucauldian approach on at least one point. While I acknowledge the situatedness of planning ethics, I also see a need for being able to discuss the legitimacy of power by taking into account ethics, which transcend context (see Clegg et al., 2014 for a discussion between proponents of universal and situated appraisal of power). I will return to develop this position further in Chapters 4 and 8.

During the last decades, another kind of "post-political" critique has been posed towards communicative planning theory and the participatory practices this theory underpins (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Franzén et al., 2016; Metzger et al., 2014; Pløger, 2004; Purcell, 2009). Here scholars draw on, and contribute to, a larger stream of social science research, which is concerned with critical scrutiny of "the deeper purpose behind and wider implications of policy terms such as governance, partnerships and sustainable development" (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012, p. 91). Post-politics is then used as a term to signify how dominant neoliberal discourses smooth out conflicts and resistance by masking itself under, for example, participatory planning practices.

The post-political take on power is related to Foucauldian power analytics and yet different. It has a similar focus on how discourses carry power and work through planning to normalise domination. But, post-political planning is arguably different from Foucauldian power analytics, due to its affiliation with late Marxism, most notably in the form of agonism (Mouffe, 1999, 2005) and actor network theories (Callon and Latour, 1981; Latour et al., 1988). At the heart of this theoretical stream is the idea that current politics is locked up in a post-political system. Allmendinger and Haughton (2012, p. 90) explain what this means:

> This system gives the superficial appearance of engagement and legitimacy, whilst focusing on delivering growth expedited through some carefully choreographed processes for participation which minimise the potential for those with conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing.

According to post-political planning, the emphasis on participation and consensus is underpinning and legitimising the dominance of market-driven development. As an example, Hilding-Rydevik et. al. (2011, p. 182) discuss the consequences of what they see as the post-political state in Swedish regional planning:

> One obvious consequence, as we see it, is that the consensus norm as a basic organizing principle for the SRD [Sustainable Regional Development] discourse leads to a systematic avoidance and concealing of conflicts. In other words, it produces and reproduces a false sense of unity and coherence, which in turn prevents the formulation of alternative goals and trajectories for society.

In one stream of post-political planning, Chantal Mouffe's (1999, 2005) work on agonism has been used to analyse contemporary planning and to build up an idea of an alternative planning practice (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010; Bond, 2011; Gunder, 2003; Larsen et al., 2017; Mouat et al., 2013; Pløger, 2004). Here pluralism, conflict and power are seen as inherent to processes of identification and human interaction. Thereby, the emphasis on consensus in communicative planning theory and participatory practices is seen as problematic, since it can only be temporary and will mask the necessity of exclusion of perspectives and interests (Mouffe, 1999). According to Mouffe (2000), this kind of "false consensus" makes our society vulnerable to different extreme movements and radicalised groups. Instead she puts forward the concept of agonistic pluralism to present a new way to think about democracy. Mouffe argues that antagonism is the kind of conflict that is dangerous to society, while agonism is the desirable constructive conflict necessary for society to prosper.

When Mouffe's ideas are brought into planning, it is often in opposition to the ideas of communicative planning (Bond, 2011; Gunder, 2003; Hillier, 2003;

Mäntysalo et al., 2011; Mouat et al., 2013). Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010, p. 341) provide an example of the agonistic critique towards communicative planning theory.

> […] the search of consensus in a communicatively rational planning argumentation any presumption of a shared life-world horizon forms a straitjacket that restricts participation (Mäntysalo and Rajaniemi, 2003, p. 127). People's individual differences are thereby tossed aside while they are offered a universal identity as rational and moral beings (Hillier, 2002, p. 159). The ability to recognize the better argument requires a shared reality with shared problems. Habermasian communicative planning theory is unable to acknowledge conflicting conceptions of reality as being equally valid.

Thereby, power is understood as inherent in human relations and there is a recognition that planning will always involve conflict between people who are shaped through different cultural, societal and personal experiences. The key in this planning theory is thus that planning ought to provide a legitimate arena for negotiation between different meaning systems.

According to the proponents of the agonistic version of post-political planning, inserting an ethos of agonism into planning will lead towards a culture of planning that is more tolerant of the coexistence of, and conflicts between, different meaning systems. Even if the conflicts were found to be irresolvable, the actors may still come to a mutual agreement on the procedure – how the differences in opinion are to be dealt with.

As in the Foucauldian tradition, the role of the planner is not clearly pinned down in agonistic planning. This is in line with the post-modern resistance to closure. Although Bond (2011, p. 176), defined two problems that planners have to deal with in agonistic planning: the first is how to get to some kind of a decision given the ideal of contestation and contingency in agonistic planning and the second is how to normatively decide when a decision is democratic.

> How can planners work with dissensus? Decisions will be taken. Sometimes there will be widespread agreement and at other times there will be much dissensus. In any context it is important to understand the conditions of possibility for a decision where one trajectory is taken and others are foreclosed.

Thus, an agonistic planner needs to be capable of working under conditions of uncertainty or even un-decidability.

> […] in contrast to furthering this modernist tradition of control and normalisation through the use of a plan forming a rigid 'consensus' towards the future, planning may have the potential to develop practitioners who can foster, accommodate and protect the ever-evolving desires of the different and diverse groups that comprise the majority of our societies within an increasingly uncertain and complex dynamic world. (Gunder, 2003, pp. 237–238)

I am largely sympathetic to the ideas about agonistic planners. I do agree that planners have a role to play when it comes to "repoliticising" planning. However, I also see the practical problems confronting an agonistic planner working inside a system where closure and consensus are highly valued and necessary in practice. Hence, following my preference for reflective planners, I do believe that the identity as an agonistic planner is useful and productive in certain situations, while in other situations might be difficult or even counterproductive to adhere to.

Finally, a more activist conclusion has been derived from the post-political narrative. Taking up the legacy of Davidoff's (1965) advocacy planning, scholars here cast planners as inside activists.

> As planners […] we must make it our business to actively […] offer us a way out of the wilderness of neoliberalism. Reclaiming power through political mobilization is our best hope for creating more democratic, more just, and more civilized cities. But it requires that […] planners consciously take up the hegemonic struggle against neoliberalization, rather than trying to paper it over with dreams. (Purcell, 2009, p. 160)

The activist planner should take on the role of the leader of the struggles against domination from inside the planning system. As Purcell (Ibid., p. 158) explains:

> What is required is a strategy of counter-hegemonic struggle to achieve "a profound transformation of existing power relations" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 52). For planning, that transformation requires "counter-hegemonic planning practice" (Sandercock, 1998, p. 169) that can destabilize the current hegemony and establish an alternative one.

I certainly agree with the idea that planners could be progressive change makers, instead of merely reproducers of unjust power relations. However, I differ with the advocates for activist planning by also recognising that the choices planners make take shape as situated dilemmas rather than clear cut choices between right and wrong. Hence, my preference is for reflective planners rather than activist planners. Activists are important in democracies, but to merely construct planners' identities as activists comes with totalitarian consequences. From where would a radical activist planner derive a universal mandate to further their cause? Instead, I argue that a reflective planner might, in certain but not all, situations see their identity as an activist.

How have the leading communicative planning scholars responded to the various lines of critique?

Judith Innes' has tended to take a position where she cast the critics as "uniformed", making "inaccurate generalizations" or accused them for being "downright uncivil" (Innes, 2004; Innes and Booher, 2015). Yet, in a more constructive manner, she has also proposed that the differences in perspectives might be embraced as an opportunity to develop a more robust planning theory

(Innes and Booher, 2015). She then, very briefly, sketches how Castell's (2009) theory of communication power might be used to "overcome the dividing discourses" in planning theory. In Chapter 5 I will, as part of the analysis of communicative planning theory, assess this attempt alongside Innes' work over the decades.

Tore Sager has, in contrast, chosen another basis for his response: "in so far as the [critics'] arguments are valid and the planning theory is not modified – CPT [communicative planning theory] will lose credibility as a critical theory" (Sager, 2012, p. xi). Choosing to take the critique seriously, he outlines an elaborate response in view of reviving communicative planning theory "so as to take the sting out of the criticism and restore CPT as a plausible theory" (Ibid., p. xi). I find Sager's response to be useful, especially since it explicitly recognises that planners must act, not only communicatively, but also strategically. However, his response is insufficient for addressing the problem of the treatment of power in communicative planning theory. For Sager has not included an explicit rethinking of the communicative planning approach to power in his responses to the critics. This is a task that I deem necessary and take on in this thesis.

Patsy Healeys' responses have been to stress that her work, as well as other communicative planning scholars work, draws on broader theoretical resources than Habermas' theories (Healey, 2003, 2009). She emphasises how the ideas of new institutionalism provide a useful relational perspective on power and how American pragmatism is an integral part of the treatment of power by communicative scholars, such as John Forester (Healey, 2009). Yet, Healey has not engaged in any elaborated attempt to explicitly theorise power from a new institutionalism stand point.

John Forester in turn draws on his preference for American pragmatism to respond. He then claims that the critics rediscover power over and over again, without attempting to understand how it can be resisted in planning practice.

> By the mid-1970s, we had celebrated a good ten years of discoveries at the end of planning theory articles that '(Aha!) Planning is political'. We know that quite well by now. We really need less often to keep rediscovering politics and 'power', and more often to carefully assess forms of power and their specific types of vulnerabilities, for only where dominating power is vulnerable is critical resistance possible. (Forester, 2000, p. 915)

The route Forester has taken based on this position, is to, during the last decades, pay attention to what planners do in their everyday practices. Thereby he has collected a portfolio of exemplars and discussed these to cast light on important dimensions of planning, among them power relations. But he has not returned to theorise on power in planning after his Habermasian period in the 1980s and

1990s. It is this task I attend to in attempting to rethink power in participatory planning.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have positioned the thesis in the discussions about planners, participation and power. I have suggested that planners might learn by doing and open power relations for critical scrutiny by engaging in reflective practice. I have also demonstrated that the two most influential planning theories in participatory planning practice, rational and communicative planning theory, are too reductive in conceptualisation of power and hence only provide part of the conceptual support needed for reflective practice. The chapter also clarified how other competing planning theories can potentially fill the conceptual voids. But the debates about power are fragmented and alternative conceptualisations are often portrayed as mutually exclusive rather than complementary. This problem, the reductive and fragmented treatment of power, is what makes this thesis warranted.

   The chapter points towards how I attempt rethinking power in participatory planning. I will draw on and problematise communicative planning theory, but also make use of the critique against this theory. Due to the fragmented treatment of power in planning theory, I will turn to power theory to develop the conceptual tools needed for researching and rethinking power (Chapter 4). But first, the next chapter explains the methodology applied in the thesis.

3 The research methodology: Frame analysis

> Framing enables actors to understand a situation as being of a certain kind […] and they can start to imagine what could or should happen next in light of prior notions concerning the ways certain problems can and should be handled. (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016, p. 98)

The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective practice. In Chapter 1, I presented the research design. This chapter explains why and how frame analysis is the main methodology in the thesis.

In the first section I explain why I have assumed a social constructivist position and how that leads me to subscribe to the interpretive research tradition. In the second section, I discuss the methodology frame analysis and in closing section three I elaborate upon the interpretive and abductive research process.

3.1 Social constructivism and interpretation

3.1.1 Social constructivism

This thesis is based on a view of the world as socially constructed through shared systems of meaning. Humans are thereby seen as engaged in meaning-making to understand the situations they confront (Berger and Luckmann, 2011; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). Meaning-making is performed by individuals, but takes place through interactions within social practices, which include shared routinised ways of understanding the world (Reckwitz, 2002). This ontological position leads me to focus the research on planning as a practice with multiple systems of meaning.

To assume a social constructivist position is to subscribe to an anti-essentialist ontology (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). This entails a recognition of the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities instead of a single reality, governed by immutable natural laws (as in positivist ontologies). In this understanding, people's meaning-making is seen as informed by competing and partly overlapping ideas, world views and thought styles (Lewicki et al., 2003; Raitio, 2008; Schön and Rein, 1994). Characteristically, social constructivism therefore takes a critical stance towards reified truths and alternatively emphasises the communications through which such truths are constructed socially. Based on this understanding of the world, it becomes relevant to search for different notions of power in participatory planning, rather than a singular essential definition.

In social constructivist accounts, meaning-making is seen as a messy and often subconscious process (Schön and Rein, 1994; Hajer, 2003). Thus, as Hajer (2003, p. 176) points out, people "do not hold immutable and stable beliefs and value positions" and actors are most often unaware of the shared systems of meaning that they draw upon in meaning making (Schön and Rein, 1994). The messy and tacit nature of meaning-making prompts me to access a variety of empirics and go behind actors' explicit statements to search for the underlying knowledge structures and thought styles pertaining to their understanding of power.

Considering reality as socially constructed also includes an appreciation of the contextuality of meaning-making. Actors confirm meaning upon the world in a specific historical and material context, which shapes their understandings and that they in turn shape (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). Hence, I view power relations as situated and dynamic.

3.1.2 An approach inspired by the interpretive research tradition

The ontological view that the world is socially constructed corresponds with my interest in researching and rethinking notions of power. For this task I have found inspiration in the interpretive research tradition (Jennings, 1983; Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). This tradition focuses on how knowledge can be developed around the different ways in which humans make meaning.

In line with the interpretive research tradition, I have taken an abductive approach in this research. Abduction starts with puzzles, surprises or tensions that the researcher experiences "and then seeks to explicate by identifying the conditions that would make that puzzle less perplexing and more of a 'normal' or 'natural' event" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. 27). For me, the puzzle

originates from the difficulties I have had in reconciling the tensions surrounding power in participatory planning (see prologue).

In abduction the researcher is engaged in "puzzling-out", in making the study object less puzzling. The researcher then constantly moves back and forth in an iterative cyclical fashion between the puzzle and possible explanations in the findings from the research and the relevant literature. The back and forth takes place less as discrete steps and more in the same moment: the researcher is simultaneously puzzling over empirical material and theoretical literature (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). This way of seeing abductive research has led me to a cyclical engagement with (i) the power literature, (ii) the planning literature and (iii) the findings from the analysis of notions of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish planning policy and practice.

In interpretive research, researchers as other actors, are seen as engaged in the social construction of knowledge (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). The interpretive tradition posits that the researcher can not assume a position outside of the social, since this would be a view from nowhere (Nagel, 1989). Notably, this is a different understanding compared to conventional positivist methodology, where researchers are seen as objective and distanced from the world they study. The difference in ontological assumptions means that commonly accepted positivist standards for assessing the trustworthiness of scientific knowledge are not entirely appropriate for interpretive research (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006).

How have I conducted the research in order to make it trustworthy? In this section I will merely discuss the main principles I have based the research on. The more concrete detailed methodological choices will instead be discussed in Section 3.3. The three overarching principles I have applied are to be doubtful, systematic and reflective.

In interpretative research, as in all research endeavours, an attitude of doubt is crucial to the generation of knowledge. Adhering to this ideal, I have throughout the research process consciously strived to include "checks" on my own meaning-making (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). This includes testing alternative interpretations by internal reflection as well as in deliberation with others.

Being systematic has meant that I have made purposeful choices, which I explicatly discuss in the thesis. Additionally, I have assured that the analytical process is formalised into a sequence of steps that can be repeated. I have also created an audit trail so that others can access the empirical material I have analysed and assess the accuracy of my interpretations (see Section 3.3).

To be reflective has been a key principle in the research. The term reflective (and the similar term reflexive) are widely used and different definitions are applied. Here I use reflection to signify the process to (i) question my own

normative position in relation to my scholarship; (ii) question the relation between me as the researcher and the phenomena studied and (iii) how my position in social systems might affect the knowledge I produce about the social puzzle I study (cf. Rose, 1997; Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). It is in this manner I use the concept of reflection to signify the critical scrutiny of my own research practices.

I have sought to engage in reflection throughout the research process. Two themes have been particularly salient to me: (i) the friction and corresponding traits between my two identities as researcher and facilitator/planning practitioner and (ii) my own (shifting) understanding of power in participatory planning. When reporting on the research, I have chosen to clarify personal reflections on these two themes in a narrative in the prologue, in a discussion of my normative position in Section 1.1, in Section 8.4.3 and in the epilogue.

For researchers who take an interpretative approach, language matters since it "profoundly shapes our view of the world and reality, instead of being merely a neutral medium mirroring it" (Hajer, 2006, p. 66). As language is at the nexus of meaning, context, and action, interpretive research takes language seriously (White, 1992). Since the 1960s, there has been an increased interest in language and meaning-making within social science, often referred to as a communicative turn (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Schön and Rein, 1994). The increased interest in language use is due to the links between language and actions. Richardson (2002, p. 354), writing about discourse analysis, explains how analysis of language: "[…] puts the spotlight on the boundaries of thought and action. [Discourse analysis] is an attempt to first notice how these boundaries are established and maintained, and then to notice the effects of this closing down process". Thereby, my interest in language is justified, since humans use language to interpret reality and since these interpretations condition people's thinking and actions. Following this line of argument I agree with Hajer's (2006) claim that language has the capacity to make politics, shift power balances and impact institutions and policy making.

Critics might say that a focus on language hides how social processes are also shaped by "real" material and political realities (Bhaskar, 1991; Niiniluoto, 1999). My answer is first that a focus on language does not entail a complete denial of the existence of "reality". As Dryzek (1997, p. 12) argues,

> Just because something is socially interpreted does not mean it is unreal. Climate is changing as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, pollution does cause illness, species do become extinct […] But people can make very different things of these phenomena […].

Secondly, I also acknowledge that human behaviour is shaped not only by language, but also by the material circumstances humans act in and by the

practices in which people engage (Hajer, 2006; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). As Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 177) argue, "Language does not simply 'float' in society, but should be related to the particular practices in which it is employed". Thus, planners' sense-making does not emerge "out of the blue". As Healey (1997, p. 7) tells us.

> Every field of endeavour has its history of ideas and practices and its traditions of debate. These act as a store of experience, of myths, metaphors and arguments, which those within the field can draw upon in developing their own contributions, either through what they do, or through reflecting on the field. This 'store' provides advice, proverbs, recipes and techniques for understanding and acting, and inspiration for ideas to play with and develop.

An important choice I have made is to primarily focus on language as the study object. This means that I have refrained from studying other important features, which influence meaning-making in practices. Speaking with Reckwitz (2002, pp. 250–252), I have thereby left out how practices includes "routinised bodily activities" and "using particular things in a certain way".

Instead I have focused on spoken and written language. This study object allows me to access the deeper notions, which planners draw upon to make meaning. I conceptualise these as frames (see next section). Frames organise experience, predispose actors for certain actions and influence the way they act. Even if I recognise that planning practice is taking shape through complex processes, which include more than frames, I still maintain that the focus on language enables development of important and relevant knowledge about planners and their practices. Because "language matters" (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006).

3.2 About frame analysis

In order to study the complexities and ambiguities of planners' meaning-making I need a methodology fit for the task. The immense focus on language in contemporary social sciences has provided me with a multitude of options. Most relevantly, in view of the aim of this thesis, is discourse analysis (Dryzek, 1997; Foucault, 1979, 1982; Hajer, 2003; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Richardson, 2002) and frame analysis (Goffman, 1974; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Raitio, 2013; Rein and Schön, 1996; Schön and Rein, 1994). I have come to choose the latter for studying the fine grains of the dynamic and power-laden meaning-making in planning practice.

The main reason for choosing to apply frame analysis instead of discourse analysis is due to the links between frame analysis and reflective practice (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön, 1983; Schön and Rein, 1994; Yanow and

Tsoukas, 2009). Working with frame analysis comes with the advantage of having a consistent terminology for both the empirical investigations and the practice I am aspiring to support.

Frame analysis has proven to be a valuable methodology for understanding policy processes and the actors who inhibit these (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön and Rein, 1994). Donald Schön, with his colleague Martin Rein, made important contributions to developing frame analysis. There is a link between reflective practice (see Section 2.3) and frame analysis, which makes this methodology especially suitable for my thesis. Adding to the relevance of frame analysis is the work that more recently has been done by others interested in reflective practice, to develop frame analysis into a more "dynamic, process-oriented engagement that is politically nuanced and power-sensitive" (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016, p. 93).

Frame analysis traces back to the early contributions of Bateson (1973) and Mead (1934) who were interested in studying meaning-making as an interactive process, whereby humans define the situations they confront (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). Following this tradition, Goffman (1974) made an influential contribution by conceptualising meaning-making through the concept frame. His early work has since been used to develop a heterogeneous set of analytical traditions with different ontological groundings and empirical interests, all of which are included in the family of approaches to frame analysis.

It is rather difficult to sort out how alternative approaches to frame analysis vary according to assumptions about the nature of frames. Dewulf et. al. (2009) have made a helpful distinction. First, there are approaches that are interested in frames as cognitive representations located in the individual mind (Neale and Bazerman, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Secondly, there are approaches which, in contrast, are interested in frames and framing as a way to conceptualise interactional meaning-making (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Rein and Schön, 1996).

In the cognitive approaches, meaning is located "between the ears" of each individual and "ultimately depends on their private understandings and interpretations of information communicated and processed" (2009, p. 163). In contrast, in social constructivist accounts of frames and framing, meaning is located "between the noses" and is constructed through interactions. Following my social constructivist position, I have chosen to draw on the latter approaches to frame analysis.

Within the approaches focusing on frames as interactively constructed, I have chosen to work with the strand developed within policy analysis (Bacchi, 2009; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Raitio, 2008, 2013; Rein and Schön, 1991; Rein and Schön, 1996; Schön and Rein, 1994). I have opted to do so since this

tradition has been developed to understand frames and framing in the kind of practice I am interested in: policy processes (in my terminology, planning processes). Additionally, this tradition of frame analysis is suitable due to its affiliation with reflective practice.

The basic metaphor in this analytical tradition is the frame. This metaphor is used to signify that there is a less visible foundation "that lies beneath the more visible surface of language or behaviour, determining its boundaries and giving it coherence." (Rein and Schön, 1996, p. 88). The metaphor of a frame is generative since it allows us to see how people consciously or unconsciously, set a boundary within which they are able to focus on what is inside as distinct from what is outside. Thus frames select for attention certain features of reality and enable people to construct a coherent understanding of them (Raitio, 2013). Thus, as Perri (2005, p. 94) explains, frames essentially perform two functions.

> First, frames organize experience; that is to say, they enable people to recognize what is going on, they provide boundaries, define what counts as an event or a feature; crucially, frames define what counts as relevant for attention and assessment. Secondly, they bias for action; that is to say, they represent people's worlds in ways that already call for particular styles of decision or of behavioural response.

Thereby, frames are often said to include two linked elements: a diagnosis element answering the question "what is going on" and an action bias element, which answers to the question "what should be done." (Schön and Rein, 1994). I use this distinction in the research because it is analytically useful, even if, in human interactions, these two elements are intertwined (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016).

In line with Dewulf (2009) and van Hulst and Yannow (2016), I separate fram*es,* distinguishable thought styles and knowledge structures, from fram*ing*, the situated, dynamic and interactive process through which people make meaning of the situations they face. I find the distinction between frames and framing effective for my purposes. I will assume that the scholars, policy makers and planners, who's meaning-making I study, engage in framing to understand phenomena associated with power, and that when doing so they, consciously or unconsciously, draw on shared generic narratives, knowledge structures and thought styles embedded in their practice, which usefully can be conceptualised as *frames*.

Notably, this is a different usage from Dewulf's typology, since I do not assume that using frames instead of framing implies an assumption that these are located "between the ears", which would be a cognitive approach. Instead, I use frames to recognise that it is not only interactions in the moment, which shape meaning-making, but also distinguishable collective narratives,

knowledge structures and thought styles created through historical interactions in planning practice (Healey, 1997).

According to van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 96) policy-focused frame analysis in the tradition of Schön and Rein is interested in the work frames and framing accomplish by: "(a) highlighting certain features of a situation, (b) ignoring or selecting out other features, and (c) binding the highlighted features together into a coherent and comprehensible pattern." Since these situations often are far from easy to interpret, planners must rely upon simplification and previous experience.

Thereby: "framing provides a scaffolding for perceiving and articulating patterns among [a situation's] disparate, and perhaps contending, elements" (Ibid, pp. 97-98). It is in this way framing enables what Rein and Schön called "a normative leap" between what *is* to what *ought to be.* van Hulst and Yannow (Ibid. p. 98) explain.

> Framing enables actors to understand a situation as being of a certain kind […] and they can start to imagine what could or should happen next in light of prior notions concerning the ways certain problems can and should be handled.

In planning studies (Forester, 1999; Richardson, 2005; Throgmorton, 1992) as well as in frame analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Rein and Schön, 1996) narratives, stories and storytelling are seen as important in frames and framing, since these serve to bind together the salient features of a situation. One might say that storytelling is a deeply human activity that serves to create order out of chaos. As van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 100) tell us, "Stories frame their subjects as they narrate them, explicitly naming their features, selecting and perhaps categorizing them as well, explaining to an audience what *has been* going on, what *is* going on, and, often, what needs to be done […]."

In this manner, strong and generic narratives guide both analysis and action in practical situations. In line with this, van Hulst and Yannow (Ibid.) draw attention to the work of selecting, naming and categorising that framing does.

> Through all three of these [selecting, naming and categorising], policy actors draw disparate elements together in a pattern, selecting some things as relevant or important and discarding, backgrounding or ignoring others, occluding other ways of seeing (and acting), and thereby silencing them in policy discourse and ensuing action. (van Hulst and Yannow, 2016, p. 99)

Based on this understanding, in the analysis I pay attention to how this work of selecting, naming and categorising is done by actors employing generic narratives when they frame power relations. It is also this line of thought that leads me to pay attention to the stories planners tell about their practices (see Section 3.3).

In this tradition of frame analysis, and in line with my interpretative approach, frames and framing are situated in a specific context. Acknowledging this situatedness, I have chosen to locate the empirical investigations in Swedish planning policy and practice. I will elaborate on this choice in the coming Section 3.3.

Planning processes can be understood as struggles over meaning (Mouffe, 2000), where actors drawing on alternative frames compete to shape understanding and action. With the language of frames, these struggles are *frame contests* where certain institutions "sponsor" certain frames. In frame analysis it is acknowledged how such frame contests are not merely individual endeavours, but also take shape through application of alternative "institutional" frames, which are linked to the role that different organisations have in a given practice (Schön and Rein, 1994). This understanding leads to an empirical interest in the different kinds of organisations that operate within planning practice (see Section 3.3).

Frame analysis has been accused of neglecting processes of power by favoring individual meaning-making (Carragee and Roefs, 2004; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). Recognising the validity of this critique, I have drawn on the work of van Hulst and Yanow (2016), who have taken on the task of theorising framing as a political and power-laden activity. By viewing frames as embedded in practices and systems of meaning, rather than constructed by autonomous individuals, I have taken this critique into account.

There are different views on the intentionality of framers. In media studies and in social movements studies frames are often seen as strategic devices that actors use rhetorically to get their message across (Dewulf et al., 2009). Whereas in policy analysis, it has been revealed that actors might use certain frames rhetorically without being immediately aware of how their behaviour is actually shaped by other underlying generic frames (Schön and Rein, 1994). Therefore, I recognise that analysing frames will require me to go beneath actors' texts and speech to search for the underlying knowledge structures and thought styles. How this is concretely done in the research is explained in Section 3.3.

As van Hulst and Yannow (Ibid.) show, framing in policy processes has an intersubjective aspect, which takes shape through direct and indirect interactions between actors. These interactions include talk, gestures and other modes of nonverbal communication, as well as non-human elements that are called "things" in Reckwitz's (2002) practice theory. Thus, framing "draw[s] on more, or other, than cognitive ways of knowing alone" (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016, p. 98). As discussed previously, I have chosen to acknowledge that these other ways of knowing exist, but I have not gone in depth with analysing them.

A related feature of framing, in my usage, is that the meaning of the situation lies not in the acts, events or frames actors supposedly carry in their heads. Instead, it arises in the course of actors' interactions with those acts, events, and things. As van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 98) argue, "Grasping framing's dynamism rests on understanding that actors act toward things on the basis of the meanings things *acquire* for them *in the course of* that sense-making […]".

van Hulst and Yannow further explain how it is fruitful to see framing as a *conversation with the situation*. Through this "conversation" actors attribute some initial meaning to the situation at hand and look at what happens as a result. In this way van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 98) see framing as "an interactive and iterative process, in which details and generalities inform one another, a clearer idea of what is going on develops, and meanings 'emerge'".

Due to my interest in analysing notions of power through frame analysis, I will refrain from attempting to capture all the complexities of frames and framing discussed in the previous paragraphs. Hence, I do not aspire to analyse framing as dynamic and contingent meaning-making. Instead, I focus on explicating notions of power embedded in participatory planning through frame analysis. This is in line with the aim I have set for this thesis.

So, frames and framing work by making certain features of a situation salient and drawing them together into a coherent narrative. But what is it that framing frames? I follow Dewulf et al. (2009) and van Hulst and Yannow (2016) to argue that framing in policy processes can frame three kinds of "entities" (which I call frame topics): the substantive *content* of the policy issue, the *identities* of actors in the policy process and the *policy process* itself.

When content is framed actors pay attention to the meanings attached to agenda items, events or problems in planning processes. Whereas when identities are framed the focus is on the meanings about oneself and one's relationships with a counterpart(s). Process frames refer to the interpretations that actors assign to the "policy process itself". In my investigations, I direct interest towards how actors frame power in participatory planning, which is process framing and how they frame planners' roles in power relations, which is identity framing.

After having explained my general view of frame analysis, I now discuss more specifically how frame analysis is applied in this thesis.

3.3 Analysing frames in participatory planning

3.3.1 Aim and research questions

Frame analysis is conducted in pursuit of the aim *to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective practice*. To reach the aim, I pursue four research questions:

I.   What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning?
II. Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?
III. To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?
IV. How can rethinking power in participatory planning provide a set of concepts that can enable reflective practice?

Through the abductive process, I gradually came to develop a research design including the five linked research tasks, which were discussed in Section 1.2. For the empirical investigations (Tasks 2-4) I developed a tailored version of frame analysis, presented and discussed in the following sections.

3.3.2 The common process for frame analysis

Following the abductive approach, I gradually distinguished three linked investigations into: (i) communicative planning theory, and Swedish participatory planning (ii) policy and (iii) practice. I developed and applied a tailored version of frame analysis, which I use in all three investigations in accordance with the ideal of making the research systematic. Yet, due to the differences between the three domains - theory, policy and practice - I have also tailored certain parts of the analytical process to fit each investigation. I will first discuss the common analytical process and thereafter discuss the specificities of investigating theory, policy and practice.

To generate data, I followed alternative procedures in the three investigations (see Section 3.3.3-5). The common steps in the analysis were selecting suitable study objects, generating text or analysing already available text. In the analysis of the texts, I focused on identifying frames concerned with two topics: i) power in participatory planning (process frames) and ii) planners' roles in power relations (identity frames).

In the analysis, I have paid attention to how the actors are employing process and identity frames, which includes two dimensions: i) a diagnosis, which is linked to ii) an action bias. To do that I have both analysed the sections of the texts where power is explicitly discussed and looked for tacit understandings,

which are hidden underneath texts where notions of power are inferred. Further, I have paid attention to what is left unspoken about power and planners, i.e. I have been attentive to the "silences".

The investigations were guided by RQ 2 and 3 (see Section 3.3.1), which were broken down into the analytical questions portrayed in Table 2.

Table 2. *Analytical categories and questions in the frame analysis*

Topic	Diagnosis	Action bias
Power in participatory planning	How are the scholars, policy makers and planners diagnosing power in participatory planning?	Which action bias is the diagnosis leading to?
Planners' roles in power relations	How are the scholars, policy makers and planners diagnosing planners' roles in power relations?	Which action bias is the diagnosis leading to?

More specifically the analytical process in the three sub studies consists of movement back and forth between the following steps in consecutive iterations.

1. Reading through the selected and generated texts.
2. Identifying quotes dealing with the two frame topics: power in participatory planning and planners' roles in power relations.
3. Coding the quotes in Atlas.ti in the categories: diagnosis, action bias and frame topic.
4. Putting all the quotes into a single document structured per framer with all quotes divided into the two frame topics.
5. Analysing the quotes in view of identifying diagnosis and action biases regarding the two frame topics. To do that, I searched for the features and concepts made salient; analysed the metaphors; elicited the narratives and looked for how diagnosis is linked to action bias. Here I used the conceptual tools developed in Research Task 1 through the review of the power literature (see Chapter 4) to identify alternative notions of power.
6. Writing up an analysis of each framers' framing. Here I aimed at being descriptive, but also towards identifying puzzles and tensions in the treatment of the two frame topics.
7. Identifying the underlying process and identity frames. This task consisted of comparing the framers' framing and analysing these through the conceptual tools developed from review of the power literature (see Chapter 4).
8. Labeled the identified process and identity frames through a short storyline and summarised the generic narrative in each frame in the format demonstrated in Table 2.

9. Presented and discussed the preliminary findings with supervisors, planners, other researchers and PhD students.
10. Presented and discussed the preliminary findings with the policy makers and planners within Research Task 3 and 4.
11. Went back to the proceeding steps to revise the analysis based on the feedback.

It is by going through these 11 steps in consecutive iterations that I have conducted the analysis.

After having described the common analytical process, I now elaborate on the specificities of investigating theory, policy and practice.

3.3.3 Analysing frames in communicative planning theory

For reasons elaborated upon in Chapter 2, I have chosen to analyse communicative planning theory, among the alternative planning theories. I subscribe to the view that planning scholars do not merely describe and analyse planning practices, they are also engaged in "world making" by suggesting that certain ways of making meaning are more useful than others. Therefore, they are to be viewed as planning actors, rather than objective observers. Thus, I see the analysis of communicative planning theory, not as a conventional literature review, but as a frame analysis of scholars' meaning-making.

Most of the communicative planning scholars combine their analytical work with normative intentions to democratise planning from the bottom up, by criticising hierarchical forms of power and advocating for inclusive dialogues. This general orientation is employed quite differently by scholars active in different contexts. There have also been changes over time in how communicative scholars deal with power.

In order to access process and identity frames within communicative planning theory, I have chosen to focus on the work of three influential scholars over four decades: John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. I have selected these scholars because they are prominent representatives of influential and distinct streams within communicative planning theory (see Chapter 2). In order to track changes over time, I have decided to analyse the scholars' publications from the 1980s to the present.

These three scholars are widely recognised as founders of communicative planning theories. They have been and are active within different planning contexts in Europe (Healey) and the US (Forester and Innes). Pursuing their own approaches, they also share a common orientation and have over the years been part of a community of scholars who frequently meet and exchange ideas. These

three scholars exercise influence over the development of communicative planning theory by mentoring younger scholars and are widely cited within planning theory and beyond. They share ambitions to be useful for practitioners and strive for their research to be practice-oriented.

I argue that analysing these scholars' work over four decades will enable me to access distinct influential approaches to power in communicative planning theories. By making a longitudinal study I additionally claim that I am able to trace changes over time in the communicative planning approaches to power. Yet, I also recognise that zooming in on these three scholars comes with limitations.

First, it means that I will refrain from conducting in-depth analysis to map alternative approaches to power, within communicative planning theories beyond the work of the three scholars. However, through the literature review presented in Chapter 2, I have drawn the conclusion that the work of Forester, Healey and Innes is representative of the most influential streams within communicative planning theory. It can thereby be assumed that the chosen focus should enable identification of the most influential approaches to power within communicative planning.

Secondly, the three scholars are working in British/European (Healey) and US planning contexts (Forester and Innes), which means that I will not go into depth with theoretical approaches developed in other contexts (for example Sweden, which is the empirical focus of the analysis of planning policy and practice). The reason for this choice is simply that the three scholars exercise influence over planning discussions across the Western planning systems and beyond. Specifically, in Sweden, there are arguably no planning scholars who are seen and see themselves as key contributors to communicative planning theory. Instead the three studied scholars are often used when participatory planning in Sweden is discussed (e.g. Strömgren, 2007; Tunström, 2009; Lindholm et al., 2015; Fridlund, 2017; Wiberg, 2018).

To select publications from the long work of the three productive scholars, I identified the most influential work from each, informed by citation index and singled out publications where the scholars are explicit about their views of power and included work from different time periods. This led to the selection of publications listed in Table 3.

Table 3. Analysed publications

Scholar	Publication
John Forester	Forester, J. (1980). Critical Theory and Planning Practice. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 46 (3), pp. 275–286.
	Forester, J. (1989). *Planning in the Face of Power*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
	Forester, J. (1993). *Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism*. New York: SUNY Press.
	Forester, J. (1999). *The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes*. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
	Forester, J. (2009). *Dealing with Differences: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
	Forester, J. (2013). On the theory and practice of critical pragmatism: Deliberative practice and creative negotiations. *Planning Theory*, 12 (1), pp. 5–22.
	Forester, J. (2015). What kind of research might help us become better planners? *Planning Theory & Practice*, 16 (2), pp. 145–148.
Patsy Healey	Healey, P. (1992). Planning through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory. *The Town Planning Review*, 63 (2), pp. 143–162.
	Healey, P. (1992). A Planner's Day: Knowledge and Action in Communicative Practice. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 58 (1), pp. 9–20.
	Healey, P. (1997). *Collaborative planning: shaping places in fragmented societies*. Planning, environment, cities. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
	Healey, P. (1999). Deconstructing Communicative Planning Theory: A Reply to Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 31 (6), pp. 1129–1135.
	Healey, P. (2003). Collaborative Planning in Perspective. *Planning Theory*, 2 (2), pp. 101–123.
	Healey, P. (2012). Re-enchanting democracy as a mode of governance. *Critical Policy Studies*, 6 (1), pp. 19–39.
Judith Innes	Innes, J. E. (1995). Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 14 (3), pp. 183–189
	Innes, J. E. (1998). Information in communicative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association; Chicago*, 64 (1), pp. 52–63.
	Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A framework for evaluating collaborative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 65 (4), pp. 412–423.
	Booher, D. E. and Innes, J. E. (2002). Network Power in Collaborative Planning. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 21 (3), pp. 221–236.
	Innes, J. E. (2004). Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics. *Planning Theory*, 3 (1), pp. 5–20
	Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2010). *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*. London/New York: Taylor & Francis.
	Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2015). A turning point for planning theory? Overcoming dividing discourses. *Planning Theory*, 14 (2), pp. 195–213.
	Innes, J. E. (2016). Collaborative rationality for planning practice. *The Town Planning Review*, 87 (1), pp. 1–4.

3.3.4 Analysing frames in Swedish participatory planning policy

To access the framing of power in Swedish participatory planning policy, I have chosen planning guidance as the study object. Planning guidance documents are suitable study objects in view of my interest in explicating notions of power in participatory planning policy. Governments and agencies use guidance in their attempts to steer the implementation of planning policy to influence planning practices in the direction they prefer. Thus, as Cashmore et al. (2015, p. 85) argue, "guidance plays a prominent role in contemporary governance". Given my interest in reflective practice, guidance is especially relevant to study as it is intended to help planners make sense of the difficulties they face.

I have chosen to focus the analysis of guidance on the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR). These two organisations are arguably two of the most important norm-setting organisations for participatory planning in Sweden.

Boverket is the central authority commissioned by the Swedish government to review developments within the fields of housing, building and planning. Boverket supervises town and country planning in Sweden from legislative, procedural and architectural perspectives. The agency carries the responsibility to develop Swedish planning processes and instruments, including pointing out best practices and providing planning guidance.

SALAR represents the governmental, professional and employer-related interests of Sweden's 290 municipalities and 20 county councils/regions. All of Sweden's municipalities, county councils and regions are members of SALAR. SALAR has been one of the most influential actors when it comes to promoting citizens' dialogues (*medborgardialoger*) since the early 2000s. *Medborgardialoger* is one of the key terms used to signify participatory planning processes in Sweden. Their work is steered with a special commission from SALARs congress, which is comprised of municipal and regional politicians from the Swedish parties. SALAR has a division in their organisation that is responsible for democracy and co-creation. They work intensively in networks with politicians and civil servants, organise training programmes, provide web support and produce publications and guidance to promote citizen dialogues.

By selecting SALAR and Boverket, I gained access to two different kinds of organisational frames within Swedish planning policy. SALARs work is anchored in the Swedish democracy policy and is centred on the need to revitalise democracy, which is felt by many Swedish municipalities. Thereby, their framing is based on a different kind of logic compared to that of Boverket, which mainly upholds the Swedish states' interests in the planning system. This selection will

thereby include two important tensions within the Swedish planning system: that between the state and the municipalities and that between the spatial planning system's reliance on the ideas of rational planning and representative democracy (Strömgren, 2007) and the democracy policy, which is more inclined to push for communicative planning and deliberative democracy.

Like all choices, these choices will open some possibilities and close others. Notably, my selection excludes the guidance offered by consultancy firms and academic institutions. Perhaps guidance from these kinds of organisations could provide access to innovative and radical process and identity frames, which have not yet been taken up in the slower moving norm-setting organisations I have chosen to study. However, I do have access to the more radical frames from my review of planning theory (Chapter 2), e.g. in the writings about agonistic planning (Bond, 2011; Fröberg, 2017; Mouat et al., 2013) and the planning thoughts inspired by Foucault's work (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Richardson, 2002). I have also mitigated the risk of missing out on important frames by studying notions of power in planning practice (Section 3.3.5 and Chapter 7).

I have chosen to analyse guidance in written publications. This choice has been made since publications have gone through a thorough process of internal, and at times external, scrutiny before going to press. This means that the framing in these publications can be seen as representing the official position of the organisation and thus reflective of its norm-giving function.

To select among the publications from Boverket and SALAR, I first looked into the list of available publications from each organisation and selected those I found to be most relevant for my purpose. Thereafter, I have explained the purpose of my study to the responsible desk officers at Boverket and SALAR and asked if they found my selections sufficient for enabling an analysis of their guidance for participatory planning (*medborgardialog*). After small adjustments, this led to the selection of the publications listed in Table 4.

Table 4. *Analysed guidance publications*

Publication	Purpose
SKL (2009) *11 tankar om medborgardialog i styrning.*	To provide guidance on how to include participatory planning in municipal governance.
SKL (2013) *10 steg för dialog vid konflikter.*	To provide guidance for the handling of conflictual and complex issues through citizens' dialogues.
SKL (2019a) *Medborgardialog i komplexa frågor: erfarenheter från utvecklingsarbete 2015-2018.*	To provide guidance based on lessons learned from recent development work sponsored by SALAR.
SKL (2019b) *Medborgardialog i styrning: för ett stärkt demokratiskt samhälle.*	To provide guidance for how municipalities ought to include participatory planning in their governance systems.
Boverket (2018) *Boverkets vägledning för medborgardialog.*	Web-based guidance for municipalities work with citizens' dialogues within the Swedish national planning framework (PBL).

3.3.5 Analysing frames in Swedish participatory planning practice

In this investigation I am interested in the framing of power in Swedish participatory planning practice. I have, due to the focus on planners in this thesis, chosen not to include other planning actors such as citizens, politicians, activists and developers. This choice limits the scope of the empirical material, but it is a choice made purposefully in accordance with the aim of the thesis, with its focus on reflective practice.

Inspired by Forester's (1999, 2009) method for eliciting practitioners' profiles, I seek to access planners' understandings of power through interviews about an episode of participatory planning in which they have been engaged. I have chosen to conduct interviews as it is a useful method for accessing the life worlds of practitioners (Kvale, 2007). An additional advantage of using interviews for this task, is that the interviews complement the reliance on written language in the other two investigations and thereby provide access to another kind of study object: spoken language.

Following Forester (1999, 2009), I have paid attention to the personal characteristics of the planner when selecting who to interview. I strive towards interviewing planners who are thoughtful, reflective and engaged in their work. The reason for this choice is that it can be assumed that these engaged and reflective planners have paid attention to power and reflected upon it. Therefore, this way of selecting planners provides potential for accessing the notions of power, which are embedded in their practice.

The interview study was done in two phases. In the beginning of the research during a scoping phase, I interviewed five planners with the purpose of developing the research design by accessing concrete practice stories. These stories where used to inform the parallel investigations into participatory planning theory and policy.

In the second phase, I decided to go deeper into one of the stories, since it seemed to provide important insights about the framing of power when planning is contested. This story puts the consensual notions of power in communicative planning theory to a hard test and thereby informs the assessment of the extent to which the treatment of power in this theory can enable reflective practice.

In addition to this "least likely" case, in the second phase I chose to conduct an additional interview with a planner with experience with a "most likely" participatory planning episode. This was a well-resourced planning episode, where stakes were not as high as in the first story. Bringing this second story into the research was important, since it can be assumed to show the manner in which communicative planning theory might work when the context is friendlier. It is these two stories, a conflictual and a harmonious one, which are presented and analysed in Chapter 7. I left it to these two planners to decide if

they wanted to be anonymous or use their names in the thesis. Both planners decided upon the latter.[6] The six interviewed planners are listed in Table 5.

Table 5. *Interviewed planners*

Title	Organisation	Planning process
Project leader	Save the children Sweden	Multi-stakeholder collaboration to support youth at risk
Dialogue strategist	Gothenburg municipality	Contested location of refugee houses
Project leader	Malmö municipality	Place development with gender perspective
Communication strategist	Sollentuna municipality	District planning for the area Edsberg in Sollentuna
City planner	Uppsala municipality	Development of a park within the district planning of the area of Gottsunda in Uppsala
Consultant	Preera	School development in the municipality of Upplands Väsby

Throughout the interview study, I worked iteratively to test different approaches to doing the interviews and different sets of questions and ways of asking them. Based on these experiences, I gradually developed the following approach to the interviews.

Prior to the interview I made a consent agreement with the respondent. Following Kvale (2007), I prepared interview guides (see Appendix 1), with themes and example questions prior to the interviews, but I was also flexible and open to straying from the interview guide to follow up with unexpected and interesting answers from the planners.

Following Forester (1999, 2009), I decided to let the interviews revolve around the planners' experiences of a specific participatory planning episode. These episodes can be seen as "cases", yet it was not my ambition to go in to depth with these. Rather the planners' stories provided me with access to notions of power through the narratives they told.

Prior to each interview, I selected the case we would talk about with the planners. We discussed potential cases and selected one to focus on. The cases were recent to make sure that the planner still had a fresh recollection of their experiences. Further, the cases had activated power relations and thereby lead the planners to narrate. However, as discussed previously, this did not necessarily mean that the planner paid explicit attention to the two frame topics in the conversations. In order to stimulate rich conversations, it was also of importance that the planner was central and engaged in the case we discussed.

---

6. I interviewed Bernard le Roux (Dialouge Strategist Gothenburg Municipality) twice during 2016 and once during 2019. I interviewed Henrik Ljungman (City Planner Uppsala Municipality) twice during 2018. Their stories are presented and analysed in Chapter 7.

I divided the interviews into two themes: (i) the planner's own narrative of the participatory planning episode and (ii) reflections and analysis of the episode. These two themes were selected since I found it important to first elicit the planners' narrative and thereafter allow for the planners to analyse their experiences, since such reflections might reveal differences in the framing used in a reflective conversation compared to narrating. Consequently, during the first theme my role was to assist and enable the planners to tell their own stories of the selected episode. In this segment I attempted to get access to the planners' own narrative by asking enabling questions and being appreciative.

In the second theme, I followed Kvale (2007) and switched to a more active role, in order to build analysis into the interview. Thus, I used different interview approaches, such as asking clarifying questions, suggesting hypotheses and interpretations and even confronting and challenging the planner. I clarified the meaning of the planners' story during the interview and attempted to confirm or reject my preliminary interpretations by sharing my tentative ideas with the planners. Thereby, initiated the analysis and validation of the findings already during the interviews.

The interviews were audio recorded and as part of the analysis I transcribed the recordings into written text (the initial interviews were transcribed by a research assistant). Transcription is a transformation of the rich communication during an interview into written form. As Kvale (2007) tells us, meaning will by necessity be lost during this transformation. In order to mitigate the risks involved with transcribing interviews, I made the following choices.

I had a research assistant do the transcripts and compared that with doing the transcription myself. My conclusion was that transcription is an important interpretative process and therefore I decided to do the transcripts myself. This is as Kvale (2007, p. 92) puts it: "Rather than being a simple clerical task, transcription is an interpretative process, where the differences between oral speech and written texts give rise to a series of practical and principal issues".

Transcription involves many small decisions of technical and interpretational character. I followed Kvale's (Ibid.) suggestion and developed a formal procedure for the transcriptions to ensure that the transcripts used the same form. An important choice was between letting the transcript mimic oral speech, (i.e. including hesitation, humming and the like), or letting the transcript take the more formal shape of a written text. Here I decided on the latter. The reason was that my interest is not directed towards a detailed linguistics conversational analysis; rather it is about getting a readable account of the interviews.

In the second phase of interviewing, I decided to focus upon two stories. Following Forester's (1999, 2009) method for practitioner profiles and frame analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön and Rein, 1994) I chose to elicit a

condensed narrative from the transcripts of these two interviews (presented in Chapter 7).

From the two selected interviews, I developed a narrative for each in written form, which allowed for a continued conversation with the planner to analyse the underlying frames. In order to get as close as possible to the planners' under-standings, I elicited the planners' own narratives of their practice experiences. Previous planning studies have demonstrated the value of taking planners' narratives as the starting point for analysis (Bornemark, 2016; Forester, 1999; Fridlund, 2017; Lindholm et al., 2015; Richardson, 2005; Wiberg, 2018).

Inspired by Forester's work (1999, 2009), I aimed to elicit narratives, which as accurately as possible mirrored the planners' recollections. This meant that I mostly used the planners' own words and refrained from including my own analysis. The output from this step is the two practice stories presented in Chapter 7.

The narratives then served as the textual basis for the continued analysis, which included follow-up interviews with the two planners. First, I shared the draft written stories with the planners and asked them to read through and suggest changes if they like.[7] After that step, I applied the analytical process described in Section 3.3.2 to make a tentative interpretation. I then presented and discussed my tentative interpretation with the planners and asked if they could recognise their own framing and the underlying frames. After feedback from the planners, I went back to another analytical iteration following the common procedure for frame analysis described earlier.

After discussing the frame analysis methodology in this chapter, I will now, in the following Chapter 4, report on the review of power theory, which informs the rethinking of power in participatory planning.

---

7. Notably, the stories at this stage were written in Swedish, whereas in the versions in Chapter 7, the stories are translated into English.

4   A plural view of power

> If a singular view of power is held on to, debates tend to be zero-sum. In place of this zero-sum situation, I propose that power consists of a cluster of concepts, each of which qualifies as 'power'. Following Wittgenstein, I argue that power is a family resemblance concept, which entails that there is no single 'best' definition of power. (Haugaard, 2010a, p. 420)

The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective practice. In the previous chapters, I have demonstrated that this aim is warranted due to the fragmented and reductive treatment of power in participatory planning theory (Chapter 2) and explained the thesis' methodology (Chapter 3). I will in this chapter answer Research Question 1: *What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning?*

I answer the question through a review of the power literature. I thereby tap into the rich repository of conceptual tools and explain how these can be used to research and rethink power in participatory planning.

My engagement with the power literature has taken shape abductively over the course of the research process. I have moved back and forth between reading literature and investigating notions of power in planning theory and Swedish planning policy and practice. The argument I thereby developed, unfolds as follows.

In the first section, I draw on Haugaard (2010a) and Wittgenstein (1967), and decide to treat power as a family resemblance concept. This means that power is not seen as a single entity, but as a cluster of concepts, which are related to the reproduction of social order. This view of power makes it possible to conceptualise alternative notions of power, as members of the same family of concepts.

In the next section, I employ this plural view of power to develop a family of power concepts, which carry potential to enable reflective participatory planning practice. The power family is intended to be tested in the empirical investigations

(Chapters 5-7) and then validated as a basis for rethinking power (Chapter 8). At the end of the section, after reviewing the most influential contributors to the power literature, I assemble a family of four power concepts: *power to*, *power with*, *illegitimate power over* and *legitimate power over*.

4.1 Power: a family resemblance concept

Power is one of the most central and contested concepts in social science and praxis (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). While many agree about the importance of power, there is controversy about how to define it, how to study it and how to normatively appraise it (Lukes, 2005). In the planning literature, as well as in the more specific power literature, debates about these kinds of questions tend to be zero-sum. Scholars compete about the best way to define and study power. This leads to entangled debates, where it is difficult to relate alternative notions by clarifying differences and similarities. To disentangle the treatment of power in participatory planning a plural view of power is preferable since it can lead to a broader and more complex understanding, which is conducive to reflective practice. To view power as a single entity can actually lead to unreflective practice, since it might prevent critical reflections on presumed notions of power.

In order to operationalise a plural view of power, I follow Haugaard (2010a) and suggest that power is the kind of concept that Wittgenstein (1967) coined as family resemblance concepts. This means that the concept power covers an ambiguous set of different but related concepts associated with the reproduction of social order. In this section I elaborate on why I have chosen this way of defining power.

4.1.1 A brief genealogy of power

Let us first acknowledge, through the work of Clegg and Haugaard (2009), the richness and diversity of alternative approaches to power, and thereby demonstrate the value of a plural rather than a singular view of power. Clegg and Haugaard (Ibid.) explain that already the Ancient Athenians were interested in political power. At that time legitimate and illegitimate power were distinguished through the contrast between power that followed the dictates of the law (nomos) and power that exalted in the glorification of an individual (hubris). Thereby, a line of inquiry concerned with the normative appraisal of power was opened, which is still relevant for contemporary planning practice where ethical situated judgements are made between better and worse options (Campbell, 2002).

In the medieval period, Machiavelli (1903) took the power canon further. While he did not dwell on legitimacy he was concerned with explaining how a prince could rule, (i.e. maintain social order), through cunning manipulation. His account revolves around power as domination with a special interest in how the successful prince manages society through strategic action. Here power is exercised over others and society is constituted through the domination of the weak by the strong (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). Even if the prince wielded his power in a manner that was far from democratic, Machiavelli's emphasis on the strategic use of power still tells us something important about conflictual power and also contemporary participatory planning episodes.

In contrast Thomas Hobbes' (1981) influential work on the Leviathan, in the year of 1651, provides an image of how power flows from society to the individual. Hobbes argues that society must be ruled by absolute sovereignity, less the "egoistic nature of man" would result in civil war. Hobbes saw the legitimacy of sovereign power as a presupposition of common wealth (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). In modern democracies we no longer think of society as a Leviathan and do not accept sovereigns. Yet, the democratic state and its planning system must be capable of exercising the kind of coercive power, which Hobbes found necessary to avoid civil war (Mansbridge, 2012).

For Nietzsche (2011), power was the ability to define reality. He showed that if you can define what is seen as real and what is seen as moral then you create the conditions for legitimacy. In the work of Nietzsche, Machiavelli's and Hobbes' interest in the cruder forms of power are replaced by a focus on the more sophisticated and less visible aspects of power (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). This is the kind of power, which is central to democratic societies and democratic practices, such as planning; power that we are often not aware of, but structures social relations and thereby provides the predictability needed to make planning, as coordinated action, possible.

According to Clegg and Haugaard (Ibid.), in the post-World War II discussions about power, the consensual view of power, pursued by Hannah Arendt (1970), Talcott Parsons (1963) and Barry Barnes (1988) among others, constituted an influential strand of the power literature. These scholars saw power as the opposite of coercion and as a prerequisite for agency and society. This kind of consensual power is the form of power that many planners would like to see arising from participatory planning processes.

Simultaneously, the Hobbesian notion of power as domination was reformulated by many, including Robert Dahl (1957), Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz (1962) and Steven Lukes (1974). In contrast, Michel Foucault (1979, 1982) took the Nietzschean view of power as systemic and constitutive of reality further.

Both the agent-specific and the systemic understandings of power are necessary in a tool box for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning.

4.1.2 Why does it matter what kind of concept power is?

From the brief genealogy of power, it is evident that there is no consensus on how to define and study power. The differences matter, since the ways in which scholars and practitioners think about power influences what they can explain and what actions they take. How we think about power might have very real consequences for power relations in participatory planning.

> […] how we think of power may serve to reproduce and reinforce power structures and relations, or alternatively it may challenge and subvert them. […] To the extent that this is so, conceptual and methodological questions are inescapably political. (Lukes, 2005, p. 63)

How do we then think about power? Which notions of power are we focusing our gaze on? The most common way to approach power is to equate it with domination (Haugaard, 2015). This is the way that power is most often defined in theory as well as used in everyday speech. Power is then seen as carrying an essential meaning, which signifies social relations where powerful actors get it their way in an unfair fashion. This is also largely how power is approached in communicative planning theory (see Chapter 2).

Steven Lukes (1974, 2005) is one of the most prominent representatives of the view of power as domination. He argues that power is an "essentially contested" concept in the sense that "reasonable people, who disagree morally and politically, may agree about the facts but disagree about where power lies" (2005, p. 64). This view of power leads Lukes to argue that his radical definition of power as domination is superior to other ways of defining power (Haugaard, 2010a). According to Lukes, a definition of power must include the hidden aspects of power, and must allow for agency since this provides possibilities to attribute responsibility to actors (Lukes, 2005).

Lukes is surely right in emphasising the hidden aspects of power and the need for attributing responsibility. These are crucial aspects of power, not least in participatory planning. Yet, his claim that his definition of power is better than the rest (Haugaard, 2010a) suggests the kind of singular view of power that I have chosen to move away from. Thinking that we have, or in the future might find, a single best way to define power does not fit with the aim of this thesis. Given the multiple ways in which power is operating in planning processes, I find a singular view of power too reductionist, in view of my interest in enabling reflective practice.

Instead, I concur with Haugaard's claim that power is not a single entity, rather it represents a cluster of related concepts, each of which might validly represent power (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009; Haugaard, 2010a). The advantage with this plural view of power is that the zero-sum debates about the best definition of power can be replaced by plus-sum reflections, where we gradually refine our understanding of the linked empirical phenomena related to social order. I thereby find that a plural view of power is useful for researching and rethinking notions of power in participatory planning.

4.1.3 What is a family resemblance view of power?

To operationalise a plural view of power, I follow Haugaard's (2010a) development of Wittgenstein's (1967) work on family resemblance concepts. As Haugaard (Ibid.) explains, Wittgenstein argued that concepts, which could be thought to be connected by one essential common feature, may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all.

The word "game", was the example Wittgenstein (1967) used to explain this idea. To make his point, he discussed common features that all the usages of the word "game" might include. He concluded that it is impossible to identify any common features. For example, he said that winning and losing could perhaps be a common feature to all usages of game. Although, this is not the case, since what a solitary kid is doing when bouncing a ball towards a wall could validly be called a game, without involving winning and losing. Thus, the word game is like the members of a family in which there are many overlapping characteristics without a single one being common to all: Maria has her father's mouth and her mother's eyes, while her brother has his father's hair and mother's temper and so on (cf. Haugaard, 2010a and Wittgenstein, 1967).

In line with this definition, power in this thesis is treated as a family resemblance concept. This means that power concepts might signify different empirical phenomena, all of which are related to the reproduction of social order, but not necessarily united by one common feature. Thus, I see power as consisting of a cluster of concepts, each of which might accurately qualify as "power".

Following Haugaard (2010a), this means that power can be represented through alternative concepts, all of which might be valid as members of the same family. This includes the Athenian and Habermasian interests in power and legitimacy, the Machiavellian focus on leaders' power to rule through strategic action, the Nietzschean and Foucauldian emphasis on power as constitutive of social reality, the enabling and concerted power à la Arendt, as well as the Hobbesian emphasis on coercive power as a precondition for peace. Hence, a

family resemblance view of power is a useful basis for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning.

Importantly, a family resemblance view of power does not entail a relativistic position, in which any definition of power is as good as the other. Instead, I agree with Haugaard's (2010a) assertion that criteria can and ought to be established for separating better from worst usages of the concept. Applying a pragmatic approach, I suggest that usages of concepts can be evaluated according to how well they fulfill their purposes. This means that I see alternative concepts of power as conceptual tools intended to help us fulfil certain purposes.

> Viewing concepts as a set of *conceptual tools* entails that one moves away from any kind of reified views of essences, which usually entail evaluative judgements concerning correct and incorrect usages. If a certain usage enables the social scientist to explain complex ideas well, then that is all that matters. (Haugaard, 2010a, p. 427)

I concur with Haugaard's pragmatist position, even if my purpose is different from his. My task is to enable reflective practice. Hence, if concepts of power support critical reflection on routinised ways of understanding and enable situated judgements, this is what matters to me.

4.2 Developing a family of power concepts

After having decided to treat power as a family resemblance concept, I now develop a family of power concepts intended to be used to research and rethink power in participatory planning. At the end of this section the power family will include *power to, power with, illegitimate power over and legitimate power over.* These concepts have been selected and connected in a family since they carry the potential to: i) explicate the basic notions (constitutive, consensual and conflictual) of power in participatory planning; ii) to explain power empirically and appraise power normatively and iii) relate different notions of power in a manner that enables reflective practice.[8] By fulfilling these criteria the power family is suitable for the tasks to first research notions of power in participatory planning and then provide a basis for rethinking power in the same practice.

The following four subsections provide an elaborated discussion and definition of each of the four power concepts and relate them as members of the same family of concepts. Since, *illegitimate power over* signifies the most established notion of power in everyday language, as well as in planning, it is to this member we turn first.

---

8. For an elaborated discussion of these three criteria see Chapter 2.

4.2.1 Illegitimate power over

Power is most often seen as reprehensible domination, through which powerful actors get their way through undesirable means. As I have already argued, to exclusively define power as equated with domination, as an evil, would not suffice for enabling reflective practice. Instead, I follow the family resemblance view and explicate this notion of power as one of the members of the power family, which I coin as *illegitimate power over*. According to Giddens (1984), this notion of power, which is zero-sum (one actor's loss is another actor's gain) and conflictual, underlies virtually all major traditions of Western social and political theory.

In participatory planning the family member *illegitimate power over* is needed because of the potential it provides for reflections on the kind of power that works to deceive and dominate through participatory processes (i.e. for normative appraisal). For this task the power literature provides rich conceptual tools for planners to scrutinise powerful actors' behaviour, as well as for engaging in self-reflection over their own exercises of power. Importantly, the work on *illegitimate power over* also provides conceptual tools to unmask the hidden and less agent-specific power processes, which enable some planning actors to grow strong and manipulate others by subtly setting the agenda or by securing consent for domination through making desires and realities (Lukes, 1974, 2005).

The famous debates about the faces of power provide a window into how this family member has been dealt with in the power literature. The key issue in this debate was to identify and describe the different dimensions, or faces, of power. Robert Dahl (1957) opened up this debate in the 1950s when he set out to define power more clearly. He did that by developing a nuanced vocabulary of power revolving around power as the ability of actor A to prevail over actor B, by making B do something which B would not otherwise have done. This has later been coined as the first dimension, or face, of power. In this dimension power is observable and exercised directly between actors.

As a critique towards Dahl´s definition, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) introduced another dimension, the second face of power. Here, the strong actor A devotes their energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration, only of those issues that are comparatively harmless to A (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Normatively, this can be seen as domination or as reprehensible illegitimate power, if the institutions cannot be generalised to include the perspective of B and, as a consequence, B becomes a means to A's ends (Haugaard, 2012). Starting to explore two-dimensional power broadened the discussions and allowed for including more subtle forms of *power over* and also started to challenge the agent-specific view of power.

Lukes (1974), broadens the inquiry into *illegitimate power over* even further by introducing yet another dimension, the third face of power. He argues that the third face of power is often even more difficult to spot than the second face. He claims that power frequently works through false consciousness, which makes subordinates consent to power relations that are not in their interest. Lukes' (1974) argument is that it is useful to think about power broadly and to pay attention to those aspects of power that are least accessible to observation. As he explains,

> A may exercise power over B by getting him (sic) to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? (p. 23)

Lukes sees how *power over* works to impose internal constraints, and explains how those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaptation to domination, by either coercive or non-coercive means (Haugaard, 2012).

Lukes has been criticised on several points: for holding on to an agent-specific view of power; for using false consciousness in an elitist way and for his reliance on a realist view of interests (Haugaard, 2010b). Yet in my view, his third dimension of power still usefully signifies the important power process, whereby certain assumed norms make some planning actors emerge big and strong. The kind of deeper normative critical analysis, enabled by the work on three-dimensional power, provides a backbone for the thinking of a reflective planner. In combination with the work on one- and two-dimensional power it provides planners with rich conceptual tools for understanding processes of *power over*.

I define *illegitimate power over* as an exercise of power through which actors get other actors to do what they would otherwise not have done, in a manner which is seen as unacceptable. I thereby take a view of legitimacy as contested and situated in a specific context (Campbell, 2006; Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and Harkki, 2014). In this view it becomes apparent that the same empirical process of *power over* might be seen as legitimate or illegitimate by different actors. It is therefore the formulation "which is seen" is included in the definition of *illegitimate power over*.

Even if the three dimensions of power provide useful food for planning thought and action, the manner in which these conflate power with domination is problematic. To merely define *power over* as illegitimate is a common mistake in both the planning and power literature (Friedmann, 1998; Haugaard, 2010a). It is this way of thinking about power that might lead to attempts to escape from *power over*, even if such an escape does not exist in contested planning processes. Hence my power family also includes a notion of *power over* as acceptable, which I explain as the concept *legitimate power over* (see Section 4.2.4).

4.2.2 Power to

Besides the predominant view of power as conflictual domination, *illegitimate power over,* other scholars have theorised power as an outcome of social order, which cannot be reduced to domination (Arendt, 1970; Barnes, 1988; Haugaard, 1997; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963). In this view, power is understood as the ability to act derived from social order. These notions of power, are in my family expounded as the concept *power to*.

Power to is included in the power family since notions of power as constitutive of society are needed for reflective practice. Planners need to grasp how their practice requires "a particular order of things and the settling down of governing into subtle, day-to-day, taken for granted reproduction of power relations by disciplined subjects" (Richardson and Cashmore, 2011, p. 107). Understanding the established order, which is to empirically explain power, is a necessary basis for making normative judgements about accepting or attempting to change this order (Haugaard, 2003).

The creation of power has been approached in a multitude of ways in the power literature. In order to access and make commensurable some of the more influential and relevant contributions, I draw on Haugaard's work (2003). I thereby follow in the footsteps of other planning scholars who have demonstrated how useful Haugaard's theory is to understand *power to* in planning (Richardson and Cashmore, 2011).

Haugaard's starting point for theorisation is that power, in a basic sense, is the ability to act, the *power to*. The premise for many scholars in the power literature is the idea that a society gives actors *power to* through the production of social order (Arendt, 1970; Barnes, 1988; Giddens, 1984; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963). For if social life were entirely contingent, if there was no social order, social power would not exist. Social order renders actors' behaviour predictable and hence both constrains and enables their actions.

Haugaard (2003) has outlined a theory of power creation, which renders commensurable several different accounts of how *power to* is derived from social order. In general terms he posits that power is an ability to do something, which actors can derive from two sources: nature and society. Basically, natural power comes from the body and from humans' ability to harness resources from nature. According to Haugaard (2003, p. 89) "If one individual treats another as a physical object, through violence, the source of power is nature (biceps or explosives) and, as a consequence, the power can be regarded as natural". In its raw form, violence only creates two forms of predictability: mutilation and death. However, in most complex societies, violence is blended with social power and then we get the kind of power that is covered by *legitimate* or *illegitimate power over* in my power family. In a relationship were power is

created in this form, the less powerful actors are unwilling to accept social order, which releases threats or incentives used to induce them to do so (Ibid.).

However, Haugaard confirms Arendt's (1970) observation that a state that has to resort to violence frequently is actually quite weak. This is because conflictual power is costly, both for the powerful and for the less powerful.

> […] physical power is not the ultimate form of power. Quite the contrary, its use represents the failure of social power. Once the Sovereign has to draw their sword it is because the Leviathan has failed to create social power. In a well-functioning Leviathan, this is a relatively infrequent occurrence compared with routine compliance. (Haugaard, 2003, p. 108)

According to Haugaard, in modern societies the subtler forms of power, linked to the production of social order, "outstrip the quantity of power attributable to the sword" (Ibid.).

> The image of Hobbes' Leviathan wielding the sword is replaced by a more complex vision of actors reproducing social order which constrains and is responsible for relations of power and powerlessness, but also facilitates by conferring upon actors a capacity for social action which enables them to make things happen which would not otherwise occur. (Haugaard, 2003, p. 88)

The ability to act, *power to*, is created through a range of socialisation mechanisms, which reproduce social order. To further explain the notions of power covered within the concept *power to,* I have, in Table 6, summarised and adjusted Haugaard's synthesis of how power scholars have theorised the mechanisms associated with the reproduction of social order. The table briefly explains how *power to* is created through shared meaning (Barnes, 1988; Giddens, 1984; Haugaard, 1997; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963), system bias (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), systems of thought (Foucault, 1979), tacit knowledge (Lukes, 1974), reification (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1979), discipline (Foucault, 1979) and coercion (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974).

Table 6. *How power to is created (adjusted from Haugaard, 2003 and Richardson and Cashmore, 2011)*

Forms of power creation	Description
Power to created through shared meaning	Societal structures provide shared meaning, which renders people's actions predictable and thereby provides them with the ability to act.
Power to created by system bias	Certain actions are excluded as not being meaningful and thereby actors are empowered and disempowered to act.
Power to created by tacit knowledge	Powerful actors are provided with *power to* due to their positions being taken for granted. Less powerful actors are empowered when they become aware of how tacit knowledge underpins an arbitrary social order, which is to their disadvantage.
Power to created by systems of thought	Shared systems of thought render actions commensurable or incommensurable with actors' tacit knowledge and thereby enable and constrain their actions.
Power to created by reification	Social order appears non-arbitrary due to tradition or religious and scientific truths, which provide certain actors with power and others less so.
Power to created by discipline	The internalisation of routines leads to predictable behaviour by blocking actors from reflecting on the legitimacy of social order. Thereby some actors are provided with power and others less so.
Power to created by coercion	Some actors resist social order and other actors restore it by exercising *power over* based on a mix of social incentives, threats and physical force in order to get the actors who resist into compliance.

The forms of creation of *power to* in the table include several of the socialisation mechanisms, which power scholars have pointed to as key for reproducing social order. The first six forms all work to create *power to* through routinised behaviour and consensus on meaning. Whereas the seventh form, coercion, includes open conflict and resistance.

Drawing on the work of Haugaard (2003; drawing on Clegg 1989) I define *power to* as a dispositional ability to act derived from social order (cf. Morriss, 2002). This ability enables some actors to, episodically, exercise *power over* others and also provides the social predictability needed for actors to, in other episodes, act in concert towards shared objectives, *power with* (the family member described in the next section). Thereby *illegitimate* and *legitimate power over* (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.4) as well as *power with* are in my family seen as subsets of *power to* (cf. Haugaard in Clegg et al., 2014).

4.2.3 Power with

In contrast to the conflictual zero-sum view of power in everyday language, advocates of participatory planning often prefer consensual notions of plus-sum relationships. These are, for example, expressed in the Habermasian desire to replace or complement hierarchical power relations with dialogues in participatory planning. Most often such notions are not explicated in a language of power. For my purposes, I chose to explain these notions as the concept *power with,* which I define as exercises of power where actors engage in concerted action towards shared goals. Notably, *power with* is present when the reproduction of social order works, when the routinised assumptions of power relations are accepted by actors.

In the power literature, Hannah Arendt is seen as a prominent contributor to the notion of power as consensual plus-sum, as "the human ability not just to act but to act in concert" (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). Other feminist scholars, such as Amy Allen (1998, 2008), continue to develop this broader view of the exercise of power beyond domination. The key interest among these scholars is in collective power, which enables concerted action and the achievement of shared goals.

The difference between an understanding of power as zero-sum *power over* and as plus-sum *power with* is clearly demonstrated in the work of Talcott Parsons (1963) and Niklas Luhmann (1979). Parsons observed that, power, like wealth, is not necessarily zero-sum. For Parsons power, like money, is a circulating medium by which obligations are exchanged within the political system (Göhler, 2009). Through this medium the possibility of concerted action is created and increased. Thereby Parsons (Ibid., p. 108) saw power as "the generalised medium of mobilising resources for effective collective action." Parsons' view is overwhelmingly positive: power is creative, it accomplishes acts and it changes the nature of things and relations (Clegg et al., 2006).

Adding to the view of power as *power with* is the work of Luhmann (1975; 2000). For Luhmann, power is a symbolically generalised medium of communication. As Göhler (2009) explains, via the medium of power, credit is given and performance is anticipated: the high performance expected of leaders by those being governed demands an "investment" in the form of increased support. The result is a joint increase in power, *power with*.

For many scholars in this camp of the power literature, power is equated with empowerment. For example, for Arendt (1970, p. 56) power is the opposite of violence and coercion.

> […] politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites: where one rules absolutely the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course ends in power's disappearance.

Following Arendt's line of thought, "power with scholars", often tacitly distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate power by contrasting consensual power (seen as legitimate power) with conflictual power (assessed as illegitimate power). Such notions of power resemble the predominate views of power in communicative planning theory à la Habermas' (1985) ideas of replacing power distortions with communicative rationality.

This thought figure, to contrast *power with* to *power over* and deem the latter illegitimate, might be valid in certain situations in participatory planning. However, in other situations, it will not be sufficient for planners to merely assume that *power over* is illegitimate and strive to replace it with legitimate *power with*. In these episodes, reflective practice requires access to notions of power as legitimate in spite of lack of consent. These notions are in my power family deemed as the fourth member: *legitimate power over*.

4.2.4 Legitimate power over

The notion of conflictual power as legitimate is rarely present in planning theory. It is mainly residing in the criticised ideas of rational planning. Yet, planning cannot do without the kind of *power over* that is needed to democratically settle disputes in and through planning, unless we are to give up altogether on the ideas of representative democracy and hierarchical organisations, such as municipalities with their planning offices.

Hence, we cannot in the contemporary understanding of democracy, imagine a practice such as planning, without a notion of acceptable conflictual power. In the power family I clarify this notion of power as *legitimate power over*. This concept covers the same empirical process—the process by which actors get other actors to do what they would otherwise not have done—as signified by the concept *illegitimate power over*. The difference between these siblings is in the manner in which the empirical process is normatively appraised.

Why then is *legitimate power over* needed to enable reflective practice? It is because it will not suffice to merely think about legitimate power as consensual *power with*. Participatory planning, as with all democratic practices (Mansbridge, 2012, p. 1), requires a concept of legitimate conflictual power.

> […] solving collective action problems […] requires coercion – getting people to do what they else would not otherwise do through threat of sanction and the use of force. The work of democracy is to make that coercion somewhat more legitimate.

In line with Mansbridge's thinking, it is evident that planners need a concept of *legitimate power over* both for assessing process and outcome legitimacy. As we learn from legitimacy theory, process legitimacy is concerned with the procedures through which participatory planning is performed and outcome

legitimacy reffers to the problem solving capacity of such procedures (cf. Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and Harkki, 2014; Scharpf, 1999).

Regarding process legitimacy, participatory planning will, in certain episodes, include the exercise of *power over* by planners and other planning actors. It might well be that these episodes are deemed as instances of *illegitimate power over*, but it is equally possible to imagine reasons for deeming such exercises of *power over* as acceptable. For example, planners might want to include marginalised actors in the participatory process, even when other actors would not like to. Regarding outcome legitimacy, planning decisions that are seen to be in the advantage of weaker actors might well be assessed as legitimate, even if such decisions require the exercise of power by elected officials and/or planners over well-off actors who might resist such outcomes.

But how can *illegitimate power over* be separated from *legitimate power over*? This is a very difficult question due to the contested nature of conflictual power. According to Haugaard (2012), most of the influential contributors to the power literature (e.g. Dahl, 1957; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974, 2005; Foucault, 1979) leave us without an answer to this question. These contributors have not, for various, more or less explicit reasons, seen their task as theorising *legitimate power over*. Instead they have mainly focused on critiquing *power over* as illegitimate domination. For example, as summarised in Section 4.2.1, the famous debate about the faces of power was all about understanding *illegitimate power over*. But, I follow Haugaard and posit that conceptualising *legitimate power over* is necessary.

> If, as observed by Foucault, there is no escape from power, then we need a set of criteria for distinguishing desirable from undesirable power – a task which neither Foucault, nor most of the other protagonists in the power debate, has adequately equipped us for. (Haugaard, 2010b, p. 52)

When is *power over* legitimate? To provide a window into how this question can be reflected upon, I turn to Haugaard's (2012, 2015) rethinking of *power over* as a dual process, which can constitute domination (*illegitimate power over*) and empowerment (*legitimate power over*). The focus on Haugaard's work is not because I assume that his theorisation of *legitimate power over* is always valid or the universally best option for reflective planning practice. Instead I have chosen to engage with this piece of work, since it provides a somewhat novel, and in my view, promising way of thinking about *power over* in participatory planning. Empirically, Haugaard mainly uses examples from representative democracy and the power literature. In this section, I will not do more than provide some hypothetical reasoning for translating Haugaard's thinking to participatory planning. This choice is justified since Chapters 5-8 will elaborate

on the extent to which Haugaard's rethinking can be modified to fit into a broader rethinking of power in participatory planning.

Haugaard's rethinking of *power over* is premised upon the assumption that: "[…] power over constitutes a duality whereby the very same process, which leads to domination also constitutes the conditions of possibility for democracy, and thus is normatively desirable" (Haugaard, 2015, p. 147).

In spelling out his rethinking of *power over*, Haugaard (2012, 2015), in line with legitimacy theory (Beetham, 1991; Bernstein, 2004), separates sociological legitimacy from normative legitimacy. The former marks an interest in the way that actors in a particular context assess the desirability of power relations. In contrast, the latter is about the assessment from the observing scientist, who employs certain criteria for separating legitimate from illegitimate power. Haugaard strives to move from sociological analysis of legitimacy towards normative assessment of legitimacy and to clearly separate the two in his analysis.

Haugaard (2012) chose to structure his rethinking around the three dimensions of *power over* in the original power debates (see Section 4.2.1) and add a fourth dimension based on the work of Foucault (Dahl, 1957; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1982). In the following, I will only discuss Haugaard's work on the three original dimensions, since the level of sophistication offered by introducing a fourth dimension is not needed for my intention to demonstrate the manner in which Haugaard's rethinking might be useful in participatory planning.

Haugaard starts with rethinking the first dimension of power, where power is understood as the direct ability of actor A to get actor B to do what A wants (Dahl, 1957). Here, Haugaard challenges the mainstream idea that one-dimensional *power over* by necessity constitutes domination. He claims that this idea needs to be modified since "in complex democratic political systems, routine power over is not reducible to domination or coercion, as is frequently assumed" (Haugaard, 2012, p. 36).

To explain, Haugaard uses the distinction between zero-sum and plus-sum power. Zero-sum power is power in which one party gains at the expense of the other. Plus-sum power is power in which the power of both is expanded. Haugaard asserts that *power over* might sociologically be viewed as legitimate if A's short-term zero-sum *power over* B in the long run can be turned into plus-sum power also for B. Haugaard (2012, p. 37) exemplifies by referring to the democratic process.

> […] in a structured democratic contest A's gain is not B's loss in the long-term. In the short-term B has sacrificed a goal. However, as a largely unintended consequence of this interaction, structures have been reproduced which give B a chance to prevail over A at some future date. Hence, A's gain is not entirely B's loss. If B is a democrat,

> through compliance he/she has gained the benefits of reproducing certain structures that he/she endorses.

Thus, Haugaard distinguishes intermittent exercises of power that are effective due to the reproduction of social structures, from those which do not depend upon such structures. The key to sociologically legitimate one-dimensional *power over* is thus that structures that B feels they can benefit from later on, is produced or reproduced through an episodic power relation. If structures that are beneficial to all are (re)produced, it might in the long run result in the transformation of zero-sum power into plus-sum power.

In a generic sense, this reasoning might be transferable to participatory planning. For example, even if planning actor B loses an episode of participatory planning to actor A, it might still be in B's interest to comply if B finds that a fair planning process is thereby reproduced and will be available for repeat play. A caveat is that participatory planning episodes tend to be less clearly structured than, for example, elections in representative democracy. Hence, repeat play is perhaps more unlikely.

Turning to the second dimension of *power over* (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), Haugaard questions the mainstream idea that the process of excluding certain issues from policy always constitutes domination. Bacharach's and Baratz's (1962), negative assessment of two-dimensional power was due to the assumption that the exclusion could not be generalised to include the issues that B prefers to discuss and, as a consequence, B became a means to A's ends.

In order to demonstrate how this negative normative assessment can be modified, Haugaard draws on Giddens (1984) and argues that while structural constraints exclude certain forms of interaction, it facilitates other forms. Paradoxically, structures both limit interaction, and create possibilities for interaction (as discussed regarding *power to* in Section 4.2.2). If the action of others is predictable, collaborative endeavours or actions in concert, become easier (Haugaard, 2012, p. 39). This is in line with the reasoning around *power to* in Section 4.2.2. Haugaard (Ibid.) explains this as follows.

> By excluding random reactions, structural constraint makes structurally-based political power possible. The reproduction of social systems and social order in general, presupposes that certain acts of structuration are routinely excluded as invalid. When a social actor finds their interventions either 'politely ignored' or eliciting hostile responses, their structuration practices are excluded from having conferred legitimacy and, in so doing, structural constraint is enforced through the agency of others.

This way of reasoning is highly relevant for planning practice since in every planning process certain issues will by necessity be excluded in the dialogue while other issues will be included (Connelly and Richardson, 2004; Wiberg, 2016). Haugaard argues that two-dimensional *power over* is not inherently

reprehensible domination. Instead, it can also constitute the precondition of politics as something more sophisticated than domination and can therefore be assessed as normatively desirable.

Haugaard claims that what makes the second dimension of power, as described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), normatively reprehensible is not simply that issues are excluded from the of policy processes. Instead, it is that they are excluded to the systematic disadvantage of B. This means that power is made into a zero-sum phenomenon.

Although, if structures allow issues to be organised in and out in a fashion that is, by actors deemed sociologically legitimate, zero-sum *power over* can be turned into plus-sum; since repeat play, over longer periods, includes the possibility that B can win. Thus, Haugaard argues that the second dimension of power can be understood as an empirical process, which can either be normatively assessed as domination or as empowerment.

I will return to the question about how this, somewhat abstract, reasoning might be applied in participatory planning (Chapter 8). Suffice to say, that generically speaking, it makes sense, as Mouffe (2005) tells us, to think about the organising in and out of issues in participatory planning as an inevitable empirical process, that might be normatively or sociologically assessed as either legitimate or illegitimate.

Turning to the third dimension of power, Haugaard (2012, p. 42) sets out by clarifying the general referent, the empirical phenomena, of three-dimensional power as,

> […] the relationship between the social consciousness of social actors and the reproduction of relations of power. In essence, what is proposed by Lukes' concept of three-dimensional power (Lukes 1974), and much of Foucault's work on the relationship between power and knowledge (1980), is that there is a direct mapping between the tacit social knowledge that actors use to reproduce social structure and the reproduction of relations of domination.

Thereby, to Haugaard three-dimensional power is defined as the relationship between an actor's social consciousness and the (re)production of power relations. Notably, this way of re-theorising three-dimensional power bares resemblance to the role of social consciousness discussed in Section 4.2.2 where the family member *power to* is discussed.

It might well be that this social consciousness, people's habits, leads to systematic exclusion of the interests of some actors, but it can also be that it underpins normatively legitimate power relations. For example, if we sub-consciously exclude physical violence from participatory planning, it would by most be seen as both normatively and sociologically legitimate.

Thereby, Haugaard follows through on his task to rethink *power over*, by claiming that three-dimensional power can constitute domination, but that it can also be the key to empowerment. Thus, as with one- and two-dimensional power, the same empirical processes have both positive and negative normative potential.

Again, I would like to point to the possibilities of applying this idea to participatory planning. The planning culture might make us tacitly exclude repressive behavior, as well as include it in participatory planning. Thus, there is a strong argument for viewing the relationship between social consciousness and (re)production of power relations as an empirical process, rather than exclusively define it as legitimate or illegitimate.

> […] this [the view of power over as dual] has significant implications. It is not sufficient to identify processes of domination and try to deconstruct them. Rather, the task is the more complex one of deciding when the very same process of power is desirable and when it constitutes domination. (Haugaard, 2015, p. 147)

Based on this engagement with Haugaard's work, I define *legitimate power over* as exercises of power through which actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner that is seen as acceptable.

4.3 Assembling the power family

In this chapter, I have reviewed the power literature in order to answer the question: *what conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning?*

Drawing on the work of Haugaard (2010a) and Wittgenstein (1967), I started out by proposing that it is useful to treat power as a family resemblance concept in participatory planning. This plural view of power means that power is seen as a cluster of overlapping concepts, which are all related to the reproduction of social order, but not necessarily united by one common feature. I argued that this view of power carries potential for researching and rethinking notions of power in planning theory, policy and practice.

Next, I substantiated this claim by developing the family of four power concepts which is displayed in Table 7.

Table 7. *The power family in participatory planning*

Concept	Definition
Power to	The ability to act derived from social order.
Power with	Actors engage in concerted action towards shared goals.
Illegitimate power over	Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner that is seen as unacceptable.
Legitimate power over	Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner that is seen as acceptable.

Power to explicates notions of power as constitutive and productive. In my power family, *power to* is seen as a dispositional ability, which can be exercised by planning actors episodically. When the ability to act, the *power to,* is exercised, normative questions come forth. The legitimacy of power in participatory planning is situated in a specific context and frequently contested. Legitimacy can be approached with sociological interest or normative interest and can be concerned with process and/or outcome of an planning episode. Normative notions of power are, in the power family, conceptualised through the family members *power with*, *legitimate power over* and *illegitimate power over*. Notably, I thereby correct the mistaken idea that *power over* is equated with domination and instead distinguish two kinds of *power over*.

In line with the interpretative research design of this thesis (see Chapter 3), the concepts in the power family are not intended to signify the essence of power, rather they are ideal typical conceptualisations of alternative notions of power, which can potentially enable reflective practice.

Some might critique the family of power concepts for having a bias towards agent-specific notions of power. To them I would first respond that agent-specific notions are important in planning practice, since they stress both the responsibility and possibility for planners and other actors to make a difference. Secondly, I would point to how systemic, "faceless" notions of power, are included within *power to* as well as in *illegitimate and legitimate power over.* Within *power to* I have included Haugaard's (2003) theory of power creation, which synthesises the work of key contributors to the less agent-specific views of power. My discussion of the two forms of *power over* includes Lukes' (1974, 2005) third dimension as well as Haugaard´s (2012) rethinking of it.

I would also like to explicitly acknowledge that notions of power in actor network theory and similar "post human" theories (Callon and Latour, 1981; Latour et al., 1988), which are increasingly influential in planning thought related to power (e.g. Metzger et al., 2016), have not been included in the power family. This is not because I find them irrelevant for participatory planning practice. Instead I have, for reasons of feasibility, decided to leave this body of

theory outside of the family of power concepts. I recognise the future need to include these kinds of sophisticated tools for power analysis in attempts to further broaden the conceptual support for reflective practice.

Some scholars might fault me for merely including one concept of unacceptable power in the family, *illegitimate power over.* Let me therefore explain that this choice does not mean that I assume that *power with* and *power to* are legitimate by definition. Crucially, I define *power to* as dispositional. I find it logical to argue that the need to assess if this kind of power is legitimate arises only when it is exercised, which I conceptually cover with the other members in the family. Regarding *power with*, it is important to acknowledge that this form of power can lead to the exercise of *illegitimate power over* by one group over another group(s).

Finally, it is crucial to understand that the four members of the power family are ideal types. In any real world interaction, the concepts might be useful for distinguishing features of a situation, but this does not exclude the possibility that all four forms of power might be present in the same situation and that actors might come to alternative sociological and normative conclusions about what is actually "going on with power" (cf. Allen, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2004).

In the following chapters, the power family will first be applied and tested through investigations of the treatment of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice (Chapters 5-7). Then, in the concluding Chapter 8, I will synthesise the findings in view of validating the usefulness of the power family.

5 Notions of power in communicative planning theory

> In a world of conflicting interests—defined along lines of class, place, gender, organization, or individuals—how are planners to make their way? (Forester, 1989, p. 5)

> […] in the fine grain of planning practice, planners not only bring power relations into being, […] they also have the choice to change them. (Healey, 2003: 117)

> [Habermas] focuses his attention on the development of critical or emancipatory ways of knowing that are designed to get past the embedded power relations in a society. These ideas are attractive to planners. (Innes, 1995, p. 186)

This chapter presents the findings from a frame analysis of the notions of power in communicative planning theory. The findings feed into answering Research Questions 2 and 3: *which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning? To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?* The findings presented in this chapter pertain to the notions of power in the communicative planning theory, which underpins participatory planning. While notions of power in Swedish participatory planning policy and practice are clarified and assessed through separate investigations presented in Chapters 6 and 7.

The first section presents and discusses the analysis of the work of three leading communicative planning scholars: John Forester, Judith Innes and Patsy Healey. A consensual process frame is identified as informing all three scholars' approaches to power. In contrast, the scholars' framing of the planners' roles in power relations is more diverse. Here the analysis finds three alternative identity frames: the facilitator, the critically pragmatic planner and the reflexive planner. It is thereby revealed how communicative planning theory has more to offer than some of its critiques acknowledge. Yet, it is also demonstrated how the treatment of power in this theory suffers from a lack of attention to productive and constitutive notions of *power to* and a conflation of *power over* with domination.

Hence, communicative planning theory is assessed as providing useful tools for reflective practice, but as falling short of supplying the broad conceptualisation needed for planners' scrutiny of their assumptions of power.

5.1 Frame analysis of the work of Forester, Healey and Innes

5.1.1 About communicative planning theory and the analysis

In order to conduct frame analysis into notions of power in communicative planning theory, I have chosen to focus on three of the leading scholars in this tradition: John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. These three scholars have been and are active within different planning contexts in Europe (Healey) and the US (Forester and Innes). Pursuing their own approaches, they also share a common orientation and have over the years been part of a community of scholars who frequently meet and exchange ideas. These three scholars exercise influence over the development of communicative planning theory by mentoring younger scholars, and are widely cited within communicative planning theory. They share ambitions to be useful for practitioners and strive for their research to be practice oriented.

John Forester is a scholar working in a US planning context, who is widely recognised as one of the prominent contributors to communicative planning. He has persistently focused on the everyday practices of planners through his method for eliciting practitioner profiles (Forester, 1999, 2009). In his early work, he combined American pragmatism (Dewey, 1954; Schön, 1983) with Habermas' (1984) critical theory, to suggest how planners could work in "the face of power" to minimise power distortions (1989). In his later work, he has been more inclined to solely employ American pragmatism and has thereby suggested that power can be seen as a practical problem, which planners can handle through situated judgements (1999, 2009).

Patsy Healey is a scholar working in the British/European context, who, through a career spanning over five decades, has made influential contributions under the broad umbrella of communicative planning theories. Her work is diverse and covers a wide range of issues within planning. In the context of this study her work to combine Habermas' theories of communicative action with Giddens' structuration theory is highly relevant (1997, 2003). She uses Habermasian discourse ethics to critique power and suggests that planners use their agency to transform everyday practices to minimise the misuse of power and transform planning cultures.

Finally, the US scholar Judith Innes, who frequently collaborates with David Booher, draws on her own and others' practical experiences and combines these with Habermas' (1984) and lately Castells' (2009) ideas. Thereby, she critiques hierarchical power relations and advocates for consensual practices in planning. She has throughout her career combined scholarly work with hands on work to facilitate consensus building and collaborative planning processes.

In the next section I present the analysis of the three scholars' work, starting with John Forester.[9]

5.1.2 John Forester's framing of power

Forester has throughout his career critiqued the misuse of power and sought to build up a vision of planning as the organisation of hope. In the earlier stages of his career Forester frequently used Habermas' version of critical theory to define power as a distortion for authentic communication. In contrast, in his later work he has leaned more towards American pragmatism and focused on planners' "dirty-hands" experiences of working in the "face of power". In the following sections, I report on the analysis of how Forester has framed the two topics: power in participatory planning and planners' roles in power relations.

Forester's framing of power in participatory planning

Forester has throughout his career consistently critiqued the misuse of power, which I interpret as a focus on the family member *illegitimate power over*. His earlier work during the 1980s and 1990s (1980, 1989, 1993) appears heavily inspired by Habermas, and set out to theorise power as a distortion. During this period, Forester leaned towards universal theorising of how the power of the "system worlds" of a capitalist economy and bureaucracy shaped attention and distorted peoples' "life worlds". He thereby made salient how planning organisations are embedded in the system worlds of the market economy and bureaucracy and thus reproduce power relations. "Thus, planners can expect (with a few exemplary, democratically structured exceptions) that the organisations in and with which they work will systematically reproduce socio-political relations […]" (Forester, 1989, pp. 78–79).

Characteristically, for this Habermasian thought style, Forester is making the universal diagnosis that organisations will reproduce "socio-political relations". Thereby, the emphasis is on the ways in which power operates to create distortions, which prevent authentic communication.

---

9. See Section 3.3. for a discussion of the methodology.

The analysis shows how the work of early Forester mirrors the predominant tendency, in the power literature as well as in everyday speech, to conflate power and domination, i.e. to implicitly and exclusively define power as *illegitimate power over*. Thereby, even if his critique of power certainly is valid, the early Forester's diagnosis comes with the confusion associated with conflating power with domination and overlooking how *power to,* which precedes *power over*, is created through the predictability of social order (see Chapter 4).

In his later work, Forester (1999, 2009, 2013) maintains his focus on critiquing *illegitimate power over* in participatory planning, but downplays the universal theorising à la Habermas, and instead relies more on the situated analysis of American pragmatism. He coins his brand of pragmatism as "critical" and thereby wishes to convey a more power sensitive version, as an answer to the critique for power blindness, which is often levelled towards pragmatists.

What Forester means by "critical" is exemplified by his suggestion (2009, pp. 16–17) that differences "of interests, values, and power […]" must be taken into account in participatory planning and "structured biases related to ethnicity and culture, race, class, gender, and more" should always be anticipated. Yet Forester's pragmatism also comes with the characteristic trust in practical problem solving and scepticism towards theorising without action.

> Just chanting "power, power, power" won't help us, and neither will sincerely appealing to "dialogue, dialogue, dialogue." So we need to ask, how can we do better than we have, when interests and values, perceptions and perspectives conflict? (Forester, 2009, p. 3)

Forester's brand of *critical* pragmatism thereby opens interesting avenues for planning thought and action. Yet it is suffering from the same conflation of power and domination as the early Forester's work. It is still the critique of *illegitimate power over* that is the focus for Forester's diagnosis. He thereby largely leaves us without an elaborated understanding of how *power to,* arises from the predictability derived from social order. Clearly this leaves a blind spot for those who employ Forester's work to understand power in participatory planning practice.

Further, Forester's one-sided emphasis on power as domination hides the necessity of *legitimate power over* in planning. "We really need less often to keep rediscovering politics and 'power', and more often to carefully assess forms of power and their specific types of *vulnerabilities*, for only where dominating power is vulnerable is critical resistance possible" (Forester, 2000, p. 915).

As illustrated in this quote, Forester is focusing on supplying tools for assessing oppressive power, but leaves us without the conceptualisation of acceptable forms of *power over*.

When Forester moves from diagnosis of power towards action bias, he sees participatory planning as capable of empowering citizens and thereby carrying potential to play a "[…] counterhegemonic or democratising role [through]: the exposure of issues that political–economic structures otherwise would bury from public view, the opening and raising of questions that otherwise would be kept out of public discussion […]" (1993, p. 6). It is this persistent framing of participatory planning as the "organisation of hope" (2009, p. 6) that Forester has maintained throughout his career. His hope is, interpreted through the family of power concepts, to replace *illegitimate power over* with *power with*, the process where people are acting in concert towards shared objectives.

The early Forester sought to realise this vision through importing Habermas' ideas into participatory planning. Forester (1980, 1989) developed tools intended to make participatory planning capable of minimising power distortions. His action bias was at that time for participatory planning to "[…] work […] toward the correction of the needless distortions, some systematic and some not, that disable, mystify, distract, and mislead others: to work toward a political democratization of daily communications" (Forester, 1980, p. 21).
This quote is expressive of how the earlier Forester employed Habermas' work to develop analytical tools that could be applied within participatory planning with the intention, not to remove, but minimise the distorting effects of power.

In my interpretation, the early Forester's action bias can be understood as a call for minimising *illegitimate power over* and maximising *power with*. Even if this intention seems sympathetic, it leaves us without the conceptualisation of *power to* and *legitimate power over*. Thus, his emphasis on minimising power distortions does not provide us with an elaborated answer to two crucial question in the power literature, as well as in planning practice: how is power created and what is a legitimate exercise of power when there are conflicts?

In Forester's later work, the action bias is instead more inspired by American pragmatism and his affinity with Habermas is downplayed. Yet, he maintains his view that participatory planning is about correcting or minimising the negative effects of *illegitimate power over*. But now he refrains from theorising power and instead stresses that problems arising from the misuse of power can be dealt with practically.

> So when we read critical analyses, we need to learn how, in the face of power and deep difference, our lives can be better, not just to hear once again that who gets what is political, that the ruling rule, the powerful have power, that racism and sexism shatter lives, that environmental injustice is widespread. (Forester, 2009, p. 11)

This quote illustrates the later Forester's pragmatic scepticism towards theoretical analysis and preference for incremental actions in participatory

planning in view of dealing with the contextual problems created by *illegitimate power over*.

Thereby, the critically pragmatic Forester, pays attention to eliciting and analysing planners' own stories of (allegedly) successful encounters with power in participatory planning (Forester, 1999, 2009). He provides interesting food for thought, but he largely refrains from theorising power. This leaves us with an account of how incremental improvements might lead towards *power with* in participatory planning, but we are kept in the dark when it comes to explaining what *power to* and *legitimate power over* might be in participatory planning.

Forester's framing of planners' roles in power relations

At the core of Forester's framing of planners' roles in power relations, lies the diagnosis that planners work in contexts distorted and/or shaped by *illegitimate power over* "in the face of power", as Forester (1989) characteristically puts it. Thereby, his account of planners and power is usefully critical, yet it might lead to confusion caused by conflating power and domination.

When Forester leans on Habermas, working in the face of power means that, "[…] planners serving the public face particular special, private, or class interests (e.g., corporate development interests), which may work systematically to violate these norms of ordinary communication" (1980, p. 278). He then makes salient how this pressure influences planners' dealings with power. "[…] planners will often feel compelled to be less frank or open than they might wish […]" (1980, p. 279).

When Forester leans more towards American pragmatism, he instead poses critically informed questions about planners and power.

> In a world of conflicting interests – defined along lines of class, place, gender, organization, or individuals – how are planners to make their way? In a society structured by a capitalist economy and nominally democratic political system, how are planners to respond to conflicting demands when private profit and public well-being clash? When planners are mandated to enable "public participation" even as they work in bureaucratic organizations that may be threatened by such participation, what are planners to do? (Forester, 1989, p. 5)

This quote captures the essence of both the early and more contemporary Forester's diagnosis of planners in power relations: planners are restricted and influenced by *illegitimate power over*, yet they desire to make a difference and are capable of doing it. Forester (2013, p. 7) tells us that planners "may be conservative, resistant to change, captured by conventions and language, habits and frameworks that may not truly reflect 'all they can do'".

Useful as his framing may be for planners, Forester refrains from supplying us with an elaborated understanding of how planners' *power to* "make a difference" is derived from a social order. Instead he conflates power and domination, which confusingly leave us without a theorised account of how planners' *power to* make a difference is created. We are also left without conceptual support for appraising when planners' attempts to make a difference should be seen as just or acceptable: when is their exercise of power legitimate?

Forester's action bias is towards hope; the hope that planners will make a difference by minimising power distortions or by incrementally addressing misuse of power, *illegitimate power over*. He tells us to "spend less time rediscovering that power of course matters, and let's spend more time exploring how we can do better-less time presuming impossibility and more time exploring actual possibility" (Ibid.). This quote illustrates both Forester's optimistic orientation and his use of "power" as a negatively loaded term, equivalent to *illegitimate power over*. To tell us that power equates to domination and at the same time suggest that planners ought to make a difference, is somewhat confusing. For how can planners, within a democratic planning system, make a difference if legitimate power is conceptually excluded?

Hence, Forester does not elaborate theoretically on what legitimate power might be. Yet it could be said that his accounts of planners' allegedly successful practices are full of examples of when planners use their ability to act, their *power to,* to get people to do what they otherwise would not have done. This is in the analytical language of the power family, the exercise of *illegitimate or legitimate power over.* As Forester explains in his book about planners working with conflict mediation,

> […] the mediators whose work we examine here make few claims to neutrality but many to serving all parties in a *nonpartisan* way […] to show how planners and community leaders might work practically in the face of power and value differences to *achieve* such ends−more just and beautiful, sustainable, and liveable places and spaces. (Forester, 2009, p. 6)

Thereby, it could be argued that what Forester is doing is to, by way of instructive examples, show us when the exercise of power is legitimate. Even if I find this move to be useful, it does not fulfil our need for conceptualising power in a way which can transcend context. Even if power relations are situated, I do not believe that we can do without a more general language of power. I also think that, without widely accepted legitimacy criteria, it will be difficult to justify planners' exercises of power beyond the rational ideas of value-neutral experts.

Still, the later Forester's task is not to theorise power, but to draw attention to the possibility for planners to incrementally address the injustices created by the negative effects he attributes to "power".

So let us explore how we can do better than we have, how planners and policy shapers might not be ideal, but might take seriously ambitious aspirations, to be less callous and blind, less racist, sexist or classist, less apolitically technocratic […]. (Forester, 2013, p. 7)

This way of reasoning illustratates Forester's long-standing engagement with critiquing power and providing hope that planners can minimise domination. This demonstrates how Forester has dedicated most of his work to addressing *illegitimate power over* and thus left the task of theorising *power to* and *legitimate power over* aside. Therefore, his account of planners and power is usefully critical and hopeful, yet leaves planners without elaborated conceptual tools for reflecting on the legitimacy of *power over* and the creation of *power to* through social order.

5.1.3 Patsy Healey's framing of power

When Patsy Healey approaches power, she draws on Giddens' structuration theory and Habermas' theory of communicative action. She frames power as produced and reproduced by the interplay of social structures and human agency and uses criteria for authentic communication to critique the resulting exclusion of discourses and people. In the following sections, I report on the analysis of the way she frames power in participatory planning and planners' roles in power relations.

Healey's framing of power in participatory planning

Healey frames power in participatory planning from a critical stance and emphasises the necessity to transform unjust power relations through agency. Her approach is inspired mainly by the work of Giddens and Habermas. With Giddens (1997) she draws attention to how power is embedded in social structures through "implicit and explicit principles about how things should be done and who should get what" (p. 45). Thereby, she makes salient how structuration practices "carry power relations from one period to the next" (Ibid.). She characteristically sees how "power over the formation of rules of behaviour, and power over the flows of material resources" shapes human actions and thoughts (Ibid.).

To Healey structuration practices result in assumptions, which constrain, but do not determine, the ways in which agency works in human relations because,

[…] some [taken for granted assumptions] may endure and get […] inscribed in routine. […] Structuring power is carried through the medium of these ideas and routines, shaping how agency invents ways to use, develop, and distribute the material resources available in any situation. (1999, p. 1132)

This shows how Healey's framing of power, in contrast to Forester's, includes a route towards explaining the creation of *power to* beyond Habermasian distortions. Her affinity with Giddens and sociological institutionalism provides tools for a much more elaborated analysis of power. Yet she has mainly paid attention to *illegitimate power over* and, thereby, her account of power in participatory planning is constrained by the same tendency to conflate power and domination as Forester's.

Healey emphasises how *illegitimate power over* can be transformed through human agency since people can be reflexive, with the capacity,

> […] to penetrate below direct interpersonal and deliberate strategic manipulation, to access an awareness of deeper cultural concepts and practices, and the relations of power that they embody. […] people can become aware that what they do in routine ways is not inherently 'natural', but has become 'natural' through a social history of acceptance and embedding. If so, it can also be disembedded, though this may involve a long process of cultural readjustment […] to a different kind of governance organization. (Healey, 2003, pp. 113–114)

Healey combines this Giddensian dynamic and situated diagnosis of power with Habermas' more dualistic and universal theory of communicative action. Drawing on Habermas, she diagnoses power through a critique of how the Enlightenment, in spite of removing other forms of inequalities, created "new bastions of power" by which "people are made unequal" (1997, p. 39). This quote exemplifies how Healey's Habermasian diagnosis of power conflates power with domination.

Healey (1992, p. 145) explains how a "logic coupled with scientifically-constructed empirical knowledge, was unveiled as having achieved hegemonic power over other ways of being and knowing, crowding out moral and aesthetic discourse". Thus, she draws attention to how instrumental rationality, the "competitive market" and the "hierarchical bureaucracy", are responsible for the reproduction of inequality (Healey, 1997, p. 40).

This infinity with Habermas provides Healey with conceptual tools to critique power, yet the following conflation of *power over* with domination blurs Healey's explanation of what power is, of *power to*, and suggests that we perhaps should escape from *power over* in participatory planning.

Healey takes difference and inequality as the starting point when she frames power in participatory planning, maintaining a critical diagnostic focus on *illegitimate power over*: "[…] multiple dimensions of potential social division, and the inequalities that are generated through them, raise enormous problems for efforts in managing co-existence in shared spaces, as the potential social diversity is substantial" (Healey, 1997, p. 118). Healey (Ibid.) also makes it apparent how the historical structuration practices in planning have resulted in

repression and damage to nature. Such are the starting conditions in Healey's diagnosis of power in participatory planning.

Drawing on structuration theory, Healey explains how planning processes will be based on certain modes of thought that get "a privileged 'sound' through the foghorns and babble of the wider political culture in which they exist" (Healey, 2012, p. 28). Thereby certain ways of thinking and acting become taken for granted. "Infused with systems of meaning and carry[ing] cultural references forward in time. It is these abstractions from our social lives which filter back into the fine grain of our everyday lives, our life as human agents" (Healey, 1997, p. 46).

Based on this critical diagnosis of power, Healey draws attention to how certain modes of thinking and acting seem natural, and thereby reproduce power relations in planning processes. Characteristically, she does not think that social structures determine planning processes, instead she stresses how the "fine grain of planning practice […] involves delicate day-to-day choices about whether to 'follow the rules', or whether to change them, to transform the structure" (Healey, 1997, p. 47).

This reasoning illustrates how Healey, in contrast to Forester, provides a route to explaining the creation of *power to*. By drawing on the vocabulary of structuration theory she provides an approach to power potentially capable of guiding empirical analysis. Yet, her own analysis is somewhat confused due to the tendency to smuggle normatively negative assessments into the sociological explanation of power.

Healey's action bias is to use "Habermas' evaluative concept of the qualities of 'speech situations' [as] a valuable tool of critique in […] [power] struggles" (Healey, 2003, p. 113). So, she suggests critiquing power by way of argument, and thereby opening up possibilities for reflexivity and change of *illegitimate power over*. Healey stresses how instances of reason carry the capacity for changing culture and thereby power relations. "The micro-practices of everyday life are thus key sites for the mobilisation of transformative forces" (Healey, 1997, p. 49).

In this way, Healey's emphasises how reflexivity can expose *illegitimate power over* and how changes in micro practices might lead to the kind of power, which is consensual and concerted: *power with.*

Following Habermas, Healey argues that the transformation of planning cultures should create a more communicatively rational public realm because, "If based on principles of honesty, sincerity, and openness, to people's views and to available knowledge, then these truths and values can transcend the relativism of different perspectives" (Healey, 1997, p. 53). This Habermasian line of

thought can, through my family of power concepts, be interpreted as a call for participatory planning to transform *illegitimate power over* to *power with*.

This line of reasoning resembles that of some of the contributors to the power literature (e.g. Arendt, 1970; Parsons, 1963) who define *power to* and *power with* as the only legitimate forms of power. Clearly this is a necessary part of the answer to the question, *when is power legitimate?* Yet, it leaves us without a concept of *legitimate power over*, which is necessary in planning if we are to make decisions when planning processes and outcomes are contested.

True to her relational perspective, Healey further emphasises that participatory planning involves building cultures. "Firstly, to recognise the potential cultural dimensions of differences […] and secondly, actively to make new cultural conceptions, to build shared systems of meaning and ways of acting, to create an additional 'layer' of cultural formation" (Healey, 1997, p. 64). Not being blind to the difficulties, Healey sees such transformation as "utopian in reach, since in real societies, some always emerge more powerful than others, and the morality of majorities rejects some behaviours" (Healey, 1997, p. 44).

This reasoning demonstrates how Healey strives towards a consensual planning practice where power is obsolete or turned into *power with*. This shows how her account of power in participatory planning conflates *power over* with domination and largely by definition excludes *legitimate power over*.

Healey's framing of planners' roles in power relations

Healey diagnoses planners in power relations by emphasising how planners' micro practices can reproduce or transform social power structures because "[…] in the fine grain of planning practice, planners not only bring power relations into being, as Foucault describe. For Giddens, they also have the choice to change them" (Healey, 2003, p. 117). In this way, Healey's account of planners in power relations, in contrast to Forester's, provides a theorised understanding of how planners' ability to act, their *power to*, is created "in the fine grain of planning".

In line with structuration theory, Healey explains how planners' identities are shaped through social relations. At the same time, she also emphasises how planners carry the capacity to transform the same power relations, which shape their identities. In this manner, her analysis goes beyond Forester's reliance on the Habermasian emphasis of power distortions, and his later preference for accounts of planners' work, without elaborated theorisation of power.

Following her preference for reflexivity, Healey frames planners as capable of seeing through assumed relations and practices. But Healey (1997, p. 85) also acknowledges that for planners,

> [...] to change systems, and to re-make structures, requires an effort to challenge the relations of power on all three of Lukes' levels, the formal, the 'behind the scenes' and the embedded dimensions of power, and a recognition, as Foucault argues, of the power relations of the fine grain of practices.

This reasoning demonstrates the strength of Healey's analysis of planners and power, but also its limits. She leads us to pay attention to the different dimensions of power and recognise the ubiquity of power and thereby provides useful tools for power analysis. Yet she makes the same problematic conflation of power with domination as Forester does.

Based on her diagnostic focus of critiquing power, Healey's action bias is to urge planners to develop the ability to be reflexive.

> [...] to reveal when communicative and collaborative processes are likely to [...] improve life conditions for the diverse groups and communities of interest in cities and regions, and when they are likely to be merely mechanisms to sustain old and well-established power relations. (Healey, 2003, p. 112)

Even if Healey recognises that established structuration practices, which include injustices, will make it challenging for planners to induce change, she maintains a positive view of the possibility of agency. "Because people are inventive and creative, and because structuring forces cannot precisely determine events, there is always some scope for innovation" (Healey, 2003, p. 105). Thereby, she suggests that planners, by being reflexive, can transform power relations in the micro practices of planning. She is then usefully directing attention to how planners' (and others) presumed practices might result in exclusion and how they hold the capacity to change their own habits.

Healey's offering to planners is thus to provide analytical resources for critiquing *illegitimate power over*. Healey suggests tools, such as Habermas' discourse ethics, for this purpose. Thereby, interpreted through the power family, she suggests that planners should critique *illegitimate power over*, by contrasting it to *power with*, exercises of power when actors engage in concerted action towards shared goals. This is certainly an important task for planners, but this action bias largely leaves them without conceptual tools for what to make of situations when *power over* is inevitable. Healey is thereby, as Forester, inclined to overlook *legitimate power over* in her understanding of planners' roles in power relations.

5.1.4 Judith Innes' framing of power

Judith Innes' framing of power is based on a combination of Habermas' theory of communicative action (1984), and more recently Castell's (2009) ideas of communicative power (Innes and Booher, 2015), and the insights generated

from Innes' (and her long-term companion, Booher's) practical experiences of participatory practices. In the coming sections I discuss my analysis of Innes' account of the two frame topics: power in participatory planning and planners' roles in power relations.

Innes' framing of power in participatory planning

Following Habermas, the early Innes (1995, p. 186) diagnoses how power relations construct "concepts [which] can colonise the lifeworld, blinding us to the deeper reality of our own experience". Later in her career she pursues a similar diagnostic focus on "communicative power" by drawing on Castells' work (2009, 2011) since he "shares Habermas' view that communication itself is a form of action that changes the realities of the social world, including power relations" (Innes and Booher, 2015, p. 200). My analysis shows that Innes' elaboration of what Habermas' and Castells' work means for the theorisation of power in participatory planning remains incomplete.

Instead Innes' preference is for practice. She, argues that her own and others' practical experiences, shows how "old" hierarchical forms of power lose ground to the kind of power that "springs out of collaborative practices" since "the world is too complex, too rapidly changing, and too full of ambiguities for this sort of mechanical power to produce consistently what the player wanted or to produce sustainable results" (Booher and Innes, 2002, p. 222).

As demonstrated in this quote, Innes' explanation of power is based on the same kind of conflation between *power over* and domination as Forester's and Healey's. Additionally, we can also see that her explanation does not go deeper into theorising power. Instead she, as exemplified in the quote, tends to use inaccurately defined key concepts such as "old forms of power", "network power" and "mechanical power" to draw generalised conclusions without supplying much in terms of evidence.

When diagnosing power in participatory planning, Innes consistently employs a distinction between "power around the table and power outside the dialogue" (2004, p. 12). To Innes, this distinction is a crucial one, as it enables her to diagnose power relations outside the planning process as *illegitimate power over*, in contrast with the possibility of "consensus building" (Innes, 2004; Innes and Booher, 1999) and "collaborative rationality", her versions of *power with*, inside participatory planning (Innes, 2016; Innes and Booher, 2010). This demonstrates how Innes' diagnosis of power in participatory planning resembles Forester's and Healey's, by focusing on critiquing *illegitimate power over* and replacing it with *power with*.

While Forester provides us with useful windows into planning practices and Healey elaborates on how these practices are embedded in social structures,

Innes leaves us with much less to reflect on. Her theorisation of power and her practical accounts of it lack the detail needed for providing usefully thick descriptions of power in planning practice.

Innes' diagnosis of "old" forms of power as inefficient and illegitimate leads to an action bias to create power-free conditions for communication, or towards producing what she calls "network power" (Booher and Innes, 2002) and "communicative power" (Innes and Booher, 2015), which resemble *power with*. Her fundamental idea is that striving towards the ideal of "authentic" or undistorted communication can create conditions under which "emancipatory knowledge [can] transcend […] the blinders created by our conditions and institutions" (Innes and Booher, 1999, p. 418).

To Innes (Ibid.), such knowledge can be "achieved through dialogue that engages all those with differing interests around a task or a problem". To create such conditions, Habermasian criteria for comprehensibility, sincerity and inclusivity must be fulfilled, as exemplified in her later work. "The group meets face to face for authentic dialogue, where all are equally empowered to speak, all are listened to and all are equally privy to data and other forms of knowledge on the issues" (Innes, 2016, p. 2). This way of reasoning leads to the same preference for *power with* as Forester and Healey, and the same kind of conceptual exclusion of *legitimate power over* by definition.

Innes, with a remarkable consistency in the analysed publications, argues for an action bias where process design and facilitation should provide conditions for dialogue and consensus inside participatory planning processes. She describes the work that is needed to achieve such processes as "skilful management of dialogue", "well-designed processes", "skilled process and meeting management" and "well-run consensus building projects". These concepts appear intended to build a narrative around the possibilities to change relations of *illegitimate power over* into *power with*, but leave us wanting when it comes to explaining the *power to* and the *legitimate power over* necessary for achieving this result.

Innes suggests Habermasian criteria for "consensus building" and "collaborative rationality" to guide process design. The criteria are reformulated slightly in the analysed publications, but the essence is that all relevant interests are represented and that their communication is "[…] undistorted by power differentials and information differences" (Innes, 2004, p. 9). Though Innes (1995) initially wrote about undistorted communication as a potential reality in participatory planning, she later (2004; 2010) recasts this as an ideal to strive towards. She then argues that "[…] the point to keep in mind is that communicative rationality, like scientific method, is an ideal type. It is never fully achieved even in the most rigorous practice" (Innes, 2004, p. 10). This

largely resembles a vision of power in participatory planning reduced to *power with*. By definition, *legitimate power over* is excluded and we are left wondering both how the *power to* engage in *power with* is created and how conflicts can be handled in planning without a conceptualisation of *legitimate power over*.

Innes' framing of planners' roles in power relations

When Innes turns to frame planners' roles in power relations the confusion thickens. In her early work, Innes identifies planners not as neutral experts following the rules of scientific inquiry, but as designers of social processes. She claimed that planners exercise power beyond established planning norms. Based on this diagnosis, she identified a particular need for ethical principles to guide planners (Innes, 1995). By applying the family of power concepts her reasoning can be understood as a critique of planners' exercise of *illegitimate power over* and a call for criteria to distinguish *legitimate power over*.

Instead of supplying such criteria, Innes at that time developed a narrative about planners who were

> […] uncomfortable with the expert role for themselves, recognizing that they have their own biases and that expertise has its limits. They have strong beliefs about the kind of society that is desirable, but they do not know how to work toward this within their professional roles (Innes, 1995, p. 186).

Based on this claim about the perceptions of a whole profession, she turns towards an action bias by linking the work of "innovative planners" with Habermas' ideas of communicative rationality.

> [Habermas] ideas are attractive to planners because, rather than forcing them to try for a value-neutral, expert role in which they do not believe, they offer planners the possibility of an ethical stance within the world as they experience it. The principles for emancipatory knowing fit with the basic inclination of many planners. (Innes, 1995, p. 186)

Characteristically, Innes knits a narrative based on claims about planners' views of themselves and their practices. What she offers seems to be a critique of the rational planners' exercise of *illegitimate power over*, and a suggestion to turn to Habermasian criteria as an alternative. But these criteria do not help planners to ethically assess when their exercises of *power over* are legitimate, since they are designed to describe an undistorted, power-free state in planning.

Innes, over the years, gradually modified this framing of planners as facilitators of communicative rationality, and in her contemporary work has a more pessimistic view of the role of planners. "[…] planners themselves often stand in the way of collaboration, preferring to keep control, without recognising

how collaboration can reduce conflict, prevent mistakes, enrich their thinking, offer new options and reframe difficult problems" (Innes, 2016, p. 1).

Based on this more sceptical view of planners, Innes is, in her contemporary work, placing her trust in professional facilitators, coming in from outside the planning system, to create conditions for power-free communication and/or "network power". This move does not solve the problems with her original framing, but instead adds another layer of confusion. For her suggestion does not rest on an elaborated idea of where these facilitators get their ability to create fair planning processes, their *power to*, and she is refraining from theorising the *legitimate power over* required when planning processes and/or outcomes are contested.

After having reported on the analysis of Forester's, Healey's and Innes' work, I will next synthesise the findings.

5.2 The findings

Through the analysis I have pursued two research questions:

- Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?
- To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?

The analysis of communicative planning theory provides part of the answer to these two questions. The research tasks to analyse Swedish planning policy (Chapter 6) and practice (Chapter 7) will provide additional findings and enable a full answer to the questions (Chapter 8).

In the analysis of communicative planning theory, I researched the first question by identifying process frames pertaining to power in participatory planning and identity frames pertaining to planners' roles in power relations. Concerning power in participatory planning, the analysis showed variety in the three scholars' framings over the years. Yet, in spite of the differences, my conclusion is that they draw on similar notions of power, originating from the same frame, which I conceptualise as the *consensus frame*.

The consensus frame diagnoses power as domination. Thereby, it draws attention to the family member *illegitimate power over*. The action bias flowing from this diagnosis is towards "network power", "empowerment" and "authentic dialogue", which in the family of power concepts is explicated as *power with*. I will explain how I have arrived at this finding by summarising the analysis of the three scholars' work.

Forester's framing of power shifted over the years. In his earlier work he relied on Habermas to diagnose how power distorted authentic communication, and suggested that discourse ethics should be applied to minimise these

distortions in and through participatory planning. Whereas in his later work he leaned more heavily on American pragmatism to diagnose how the misuse of power creates situated problems that ought to be addressed incrementally through participatory planning. In spite of supplying two distinct generic narratives about power in participatory planning, Foresters' work takes shape through the same basic consensus frame. His interest lies in finding out when "power is vulnerable" and he sees planning as the organisation of hope for empowerment, which is, in the analytical language of this thesis, a hope for *power with.*

Healey's framing is similar yet distinctively different. She also makes use of Habermas' work to critique how power relations result in the exclusion of people and issues. Yet her move to draw on structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) provides the seeds for theorising power beyond distortions, which is largely lacking in Forester's work. Still, she is, as Forester is, mainly concerned with how planning can lead to more consensual power relations. To Healey, the hope is for agency in the micro practices of planning to transform planning cultures from *illegitimate power over* into *power with.*

Finally, Innes' framing of power relies on Habermas' and Castells' work, combined with her practical experiences of participatory practices. The analysis showed how this combination leads her to critique power distortions and "old forms" of power, and suggest that participatory planning can and ought to replace these with "network power" or "authentic communication". Innes' approach to power thereby differs from Forester's and Healey's, yet it originates from the same basic frame. Her core preference is also to turn *illegitimate power over* into *power with.* The process frame identified through the analysis of the three scholars' work is summarised in Table 8.

Table 8. *The consensus frame*

	Consensus
Diagnosis	*Power over* is illegitimate.
Action bias	Participatory planning ought to transform *illegitimate power over* into *power with*.

The analysis revealed a broader repertoire in the scholars' framing of planners' roles in power relations. I argue that the analysis shows that their notions of this topic can be conceptualised as three distinct identity frames: the facilitator, the critical pragmatist and the reflexive planner.

The facilitator frame guides all three scholars' framing of planners, though Innes has relied most consistently and heavily on this frame. In her work, the idea of the facilitator is ever-present. The generic narrative is about skilful practitioners who, through mastering process design and facilitation, are capable

of turning *illegitimate power over* outside planning processes into *power with* inside of the processes.

Forester's framing of planners shares the preference for *power with*, but is much more situated. His narratives are about planners who, through practical judgement and critical ethos, act to make a difference for those who are left outside the process and subject to repressive powers. Through the analysis of Foresters' work I have identified the critical pragmatist frame, which suggests that planners ought to work incrementally to shift the power balance to the advantage of those who lack power.

Healey has, as her fellow scholars, seen planners as change makers, towards more inclusive planning cultures of *power with*. Yet, her framing of planners is different since she supplies what Forester and Innes are missing: a theorised account of planners' roles in power relations. Her framing is informed by, what I call, the reflexive planner frame, originating from structuration theory. This frame leads to an understanding of how social structures carry past power relations into the present and how planners are shaped by these structures and yet capable of reflexivity and agency.

The three identity frames are summarised in Table 9.

Table 9. *Identity frames in communicative planning theory*

	Facilitator	Critical pragmatist	Reflexive planner
Diagnosis	Planners are working in contexts of *illegitimate power over*.	Planners are confronted with situated dilemmas in power relations.	Planners can reproduce or transform power relations through their everyday practices.
Action bias	Planners ought to use their skills to design and facilitate planning processes, which enables *power with*.	Planners ought to make situated judgements in view of minimising *illegitimate power over* and maximising *power with*.	Planners ought to be reflexive and transform *illegitimate power over* into *power with*.

Let us turn to the findings pertaining to the second question. To what extent are the notions of power in communicative planning theory enabling reflective practice? This question will be responded to with a short and somewhat theoretical answer, which I will return to elaborate and illustrate more concretely through an analysis of Swedish planning practice (Chapters 7 and 8).

The findings show that the communicative planning scholars' core notion is that *illegitimate power over* ought to be criticised and turned into *power with* through participatory planning. Conflictual power is largely defined as illegitimate and consensual power seen as desirable. The constitutive and productive notion of power, *power to* in my family, is largely missing. Regarding

the planners' roles in power relations, the theory provides three basic alternatives: the facilitator, the critical pragmatist and the reflexive planner.

Thereby, communicative planning theory provides planners with a vocabulary, which usefully turns the gaze towards how planning actors, including planners' themselves, might misuse their power to get it their way. It also provides a vision, *power with*, for how things could be different.

The most obvious constraint with this way of framing power is that it reduces *power over* to domination, to an evil. This way of thinking leads to, by definition, excluding the *legitimate power over*, which will be frequently needed to achieve both the communicative planning vision of *power with* and for settling contested planning issues. The second constraint is that more elaborated tools for understanding how *power to* is derived from social order are largely missing. These gaps in the conceptualisation of power are what might cause an attempt to escape from power altogether in participatory planning, even if such an escape does not exist (cf. Haugaard, 2010a).

The two following chapters complement this engagement with scholars' meaning-making by contextualising the research in Swedish planning policy and practice. First, in Chapter 6, I present the analysis of notions of power in planning policy and then in Chapter 7, I provide a look into planning practice and planners' "dirty hands" experiences with power.

6   Notions of power in Swedish planning policy

> Citizens' engagement in societal development and participation in planning can vitalise the municipal democracy. Participation can result in curiosity and interest, which can lead to broader engagement in society as well as in politics. […] But the dialogue ought not to invalidate the rules of representative democracy, where elected representatives have the right to make decisions on behalf of citizens. (Boverket, 2018, p. 18)

This chapter presents the findings from analysing notions of power in Swedish participatory planning policy. Two research questions are pursued: *which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning? To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?* Chapter 5 addressed the same questions and presented findings pertaining to the domain of theory. This chapter supplements those findings by explicating the notions of power in Swedish participatory planning policy.

In the first section the research is contextualised in Swedish planning policy. The second section presents the analysis. Participatory planning guidance from two influential Swedish planning authorities is analysed. When the findings are summarised in the closing section, it is stressed that power is not explicitly discussed in the guidance. Instead notions of power tacitly inform the advice and directions provided to Swedish planners. Underneath the surface of guidance, the consensus frame, identified already in the analysis of communicative planning theory, informs the guidance alongside a more influential authority frame. The guidance employs two of the identity frames, which were found in the analysis of communicative planning theory: the facilitator and the reflexive planner. Importantly, the analysis also identifies an additional expert frame, which legitimises planners' use of *power over*.

6.1 Frame analysis of Swedish planning policy

6.1.1 About Swedish planning and the analysis

The Swedish planning system is shaped by different ideals and ideas. Notably, Swedish planning policy is still strongly influenced by the rational Enlightenment ideals, which traditionally have been relatively strong in Sweden (Strömgren, 2007). These ideals suggest that power relations are structured from the top-down in the planning system. Perhaps its strongest manifestation is the municipal "planning monopoly" and an established view of planning as an expert-lead, yet political endeavour. These ideals were particularly strong during the period of social democratic dominance in Swedish policy from the 1950s to the 1970s (Strömgren, 2007), but still exercise considerable influence over contemporary Swedish planning (Gradén, 2016; Storbjörk and Isaksson, 2005; Strömgren, 2007).

Yet, since the 1960s, Swedish democracy and planning policy also includes participatory ideals (Boverket, 2018; Isaksson et al., 2009; SKL, 2013; SOU 2000:1). Based on the same kind of critique towards rationality as levelled by communicative planning scholars, ideals of participation and deliberation have made imprints on Swedish planning policy. These ideas push for more bottom-up, inclusive and consensual power relations in planning.

Finally, the neoliberal ideals have gained ground since the 1980s. This has led to an increased emphasis on market mechanisms in the planning system (Grange, 2017; Loit, 2014; Metzger et al., 2014). In terms of power, these ideals suggest that planning leads to the undesirable centralisation of power in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats. Instead, neoliberal ideals stress that private actors and market mechanisms should play a more prominent role.

Thus, Swedish planning is arguably influenced by a struggle between competing ideals, which include different notions of power. This situation makes Swedish planning relevant for my study. Since the rational, participatory and neoliberal ideals all are present, it can be assumed that frame analysis will provide access to a variety of notions of power.

To access notions of power in Swedish planning policy, I have chosen planning guidance as the study object. Planning guidance documents are suitable study objects in view of my interest in identifying and assessing different notions of power in participatory planning. Governments and agencies use guidance to influence planning practices in the direction they prefer. Thus, as Cashmore et. al., (2015, p. 85) argue, "guidance play[s] a prominent role in contemporary governance". Given my interest in reflective practice, guidance is especially

relevant to study, since it is intended to help planners make sense of the difficulties they face.

I have chosen to focus the analysis on guidance issued by the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR). These organisations are arguably two of the most important norm-setting organisations for participatory planning in Sweden.

Boverket is the central authority commissioned by the Swedish government to review developments within the fields of housing, building and planning. Boverket supervises town and country planning in Sweden, from legislative, procedural and architectural perspectives. The agency holds a special responsibility to develop Swedish planning processes and its instruments, including pointing out best practices and providing planning guidance.

SALAR represents the governmental, professional and employer related interests of Sweden's 290 municipalities and 20 county councils/regions. All of Sweden's municipalities, county councils and regions are members of SALAR. Since the early 2000s, SALAR has been one of the most influential actors when it comes to promoting citizen dialogue (*medborgardialoger*), which is one of the key terms used for participatory planning processes in Sweden. Their work is guided by a special commission from SALARs congress, which is made up of municipal and regional politicians from Swedish parties. SALAR has a division in their organisation that takes responsibility for democracy and co-creation. They work intensively through networks with politicians and civil servants, organise training programmes, provide web support and produce publications to further citizen dialogue.

In the following section I present and discuss the analysis of Swedish planning policy.[10]

6.1.2 Boverket's framing of power

The frame analysis explicates and assess the notions of power Boverket, as the national agency responsible for planning, draws on when issuing guidance for their planners. Thereby, the analysis provides a window into how the Swedish state suggests planners deal with power relations in participatory planning.

---

10. See Section 3.3 for a discussion of the methodology for the analysis.

Boverket's guidance draws attention to problems with the legitimacy of Swedish democracy by pointing at the need to increase citizens' trust in politics and politicians. The unspoken diagnosis is that there are legitimacy problems, due to low levels of citizen participation in democratic practices. "Citizens' engagement in societal development and participation in planning can vitalise the municipal democracy. Participation can result in curiosity and interest, which can lead to broader engagement in society as well as in politics." (Boverket, 2018, p. 18). This quote illustrates an inferred problem formulation in Boverket's guidance: levels of engagement and participation in Swedish democracy are too low. Boverket thereby links their planning guidance to the broader discussions about the state of Swedish democracy. The choice of the word "vitalise" suggests an underlying diagnosis of a Swedish democracy in need of change.

Boverket suggests that decisions taken through representative democracy can be legitimised if citizens are increasingly included in participatory democracy. More specifically the agency suggests that increased participation will legitimise planning decisions.

> Citizens' participation and engagement increases the legitimacy of planning. It can be about placement of new housing or new neighbourhoods in relation to existing building. A good dialogue creates mutual trust between the municipality and those who live and work in the area. A well implemented dialogue process gives increased understanding for decisions, even if all cannot agree. (Ibid.)

From this action bias, we learn that Boverket implicitly identifies lack of legitimacy and trust as problems that challenge representative democracy in Sweden. We can also see that Boverket suggests that reinforcing participatory democracy through planning will legitimise decision-making within representative democracy.

Underneath this framing of representative democracy in need of more participation lies unstated notions of power. My interpretation is that Boverket draws on a narrative that claims that citizens tend to view the exercise of power by politicians and planers as *illegitimate power over*, if they are not included in planning processes. The logic is that an increase in participation will provide politicians with access to local knowledge and opinions that can inform their use of power. If the exercises of power through planning are made more inclusive of citizens' views, they will find the exercises of *power over* legitimate and consent to them, even if they might not agree with the outcomes.

Boverket's framing is thereby different to the one in communicative planning theory. The main framing in communicative planning theory is that *illegitimate power over* ought to be transformed to *power with*. Even if Boverket shares the critique of *illegitimate power over*, the agency suggests another solution: to

restore the legitimacy of *power over* by making the exercises of *power over* more sensitive to citizens' opinions and knowledge.

In their guidance, Boverket makes a basic distinction between consultation (*samråd*) and citizen dialogue (*medborgardialog*). For Boverket, the term consultation signifies a legally regulated hierarchical relationship, where the municipality asks citizens to comment on municipal plan proposals. In contrast, the concept of citizen dialogue is used to signify a more horizontal and informal relationship where parties on an equal footing jointly make sense of planning options.

Consultation is the legally binding concept in the Swedish Planning and Building Act (2010:900), while citizen dialogue is not used as a regulatory concept in the national planning framework. Interestingly, Boverket chose to use citizen dialogue as the core concept in their guidance: their guide is titled as a guide for citizen dialogue (*medborgardialog*) and not for consultations (*samråd*). This indicates how Boverket advocates for participatory planning that goes beyond the letter of the law, in terms of providing space for participation.

Boverket explains that following the formal consultation procedure is not sufficient if municipalities aspire for better decisions through dialogue with citizens (Boverket, 2008). This standpoint is illustrative of the most prominent action bias in Boverket's guidance: municipalities ought to initiate participatory planning in the early stages of the planning processes or even before the formal start of planning.

From Boverket's reasoning, we learn about the implicit diagnosis behind this action bias. The agency problematises the formal consultation procedure (*samråd*) because it stipulates that municipalities prepare analysis and plan proposals prior to interactions with citizens. Boverket finds that if the municipality prepares draft plans, prior to dialogue with citizens, the risk is that citizens might not find the procedure legitimate, due to their limited possibility to influence the agenda.

Thus, the underlying diagnosis is, in the language of this thesis, that municipalities exercise *illegitimate power over* if they go too far in preparing plans and decisions prior to inviting citizens to participate.

> If the municipality instead initiates citizen dialogue long before these standpoints are established, the citizens' knowledge, experience and needs can improve the basis for decision considerably. […] The residences often have better knowledge about the local circumstances than the planners and decision makers. People who lead everyday lives in a place might see things differently compared to planners. It is important to harvest this knowledge and use it as a basis for the planning […]. (Boverket, 2018, p. 9)

The logic expressed in the quote is that dialogue between planners, politicians and citizens leads to increased understanding of local knowledge and needs. This

way of reasoning leads Boverket (2018, p. 17) to stipulate that "citizen dialogue ought to give increased citizens' influence".

The underlying notion of power seems to be that the exercise of *power over* might be made redundant, since plus sum solutions can be identified through increased (early) participation. Through the family resemblance view, this can be seen as a hope for *power with* or perhaps again an expectation that the use of *power over* might be accepted if it is seen as informed by citizens' knowledge and views.

A red thread runs through the guidance of Boverket's acceptance of the necessity of *legitimate power over*, both for process and outcome legitimacy. First, Boverket argues that inclusive planning processes will not arise without purposeful design.

> It is important to engage a broad spectrum of participants to the meetings and the dialogue fora. Special activities might be required to attract people who represent other interests than those next to the planned area. It is an art to distribute the talking space fairly equal and to get everyone to express their opinion. (Boverket, 2018, p. 18)

This reasoning shows how Boverket sees problems with the exclusion of people in citizen dialogue as prominent. The agency emphasises how inclusive and fair dialogue might not happen without purposeful design.

Besides arguing for focused process design, Boverket also draws attention to the limits of participatory planning as a means to legitimise planning outcomes and decisions. It is stressed that "there is an apparent risk that the people who participate in the dialogue get unproportioned influence, compared to those who do not participate, in spite of being concerned with the issue." (Boverket, 2018, p. 18). This clarifies how Boverket sees representative democracy as a guarantee for planning to be capable of realising the common good (*allmänna intresset*), which can be understood as an interest in outcome legitimacy.

Thereby, the analysis shows how Boverket recognises the tension between representative and participatory democracy. Boverket chose to explicitly address how municipalities ought to tackle such tensions.

> A well-designed citizen dialogue gives inhabitants possibilities to express their concerns and exercises more concrete influence than otherwise. But the dialogue ought not to invalidate [kullkasta] the rules of representative democracy, where elected representatives have the right to make decisions on behalf of citizens. (Boverket, 2018, p. 18)

In this quote Boverket advocates both representative and participatory democracy, while also making clear how there are tensions between the two. Boverket chose to stress that participatory planning ought to provide citizens with a "more concrete" voice and influence than they usually have. Importantly,

Boverket also clearly states that it is the elected politicians who hold the right to make decisions on behalf of citizens.

Notably Boverket uses the strong word invalidate (*kullkasta*) when they discuss the tension between participatory planning and representative democracy. The strongly negative connotations of the word (and the Swedish metaphor) seem to indicate that Boverket finds it important to get their point across: participation might undermine representative democracy and if this happens, there should be no doubt that the representative model should dictate "the rules of the game".

Thus, in my interpretation, Boverket frames power in participatory planning by firmly placing it within the boundaries of representative democracy. The emphasis is then on how legitimacy can be strengthened through increased and earlier participation by citizens in the planning processes.

This framing is tacitly informed by notions of power. Increased participation is seen to carry potential for creating legitimacy through plus-sum processes where consensus is possible. This line of thought can be explained as an interest in *power with*, yet at the same time Boverket also recognises that *legitimate power over,* derived from democratic mandates and expertise, is still necessary in order to assure process and outcome legitimacy. *Power to*, the ability to act derived from social order, is present under the surface of the text, but is merely seen as arising from democratic mandates and expertise. Less visible links between power and social order, such as socialisation and discipline are absent from the guidance.

Boverket's framing of planners' roles in power relations

The guide emphasises that planners have the right to and are responsible for making choices regarding the design of participatory planning processes. It is thereby stressed how planners (commissioned by politicians) ought to take the lead in participatory planning and clarify what is possible for citizens to influence.

> If it is not about dialogue, but about pure information, you [the planner] ought to make that clear. […] Tell the citizens early how they can influence the planning. Explain the planning conditions, why the municipality wants to do this and clarify what can be influenced. (Boverket, 2018, p. 15)

Boverket suggests that it is up to the planners to clarify if the purpose with interactions with citizens is dialogue or "pure information". Behind this action bias is a concern that citizens will lose trust if they are given a false sense that they can influence, when the actual space for influence is limited.

When it comes to process design, the guidance is placing the planners in the driver's seat. They are firmly put in charge, "Clarify the preconditions and plan the process […] How much the citizens are to be involved and in which parts of the process" (Boverket, 2018, p. 34). Notably Boverket constructs the process design as an internal municipal affair intended to clarify the purpose of participatory planning.

In my interpretation, this framing of planners as in charge of citizen dialogue, is based on the notion that *legitimate power over* is derived from democratic mandates and expertise. Planners, due to being experts in process design or in more technical areas of planning, and due to their position in the democratic planning system, hold authority that makes their exercise of *power over* legitimate. Boverket views *power over* as an inevitable process in planning. *Power over,* exercised by politicians and planners, is needed both to secure process and outcome legitimacy.

Yet Boverket also draws on the reflexive planner frame (identified in the analysis of communicative planning theory) to advise planners to critically scrutinise if their practices might be seen as exercise of *illegitimate power over*. This is indicated by how planners' habitual practices are criticized. "[…] activate more of the participants and get away from the traditional larger assembly meetings, where citizens have a passive role" (Boverket, 2018, p. 41). Here the implicit analysis is that planners (and politicians) prefer "traditional larger assembly meetings" and this is problematic since those practices make citizens "passive".

Employing the reflexive frame, Boverket (2018, p. 36) is also questioning presumed modes of communication. "Consider that all might not be comfortable with reading maps and understanding statistics". So here planners are encouraged to pay attention to how their practices might exclude certain people. Boverket is also paying attention to how planners ought to compensate marginalised groups.

> Chose a dialogue method which really facilitates participation, also from people or groups who do not have background knowledge in planning. It is useful to make a designated invitation to people or groups who might be difficult to engage in the dialogue. […] Also think about that people with disabilities ought to be able to enter into the premises. They might need special aids to participate […] Think about that all might not be comfortable with reading maps or understand statistics. (Boverket, 2018, p. 106)

Notably, Boverket is implicitly problematising planners' everyday practices because these might be seen as exercises of *illegitimate power over*. The following action bias is for planners to employ alternative modes of communication and more inclusive physical design of the premises where participatory planning is taking place.

In my interpretation, this framing is tacitly informed by a critique of *illegitimate power over*. By critiquing three-dimensional power over, Boverket suggests that planners ought to question their habitual ways of exercising power. At the same time, the agency assumes that planners must actively use *legitimate power over* to achieve the process and outcome legitimacy needed to restore the trust in the planning system.

Boverket uses neutrality as a key concept in their framing of planners' roles in relation to citizens. The agency argues that facilitators of citizen dialogue ought to be neutral.

> Chose a communicator or facilitator who can be neutral in relation to the opinions raised in the discussion […] consider if there might be reasons for having an external meeting leader. A professional dialogue leader might be needed and it might be good for the balance with a totally neutral person. (Boverket, 2018, p. 36)

Boverket claims that a facilitator of dialogue is needed here and argues that they ought to be neutral. Boverket suggests that the facilitator might be a planner, but also emphasises that there might be good reasons for bringing in a professional facilitator who can be "totally neutral". Underlying Boverket's neutrality narrative is the assumption that the advantage of the behaviour and position of a neutral facilitator is that he or she will not have a stake in the planning. The facilitator will thereby be seen as legitimate due to his or her "neutrality".

The narrative about neutrality is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the notion, discussed previously, that facilitators/planners ought to make purposeful design choices. Practitioners who make design choices, which inevitably will be to the advantage of certain actors, might not be accepted as neutral by other actors who oppose these choices. Perhaps Boverket deems it necessary for facilitators to be neutral towards the outcome of planning, while they advise planners and facilitators to make purposeful design choices to assure process legitimacy? This interpretation makes sense as a way to reconcile the two narratives. Yet it is still difficult to see how the distinction between making (often contested) process design choices and being neutral towards planning outcomes can work in practice, since process design choices most frequently influence the outcome.

The difficulties to reconcile these two narratives, about purposeful design choices and neutral facilitators, can perhaps be explained by the lack of vocabulary of power in the guidance. For underneath the surface of Boverket's reasoning are notions of power, which remain implicit. The advice that planners ought to make process design choices can be seen as a call for planners to use *legitimate power over*. In contrast, the argument for neutrality is rather difficult to conceptualise within a vocabulary of power. Neutrality seems to imply that facilitators can be positioned outside a system of power, i.e. outside a social order. If facilitators are conceptualised in this way, it is difficult to explain why planning actors would

accept their attempts to exercise power. From where would facilitators' *power to* arise and why would their attempts to exercise *power with* or *power over* be accepted by other planning actors? Hence, the tension, between the narratives of process design choices and neutrality, might be due to the former being consistent with a vocabulary of power and the latter less so. In other words, neutrality is a difficult concept to fit into a family of power concepts.

6.1.3 SALAR's framing of power

SALAR is the political association, which organises the local level in the Swedish planning system. Analysing SALAR's guidance provides access to another kind of organisational framing compared to that of Boverket, who represents the national level.

SALAR's framing of power in participatory planning

The analysis shows that SALAR frames power in two similar, yet distinct ways. First, the organisation frames along the same lines as Boverket: Swedish democracy suffers from a lack of legitimacy, which ought to be restored through increased participation within the boundaries set by representative democracy. In the second framing, SALAR instead suggests that complex and contested issues cannot be handled through the conventional decision-making procedures offered by representative democracy, due to the risk that decisions taken would not be accepted by the conflicting parties. This diagnosis leads SALAR to argue that politicians and planners "must be brave" and "accept that they do not solely hold the right to make decisions." (SKL, 2013, p. 17). In my interpretation, this framing originates from the notions of power expounded as the consensus frame, which was identified through the analysis of communicative planning theory (see Chapter 5).

I will start by discussing the analysis of the more authoritative framing, the one similar to Boverket's reasoning. The intention is to shed additional light on the underlying notions of power.

SALAR's diagnosis points to how the space available for citizen influence is frequently unclear in citizen dialogue.

> Experiences show that participants think that the decision will be taken through the dialogue. The reason for this might be that the purpose of the meeting and its' role in the decision-making process are unclear. This has to be crystal clear when municipalities implement citizens' dialogues as part of the governing process. (SKL, 2009, p. 16)

The action bias flowing from this diagnosis is that politicians and planners ought to clarify the level of influence. To do that, the guidance points towards an adjusted version of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation, as a tool for deciding the level of citizens' influence in participatory planning. Notably, Arnstein's original idea, the normative desirability of climbing the ladder, is replaced with a view of the ladder as a value neutral heuristic device. SALAR thereby suggests that the ladder can be used in order to provide clarity about the level of influence. It is argued that politicians and planners ought to stipulate what is possible to influence in a specific episode of participatory planning.

> Experiences show that elected officials too often have to defend themselves, sometimes because the dialogue is implemented to late in the process or because the space for influence has not been clearly delineated. (Ibid.) […] In order to systematise the choice of methods for citizen dialogue, the purpose of SALAR's stair is to create awareness of the scope and depth of participation, which the municpality/county wishes to offer its citizens in dialogues. (SKL, 2019a, p. 16)

Hence, this part of the analysis shows how SALAR, just as Boverket, suggests that participatory planning ought to be firmly anchored within the boundaries of representative democracy. The idea is that municipalities hold the right to use *legitimate power over* resulting from their democratic mandate. This kind of power is needed to clarify the scope of influence in citizen dialogue. Notably, SALAR (and Boverket) are thereby, in contrast to communicative planning scholars, emphasising how *power over* is necessary in participatory planning.

In their publications with specific guidance for participatory planning on "contested and complex issues", SALAR frames power in a somewhat alternative manner (SKL, 2013; SKL, 2019b). The core diagnosis is then that conflicting issues do not lend themselves well to be decided through representative democracy.

> There are a number of issues, which are so complex, and thereby potentially conflictual, that it is really difficult to handle through 'the conventional way'. […] the choice is to make a decision, which will be very unpopular among some groups or not to make a decision at all. Unfortunately, also non-decisions can have negative consequences. Non-decisions can lead to inefficient use of resources, which might hurt vulnerable groups, groups with little voice or lead to protests, which can result in riots. (SKL, 2013, p. 7)

This excerpt shows how SALAR draws on another kind of frame, which is affiliated with the consensual notions of power in communicative planning theory (see Chapter 5). It is no longer seen as sufficient for municipalities to exercise *power over*. Instead, SALAR now implies that *power over* might not be complied with since it might be viewed as illegitimate by citizens.

> The principle, which it all starts with is to 'open up'. This means that more people need to be included in the formulation of the problem and the work to handle it. The municipality needs to work with an "inclusive approach". This approach is active, curious and all participants are treated equally. (SKL, 2013, p. 28)

Notably, in this framing an alternative metaphor of "levels" replaces the formerly used ladder metaphor and now "Dialogue is the highest level where the intention is to agree on solutions, which all can accept" (SKL, 2013, p. 15). In contrast to the ladder image, where the steps were seen as value neutral, "dialogue" is now given a higher value than "discussion", "rule-based procedure" and "run over". Specifically, the latter metaphor comes with a distinctively negative connotation. "For some issues there is no solution, instead 'run over' is applied. Run over means that those who hold the formal power make a decision, even if other groups oppose the decision" (SKL, 2013, p. 15).

In my interpretation, SALAR is now tacitly informed by the consensual way of seeing power, the same frame that was previously found in the analysis of communicative planning theory. Power is then implicitly seen as *illegitimate power over* and ought therefore to be replaced by *power with*. Thereby, SALAR opens a critique of prevailing power hierarchies, at the same time as running the risk of suggesting that there might be an escape from *power over*. This framing is clearly illustrated by the metaphor "run over", which dramatically underscores how reprehensible it is to exercise *power over*.

Yet, under the surface of SALAR's guidance, there is simultaneously recognition of the necessity of *legitimate power over*.

> The work is finalised by the signing of an agreement with the help of the mediator. The purpose is to clarify what has been achieved, what has been agreed, what the parties disagree on, what to do if parties cannot agree, how the parties ought to relate to each other, how unresolved issues will be resolved in the future and how the respective group is responsible for holding the agreement. (SKL, 2013, p. 27)

It is emphasised how the agreement should include a clear division of power and responsibility. "Agreements rarely last forever, therefore the agreement period and how to follow up ought to be clearly stated in the agreement. Who is responsible, how to follow up, the feedback results of following up […]" (SKL, 2013, p. 28). Interestingly, SALAR is also suggesting that a higher authority might be needed to oversee the agreement. "Finally, the agreement also ought to stipulate if another body, for example the municipal council, needs to make decisions about its validity" (SKL, 2013, p. 28).

This reasoning, in my interpretation, implies a return of *legitimate power over* through the back door. Thereby, the analysis reveals tensions between notions of power as conflictual and as consensual.

SALAR's framing of planners' roles in power relations

The two alternative frames identified above, the consensual and the more authoritative, are reflected in how SALAR approaches planners' roles in power relations. SALAR employs the already identified facilitator frame and the reflexive planner frame,[11] but the guidance is also informed by an additional frame, which stresses planners' legitimate right to exercises *power over,* due to expertise and democratic mandates.

Drawing on the latter frame, SALAR emphasises how planners are positioned in the democratic system and thereby hold the authority to exercise *legitimate power over* in participatory planning. Planners are encouraged to use this authority to tackle the problems that SALAR has identified in the practice of participatory planning. This includes the diagnosis that politicians need better knowledge about citizens' values; that there often is a lack of clarity regarding the space for influence and that there is a problem with the "usual suspects" in participatory planning.

SALAR's action bias, in relation to these problems, is mainly that planners ought to clarify the space available for citizens to influence and that planners ought to actively work to reach out to those who are rarely participating to include them in participatory planning. Underlying this narrative is the notion that planners ought to exercise *legitimate power over* in order to assure process and outcome legitimacy.

In an alternative framing, it is in contrast argued that planners, to some extent, ought to question their habitual practices, including the tendency to use exclusionary language and organise meetings in the city hall. I interpret these suggestions as derived from the reflexive planner frame (see Chapter 5).

When SALAR is employing the facilitator frame, they rely upon the concept neutrality, just as Boverket. The diagnosis is then that "successful conflict management requires […] a neutral party (mediator) who drives, and is responsible for, the process" (SKL, 2013, p. 17). SALAR's argument seems to be based on the idea that a "neutral mediator" is necessary in order to establish trust from all participants.

> In order to be trustworthy when one opens up and issue, those who work with citizen dialogue need to be seen as neutral. Neutrality is here defined as impartial, not valuing and compassionate. Neutrality is a role and a tool, which municipal employees can be trained to assume, but it can be difficult and requires practice and awareness. (SKL, 2019b, p.13)

---

11. These frames were identified in the analysis of communicative planning theory in Chapter 5.

Neutrality is seen as important in order to achieve trust in the participatory planning process.

> All those who are concerned or will be concerned within the organization, must be involved; foremost in order to get knowledge and understanding of the necessity to give an independent role to the mediator in order to make the process successful. This means that those who are politicians or civil servants cannot expect to influence the mediator to take the road that directors, politicians and others might think is the best one. The reason being that the municipality/county also has a perspective/s, which should not have more weight than other perspectives. (SKL, 2013, p. 18)

From this we learn that SALAR stresses that the involved parties must be convinced to see the mediator, which is a similar position to that of the facilitator, as independent. SALAR stresses how this means that the municipal directors and politicians should not expect the mediator/facilitator to look after their interests.

From further elaboration in the guidance (SKL, 2013), we learn that planners can, under some (unspecified) conditions, play the role of neutral facilitators, while under other (again unspecified) conditions will be seen as representatives of the municipality and thereby as a party to the conflict and thus unable to act as neutral facilitators. SALAR discusses the role of the mediator/facilitator as follows:

> The mediator's assignment is to create a safe forum for open dialogue between the concerned parties. The mediator can contribute with a "neutral energy" to the process. This neutrality creates the basis for increased trust and confidence between the parties. (SKL, 2013, p. 18)

Yet the municipality is still given a special role as the commissioner of a mediator/facilitator, either from outside or from inside the municipal organisation.

> To give the mandate is a brave and necessary action in order to progress the process. […] The municipality's/county's civil servants and elected politicians are often involved parties. Thus, the mediator must be able to talk also to them – as parties in the conflict – even if they at the same time are the commissioners of the mediator. It is important that the mediator's neutrality always is respected. (SKL, 2013, pp. 18-19)

Just as for Boverket, neutrality is a key concept in SALAR's narrative of planners' role in power relations. But it is difficult to reconstruct the underlying logic in a language of power. It seems as if SALAR's intention is similar to Boverket's: the facilitator's role is to turn *illegitimate power* into *power with*. Through the vocabulary of the power family, we can see that this task requires that the facilitators are accepted by participants as having a position in a power system, which entitles them with the *power to* act as facilitators. Yet, the concept of neutrality suggests that facilitators are positioned unbiased outside of such

power systems. Why would participants accept that the holder of this position is entitled to *power to* act as facilitators?

SALAR's and Boverket's neutrality narrative also leaves us puzzled when it comes to *legitimate power over*. When participatory planning is conflictual, meaning and goals are no longer shared. Under such conditions the facilitator will need to make design choices and facilitate processes, which will frequently be contested. In the language of power, such conflictual situations require the use of *power over* by some actors to restore a social order, which enables coordinated action (Haugaard, 2003). Hence the use of *power over* is inevitable in the kind of planning processes where SALAR and Boverket make the case for neutral facilitators. But how can the neutral facilitator justify the use of *power over*? When would a neutral facilitator's use of power be deemed as legitimate and complied with? These key questions are difficult to answer based on the guidance provided by SALAR and Boverket.

6.2 The findings

This section summarises the findings pertaining to the two research questions.

- Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?
- To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?

The analysis of Swedish planning policy complements the findings from the analysis of communicative planning theory (Chapter 5). The final research task to analyse Swedish participatory planning practice (Chapter 7) will provide additional findings and enable a complete answer to the questions (Chapter 8).

First, it is important to stress that Boverket's and SALAR's guidance offers little in terms of explicit vocabulary for reflections on power relations. Instead the analysis revealed inferred notions of power underneath the surface of the text. Regarding the first frame topic, power in participatory planning, the analysis found that the consensus frame, identified in the analysis of communicative planning theory, informs the guidance. But also, and more prominently, there is another kind of frame, which I conceptualise as the authority frame. In contrast to the consensus frame, the authority frame does not suggest that *illegitimate power over* is to be replaced by *power with*, instead the action bias is for participatory planning to restore the *legitimacy of power over* by improved communication between politicians, planners and citizens.

Through the authority frame, both Boverket and SALAR draw attention to a lack of trust in Swedish democracy, which participatory planning ought to address by providing space for communication between the "rulers" and the "ruled". Yet this frame also leads to setting clear boundaries around

participation. For participation should not "invalidate" (*kullkasta*) representative democracy. In my interpretation this reasoning originates from a diagnosis questioning the *legitimacy of power over*, which leads to an action bias to restore the *legitimacy of power over* through participatory planning. This authority frame is summarised in Table 10.

Table 10. *The authority frame*

	Authority
Diagnosis	The legitimacy of *power over* is questioned in planning.
Action bias	Participatory planning ought to restore the *legitimacy of power over*.

Regarding the second frame topic, planners' roles in power relations, the analysis revealed how the guidance drew on two of the three identity frames offered by communicative planning theory: the facilitator and the reflexive planner (see Chapter 5).

Additionally, another kind of framing of planners in power relations was present in the guidance. Here it was stressed that planners hold a special position as experts and civil servants in the planning system and this position requires that they use their authority to make design choices, to settle conflicts and to ensure that planning meets not only the interests of those who participate, but also the common good.

Underlying this reasoning is an expert frame. Seen through this frame, planners' roles in power relations are to exercise *legitimate power over* based on expertise and democratic mandates. This frame is summarised in Table 11.

Table 11. *The expert frame*

	Expert
Diagnosis	Planners are experts positioned in a democratic system and thereby entitled to exercise *legitimate power over*.
Action bias	The planner ought to exercise *power over* to assure process and outcome legitimacy.

What does the analysis tell us about the extent to which the notions of power in the guidance enables reflective practice? First, the analysis shows that the planning guidance does not offer much in terms of explicit vocabulary for planners' reflections on power relations. Power is rarely mentioned explicitly in the guidance and hence a vocabulary for critical reflections on power is not provided.

However, the family of power concepts, which was applied and tested in the analysis, showed capable of explicating the tacit notions underneath the text. Thereby, some conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which the notions of power in the guidance enable reflective practice. I will here point to the core

observations, which will be complemented through findings from the analysis of participatory planning practice (Chapter 7) and finally be used as a basis for rethinking power (Chapter 8).

The manner in which the consensus, facilitator and reflexive planner frames are applied in the guidance can enable useful critical reflection on *illegitimate power over.* Here, the guidance is suggesting a similar kind of critical scrutiny of hierarchical power relations as communicative planning theory (Chapter 5). The critical scrutiny of hierarchical power relations offered by the guidance is certainly an important asset for reflective planners.

But the way that these three frames are applied in the guidance also leads to constraints for reflective practice. The three frames rely on the basic thought figure that *power over* ought to be turned into *power with.* This might be a useful way to understand and normatively appraise certain situations in planning, but this thought figure falls short of supplying a vocabulary suitable for reflecting on contested planning situations, where there might be no plus-sum solution. Hence, there is a conceptual void when it comes to conflictual, and yet acceptable, *power over*, which in the power family is conceptualised as *legitimate power over*. Hence the consensus, facilitator and reflexive planner frames leave us with a vexing question: how should planners make sence of planning when it is conflictual, when a language of consensual power does not suffice?

A linked problem, which the guidance shares with communicative planning theory, is the lack of vocabulary for reflections on power as constitutive and productive. These are the notions of power, which are covered by *power to* in my power family. [12] This gap in understanding is, for example, causing tension in the narrative of facilitators who both make (potentially contested) process design choices and are neutral. The former requires exercises of power, which are accepted by planning actors, while the latter suggest that facilitators are positioned outside a power system. Why would participants accept the use of power from a facilitator positioned outside of a power system? Is the language of neutrality sufficient to justify what will inevitably be the use of power? In my view, the language of neutrality risks confusing reflective practice. Instead, a vocabulary of power is more suitable as is demonstrated by the way in which the power family is applied in the analysis.

Finally, the analysis also shows how the authority and the expert frame bridges some, but not all, of the gaps in the understanding offered by the three "power with frames". The authority and expert frames offer an understanding of *power over* as a necessary part of participatory planning. This conflictual notion

---

12. See Section 4.2.2 for a more elaborate discussion of *power to*.

of power is a much-needed addition to the consensual framing in communicative planning theory.

Through the family resemblance view of power, we can see how alternative understandings can, sometimes, be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. This points to the possibility of seeing power as a plural concept.

The notion of *legitimate power over* in the guidance stresses justification of the use of power through a representative democracy model. Expertise and democratic mandates are implicitly seen as sources for legitimacy. This is a useful addition to communicative planning theory, which largely lacks a conceptualised account of the legitimacy of power. Yet, it is too reductive to merely conceptualise legitimacy by referencing the ideas of representative democracy. Participatory planning takes place at the intersection of representative and participatory democracy and hence requires a broader conceptualisation of legitimacy. In this way, the guidance might supply planners with some but not all of the conceptual tools they need to reflect on legitimacy.

I will return to elaborate on these observations when the rethinking of power is presented in Chapter 8. But first, the next chapter takes us to Swedish participatory planning practice.

7   Notions of power in Swedish planning practice

> One of the reasons that I decided to resign was my concern about the municipality's apparent unwillingness to prepare for social conflicts that I knew were coming our way. (Planner in Gothenburg Municipality)

> Yes, I think that is the 10 000-crown question: what is right to do when people have different opinions? (Planner in Uppsala Municipality)

This chapter presents the findings from analysing notions of power in Swedish participatory planning practice. Two research questions are pursued: *Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning? To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?* The previous investigations into communicative planning theory (Chapter 5) and Swedish participatory planning policy (Chapter 6) have already provided findings pertaining to the questions. This chapter complements these by providing insights about the experiences of Swedish planners. In the analysis, I elicit and analyse stories about participatory planning episodes from two Swedish planners.

The first section presents the stories and the frame analysis. The first story gives an account of participatory planning when stakes are high and the planner is crisscrossed by power relations, which block the possibility to do what he wishes to. In contrast, the other story offers insights into what a planner might do when resources are less scarce, planning issues not as controversial and there is more space to reflect and make purposeful choices.

In the closing section, I draw together the findings. At this point, it is emphasised that the planners find it difficult to deal with the complexity of power relations. Both the consensus and the authority frames figures under the surface in the stories. In their different ways the planners are challenged by the tension arising from the competing notions of power in these frames. Is *power with* always preferable? When is *power over* legitimate? The planners' struggles

with those kinds of question shows the value of the broad conceptualisation of power developed in this thesis.

7.1 Frame analysis of Swedish participatory planning practice

The planners I have interviewed[13] share the same desires for revitalising democracy and for empowering citizens through planning as the scholars and policy makers, whose framing I analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. Their stories show us how planners are confronted with situations, which require hard thinking and questioning of presumed notions about what power is and when it is legitimate.

Yet, just as in the Swedish planning guidance (Chapter 5), notions of power mainly remain tacit in the stories. Underneath the surface, the planners' meaning-making is guided by the process and identity frames, which were identified in the analysis of communicative planning theory and Swedish planning policy. The stories demonstrate how these frames are constraining and enabling the planners' attempts to deal with power.

7.1.1 Dialogue or information meetings?
- The story of a contested planning process

During the spring of 2016, Bernard le Roux was working as a dialogue strategist in Gothenburg Municipality. He was responsible for designing and facilitatating participatory processes and for providing advice and support to other departments in the municipality. This story focuses on Bernard's work with a series of citizen meetings on suggested locations for temporary housing for refugees in Gothenburg. The increased number of refugees had resulted in a need to swiftly build houses for the newcomers. The municipality had identified potential sites where houses could be built. After having identified the sites, the municipality decided to arrange a series of, what they called, "information meetings" with the intention of presenting their plans for suggested locations and answering citizens' questions.

Bernard is an experienced facilitator specialising in designing dialogue processes and facilitating meetings, often those with a great deal of conflict. His chief interest is in conflict management and he has a background as a mediator in interpersonal and social conflicts. An important basis for Bernard's motivation is his upbringing in South Africa during the conflictual period prior

---

13. See Section 3.3 for a discussion of the methodology I have developed and applied.

to democratisation. During this time, he learned that if people are empowered to work through conflicts, solutions tend to be more sustainable.

Therefore, he believes that it is important to create, what he calls, "real meetings" where humans "really meet each other" so that "something new can be created". He explains,

> To me dialogue is more than simply an exchange, it goes deeper than only the head. In a dialogue something new and bigger is created. I have seen how people can become locked into positions and how damaging the effects are. South Africa is an example of this. That is why we talk so much about creating a flow in the context of dialogue. (le Roux, 2016)

Bernard has been inspired by Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela, as they "show that we can be better than we normally are and leave our natural instinct to revenge aside". Theoretically he draws on three areas: firstly, conflict and mediation theory, especially Folger and Bush (2004) and their "Transformative Mediation". "I always return to their way of looking at conflict, dialogue and communication". Secondly, he is inspired by Myrna Lewis' work on Deep Democracy (www.deep-democracy.net), which has helped him to "see what is under the surface in group processes". Thirdly, he refers to design thinking as inspiring an approach to open up and listen, "to listen, reflect and concretise, prototyping on small scale inspires me in my work".

A key event in his life that has led him into process design and facilitation was when he freed himself from his father.

> My father was a judge in South Africa. I studied law, but felt instinctively that this was not the path for me. I realised how law melted into repressive hierarchical structures, which resulted in me not becoming a lawyer. Instead, I became a teacher and saw how children ended up being the real victims in conflicts between the parents. I thought to myself that there must be another way, thus leading to becoming a mediator. After seeing how relationship conflicts often simply went around in circles, I started to think that there has to be a better way to deal with differences and conflict. I turned to Myrna Lewis who taught me that there are always issues under the surface related to the unconscious in a group and in the self. I was also inspired by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. (le Roux, 2016)

Bernard and I decided to focus the interview on his work with a series of citizen meetings on temporary housing for refugees in Gothenburg in February 2016. Bernard was at that time working in Gothenburg Municipality as a "dialogue strategist". What follows is Bernard's own story of the difficulties he confronted.[14]

---

14. See Section 3.3.5 for a description of the method I have applied to elicit Bernard's story.

This was the last job I did before leaving Gothenburg Municipality. One of the reasons that I decided to resign was my concern about the municipality's apparent unwillingness to prepare for social conflicts that I knew were coming our way. One issue was the refugee crisis and another was the problems arising in our schools. We talked a lot about preventing damaging conflicts and training politicians and civil servants in dialogue and when the municipality was suddenly faced with the challenge of building temporary houses resulting from a new law that came into force in February or March. It was almost a sense of panic, since there were not enough houses in the current stock. I saw the need for dialogue but there was no receptiveness on the part of the municipality.

The Communication Department took responsibility for ten information meetings and we were not asked to contribute. Although, the Thursday before the first meeting (on the following Tuesday), the person who would lead these meetings felt that they could not lead the meetings. We were then asked if we could step in and help to lead the meetings. First, we considered saying no because we felt the approach of using one-way communication to be inappropriate, but we were ordered by our superiors to do the job.

I was frustrated by the limited possibilities to influence the design of the process. To me the whole process design is highly important; it has to do with how you invite people and how you think about the meeting. The Communication Department were worried that people might become angry and violent and they thought that we were able to deal with conflict. We were given a tight leash and it was deemed unnecessary for us to meet those from the city who would face the public. Instead we met with a coordinator at the communication department. We raised concerns that if the meetings became too one-sided, focused only on information, that would increase the risk for conflict. We also said that our experience is that one should not expect people to politely ask questions at such meetings; it is not that people need more information, many would attend the meetings to protest. The more one-sided the meeting is, the higher the risk of tension. We attempted to prepare the directors who would be on stage, to influence them to maintain a receptive and open attitude.

I was not present at the first meeting, but facilitated the second and third meetings. Part of my preparation was to work with myself, as a facilitator. I am my own instrument. I need to be very clear with myself about how I function. We were told about security arrangements and that guards would be present. Unfortunately, I did not get much possibility of speaking to the directors who would be at the meetings. We had a brief exchange just before the meeting. The form was pre-determined. This did not feel right to me. I felt that I was taken hostage in someone else design process.

If they ask me to come and handle conflicts then I will do it to my best ability. For me there is a big difference between one-way communication and an exchange or dialogue. If we were to do a dialogue process there would not only be people standing on a stage talking and repeating information that had already been published in the papers. The design would be entirely different. If you are about to make decisions that concern people, they have a right to be part of the process. If you only tell them that this is the way we will do it you risk turning those who are affected against you, since they will see the "dialogue" as a phony process. You need to understand people's concerns. There is a difference between only giving information and having a dialogue to understand. Nobody thought about including the refugees in the meetings. They were viewed as objects. Some participants saw them as potential rapists.

Prior to the meetings, I felt a lot of pressure. I was nervous because there was a lot of activity on Facebook, you know racist stuff. To prepare for the meetings, we said that we needed a team of trained facilitators with microphones on the floor. They would be a part of the facilitation team. This was important. This had worked well for us previously. They would have the responsibility to identify "hot spots" and identify participants who are angry and wanted to speak and to let them know that we knew that they wanted to speak. This was not to prevent people from speaking, it was rather to assure that those who want to say something would have a chance to do so. We talked about three things before the meeting: firstly, if someone stood up and shouted comments we would ask them to wait for their turn and use the microphone. If someone just took the microphone and continued talking we had the possibility of cutting the sound. We also talked about what to do if violence occurred.

In this kind of meeting, you have a lot of power as facilitator. Potentially you can direct the flow of the meeting. There are simple things you can do: make sure that you have eye contact with everybody. This communicates that you are aware of what is occurring and this creates a sense of security or safety. Then you can slow down the pace of the conversation and you can ensure that the microphone reaches those who want to speak. These things can make a real difference.

At the meeting, there were many expressions of power in the room. There were people using their phones to film those who were positive to the refugees and asking them who they were. Uniformed men stood at the back of the hall with flags. At one stage it almost became violent. It was when a young anarchist had been provocative. When he left, some people followed him out. The guards were alerted and needed to ensure that he would remain safe.

At the first meeting, politicians were sitting in the audience and they were asked questions by the public. This resulted in a debate between the politicians;

they expressed different views on the issue. Some of them said things that went against what the directors had said. Then those who were in charge signaled to them that they should not respond. This was very interesting. But the civil servants were very concerned about this. In the break all the politicians, except the Swedish Democrats [the far-right wing party], were told that they should not participate in the meeting nor answer questions. I was very surprised by this. I have never experienced anything like it before. I knew that they would be in the audience and for me it was obvious that if politicians were asked questions they should be allowed to respond.

I left the city administration two or three days after the meetings I facilitated. After that there were more meetings in other districts. I did not get any real feedback directly after the meetings from those in charge other than that they said that they were pleased that we had kept the meetings calm. The only substantive feedback I got was by coincidence when I did a study, months after and met with some of the politicians and directors. Then they reasoned that it had not been possible to influence the decisions about the refugee houses and that this meant that it was important to clarify that the meetings were merely intended for informing and answering questions. They told me that as civil servants their job was to enable political decisions. The intention was not to have a dialogue.

If I had been in charge and could have decided on the way this should have been dealt with in the first place. Then I would design a process where power is shared between the decision-makers and those who are affected by the decision; between me as facilitator and those who participate. Then we should talk about how to set up the meeting. For me process design is also part of gathering of perspectives. Prior to the meeting I want to ask people what is important for you, how and with whom would you like to talk about it. I would have mapped the different perspectives prior to the meeting and instead of a big meeting we would have designed smaller group processes. You know, you can't try to solve this kind of thing with 300 people at the same time. This is what I would have proposed. But if they had insisted on a big meeting I would have organized it in a different way. Not as an information meeting, instead I would have given space for dialogue.

7.1.2 Analysing the story

This story provides a window into an episode of planning where stakes are high and process and outcomes contested. The story is about a frame contest where time is short and those in charge are unable to talk things through. In my interpretation, the core narrative is about Bernard's desire for real dialogue

originating from the consensus frame and the communication departments' intention to inform citizens, based on the authority frame. In line with Bernard's preference for dialogue, he mainly draws on a facilitator frame to position himself in the power relations. But, when under pressure, he switches into a critically pragmatic position to do what is necessary in a difficult situation.

The planner's framing of power in participatory planning

The main narrative is about a confrontation between two opposing camps, it is Bernard and his colleagues versus the communication department. Bernard's fraction is making the diagnosis that citizens will not find the process for deciding on sites for refugee houses legitimate if they are not included in participatory planning. His preference is for inclusive dialogue. Bernard's argument is that there is a link between an inclusive planning process and citizens' acceptance of planning decisions.

> The results after the Gothenburg meetings was, for example, that one of the houses were set on fire as a protest. So, the risk is that the end result will not be good if meetings are aimed only at providing information. People reason: 'If I can´t influence the decision, I will go back to other means such as threats and violence'. They feel that they are not listened to, marginalised and lack power in relation to politicians and civil servants who can make decisions without even listening to those concerned. (le Roux, 2016)

To Bernard the action bias is for participatory planning to be inclusive and provide space for dialogue. In my interpretation this understanding originates from the consensus frame with the core idea that *illegitimate power over* outside participatory planning ought to be turned into *power with* inside the participatory process.

In the story, we also learn about Bernard's interpretation of the intentions of those he was up against, the ones who were in charge of preparing the meetings. He tells how they were determined to make sure that the meetings were only about information and answering questions. The argument they gave Bernard was that their job as civil servants is to implement a political decision and not to have dialogue.

Here the story provides us with insight into the reasoning of those who preferred to see the meetings as information meetings rather than dialogue meetings. I interpret their way of reasoning as informed by the authority frame, which was identified in the analysis of Swedish planning guidance (Chapter 6). In this frame it is suggested that representative democracy provides politicians and planners with *legitimate power over* and that citizen will comply to *power over* if they are included in a participatory planning process where reasons are given for politicians' and planners' decisions.

Thereby, the narrative of the two camps can be interpreted as a frame contest between the consensus frame and the authority frame. Bernard's side suggests that dialogue, inclusion and consensus, *power with* in my family of concepts, is the preferred kind of power. In contrast, those who want to see the meetings as supplying information draw on the notion that politicians hold the authority to make decisions and that the meetings are only supposed to be about legitimising decisions taken through *power over*.

The planner's framing of his role in power relations

Bernard mainly sees himself as a facilitator charged with a mission to create conditions for inclusive dialogues towards consensus. This is a preference for *power with* based on a critique of *illegitimate power over*. Yet, when he finds his path blocked by the communication department, he turns to another kind of identity as a critical pragmatist. He then seeks to realise his ambitions not merely by open communication, but also through strategic incremental action.

When Bernard draws on the facilitator frame, the core diagnosis is that there is a need for politicians and planners to share their power with citizens. The rationale is that if the meetings become one-sided the risk for conflict increases. Bernard explains by sharing his experience, that people rarely want to ask questions when they are upset, they want an opportunity to voice their concerns. Therefore, the more one-sided the meeting is, the higher the tension.

This diagnosis leads towards an action bias where Bernard sees his task as being about facilitating processes of *power with*. "I would design a process where power is shared between the decision-makers and those who are affected by the decision; between me as facilitator and those who participate." (le Roux, 2016).

This action bias includes questioning the established norm to organise large assembly meetings.

> I would have mapped the different perspectives prior to the meeting and instead of a big meeting we would have designed smaller group processes. You know, you can't try to solve this kind of thing with 300 people at the same time. This is what I would have proposed. But if they had insisted on a big meeting I would have organized it in a different way. Not as an information meeting, instead I would have given space for dialogue. (le Roux, 2016)

When Bernard found his preferred path blocked, he had to rely on an alternative identity as a critical pragmatist. In the story, he tells us how it was difficult to talk to anyone in charge of the meetings and he and his colleagues were "put on a tight leash". So here Bernard finds himself unable to engage in his preferred mode of working: co-design and dialogue. In my interpretation, he is unable to

draw on his favoured identify frame as a facilitator. Instead he tacitly turns to an alternative way of understanding his role in power relations.

First, he tried to refuse to do the job, but when he was ordered by his boss, he explored other possibilities. He then strategically prepared for handling what he foresaw was to be challenging meetings. One strategy was to bring together a team of facilitators who would help each other in handling the meeting.

> We talked about three things before the meeting: Firstly, if someone stood up and shouted comments we would ask them to wait for their turn and use the microphone. If someone just took the microphone and continued talking, we had the possibility of cutting the sound. We also talked about what to do if violence occurred. (le Roux, 2016)

Bernard here employed an alternative diagnostic focus. Attention is now drawn to the risk that the meeting will be conflictual and hostile. The action bias arising from this shift in attention is, not towards power sharing, but towards pragmatic action to manage the meeting and to prevent violence by employing facilitation skills. Pragmatically, the planner is now tacitly acknowledging the need for *power over*.

> You have a lot of power as a facilitator. Potentially you can direct the flow of the meeting. There are simple things you can do: make sure that you have eye contact with everybody. This communicates that you are aware of what is occurring and this creates a sense of security or safety. Then you can slow down the pace of the conversation and you can ensure that the microphone reaches those who want to speak. These things can make a real difference. (le Roux, 2016)

In this manner we can see how Bernard, when finding his preferred identity frame blocked, turns to the alternative critically pragmatic frame, which he employs to make sense of the difficult situations he is confronted with.

7.1.3 What to make of power differences? - A story about ambivalence

During 2017 and 2018, Henrik Ljungman, a planner at Uppsala Municipality in Sweden, led a participatory planning process around the development of Lina Sandells Park in Gottsunda, Uppsala. The park development was part of a larger planning process with the purpose of achieving a socially and ecologically sustainable Gottsunda district. This district is one of the challenged neighbourhoods that suffers from relatively high unemployment and crime rates. Uppsala municipality secured funds from Boverket to develop new methods for inclusive dialogues in planning.

Henrik works as a city planner in Uppsala Municipality. He is interested in dialogue processes, but had limited experience with leading dialogues with

citizens prior to his work with the park development. He is trained as a landscape architect, with an interest in urban development. What follows is his story.[15]

I like to understand connections and different perspectives and yet reach a conclusion that is reasonable. There are a lot of people with ideas that are in opposition. I find this exciting. What is the right thing to do when people have different perspectives on the same issue?

I want to focus on the humans in the city and the human experience of the city. What is the human scale and to what extent are people valuing different things? I am interested in what kind of city we are building and for whom we create it. One will have to try to understand the different perspectives that people represent. But to give precedence to a certain perspective is a totally different thing. Because then there are other different priorities and people will be upset in almost all projects. Even in park planning. That is the way it is. Everything that happens in the public environment and all development will result in reactions.

The whole idea of dialogues is interesting. It is extremely difficult to measure what kind of standpoints that exists. I mean, one will not make opinion polls for every single question to learn about the representation. Instead, there will be elderly people with a lot of time who will get a strong influence, at least in the media. That is why I find it interesting to try to include kids and youth and other groups who do not have the same access, time or ability to express their views. We need to bring them in. Else there will be groups with strong voices who will set the agenda for the public conversation. I guess that is not per definition something bad, but it is something to think about in its context. I mean, the group who have a strong voice does not necessarily have bad arguments. They can have really good arguments, but one need to always think about that there are different perspectives. Yes, I think that is the 10 000-crown question: what is right to do when people have different opinions?

My work with Lina Sandells Park started when I entered into the working group for the comprehensive plan for Gottsunda. That work was ongoing since there were a lot of discussions about how to approach this area. Our master plan is pointing to this area as a future city node, which means that its function is to relieve the inner city from traffic. In the future, the intention is that this will be a much more urban place than it is now. At the same time, the residents see living in the area as a quality lifestyle choice, where they can let their kids run free without fences and worries over cars. This is a key question: how can we make Hugo Alfvéns väg into an urban passage with perhaps even tram traffic?

---

15. See Section 3.3.5 for a description of the method I have used to elicit the story.

If we are to include several thousand work places in Gottsunda and Ultuna (an area nearby) 2050, the changes will not be small.

That's when we thought that Lina Sandells Park, which is perhaps not a signature place today, could be a very green place in the new urban context. The mission from the politicians was to develop a plan programme for social sustainability, but Lina Sandells Park was not mentioned explicitly. As this is the entrance to Gottsunda, it is very important to set the image of Gottsunda; the physical image, as well as media image. We also need to consider the house owning structure. Where does the municipality own land? Where do we think we can progress something? How can we bring the green character, the Gottsunda people want? So that's why we ended up with Lina Sandells Park. We thought that we could make a major investment there and it was very much me who lobbied for this to happen.

When we wrote the application to Boverket, we decided that the project would be about creating a green meeting place with a focus on activity. We know that these kinds of places are 70-80 percent of the time used by guys. That's why our point of departure was: how can we get the girls to use the park more? We will try to see if there are differences in preferences for the park development among guys and girls and place some extra emphasis on the girls' preferences.

We already have focus groups in Gottsunda, intended to provide a broader representation and a better gathering of perspectives. There is the youth centre, school, preschool and other organisations who work with girls, who are subject to honour oppression. There are cultural associations and so on. All these focus groups include groups that I rarely see in any formal city planning dialogue. It is kids, youth and there are girls. There are different cultural backgrounds. This has felt really good. We have chosen to work locally, and it is the people in the area we ought to work with, those who live nearby the park and those groups that we think normally do not get much representation.

Gathering perspectives has been an important part of the work and the focus groups has also been important. We draw a lot of conclusions: it is really important that we go out in the area to work, that we come to their places and meet them there. This breaks up the formal power structures. I mean, here you come as an educated guy and talk to kids off course, then you do not like to follow the formal way of being a municipal person. You like to find ways to communicate that works for them and where you feel that you get engagement and response.

In one of the dialogue meetings at the school, I had the feeling that they guys took a bit more space. We decided to lead the conversation and divide the time more equally between guys and girls. In this school some of the kids speak great Swedish and are super engaged, whereas others are relatively new arrivals and

think it is truly embarrassing to speak. Some also thought it was embarrassing to speak to me since I am a guy.

That's why we wanted to work with groups of girls. We did some research and saw how there are both pros and cons with homogenous and heterogeneous groups. We formed a core focus group with girls in order to find out if they had other needs than the mixed groups.

Then we also had dialogues with kids in preschool and that was a different thing altogether. These were 4 to 5-year-olds. We brought lemons and oranges, which we painted with the kids. There were happy faces on the oranges and sad faces on the lemons. Then we asked the kids to place the fruit on places that they saw as good and bad in the park. Sad lemons on bad places and happy oranges on good places.

We also worked with those who lived close to the park. But the representation at this meeting did not turn out that well. There are a lot of people with foreign backgrounds living there, but it was mainly those with Swedish background who turned up.

At this meeting the debate became a bit heated. Some thought that a lot of construction could be done in the park, while others wanted to preserve the nature. One extreme was, 'you should not even touch a branch' and the other extreme was a guy who spoke about safety and said that Bandstolsvägen is a hot spot for crime and youth gangs and those kinds of things. Therefore, he originally suggested that we ought to blow up the hill where there were trees, and make something entirely new like sports or soccer fields.

For us it was all about asking questions. Actually, we were the ones who facilitated. We kind of had to create an image of what the park could be. Then we provided space for participants to sketch and draw together. We wanted them to identify what they had in common. At dialogues I have attended before, it has often been that the municipality comes in and presents something. This often leads to protests and anger towards the municipality. But when you talk to people you realise that they are not a homogenous group, where everybody desires the same thing. Instead people have different interests and some are very focused on what is happening outside my window. Therefore, I thought, from a dialogue and democracy perspective, that it would be good to create understanding of the different perspectives on the park. It is easier to agree that the municipality is doing the wrong thing, compared to present solutions for how to do it instead. I mean, since this would require that citizens agree.

We had municipal staff who attended the group discussions at the meeting. They helped with sketching, since not all people are comfortable with maps and sketches. What happened was that when participants could say their things, it became clear that they had different views and then they could start to align

them. The main example is that the lady who wanted to protect everything kind of saw the need. 'Yes, I guess it will have to be a bit more accessible, but perhaps it can be done without ruining the whole nature feeling and the woods.' The guy who wanted to blow up the hill, saw that there were other needs and could approach some kind of compromise. I think it ended with him drawing a butterfly hotel at the sketch.

Our working assumption has been that a dialogue does not mean that a wish list will be created and all will get what they want. If all can wish freely, we will not be able to gratify it. Instead we wanted to catch the perspectives and kind of place them next to each other in order to get some kind of understanding of how to approach the park.

At a later stage, we worked with "Ronjabollen", which is a girl's group for those who are subject to honour oppression. The first thing I was asked by the leader of the group was: 'why are you building a park here?' She explained that the participants in her group get governed and controlled when there are a lot of people moving around. She talked about the old men sitting on benches monitoring and keeping watch. So, for those girls it is better to have their activities in a closed premise where they can be left alone. This means that there is a divide between different girl groups; for some it is really important with secluded places without surveillance. But to follow that suggestion would run counter to our purpose: to create a cross generational meeting place.

When we approached the different groups of girls, I kept in mind that we, the planners, will be perceived as authorities. We are educated, we hold positions, we can participate in change and so on. So, if we are to talk to 13 and 14-year-old girls we need to kind of use another language.

After these meetings and some more, it was time to produce a first sketch of the new park. We had been very clear in the application to Boverket that it is the dialogues that should inform the park development. At the same time, we have made assumptions about what kind of place we would like to create. It is to be cross generational, activity friendly, a green place and we wanted to focus on the needs of the girls. But we did not want project leaders and the architects to start with what they themselves wanted. Instead we wanted to be guided by what was brought up from the groups we had spoken to.

We tried to bring together a comprehensive view of our own assumptions and the most common suggestions from citizens. Thereafter, we brought in an architect to make a sketch, on which we later made some changes, in order to make sure that the ideas from the dialogues were reflected.

This is where we stand now, we are to put together a proposal and feed it back to the dialogue groups. In the proposal we have some alternatives and have pointed to some concrete choices. It is important to hold the budget and we need

to weigh the perspective towards how feasible they are. It is easy for all to wish, but difficult to be architects and to grasp the whole thing. There is also a lot of experience among those who have worked with parks for a long time. They know a lot about what works.

7.1.4 Analysing the story

This story has a different feel to it compared with the previous. Instead of a frame contest between two opposing sides, this story takes shape through ambivalence, tensions and dilemmas. It is about a planner who is interested in dialogue, but with limited previous experience. He is provided with extra funds and stakes are not as high as in the contested Gothenburg meetings. The planner pays attention to power differences, which he is ambivalent to. Is it justifiable that some are more powerful than others?

To understand power relations, he switches between the consensus and authority frame. At times, he strives towards inclusivity and consensus, *power with*. In other sequences of the story he is instead acknowledging the necessity of *power over* and seeks to establish when this form of power is *legitimate*. To position himself in power relations he switches between the identities of facilitator, expert and reflexive planner.

The planner's framing of power in participatory planning

The core diagnosis in the story is that power is unequally distributed in society and in participatory planning. It is argued that gender, age, ethnicity, position and knowledge create unequal opportunities for certain voices. It is said that well-educated and elderly people have better possibilities to get their voices heard. The planner is also drawing attention to the fact that those with a foreign background have fewer possibilities to influence the dialogue. He additionally problematises power differences between pupil groups at the school. He is drawing attention to how men can mobilise more power than women, for example, when he describes the meetings at the school. He is equally aware that his own position comes with certain privileges.

In my interpretation, his interest is directed towards *power over* and he is concerned with separating *legitimate* from *illegitimate power over*. Perhaps the ambivalence in the story arises from the difficulty of this task. "That is the 10 000-crown question: what is right to do when people have different opinions?" (Ljungman, 2018). The planner seemed to be faced with a core dilemma in this story: what am I, as a planner, to make of situations where people cannot agree?

Let us look more closely into how the power disparities are understood in the story. The differences between politicians and civil servants are most often seen as legitimate. The planner acknowledges that democratic mandates provide politicians with legitimate power and that his role is to see to it that the political will is reflected in the planning of the park. Yet, he also draws attention to how there is space for planners to manoeuvre inside the political framework.

When it comes to differences between municipal planners/civil servants and citizens the story is more ambivalent.

> […] it is really important that we go out in the area to work, that we come to their places and meet them there. This breaks up the formal power structures. I mean here you come as an educated guy and are to talk to kids, off course then you do not like to follow the formal way of being a municipal person. You like to find ways to communicate that works for them and where you feel that you get engagement and response. (Ljungman, 2018)

This quote exemplifies how, in certain parts of the story, power differences between planners and citizens are deemed illegitimate. Yet in other parts of the story these differences are viewed as legitimate. "It is easy for all to wish, but difficult for all to be architects and grasp the whole thing" (Ibid.). Here it seems as if the assessment shifts towards acknowledging expert authority as a basis for *legitimate power over* to weigh citizens' different desires and produce a comprehensive plan.

There is also ambivalence in the way that the narrative diagnoses power differences between citizens.

> […] there will be groups with strong voices who will set the agenda for the public conversation. I guess that is not per definition something bad, but it is something to think about in its context. I mean, the group who have a strong voice does not necessarily have bad arguments. They can have really good argument, but one need to always think about that there are different perspectives. (Ljungman, 2018)

This quote illustrates the ambivalence. On one hand, powerful citizens have good arguments; on the other hand, it is not fair if these people set the agenda.

The ambivalence regarding the judgement of power differences is mirrored in the planners' action bias. One prominent idea is that participatory planning ought to provide possibilities for inclusive dialogue that leads to a better understanding of different perspectives. Perhaps participatory process can even lead to alignment of different desires? This way of reasoning is prominent in the description of the meeting near the park. "What happened was that when participants could say their things it became clear that they had different views and then they could start to align them" (Ljungman, 2018). This quote illustrates a preference for achieving shared meaning by aligning perspectives.

But there is also an alternative action bias in the story. Then the planner suggests that there are differences between citizens that cannot be reconciled through participatory planning. "But when one talk to people one sees that it is not a homogenous group where all want the same. Instead people have different interests" (Ibid.). This quote illustrates how the planner in this action bias sees limits to how participatory planning can reconcile differences. The differences in citizen's interests require that the municipality step in and make decisions. Participatory planning is not only about moving towards consensus but also making decisions when issues are contested.

> Our working assumption has been that a dialogue does not mean that a wish list will be created and all will get what they want. If all can wish freely, we will not be able to gratify it. Instead, we wanted to catch the perspectives and kind of place them next to each other in order to get some kind of understanding of how to approach the park. (Ibid.)

As illustrated by this quote in this action bias, participatory planning is intended to increase the communication between decision makers and citizens, but not necessarily lead to agreement.

In my interpretation, the ambivalence in the story originates from tensions between the consensus and the authority frame. Drawing on the former, the planner is deeming *power over illegitimate* and seeks to achieve *power with*. In contrast, when the authority frame is guiding the planner he recognises the necessity of *power over*. Consequently, he instead casts participatory planning as an arena for legitimising *power over*.

Thereby, the ambivalence in the story is essentially about the difficulty of the task to separate *illegitimate* from *legitimate power over*. To the planner the purest source of *legitimate power over* is a democratic mandate. Whereas, the planner is increasingly ambivalent regarding the legitimacy of planners' and citizens' exercises of *power over* each other.

The planner's framing of his role in power relations

The ambivalence in the framing of power in participatory planning is reflected in how the planner frames his identity in power relations. In my interpretation, the planner is switching between three of the different identity frames I have found in the previous sub studies (Chapters 5 and 6). He interchangeably sees himself as an expert, a facilitator and a reflexive planner.

When the planner frames his identity as an expert he takes charge over the planning process.

> This is the entrance to Gottsunda, which is very important to set the image of Gottsunda. The physical image as well as media image. Then we also need to consider the house owning structure. Where does the municipality own land? Where do we

think we can progress something? How can we bring the green character, the Gottsunda people want, to the forth? So that's why we ended up with Lina Sandells Park. We thought that we could make a major investment there and it was very much me who lobbied for this to happen. (Ljungman, 2018)

The planner is here seeing himself as an expert. He demonstrates his knowledge about how planning is done and what the social results of the physical changes to the area might be. He tells us about the kind of informed questions that provided the rationale for the choice to focus on this particular park and not another. Importantly, he also lets us know that the choice of this particular park, and not another, was his making, i.e. he explains how he exercised what he sees as *legitimate power over* based on expert authority.

Then again, in other parts of the story the planner is also drawing on the reflexivity frame. He pays attention to how his presumed habits risk reproducing power relations, which he finds undesirable.

When we approached the different groups of girls I kept in mind that we [the planners] will be perceived as authorities. We are educated, we hold positions and we can participate in change and so on. So, if we are to talk to 13 to 14-year-old girls we need to kind of use another language. (Ibid.)

This demonstrates the kind of understanding offered by the reflexivity frame. It directs attention to how planners' micro practices matter and suggests that the planners make small changes in how they act in order to shift the power balance.

In other parts of the story, the planner sees himself as a facilitator, for example in the narrative about the meeting with the neighbours of the park.

The main example is that the lady who wanted to protect everything kind of saw the need: 'Yes, I guess it will have to be a bit more accessible, but perhaps it can be done without ruining the whole nature feeling and the woods.' The guy who wanted to blow up the hill, he saw that there were other needs and could approach some kind of compromise. I think it ended with him drawing a butterfly hotel at the sketch. (Ljungman, 2018)

In this sequence the planner and his colleagues designed and facilitated a meeting with citizens, in view of creating possibilities for aligning their perspectives. They worked to create an inclusive process and the narrative leads towards a resolution in the form of consensus or perhaps compromise. In my interpretation, this is an example of how the planner frames his identity as a facilitator who is striving towards turning *illegitimate power over* into *power with*.

After having analysed the two stories, I will now summarise the findings by returning to the two research questions.

7.2   The findings

The analysis of the two stories was guided by two research questions.

- Which basic notions of power are embedded in Swedish participatory planning?
- To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?

The analysis shows, regarding the first question, that the planners pay attention to power and find it difficult to deal with. Even if power is mentioned explicitly in both stories, the planners do not supply elaborated explanations of how they define and appraise it. Instead, notions of power are mainly present underneath the surface of the texts.

In my interpretation, the planners are tacitly informed by the two already identified alternative process frames: the consensus and the authority frames. The former leads them to an assessment of *power over* as *illegitimate* and suggests that participatory planning ought to replace *power over* by creating conditions for *power with*. In contrast, through the authority frame the planners see how *illegitimate power over*, might not be possible to replace with *power with*. Instead this authority frame portrays participatory planning as intended to legitimise the use of *power over* through improved communication.

The tensions between these two frames surface in different ways in the two stories. The Gothenburg story takes shape as a frame contest between two camps, where one is advocating for authority and the other for consensus. In contrast, in the Uppsala story the tensions instead lead to ambivalence. The planner sees the validity of both frames and struggles to make sense of which frame to draw upon in the complex situations he faces.

Also, when the planners pay attention to the second frame topic, their roles in power relations, the reasoning mainly takes place underneath the surface of the stories. In some parts of the stories, the planners sparsely discuss their roles. Yet, the identity framing is mainly implied by the way the planners are positioned in the stories.

Underneath the surface, the two stories provide us with two alternative accounts of planners' roles in power relations. In the Gothenburg story, the planner clearly prefers to see himself as a facilitator. He sees his role as designing and facilitating planning processes where actors can engage in *power with*. In the story, this framing is made clear by way of contrast with the expert frame, which alternatively allows the communication department to view *power over* as legitimate. The planner is refuting this idea by suggesting that his mission ought to be to level power and achieve *power with*. Yet, when the planner finds

this path blocked, he is forced into drawing on the critically pragmatic frame and do the best he can to mitigate the difficult circumstances.

In the second story, we meet a planner who is less certain about his preferred identity. We see how he, at times, employs the reflexive planner frame to question how his habits might be exercises of *illegitimate power over*; while he in other instances relies on an expert frame, which charges him with *legitimate power over*. Yet he is also framing along the same lines as the Gothenburg planner, notably at the meeting with the residents close to the park, and he employs the facilitator frame with its preference for *power with*.

To what extent are these notions of power enabling reflective practice? In the Gothenburg story, the planner is struggling to stick to his preferred consensus frame and the identity as facilitator. The story illustrates the limits of these two frames. When stakes are high and planning is contested, it might be too reductive to rely on the thought figure that *power over* ought to be turned into *power with*. The story also underscores how the facilitator frame, with its notions of "neutral" and "power-free" planners, is a weak basis for action in a situation where time is short, stakes are high and planning contested. In contrast, when the planner switches to pragmatic action, he seems to be more able to cope with the challenging meetings.

The Uppsala story provides other insights into how notions of power are playing out in practice. Here the planner's preferences are less clear and the stakes are not as high. Yet, the planner is still challenged by the workings of power. He pays attention to power differences, but find it difficult to know what to make of them. The different notions of power come to a head when people are not agreeing about what the right thing to do is. It is in these situations that the use of *power over* becomes inevitable. When the planner draws on the authority frame and sees his identity as an expert, he is enabled to make sense of what to do. He can legitimise the use of *power over* by referring to authority and expertise. In the situations where he finds that these frames do not fit, he is ambivalent without clear guidance on how to proceed. This underscores how planners find themselves "on thin ice" if they wish to go beyond the conventional reliance on authority and expertise in contested planning processes.

Hence, my analysis shows that both the consensus and the authority frames might be capable of guiding planners' actions in certain situations, but neither of them supply the broad conceptualisation of power needed for reflective practice. In the following closing chapter, I synthesise the findings from the entire research process as a basis for rethinking power in participatory planning.

8 Rethinking power in participatory planning

The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective practice. The previous Chapters 4-7 have reported on the review of the power literature and the analysis of notions of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. In this concluding chapter, I synthesise the findings, discuss these in view of previous research and thereby clarify the contribution the thesis makes.

The first three sections answer the research questions. In these sections, I integrate the findings from the review of the power literature and the empirical investigations. Section 8.1-2 provide the evidence underpinning the rethinking and Section 8.3 outlines the rethinking by developing a family of four power concepts.

In Section 8.4, I conclude by explaining how the thesis contributes to planning theory and environmental communication by problematising reductive notions of power and, as an alternative, rethinking power as a family resemblance concept. This theoretical contribution matters to planning practice since it can enable planners to develop their ability to be sensitive to what a situation requires, i.e. to acquire practical wisdom (phronesis).

8.1 RQ1: developing conceptual tools from power theory

What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning?

Through the abductive research process, I developed, applied and tested conceptual tools from power theory. To answer RQ1, I moved back and forth between reviews of the power literature and investigations into communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice.

I gradually zoomed in on work in the power literature, which had as its purpose to synthesises and render commensurable alternative notions of power (Allen, 1998; Clegg, 1989; Haugaard, 2003, 2010a, 2012, 2015). Thereby, I decided to treat power as a family resemblance concept (Haugaard, 2010a; Wittgenstein, 1967). In this plural view, power is not a single entity, but a cluster of concepts, which are all related to the reproduction of social order, yet not necessarily united by one common feature. I deemed a family resemblance view of power as particularly useful for my aim to develop concepts that can enable reflective practice.

Through the continued empirical investigations and reviews of the power literature I gradually developed a family of four power concepts. These four concepts were established in view of i) explicating the basic notions (constitutive, consensual and conflictual) of power in participatory planning, ii) fulfilling the two tasks that planners need concepts of power for (empirically explaining and normatively appraising power) and iii) relating different notions of power in a manner, which enables reflective practice. The family of concepts includes one concept for the creation of power, *power to,* and three concepts for the exercise of power: *power with*, *illegitimate power over* and *legitimate power over*.

Table 12. *The power family*

Family member	Definition
Power to	The ability to act derived from social order
Power with	Actors engage in concerted action towards shared goals
Illegitimate power over	Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner that is seen as unacceptable
Legitimate power over	Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner that is seen as acceptable

Hence, I answered RQ1 by importing the idea from power theory that power is a family resemblance concept and by developing a family of four power concepts. The extent to which this power family can enable reflective practice was, in the next step of the research, tested through empirical investigations into notions of power in participatory planning.

8.2 RQ2 & 3: analysing notions of power in participatory planning

- Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?
- To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice?

These two research questions guided the empirical investigations. I pursued the questions by conducting the three research tasks to analyse notions of power: in communicative planning theory (Chapter 5), in Swedish planning guidance (Chapter 6) and in Swedish participatory planning practice (Chapter 7). The study objects in these investigations were publications from the leading communicative planning scholars John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes, planning guidance from two Swedish planning authorities and interviews with Swedish planners. In the empirical investigations I tested the usefulness of the family of power concepts developed through the review of power literature (see Section 8.1).

In this section, I answer RQ 2 and 3 by synthesising the findings from the empirical investigations and discussing these in light of previous research. I structure the text according to the analytical distinction between process and identity frames, which guided the empirical investigations.

8.2.1 Two process frames: consensus and authority

Through frame analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön and Rein, 1994) I explicated the notions of power in participatory planning as two process frames. It is the consensus frame that suggests that *illegitimate power over* ought to be replaced by *power with* and the authority frame, which alternatively points to how participatory planning ought to restore the legitimacy of *power over*. The analysis confirms that the consensus frame stands strong in communicative planning theory. Even if the ways in which Forester, Healey and Innes have applied this frame varies, they largely adhere to the same kind of preference for consensus and implied rejection of *power over*. In contrast, even if the consensus frame is present in Swedish planning guidance, it is the authority frame, which is most prominently used as a basis for guiding planning action. In planning practice these two frames were found to interplay in ways that created tensions, ambivalence and conflict.

Table 13. *Two alternative process frames*

	Consensus	Authority
Diagnosis	*Power over* is illegitimate in planning	The legitimacy of *power over* is questioned in planning
Action bias	Participatory planning ought to transform *power over* into *power with*	Participatory planning ought to restore the legitimacy of *power over*

Turning to RQ 3, I will now discuss the extent to which the notions of power in the two frames enable reflective practice. I argue that both the authority and the consensus frame provide relevant perspectives on power, yet individually and combined fall short of supplying the broad understanding needed to enable reflective practice. Let me explain this claim by linking back to the scholarly discussion about power in participatory planning (Chapter 2).

The authority frame is affiliated with the ideas of rational planning (Faludi, 1973). Rational planning is inspired by positivistic science and concerned with generating alternatives, prior to making optimal choices. A basic thought figure is to separate ends from means and suggests that the former is value-loaded and the latter value-free (Allmendinger, 2009). Thereby, power is, if discussed at all, seen as derived from democratic mandates and essentially about deciding the ends, the "what". The practice of planning is seen as a technical value-free endeavour, merely about working out the "how".

Communicative planning theory grew out of a critique towards these ideas in rational planning. Communicative scholars faulted the rational theory, both for being unable to capture the complexities of human relations and for illegitimately excluding marginalised voices from planning (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1992b; Innes, 1998; Sager, 1994). Due to its affiliation with rational planning, the authority frame is vulnerable to this type of critique.

I certainly agree that the authority frame is too reductive in the understanding of power it offers. In the language of this thesis, this frame is not employing the whole power family. Power is merely seen through the eyes of two of its members: *illegitimate power over* and *legitimate power over*. This clearly does not supply the broad understanding of power required to enable reflective practice.

However, I will not go as far as to suggest that the authority frame has no place in reflective practice. Instead, I apply the family resemblance view of power and argue that the authority frame might certainly fulfil a purpose in reflections on power in planning; not least since expertise and the ballot box are still the most accepted sources of legitimate power in Western planning systems (Connelly et al., 2006; Strömgren, 2007). When planning is contested it is thereby relevant to consider if the authority frame is useful as a basis for planners' actions.

The consensus frame and its application in planning practice and communicative planning theory is subject to sustained critique (see Chapter 2). The core messages from the critics are that the understanding offered by consensual notions of power is weak in explaining what is going on in planning (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000), that its application in practice might reinforce the power of neoliberal discourses (Purcell, 2009) and that consensual notions of power might smooth out

necessary conflicts and differences (Mäntysalo et al., 2011; Mouffe, 1999; Pløger, 2004). My research confirms that communicative planning theory, with its consensual framing of power, is far from supplying the broad conceptualisation needed to empirically explain and normatively appraise power in participatory planning. Nonetheless, I will not go as far as some of the critics and fully dismiss this theory.

Instead I argue that the problem with power in communicative planning theory can be reformulated in a manner that points towards how this theory can be strengthened. In the language of this thesis, the problem is that communicative planning theory largely makes the mistake to conflate *power over* with domination (cf. Haugaard, 2010b). My analysis shows how communicative scholars have taken on the task to critique power when it works to exclude issues, people and knowledge forms from planning. Focusing on this task they have often implicitly, assumed that domination is all that there is to power and largely refrained from elaborating explicitly on how power is created and how it can be exercised in alternative forms. I thereby claim that the core problem is that power in communicative planning theory is largely theorised as *illegitimate power over*, which excludes the richer understanding of power supplied by family members such as *power to*, *power with* and *legitimate power over*.

Some communicative planning scholars may reject my critique. They might say that they have not only paid attention to *illegitimate power over* but also dedicated long-term interest to enabling forms of power. This might certainly be true, but their interest has not been expressed in the form of elaborated theorising of the kind of conflictual yet desirable power, which is included in the concept *legitimate power over*. The leading scholars have also refrained from providing conceptual tools for understanding the processes through which power is created in planning, covered by *power to* in the power family.

Regarding *power with*, I can see how the work communicative scholars have done à la Habermas, to theorise inclusive dialogues and empowerment, might refer to similar empirical phenomena as my conceptualisation of *power with*. Yet, power has not been a central concept in this area of communicative planning theory. Thereby, attempts to engage in reflective practice, based on Habermasian communicative planning, is hindered due to the lack of an integrated vocabulary of power.

I acknowledge that Innes has made attempts to theorise the empirical process covered by *power with* (Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes and Booher, 2015). But, as I have elaborated on in Chapter 5, these attempts are problematic since Innes universally rejects *power over* as undesirable and in the same universal manner endorses *power with*. From my family resemblance view, this is too reductive to provide the dynamic and situated understanding needed for reflective practice.

After having addressed RQ2 and 3, by synthesising the findings pertaining to the framing of power in the process of participatory planning, I will now provide a full answer to RQ2 and 3 by synthesising the findings regarding the identity framing of planners' roles in power relations.

8.2.2 Four identity frames

The frame analysis of communicative planning theory and Swedish planning guidance and practice identified four alternative frames concerning planners' roles in power relations. The notion of the planner as a *facilitator* was identified in planning guidance, as well as planning practice. The planner is cast as a skilful practitioner who can turn *illegitimate power over* into *power with* by designing and facilitating purposeful planning processes. This frame especially figures in Innes' work, but also in planning guidance and practice.

In contrast, in the expert frame, the planner is seen as charged with *legitimate power over* derived from expertise and democratic mandates. This frame stands strong in Swedish planning guidance as well as planning practice, but is largely refuted in communicative planning theory.

Alongside the facilitator frame, communicative planning theory also frames planners as critical pragmatists. The emphasis is then on how power relations are situated in a specific context in which the planner ought to make situated judgments in view of minimising domination. This frame is ever-present in the work of Forester.

Finally, in the work of Healey, and also in Swedish planning guidance, the framing of planners' identities as reflexive planners is present. Here, the planner is seen as capable and willing to question presumed power relations and act to change undesirable forms of power through their micro practices.

Table 14. *Four identity frames*

	Facilitator	**Expert**	**Critical pragmatist**	**Reflexive planners**
Diagnosis	Planners are working in contexts of *illegitimate power over*.	Planners are experts positioned in a democratic system and thereby entitled to exercise legitimate power over.	Planners are confronted with situated dilemmas in power relations.	Planners can reproduce or transform power relations through their everyday practices.
Action bias	Planners ought to use their skills to design and facilitate planning processes that enables *power with*.	Planners ought to exercise *power over* to assure process and outcome legitimacy.	Planners ought to make situated judgements in view of minimising *illegitimate power over* and maximising *power with*.	Planners ought to be reflexive and transform *illegitimate power over* into *power with*.

After having summarised the findings pertaining to RQ2 in the table, I now turn to RQ3 and discuss the extent to which the four identity frames enable reflective practice. I will do so by linking the findings to long-standing discussions about the role of the planner.

The role of the planner has been subject to much controversy over the years (see Chapter 2). Academics, educators and policy makers have suggested an abundance of alternative roles for planners. These debates can be understood as struggles over the best way to "make up" planners (Cashmore et al., 2015). Proponents of different ideas are suggesting roles for planners, which fit with their particular view of what planning and planners ought to be.

The findings show that, even if communicative planning scholars have chosen different paths in their attempts to invent planners, their shared ambition has been to deconstruct the idea of planners as value-neutral experts and replace this idea with a view of planners as agents of change working towards more inclusive planning. More or less explicitly, their intention has been to critique the power-free rational ideas of planners as experts, by providing alternative ideas of what it means to be a planner in power relations.

Communicative planning scholars' efforts to construct planners are subject to sustained critique from other camps in planning theory. It is argued that communicative planning theory is neglecting the fact that planners are working in contexts permeated by power and therefore provide naïve and unrealistic ideas about what it is to be a planner (McGuirk, 2001; Purcell, 2009). Even if I partly agree with this critique, I find it to be based on a reductive view of what communicative planning offers for our understanding of planners' roles in power relations. Let me explain this claim by discussing each of the recognised identity frames.

The idea of planners as *facilitators* is the frame that has been most critiqued for naivety and unrealism. The findings from my research largely confirm this critique, but suggest that it is not to be levelled towards communicative planning theory as a whole, but rather against some of its streams and towards the application of this frame in Swedish planning guidance.

The problem with how the facilitator frame is applied in theory and in guidance is that it suffers from a conflation of *power over* with domination. Employing the concepts I have developed in the thesis, we can see how power is solely defined as *illegitimate power over* and *power with*, which excludes the understanding offered through the family members *power to* and *legitimate power over*. Thereby, this frame is blind to how a planner's ability to act, their *power to*, is derived from a power system. Just as it hides how planners in certain episodes, even when they are facilitating, might have to exercise *legitimate power over*.

Even if I largely confirm the critics' view of this frame, I differ from their implicit conclusion that seeing planners as facilitators is misleading. Instead, I posit that the problems with how the facilitator's role is constructed can be addressed by rethinking power in participatory planning as a family resemblance concept. I will elaborate on this claim in Section 8.4.2.

The idea of planners as *critical pragmatists* has attracted little interest in the discussions about the treatment of power in communicative planning theory (Healey, 2009). However, the move made by Forester to charge his planners with the concept "critical" in front of pragmatists, was due to the critique towards pragmatism for not taking power relations seriously. Given my preference for reflective practice, which originates from pragmatism (Dewey, 1933), I am largely sympathetic to the idea of critically pragmatic planners. Yet, I also see how this frame needs to be complemented with an elaborated conceptualisation of power in order to enable reflective practice.

The usefulness of the critically pragmatic frame is due to how it validly assumes that power relations are dynamics and situated in a specific contingent context, which requires planners to reflect and act without relying solely on universal ideas. How this view of planners is meaningful is demonstrated in Forester's long-term work eliciting planners' own stories (Forester, 1999, 2009) as well as in the stories I have obtained in this thesis (Chapter 7).

However, as with all ideas, the idea of pragmatic planners has its limitations. We cannot merely rely on the idea of skilful practitioners when reflecting on power in planning. We also need to acknowledge how these practitioners are themselves situated in power relations. For that task we need access, not only to contextual practical understanding, but also to conceptualisation of what power is and when it is legitimate.

A specific problem with Forester's application of critical pragmatism is that he has mainly refrained from theorising planners in power relations. It was only in his Habermasian period, that Forester sought to conceptualise planners in "the face of power" (e.g. Forester, 1989). Due to critique of Habermasian views of planning, Forester seems to have distanced himself from that work and instead mainly directs interest towards stories of planners "working in the face of power" without replacing Habermas with another way of providing a more elaborate conceptualisation of planners in power relations.

Forester's stories provide us with valuable insights about how planners use power to get things done. But his commentary is largely informed by an inferred conflation of *power over* with domination. This leads to difficulties in extracting a general understanding about planners' roles in power relations from the stories, and provides limitations to how his application of the critically pragmatic frame can enable reflective practice.

Healey's work on reflexivity offers the same kind of dynamic and situated understandings of the planners' roles as the pragmatic frame. In addition, her work also offers what the pragmatic frame is lacking: a route towards theorising how planners are positioned in these power relations. Thereby, Healey's work carries potential for improving the treatment of power in communicative planning theory. Through the concept of reflexivity, there is a link to structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; Healey, 1997). Thus, this frame offers a theoretical understanding of how power relations are carried from the past to the present and how planners' identities are constructed through taken for granted power relations. We are also provided with theorised understanding, through the concept of reflexivity, of the mechanism through which such power relations are reproduced or transformed.

Yet, since Healey's work also largely conflates *power over* with domination, the manner in which she has applied the reflexivity frame provides a one-sided emphasis on transformation of illegitimate power relations. Even if this is an important focus, it is problematic to imply that all hierarchical power relations are bad, since this form of power is necessary in democracies. Instead, I posit that empirical explanations of power ought to be separated from normative appraisal (Haugaard, 2010a). I take this claim and the work of Healey as an additional basis for rethinking power in participatory planning in Section 8.3.

Finally, the findings from this research confirm that the idea of planners as experts stands strong in the Swedish planning context. This is notable since the Swedish planning system seems conducive for communicative planning's aspiration of replacing the expert planner with the facilitator. Communicative planning theory has certainly made imprints on Swedish planning policy and practice. Yet, the research also confirms that the rational view of planners as experts is resilient in Sweden. This is in line with findings from previous research in Sweden and in other planning contexts (Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2016; Gradén, 2016; Storbjörk and Isaksson, 2005; Strömgren, 2007).

Even if I agree with the critique of power blindness to the idea of planners as experts, I find it hard to approve of the communicative scholars' implicit view that we can do without the idea of planners as experts. Arguably, the practice of planning is part of the Enlightenment endeavors for rationality. To refute the idea of planners being experts is thereby perhaps the same as refuting the idea of planning altogether?

The shared understanding in our societies of the value of expertise is basically what provides planners with their position in the power system. It is the shared meaning of what it is to be an expert, which provides them with their ability to act as planners, their *power to*. Given the resilience of this identity frame, also in the participation-friendly Swedish context, I posit that the notion of the

planner as an expert still has a place in reflective practice. Importantly, it is not the unreflective power abusing expert's role that ought to be available to planners. Instead, I suggest that the reflective planner can consider if the role as an expert is suitable in a particular situation.

In sum, I have in this section answered RQ2 and RQ3 by summarising the findings and discussing these in light of previous research. I have explicated tacit notions of power into two process frames: consensus and authority. I have identified four identity frames: expert, facilitator, critical pragmatist and reflexive planner. I have also demonstrated how the research shows that communicative planning theory and Swedish planning guidance, supply useful perspectives on power, but falls short of supplying the broad conceptualisation needed for reflective practice. Through a summary of the findings, it has also been validated that the family of power concepts developed in this thesis are useful for researching and rethinking notions of power in participatory planning. In the next section I will answer the final RQ4 by outlining the rethinking of power in participatory planning.

8.3 RQ4: rethinking power in participatory planning

How can rethinking power in participatory planning provide a set of concepts that can enable reflective practice?

The synthesised findings from the research provide evidence for answering this final research question. In short, I claim that the research has found that rethinking power, as a family resemblance concept in participatory planning, is conducive for reflective practice. I also make the linked claim that I, through the research, have developed a family of four power concepts−*power to*, *power with*, *illegitimate power over* and *legitimate power over*−that can enable reflective practice.

Thereby, the thesis provides a route beyond the fragmented and reductive treatment of power in participatory planning, towards reflective practice. In this section I will substantiate these claims by outlining the way in which I propose rethinking power.[16]

---

16. The full theoretical reasoning behind the rethinking is presented in Chapter 4.

8.3.1 Outlining and discussing the rethinking of power

The rethinking I propose is based on a family resemblance view of power and intended to provide a broad conceptualisation, which can enable reflective practice. The first step is to provide a concept that covers the empirical processes through which power is created in planning. What is needed to conceptualise is how power is constitutive, ever-present and productive in planning. Such a concept is needed because planning requires "a particular order of things and the settling down of governing into subtle, day-to-day, taken for granted reproduction of power relations by disciplined subjects" (Richardson and Cashmore, 2011, p. 107). My empirical investigations confirmed that an elaborated understanding of the creation of power is largely missing in communicative planning theory as well as in Swedish planning guidance. The analysed stories from planners illustrate how this conceptual void might impede reflective practice.

To fill the conceptual void, I draw on Haugaard's (2003) theory of power creation and propose including the concept *power to* in the power family. This concept is defined as the ability to act derived from social order. The basic premise is then that society gives actors the ability to do things, which they could not have done if they were not members of the society. This added ability to act, *power to*, is derived from the predictability of social order. If actions would not be ordered and predictable, if social life were entirely contingent, the added ability for action would disappear.

Hence, actions and subject positions in planning are ordered through shared systems of meaning, social orders, which provide predictability and thereby supply actors with *power to*, the ability to act. The social order, and the *power to* derived from it, is created through a range of linked social mechanisms, including system bias, tacit knowledge, reification, discipline and, as a last resort if other mechanisms do not work, coercion.[17]

In a planning context, this means that the creation of *power to* requires that planning actors, on a basic level, share a common understanding of the character of the social order. This includes a basic, most often unspoken, agreement on the meaning of core actions such as "to plan", "to make a decision", "to engage in dialogue" or "to facilitate". The same kind of shared meaning is also required regarding different subject positions, their role in the social order, such as "planners", "citizens" and "politicians".

In the Gothenburg case (see Chapter 7), we get an example of how shared meaning, and the *power to* arising from it, is necessary for planning action. In this story, the planner was called in late to, against his will, lead meetings with

---

17. In Section 4.2.2 I provide an elaborate description of these mechanisms based on Haugaard's (2003) theory of power creation.

citizens on the placement of contested refugee housing. The meaning that the municipal communication department attached to the meetings and their understanding of what it meant to be a planner differed from the planner who I interviewed. The communication department saw the meetings as being about informing citizens about decisions the politicians intended to make regarding the location of the housing. In contrast, the planner saw the meetings as intended to create an arena for dialogue about broader issues related to integration. The story tells us how the planner could not get recognition among key actors for the meaning he conferred to the meeting and his position in it. Hence, he was not provided with the *power to* act according to his preferred identity as a facilitator of a dialogue.

As illustrated by the Gothenburg example, including *power to* in the power family puts an end to the attempts to escape from power in participatory planning. Planning actors who wish to change "the way things are done"−to challenge the social order−cannot be successful without having their ability to act, their *power to*, confirmed by other planning actors by reference to a shared understanding of social order.

If there is no escape from power in participatory planning the task cannot merely be, as Forester (2000, p. 915) suggests, "to carefully assess forms of power and their specific types of vulnerabilities [italics removed]". Instead, we must also attend to the more complex task of separating illegitimate from legitimate power. The Gothenburg story illustrates how the common tendency to conflate power and domination, as in the quote from Forester, is not very helpful for planners who approach this task.

As an alternative, I continue the rethinking of power by suggesting that it is useful to separate empirical analysis from a normative appraisal of power (Haugaard, 2010a). This means to distinguish questions like "how is power created?", "how is power operating?" from questions of the character such as "when is power legitimate?". The empirical investigations showed that part of the confusion surrounding power in participatory planning is due to the difficulties in distinguishing between these two kinds of questions about power.

The power family offers the concept *power to* for empirical analysis of the creation of power and *power with, illegitimate power over* and *legitimate power over* for normative appraisal. To emphasise the distinction between empirical analysis and normative appraisal, *power to* is seen as a dispositional ability which, can be exercised episodically in consensus, without subjects to it attempting to resist (Arendt, 1970; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963), or in conflict, with covert or open resistance (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974, 2005). Hence, the power family includes three concepts for the

exercise of power: *power with* (consensual power), *illegitimate power over* (conflictual power) and *legitimate power over* (conflictual power).

The empirical process of *power with* takes place when planning actors agree on the process and/or outcome of planning. *Power with* might include a deeper form of consensus on meaning or a shallower consensus on specific planning processes or goals. When actors agree, social order remains unquestioned and actors are able to exercise their *power to* in concert. The concept *power with* thereby refers to instances of shared meaning and/or pursuit of collective goals. It is this kind of power, which Hannah Arendt (1970, p. 44) wrote about as "the human ability not just to act but to act in concert" and Amy Allen (1998, p. 35) described as a "collective ability based on the receptivity and reciprocity that characterise relations among members of the collectivity".

Some qualifications are needed in order to clarify the meaning of *power with* in participatory planning. First, as pointed out by agonistic approaches to planning, any consensus in planning is temporary and *power with* can, and often does, enable one group to exercise their *power over* another group of people or other species. Secondly, a seemingly consensual planning processes might, through closer scrutiny, be unmasked as imposed social order, for example through subtle forms of two- or three-dimensional *power over*. Thirdly, we also need to acknowledge how, as demonstrated in this research as well as in the power literature (Haugaard, 2015), *power with* might not arise without actors exercising *power over* other actors to create conditions for concerted action. In the situated interactions in participatory planning, we might often find that exercises of *power over* constitute a condition for *power with*.

The story about the planning in Uppsala provides us with an example of how *power over* can be necessary to create conditions for *power with* (see Chapter 7). The planner tells us about a meeting with the neighbours of the park. At the onset of the meeting, conflicts surfaced and the planners' response was to structure the meeting as a collaborative endeavour where participants drew maps of their visions for the park. This intervention led to consensual interactions, where those who originally were in conflict could reach agreement on process as well as goals. In this way, this episode is an example of how the exercise of *power over* might be necessary for creating conditions for *power with*.

Notably, the manner in which I define *power with* is distinctly different from communicative planning scholars' treatment of similar empirical processes. Even if communicative planning scholars, as well as Swedish planning guidance, pay attention to this form of power, it is most often without naming it power and largely without providing elaborated explanations of how the *power to* act is created.

Innes' interest in "network power" and "communication power" are the most explicit attempts to include consensual planning interactions in a language of power in communicative planning theory (Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes and Booher, 2015). These attempts are, in my view, problematic since Innes' work is solely informed by the consensus frame. Hence, instead of shedding light on the interplay between *power with* and *power over*, her work mixes up empirical and normative analysis of power by casting *power over* as evil and *power with* as good. Hence, Innes' way of theorising power suggests that we can do without *power over* in planning.

The discussion of *power with* takes us to the next step in rethinking power, which is to deal with *power over.* In the power family, this concept is defined as the empirical process where actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done. On a general level, *power over* thus signifies conflictual interactions in planning, where some actors contest social order and/or specific planning processes or goals. Hence, *power to* can no longer be exercised as consensual *power with* (cf. Haugaard, 2003). The creation of power through social order fails since meaning or specific objectives are no longer shared. Therefore, *power over* is exercised by some actors over others to restore order and implement planning processes and goals in spite of lack of consent.

This was what happened in the Gothenburg story. The planner resisted the meaning that the communication department conferred to the meetings and he also resisted the manner in which they wanted to design the process. Hence, *power over* was exercised first by the communication department and then by the planner's superiors, who ordered him to lead the meeting against his will. *Power over* was used to define the meetings as information meetings, instead of dialogue meetings and to view the planners as experts rather than facilitators. In this manner, social order was, at least temporarily, restored and the *power to* needed to continue the planning for refugee houses was created.

Power over operates in different dimensions in participatory planning (Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 1974, 2005; Schmidt-Thomé and Mäntysalo, 2014). One-dimensional *power over* is directly observable when actors openly, through incentives or punishments, get other actors to do what they otherwise would not do. This was the face of power, which showed up when the superiors ordered the planner to lead the meetings. But, *power over* can also be hidden, such as when it takes shape as the exclusion of issues and voices from planning processes. This was the kind of power that the planner referred to when he explained how refugees were not invited to attend the meetings about the placement of their houses. Finally, *power over* can operate, in the third dimension, by shaping what people desire and want. *Power over* then "[…] shapes people's beliefs, sense of self and acceptance of the *status quo* – even their own superiority or inferiority." (Gaventa,

2006, p. 29).[18] In the story, third-dimensional *power over* is operating under the surface to form the planner's desire for dialogue, as well as shaping the participants' alternative views on the issue of refugee housing.

The analysis of communicative planning theory (Chapter 5) found that this theory largely conceptualises *power over* as normatively undesirable. As I have argued throughout this thesis, this is a mistaken conflation of *power over* with domination. We cannot assume that *power over* by definition is illegitimate, an evil, since in democracies we will have to accept that conflicts over meaning, as well as over planning processes and objectives, sometimes must be handled, not merely by consensual means, but also through the use of incentives and punishments (Mansbridge, 2012), through the use of *power over*. Hence, we should not by definition exclude *legitimate power over* from participatory planning practice.

Following from this reasoning is the normative task of establishing when the same empirical process of *power over* is to be viewed as acceptable and when it is to be seen as unacceptable (cf. Haugaard, 2012). This is, in the power family, about distinguishing the two concepts *legitimate* and *illegitimate power over*.

The research confirms that the appraisal of legitimacy in planning is situated and frequently contested (Campbell, 2006; Connelly et al., 2006). This is exemplified both in the Uppsala and the Gothenburg stories. In the Uppsala story, the planner himself supplies competing alternative criteria for assessing the legitimacy of power. While in the Gothenburg story, the planner mainly saw *power with* as legitimate and *power over* as illegitimate. Yet, when under pressure, he tacitly found ways to legitimise the use of *power over,* mainly by reference to his intention to avoid violence.

Due to the way legitimacy is situated in a specific context, rethinking *power over* in participatory planning cannot merely rely on universal normative theorisation. Therefore, I do not aspire to develop general criteria for how to separate *legitimate* and *illegitimate power over*. Instead, I argue that a combination of universal principles and situated normative judgements is suitable for appraising the legitimacy of *power over*.

An abundance of principles for assessing the legitimacy of power is to be found within political philosophy. Following Haugaard (2012), without aspiring to be exhaustive, I argue that two linked universal principles are useful for reflecting on the legitimacy of power in all participatory planning episodes. First, it is the democratic principle that the exercise of power ought to be structured. This means that the "rules of the game" ought to be understood by participants

---

18. Notably, in this third dimension, the empirical phenomena in question is similar to the processes associated with *power to*, which is the case of the family resemblance concept overlap.

and that "repeat play" ought to adhere to the same or similar rules. Secondly, linked to the principle of structured *power over*, is the principle that if *power over* is exercised it ought not to be zero-sum for the one(s) subject to it. Instead, there needs to be a way to establish that the exercise of *power over* will, if not immediately, eventually result in a plus-sum situation, for the one(s) who lose out in a specific episode.[19]

Regarding situated appraisal, I first draw on legitimacy theory and power theory (Beetham, 1991; Bernstein, 2004; Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and Harkki, 2014; Scharpf, 1999), to suggest that two basic distinctions can help in explaining and appraising the legitimacy of *power over* in a specific participatory planning episode. First, *sociological* interest in the legitimacy of power can usefully be distinguished from *normative* interest. Sociological interest is about describing how actors in a specific context assess the desirability of *power over*, while normative interest is when the observing scientist draws on certain criteria to appraise the legitimacy of *power over* (cf. Haugaard, 2010b). This distinction is helpful for correcting the common mistake, among communicative planning scholars, to be unclear about approaching legitimacy from their own normative viewpoints and when they are interested in planning actors' viewpoints in a specific context.

Secondly, I argue that it is useful to distinguish between process and outcome legitimacy. The former is concerned with the procedures through which participatory planning is performed and the latter with the problem solving capacity of such procedures (cf. Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and Harkki, 2014). This distinction is helpful because it addresses the tendency, in communicative planning theory, to merely rely on process legitimacy by adding a conceptualisation of outcome legitimacy.

The rethinking of power in participatory planning is summarised in Table 15.

Table 15. *The proposed power family in participatory planning*

Family member	Explanation
Power to	The ability to act derived from social order. Shared systems of meaning reproduced by socialisation provide actors with *power to*. This is a dispositional ability to act, which can be exercised episodically in planning.
Power with	Exercises of power where meaning and/or specific processes and goals remain uncontested and enable actors to engage in concerted action.
Illegitimate and legitimate power over	Exercises of power when meaning and/or process or goals are no longer shared, which requires some actors to exercise *power over* those who do not consent. *Power over* is an empirical process, which is inherently contested and can be viewed as illegitimate or legitimate in terms of process and outcome based on sociological or normative interest.

19. See Section 4.2.4 for a more elaborate explanation of these principles.

After having responded to the four research questions and arriving at a rethinking of power, I now reflect on the limitations of the research.

8.3.2 Reflecting on the limitations of the research

In this section, I reflect on the choices I have made and how these have limited the research. Among the myriad of choices, I have decided to reflect upon three, which I find to be especially important.

First, is the choice to focus the theoretical analysis on communicative planning theory. I made this choice about half way into the PhD project. Up until that point, I had conducted reviews of the planning literature more broadly, with the determination to map notions of power in different planning theories. I decided to focus on communicative planning theory because this theory is so influential in participatory planning policy and practice, and because my reviews showed that, rather than one approach to power, this theory offered several. To explain and assess these approaches, I needed to go deep rather than broad. I deemed analytical depth to be important to understanding the tacit notions of power within the different streams of communicative planning theory (see Chapter 5).

To go deep into theory takes time, and hence this choice limited the scope of the research by excluding the possibility of going deep into alternative planning theories. This would have certainly provided access to notions of power of relevance to participatory planning practice. Most notably, I could not go deep into the analysis of rational planning theory, the critical planning theory inspired by Foucault and the post-political/agonistic planning theories. The way I use these theories stays on the level of literature review, without the kind of deeper analysis I conduct into communicative planning theory. Yet, the notion of power as constitutive and productive, which is central both to the Foucauldian theories and the post-political theories, is represented in the power family through *power to*. While, a clear limitation, is not being able to include the notions of power in the stream within post-political theories, which draws on actor-network-theory (Callon and Latour, 1981; Latour et al., 1988; Metzger et al., 2016; Rydin, 2019).

The focus on communicative planning theory also includes the consequence that I cannot aspire to make specific contributions to other planning theories or to a more integrated theorisation of power in planning theory. What I can claim is to have made use of the critique towards communicative planning theory by including the family of power concepts in this theory. When it comes to the much-needed synthesis of approaches to power in planning theory, I can merely claim that the thesis provides an example for how a family resemblance view of power can be used to build

bridges between different planning theories. While the more integrated theorisation based on a plural view of power remains to be done.[20]

Secondly, I wish to reflect on the choice to focus on developing concepts. In the first half of the research, I focused on my own and other planners' practical experiences alongside reviews of planning and power theory and analysis of guidance. At that stage of the research, I imagined my contribution to be practical and applied. Gradually, I reconsidered this way of seeing the research and came to focus more on the world of ideas and theories. The reason for this choice was that I became more aware of how tacit notions of power constrained participatory planning practice. Hence, I came to see my task as being about doing theoretical ground work to develop concepts.

Focusing on the world of ideas, comes with a price. The consequences of this choice are that the thesis has little to offer in terms of practical lessons and applicable tools. Those who search for concrete advice and tools for tasks, such as policy development, educational design, training, process design and facilitation, might be disappointed. Instead, the work I have done is to pave the conceptual ground for supporting practical work in planning practice.

Finally, I wish to reflect upon the choice to position the research in Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. This choice was also made about half way into the PhD project. Up until then I had intentions to include empirical work I had done in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia in the thesis. The choice to focus on Swedish planning policy and practice was made because I wanted to go deep rather than broad.

To investigate Swedish participatory planning policy and practice made it possible to utilise my practical experiences, to go below the surface to explicate notions of power. The choice was also justified since I view the "participation-friendly-context" of Sweden as a most-likely case, which can provide insights for reflective practice also in other planning contexts (see Section 1.2 and cf. Flyvbjerg, 2006 on critical cases). Finally, to focus on Sweden also came with the possibility of making a needed contribution to progress the treatment of power in Swedish participatory planning.

Even if I still find this choice to be justified, I acknowledge that it limits the reach of the findings. In line with the view of the interpretive research tradition, it is not reasonable to claim that the family of power concepts developed in the thesis is universally applicable across planning systems. Meaning-making is situated in a specific context in a certain moment in time (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). It must therefore be recognised that the particularities of planning

---

20. See Section 8.4.1 for an elaborate discussion on the theoretical contribution.

cultures limit any aspiration for deceloping generalisable knowledge about power in planning practice.

8.4 The contribution to theory and practice

With this thesis I aspire to meaningfully contribute to theory and practice. Hence the "so what-question" is a crucial one (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2001b). If the proposed rethinking of power in participatory planning is accepted, what difference would it make to theory and practice?

8.4.1 The contribution to planning theory and environmental communication

This thesis addressed the fragmented and reductive treatment of power in planning theory. I developed conceptual tools from power theory, applied and tested these through the analysis of notions of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. The evidence from this research was used to rethink power in participatory planning by developing a family of four power concepts. Thereby, the thesis makes the following theoretical contributions. The thesis:

- problematises the common assumption in the planning literature that power is a single entity and instead proposes a plural view of power as a family resemblance concept;
- deems the conflation of *power over* and domination in communicative planning theory as mistaken and, as an alternative, suggests that *power over* is an empirical process, which can be appraised normatively or sociologically as illegitimate or legitimate;
- questions the manner in which communicative planning theory mainly focuses on criticising power relations and instead suggests that theories of participatory practices ought to theorise power as constitutive and productive;
- problematises the notion, in rational planning theory, that research ought to supply evidence-based methods for planning and as a complement suggests that research should also supply concepts for reflective practice.

Hence, the thesis contributes to communicative planning theory, the broader planning literature and the discipline environmental communication.

The contribution to communicative planning theory is to conceptualise power as a family of four concepts. I have drawn on the critique (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Huxley and

Yiftachel, 2000; Richardson, 1996) towards communicative planning theory, as well as built on, problematised and developed the work of its leading scholars John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. Thus, the thesis has strengthened the treatment of power in communicative planning theory.

More specifically, this thesis further develops three influential streams within communicative planning theory. I have drawn on and developed Forester's (1999, 2009, 2013) critical pragmatism, by showing how planners' stories can not only be used to provide practical lessons from working "in the face of power", but can also inform the theorisation of power. By linking Patsy Healey's (1997, 2012) new institutionalism with Mark Haugaard's (2003) power theory, I have shown a path towards (re)theorising power in communicative planning, beyond the reliance on Habermas' critical theory. I have shared Judith Innes' (1995; Innes and Booher, 2010) interest in practice, yet I have also demonstrated how theorisation can enrich a situated understanding of power, rather than provide universal normative direction.

I would also like to point out how the thesis makes two contributions to the wider planning literature. The first contribution consists of showing a route beyond the fragmented debates, towards a more integrated discussion about power. I have drawn on previous bridge-building work by planning scholars (Richardson and Cashmore, 2011; Schmidt-Thomé and Mäntysalo, 2014) and power theorists (Allen, 1998; Haugaard, 2010a, 2012) to render different approaches to power in the planning literature commensurable. The work I have conducted, demonstrates how a family resemblance view of power can make it possible to relate approaches in the planning literature and clarify their differences, without unnecessarily portraying them as mutually exclusive. The theoretical contribution this thesis thereby makes, is to clarify differences and similarities between approaches to power, which so far have mainly been seen as alternative and competing. This contribution is valuable since it provides a perspective on power, which is useful both for understanding what is going on in planning and for further theorisation.

Secondly, the thesis contributes to the work on reflective practice within planning theory. Reflective practice is widely recognised within the planning literature for the insights it brings to the understanding of planners' everyday practice. Yet, reflective practice endures sustained critique for putting too much emphasis on the practitioners learning, without explaining how this learning is enabled and constrained by a social context. Hence, Forester (2013, p. 9) asks how we can "extend and refine, even transform, Schön's Reflective Practitioner to help us to think about power […]". This thesis answers the question by demonstrating how power theory can be used to develop concepts that are useful,

not only for the reflective planner, but also for future scholarly work to theorise reflective practice.

Finally, the contribution the thesis makes to the discipline environmental communication is to develop novel ways in which frame, planning and power theory can be useful. The methodology developed for combining frame theory with practitioner profiles, can be drawn upon in future studies of environmental communication practitioners' meaning-making. The power family is available for shedding light on the workings of power in environmental communication practices in planning and governance. These contributions are valuable as they enrich the repository of methods and theories within the discipline of environmental communication.

More specifically, the thesis contributes to the work of a group of environmental communication scholars in Sweden to which I belong. This group is working to reframe environmental communication by problematising and changing core assumptions about how communication is performed (SLU, 2019). To this task, the thesis contributes with rethinking notions of power in participatory processes. Thus, the thesis brings ideas, which potentially can be used in the wider reframing of environmental communication in governance practices. Finally, the thesis contributes by providing an example of an attempt to realise the groups' shared ambition to be engaged in sustainability transformations and yet be critically reflective (cf. Joosse et al., n.d.).

8.4.2 The contribution to reflective practice

By doing theoretical ground work, to problematise notions of power and rethink them, the thesis makes a contribution that matters to planning practice. If notions of power remain unproblematised, taken for granted, they might exert a "spell" that conditions the way in which planners perceive situations and learn by doing (cf. Schön and Rein, 1994). The consequences of the prevailing notions of power in participatory planning can be dangerously counterproductive, since they can constrain and control the way planners construct the world and block their ability to learn, i.e. to adjust their understanding and action to different kinds of situations.

Through this research I have "spelled out" the notions that guide the understanding of power in participatory planning. Thereby, assumptions about what power is and what planners ought to do about it, have been made available for critical reflection. I argue that this thesis thereby contributes to planning practice. It does so by providing a family of power concepts that are useful in the reflective practice, which is required if planners are to develop the practical

wisdom (phronesis) they need to master their profession (cf. Bornemark, 2016, 2017; Fridlund, 2017; Wiberg, 2018).

The contribution of this thesis goes beyond problematising current understandings. It also suggests alternatives to the reductive notions of power in participatory planning. The thesis offers the family as a generative metaphor for reflective practice. A family consists of members with overlapping and yet distinct characteristics. If the family is well-functioning, its members are more capable together than individually. Also, the opposite is true: if a family is dysfunctional it might be destructive. When in trouble we might habitually turn to our favourite sister. This habit often serves us well, but in certain situations the sister might let us down. Whereupon, we can consider turning to another member of the family, with different characteristics, better suited to what the particular situation requires. Hence, the family metaphor contributes with a more complex understanding, compared to the prevailing metaphors, which, for example, might tell planners that they are working "in the face of power" (Forester, 1989) and dealing with "power distortions" (Innes, 1995).

The thesis makes an additional linked contribution to practice, by identifying a set of process and identity frames pertaining to power. To make these frames, which often remain tacit, available for reflection is, as Schön (1983) tells us, an important contribution to reflective practice. When planners are confronted with situations, which are puzzling and difficult, they are assisted by having access to explicated accounts of the frames embedded in their practice. Such accounts can be used both in reflection-on and in-action to critically scrutinise suppositions about how planners ought to handle power. The explicated frames can facilitate planners' reflection and learning by doing. This contribution enables planners to develop the ability to be sensitive to what a situation requires, i.e. to develop and use practical wisdom (phronesis) (cf. Bornemark, 2016; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Fridlund, 2017; Schön, 1983; Wiberg, 2018).

Let me finally draw attention to how this thesis contributes to the influential idea that planners ought to be facilitators. Due to the larger move from government to governance, planners are increasingly acting as facilitators of processes with a multitude of stakeholders. As this research confirms, facilitators are frequently conceptualised as standing "unbiased" or even "neutral" outside of power relations. This conceptualisation risks leading to the mistaken belief that facilitators are positioned external to the social order and do not exercise power. By applying the power family, we see how this position is not available to any social actor, because it is a position "from nowhere" (Nagel, 1989).

The contribution this thesis makes, is to clarify that a facilitator derives his or her *power to* from social order, i.e. from systems of power. It is the power systems that provide the facilitator with a position that enables them to exercise

both *power with* and *power over*. This implies that the idea that the facilitator is positioned outside of power relations can be refuted and replaced with the idea that the facilitator is charged with *power to*, which can be exercised in the form of *power with* or *power over*.

Following the proposed rethinking, the legitimacy of the facilitator's use of power can be approached based on empirical or sociological interests and the focus can be on process and/or outcome legitimacy. Notably, the rethinking of power does not exclude the possibility that facilitators might exercise *illegitimate power over*. Instead, it acknowledges that facilitators certainly, both in a sociological and normative meaning, can exercises acceptable as well as unacceptable forms of *power over*.

Thereby, the thesis enables facilitators to be more explicit in how they think about and deliberate with others on their use of power. Anchoring the facilitator in shared power systems can mitigate the risk that they, out of misplaced desire for symmetric power relations, give the impression that no one is in charge of participatory processes. Crucially, the thesis thereby provides a basis for a more transparent and reflective facilitation practice, capable of responding to the critique towards token participation and manipulation.

In sum, this section has explained that the contribution this thesis makes to practice is to rethink power in a manner that is useful in reflective practice. The "so-what" of this contribution is that it can potentially move participatory practices beyond the days of naivety and cynicism, towards a state where its practitioners use and develop a nuanced vocabulary of power to inform their reflection and action.

8.4.3 What's next?

Standing at the end of this research journey, I think back on the practical puzzle, which was the start of it all (see prologue). I was puzzled, and irritated, over the manner in which (some) facilitators were unwilling to provide direction for participatory processes. I saw how this way of acting came back to haunt facilitators and participants. Ambiguity hindered the realisation of the promise of participation. I suspected that there were tacit notions of power blocking facilitators' reflections and actions. Have I now solved this puzzle?

Yes and no. This thesis has conducted theoretical ground work which, arguably, sorts out at least some of the confusion surrounding power in participatory processes. The thesis has developed concepts, which can be used and further refined by facilitators (and others) to enable situated judgements about whether to lead from the front, lead from behind, or simply take a step back. In this sense, the puzzle might be seen as deciphered.

Yet, to do conceptual work is not sufficient to deal with power. If one wants to overturn and progress participatory practices, it is not enough to merely address conceptual problems. Practitioners are not free to remove themselves from the material and social world to reflect and act in any way they like. In the language of this thesis, we are all part of social orders, which enable, but also constrain, our actions. So, this thesis has not puzzled out power in a manner, which automatically changes participatory practices.

Perhaps, one can say that the thesis has covered some ground, but not taken us out on the storming sea. What is next then? How can the power family be employed in research and practice? This thesis points to several future research tasks.

Regarding researching and theorising participatory planning, I would like to point out two important tasks. First, to further theorise power as a family resemblance concept. The thesis has provided a family of four power concepts. More work is needed to both theorise this particular family, but also to extend it with additional concepts in order to provide an even broader and deeper vocabulary of power. The most pressing task in this regard is to further theorise *legitimate power over*. The thesis has identified and started to fill a problematic conceptual void by providing a vocabulary for reflecting on the difficult situations in which *power over* must be used in participatory planning. But much more work is needed to conceptualise this contested form of power in the intersection between representative and participatory democracy.

Secondly, there is an important job to be done when it comes to applying the ideas of the thesis in planning education, guidance, policy, training, tool kits and handbooks. This is about making the power family available and used in pedagogy and policy. Policy making and educational design should take on this task. The role research can play, is to systematically assess and explore what kinds of pedagogical and policy applications are capable of enabling reflective practice.

For the wider planning literature, the thesis points to a need for further connection and synthesis. The ideas in this thesis can be used and further developed as examples and, perhaps also as a basis for developing conceptual frameworks, that might provide possibilities for relating and making commensurable competing theorisations of power in planning.

For researching and theorising participatory practices more generally, the thesis points to a continued and increased focus on the everyday practices of facilitators. This group of practitioners is growing and is increasingly influential in governance efforts. To research facilitators' everyday practices provides opportunities for the development of theory, as well as for progressing this bourgeoning practice.

End words

Some might say that reflecting on power is an esoteric and meaningless activity in planning and governance practice. Given the structural injustices, power asymmetries and the urgency of sustainability challenges, practitioners ought to reflect less and go ahead and challenge the status quo. Others, who are less optimistic, might say that power works to close down the space for reflection in planning practice. They might draw the conclusion that the ideas of reflective practice are beautiful in writing, yet unrealisable in practice.

My answer to these objections? I do see how the space for reflection might be limited, but my experience shows that practitioners are still capable of opening up power relations for critical scrutiny. I also see the need for radical action, but recognise that, for practitioners, action without reflection is blind.

Epilogue

I am out running. It is my usual path around the lake in the woods. The darkness is falling and it is raining. I am thinking about the lecture I held today for the Swedish planning association. I started by asking the planners to, in "beehives", discuss if and why they needed the word power to understand planning. Thereafter, I suggested that a family of four power concepts can be useful for reflective practice. While running, I am questioning how it went. Was the lecture too theoretical? What did the planners get out of it?

As I continue, I think about a metaphor for learning I got from a colleague once. Learning is like a bird flying in an unknown territory looking for a place to land. The bird sees a branch high up in a tree. It glances upwards. Can I sit up there? It courageously flies up and lands on the branch. It attempts to find its footing, looks to see what the branch is like and explores what it can see from this new position. Eventually, it starts to sing. It stays on the branch for a while. Its song increases in strength. The bird, and perhaps also its fellows, find the song to be beautiful. Then the bird looks out in the sky and takes flight again.

Literature

Abrahamsson, H. (2016). *Vår tids stora samhällsomdaning*. Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting. Available at: https://webbutik.skl.se/sv/artiklar/var-tids-stora-samhallsomdaning.html [13 March 2018].

Alarcón Ferrari, C. (2015). *Forests at the limits*. Diss. Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

Allen, A. (1998). Rethinking Power. *Hypatia*, 13 (1), pp. 21–40.

Allen, J. (2008). Pragmatism and power, or the power to make a difference in a radically contingent world. *Geoforum*, 39 (4), pp.1613–1624.

Allmendinger, P. (2009). *Planning Theory*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G. (2012). Post-political spatial planning in England: A crisis of consensus? *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 37 (1), pp. 89–103.

Alvesson, M. and Sandberg, J. (2013). *Constructing Research Questions: Doing Interesting Research*. London: SAGE Publications.

Alvesson, M. and Sköldberg, K. (2000). *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research*. Newbury park: SAGE.

Andersson, U., Carlander, A., Lindgren, E., et al. (2018). *Sprickor i fasaden*. SOM-undersökningar 72. Bohus: SOM-institutet. Available at: http://som.gu.se/publicerat/bocker/72sprickor/ [19 October 2019].

Arendt, H. (1970). *On Violence*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Armitage, D., Berkes, F. and Doubleday, N. (2010). *Adaptive Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning, and Multi-Level Governance*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A Ladder Of Citizen Participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 35 (4), pp. 216–224.

Bacchi, C. L. (2009). *Analysing Policy: What's the Problem Represented to Be?* Frenchs Forest: Pearson.

Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two Faces of Power. *The American Political Science Review*, 56 (4), pp. 947–952.

Bhaskar, R. (1991). *Philosphy and the Idea of Freedom*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bäcklund, P. and Mäntysalo, R. (2010). Agonism and institutional ambiguity: Ideas on democracy and the role of participation in the development of planning theory and practice ─ the case of Finland. *Planning Theory*, 9 (4), pp. 333–350.

Barnes, B. (1988). *The Nature of Power*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bateson, G. (1973). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. 13. pr. New York: Ballantine.

Beetham, D. (1991). *The Legitimation of Power*. New York: Macmillan.

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (2011). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Open Road Media.

Bernstein, S. (2004). Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance. *Journal of International Law and International Relations*, 1: 139.

Blackmore, C. (2010). *Social Learning Systems and Communities of Practice*. London: Springer.

Blicharska, M., Isaksson, K., Richardson, T. et al. (2011). Context dependency and stakeholder involvement in EIA: The decisive role of practitioners. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 54 (3), pp. 337–354.

Bond, S. (2011). Negotiating a 'democratic ethos': Moving beyond the agonistic - communicative divide. *Planning Theory*, 10 (2), pp. 161–186.

Booher, D. E. and Innes, J. E. (2002). Network Power in Collaborative Planning. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 21 (3), pp. 221–236.

Bornemark, J. (2016). *Medborgardialog − Om det svåra i att mötas praktikers reflektioner om ett av demokratins viktigaste verktyg*. Stockholm: Arkus.

Bornemark, J. (2017). Neutrality or Phronetic Skills: A Paradox in the Praxis of Citizen Dialogues Organized by Municipal Administration. *Social Pedagogy*, 3 (65), pp. 51–66.

Borowski, I. (2010). Social Learning Beyond Multistakeholder Platforms: A Case Study on the Elbe River Basin. *Society & Natural Resources*, 23 (10), pp. 1002–1012.

Boverket (2018). Vägledning om medborgardialog vid fysisk planering. Available at: https://www.boverket.se/sv/samhallsplanering/kommunal-planering/medborgardialog1/ [8 June 2018].

Bush, R. A. B. and Folger, J. P. (2004). *The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative Approach to Conflict*. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons.

Calderon, C. (2013). *Politicising participation: Towards a new theoretical approach to participation in the planning and design of public spaces*. Diss. Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

Callon, M. and Latour, B. (1981). Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so. In: Knorr-Cetina, K. and Cicourel, A. V. (Eds.) *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology*: *Towards an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 277–303.

Campbell, H. (2002). Planning: An Idea of Value. *The Town Planning Review*, 73 (3), pp. 271–288.

Campbell, H. (2006). Just Planning: The Art of Situated Ethical Judgment. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 26 (1), pp. 92–106.

Campbell, H. (2012). 'Planning ethics' and rediscovering the idea of planning. *Planning Theory*, 11 (4), pp. 379–399.

Carragee, K. M. and Roefs, W. (2004). The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research. *Journal of Communication*, 54 (2): 214.

Cashmore, M., Richardson, T., Rozema, J. et al. (2015). Environmental governance through guidance: The 'making up' of expert practitioners. *Geoforum*, 62, pp. 84–95.

Castells, M. (2009). *Communication Power*. Oxford: OUP Oxford.

Castells, M. (2011). *The Power of Identity*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Clegg, S. (1989). *Frameworks of Power*. London: SAGE.

Clegg, S. and Haugaard, M. (2009). *The SAGE Handbook of Power*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Clegg, S., Courpasson, D. and Phillips, N. (2006). *Power and Organizations*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Clegg, S., Flyvbjerg, B. and Haugaard, M. (2014). Reflections on phronetic social science: A dialogue between Stewart Clegg, Bent Flyvbjerg and Mark Haugaard. *Journal of Political Power*, 7 (2), pp. 275–306.

Collins, K. B. and Ison, R. L. (2010). Trusting Emergence: Some Experiences of Learning about Integrated Catchment Science with the Environment Agency of England and Wales. *Water Resources Management*, 24 (4), pp. 669–688.

Colvin, J., Blackmore, C., Chimbuya, S. et al. (2014). In search of systemic innovation for sustainable development: A design praxis emerging from a decade of social learning inquiry. *Research Policy*, 43 (4), pp. 760–771.

Connelly, S. and Richardson, T. (2004). Exclusion: The necessary difference between ideal and practical consensus. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 47 (1), pp. 3–17.

Connelly, S., Richardson, T. and Miles, T. (2006). Situated legitimacy: Deliberative arenas and the new rural governance. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 22 (3), pp. 267–277.

Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (Eds.) (2001). *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London; New York: Zed Books.

Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral Science,* 2 (3), pp. 201–215.

Davidoff, P. (1965). Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 31 (4), pp. 331–338.

Demokratiutredningen (2000). *En uthållig demokrati! − Politik för folkstyrelse på 2000-talet*. (SOU 2000:1). Stockholm: Kulturdepartementet.

Demokratiutredningen (2016). *Låt fler forma framtiden!* (SOU 2016:5). Stockholm: Kulturdepartementet.

Dewey, J. (1933). *How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process*. Lexington: D.C. Heath and company.

Dewey, J. (1938). *Experience And Education*. New York: Free Press.

Dewey, J. (1954). *The Public and Its Problems*. Athens: Swallow Press.

Dewulf, A., Gray, B., Putnam, L., et al. (2009). Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research: A meta-paradigmatic perspective. *Human Relations*, 62 (2), pp. 155–193.

Dreyfus, H. L., Dreyfus, S. E. and Athanasiou, T. (1986). *Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer*. New York: Free Press.

Dryzek, J. S. (1997). *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Faludi, A. (1973). *Planning Theory*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Fischer, A., Spekkink, W., Polzin, C. et al. (2018). Social representations of governance for change towards sustainability: Perspectives of sustainability advocates. *Environmental Politics*, 27 (4), pp. 621–643.

Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (1993). *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. London: University College London.

Fischler, R. (2012). Reflective practice. In: Sanyal, B., Vale, L. J. and Rosan, C. D. (Eds.) *Planning Ideas That Matter: Livabiltiy, Territoriality, Governance, and Reflective Practice*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). *Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2001a.) Beyond the Limits of Planning Theory: Response to My Critics. *International Planning Studies*, 6 (3), pp. 285–292.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2001b). *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2004.) Phronetic planning research: Theoretical and methodological reflections. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 5 (3), pp. 283–306.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 12 (2), pp. 219–245.

Flyvbjerg, B. and Richardson, T. (2002). Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory. In: Allmendinger, P. and Tewdwr-Jones, M. (Eds.) *Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory*. Rochester, NY: Routledge, pp. 44–62.

Forester, J. (1980). Critical Theory and Planning Practice. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 46 (3), pp. 275–286.

Forester, J. (1989). *Planning in the Face of Power*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Forester, J. (1993). *Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism*. New York: SUNY Press.

Forester, J. (1999). *The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes*. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press.

Forester, J. (2000). Conservative Epistomology, Reductive Ethics, Far Too Narrow Politics: Some Clarifications in Response to Yiftachel and Huxley. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24 (4), pp. 914–916.

Forester, J. (2001). An Instructive Case-study Hampered by Theoretical Puzzles: Critical Comments on Flyvbjerg's Rationality and Power. *International Planning Studies*, 6 (3), pp. 263–270.

Forester, J. (2009). *Dealing with Differences : Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Forester, J. (2013). On the theory and practice of critical pragmatism: Deliberative practice and creative negotiations. *Planning Theory*, 12 (1), pp. 5–22.

Foucault, M. (1979). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, M. (1980). *The History of Sexuality*. New York: Vintage.

Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. *Critical Inquiry*, 8 (4), pp. 777–795.

Fox-Rogers, L. and Murphy, E. (2016). Self-perceptions of the role of the planner. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 43 (1), pp. 74–92.

Franzén, M., Hertting, N. and Thörn, C. (2016). *Stad till salu: Entreprenörsurbanismen och det offentliga rummets värde*. Göteborg: Daidalos.

Fridlund, G. (2017). *Utan tvivel är en inte klok : En studie om personliga skavningar som resurs för praktisk klokhet inom svensk kommunal planering*. Diss. Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology.

Friedmann, J. (1998). Planning theory revisited. *European Planning Studies*, 6 (3): 245.

Fröberg, M. (2017). Negotiating matters: Supporting agonistic pluralism in community planning. In: Morelli, N. (Ed.) *Service Design Geographies: Proceedings of the ServDes.2016 Conference*, pp. 495−499.

Fung, A. (2015). Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future. *Public Administration Review*, 75 (4), pp. 513–522.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). *Truth and Method*. London: Seabury Press.

Gadamer, H.-G. and Fantel, H. (1975). The Problem of Historical Consciousness. *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 5 (1), pp. 8–52.

Gaventa, J. (2006). Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis. *IDS Bulletin*, 37 (6), pp. 23–33.

Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity press.

Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Göhler, G. (2009). 'Power to' and 'Power over'. In: *The SAGE Handbook of Power*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 27–39.

Gradén, M. (2016) *Storskalig vindkraft i skogen: Om rationell planering och lokalt motstånd*. Diss. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Grange, K. (2013) Shaping acting space: In search of a new political awareness among local authority planners. *Planning Theory*, 12 (3), pp. 225–243.

Grange, K. (2017). Planners – A silenced profession? The politicisation of planning and the need for fearless speech. *Planning Theory*, 16 (3), pp. 275–295.

Gunder, M. (2003). Passionate planning for the others' desire: An agonistic response to the dark side of planning. *Progress in Planning*, 60 (3), pp. 235–319.

Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1985). *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Hajer, M. A, and Versteeg, W. (2005). A decade of discourse analysis of environmental politics: Achievements, challenges, perspectives. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 7 (3), pp. 175–184.

Hajer, M. A. (2003). *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hajer, M. A. (2006). Doing Discourse Analysis: Coalitions, Practices, Meaning. In: van den Brink, M. and Metze, T. (Eds.) *Words Matter in Policy and Planning: Discourse Theory and Methods in Social Sciences*. Utrecht: Netherlands Graduate School of Urban and Regional Research.

Hallgren, L., Bergeå, H. and Westberg, L. (2018). Communication Problems When Participants Disagree (or Avoid Disagreeing) in Dialogues in Swedish Natural Resource Management−Challenges to Agonism in Practice. *Frontiers in Communication*, 3.

Haugaard, M. (1997). *The Constitution of Power: A Theoretical Analysis of Power, Knowledge and Structure*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Haugaard, M. (2003). Reflections on Seven Ways of Creating Power. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 6 (1), pp. 87–113.

Haugaard, M. (2010a). Power: A 'family resemblance' concept. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 13 (4), pp. 419–438.

Haugaard, M. (2010b). Power and Social Criticism: Reflections on Power, Domination and Legitimacy. *Critical Horizons*, 11 (1), pp. 51–74.

Haugaard, M. (2012). Rethinking the four dimensions of power: Domination and empowerment. *Journal of Political Power*, 5 (1), pp. 33–54.

Haugaard, M. (2015). Concerted Power Over. *Constellations*, 22 (1), pp. 147–158.

Hayward, C. and Lukes, S. (2008). Nobody to shoot? Power, structure, and agency: A dialogue. *Journal of Power*, 1 (1), pp. 5–20.

Healey, P. (1992a). A Planner's Day: Knowledge and Action in Communicative Practice. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 58 (1), pp. 9–20.

Healey, P. (1992b). Planning through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory. *The Town Planning Review*, 63 (2), pp. 143–162.

Healey, P. (1997). *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: UBC Press.

Healey, P. (2003). Collaborative Planning in Perspective. *Planning Theory*, 2 (2), pp. 101–123.

Healey, P. (2007). *Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a Relational Planning for Our Times*. New York: Routledge.

Healey, P. (2009). The Pragmatic Tradition in Planning Thought. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 28 (3), pp. 277–292.

Healey, P. (2012). Re-enchanting democracy as a mode of governance. *Critical Policy Studies*, 6 (1), pp. 19–39.

Hertting, N. (2003). *Samverkan på spel: Rationalitet och frustration i nätverksstyrning och svensk stadsdelsförnyelse*. Diss. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Hertting, N. (2017). *Representative Democracy and the Problem of Institutionalizing Local Participatory Governance*. Routledge.

Hilding-Rydevik, T., Håkansson, M. and Isaksson, K. (2011). The Swedish Discourse on Sustainable Regional Development: Consolidating the Post-political Condition. *International Planning Studies*, 16 (2), pp. 169–187.

Hillier, J. (2002). *Shadows of Power: An Allegory of Prudence in Land-Use Planning*. London: Taylor & Francis Group.

Hillier, J. (2003). Agonizing Over Consensus: Why Habermasian Ideals cannot be "Real". *Planning Theory*, 2 (1), pp. 37–59.

Hobbes, T. (1981). *Leviathan*. London: Penguin Books.

Holmgren, S. and Arora-Jonsson, S. (2015). The Forest Kingdom – with what values for the world? Climate change and gender equality in a contested forest policy context. *Scandinavian Journal Of Forest Research*, 30 (3): 235.

Huxley, M. and Yiftachel, O. (2000). New Paradigm or Old Myopia? Unsettling the Communicative Turn in Planning Theory. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 19 (4), pp. 333–342.

Innes, J. E. (1995). Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 14 (3), pp. 183–189.

Innes, J. E. (1998). Information in communicative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association; Chicago*, 64 (1), pp. 52–63.

Innes, J. E. (2004). Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics. *Planning Theory*, 3 (1), pp. 5–20.

Innes, J. E. (2016). Collaborative rationality for planning practice. *The Town Planning Review*, 87 (1), pp. 1–4.

Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A framework for evaluating collaborative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 65 (4), pp. 412–423.

Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2010). *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*. London; New York: Routledge.

Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2015.) A turning point for planning theory? Overcoming dividing discourses. *Planning Theory*, 14 (2), pp. 195–213.

Isaksson, K., Richardson, T. and Olsson, K. (2009). From consultation to deliberation? Tracing deliberative norms in EIA frameworks in Swedish roads planning. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 29 (5), pp. 295–304.

Jennings, B. (1983). Interpretive Social Science and Policy Analysis. In: Callahan, D. and Jennings, B. (Eds.) *Ethics, The Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis*. The Hastings Center Series in Ethics. Boston, MA: Springer US, pp. 3–35.

Joosse, S., Powell, S., Boehm, S. et al. (n.d.). Critical, engaged and change-oriented scholarship in environmental communication. Six methodological dilemmas to think with.

Kågström, M. and Richardson, T. (2015). Space for action: How practitioners influence environmental assessment. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 54, pp. 110–118.

Kvale, S. (2007). *Doing Interviews*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.

Larsen, R. K., Raitio, K., Stinnerbom, M. et al. (2017). Sami-state collaboration in the governance of cumulative effects assessment: A critical action research approach. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 64 (Supplement C), pp. 67–76.

Latour, B., Sheridan, A. and Law, J. (1988). *The Pasteurization of France*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Lauria, M. and Long, M. (2017). Planning Experience and Planners' Ethics. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 83 (2), pp. 202–220.

Lemos, M. C. and Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental Governance. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 31 (1), pp. 297–325.

Lewicki, R., Gray, B. and Elliott, M. (2003). *Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts: Concepts and Cases*. Washington: Island Press.

Lindholm, T., Oliviera e Costa, S. and Wiberg, S. (2015). *Medborgardialog ─ Demokrati Eller Dekoration?* Klippan: Ljungbergs tryckeri.

Loit, J. (2014). *En stad i världsklass – hur och för vem? En studie om Stockholms sociala stadsplanering*. Diss. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Lööf, A. and Stinnerbom, M. (2016.) Making collaboration work – Reflections from both sides. In: Drugge, A.-L. (Ed.) *Ethics in Indigenous Research*. Umeå: Vaartoe - Centre for Sami Research.

Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and Power*. New York: Wiley.

Lukes, S. (1974). *Power: A Radical View*. New York: Macmillan.

Lukes, S. (2005). *Power, Second Edition: A Radical View*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Machiavelli, N. (1903) *The Prince*. London: Grant Richards.

Mansbridge, J. (2012). On the Importance of Getting Things Done. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 45 (1), pp. 1–8.

Mäntysalo, R., Balducci, A. and Kangasoja, J. (2011). Planning as agonistic communication in a trading zone: Re-examining Lindblom's partisan mutual adjustment. *Planning Theory*, 10 (3), pp. 257–272.

McCourt, D. M. (2012). What's at Stake in the Historical Turn? Theory, Practice and Phronesis in International Relations. *Millennium−Journal of International Studies*, 41 (1), pp. 23–42.

McGuirk, P. M. (2001). Situating Communicative Planning Theory: Context, Power, and Knowledge. *Environment and Planning A*, 33 (2), pp. 195–217.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Metzger, J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (2014). *Planning Against the Political: Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance*. Routledge.

Metzger, J., Soneryd, L. and Tamm Hallström, K. (2016). 'Power' is that which remains to be explained: Dispelling the ominous dark matter of critical planning studies. *Planning Theory*, 16 (2), pp. 203−222.

Morriss, P. (2002). *Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Second Edition*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Mouat, C., Legacy, C. and March, A. (2013). The Problem is the Solution: Testing Agonistic Theory's Potential to Recast Intractable Planning Disputes. *Urban Policy and Research*, 31 (2), pp. 150–166.

Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? *Social Research*, 66 (3), pp. 745–758.

Mouffe, C. (2000). *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.

Mouffe, C. (2005). *On the Political*. New York: Routledge.

Nagel, T. (1989). *The View From Nowhere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neale, M. A. and Bazerman, M. H. (1992). Negotiator cognition and rationality: A behavioral decision theory perspective. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 51 (2), Special Issue: *Decision Processes in Negotiation*, pp. 157–175.

Nietzsche, F. (2011). *The Will to Power*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Niiniluoto, I. (1999). *Critical Scientific Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parsons, T. (1963). On the Concept of Political Power. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 107 (3), pp. 232–262.

Pezzullo, P. C. and Cox, R. (2017). *Environmental Communication and the Public Sphere*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Pløger, J. (2004). Strife: Urban Planning and Agonism. *Planning Theory*, 3 (1), pp. 71–92.

Powell, S. (2016). *Gender equality and meritocracy*. Diss. Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

Purcell, M. (2009). Resisting Neoliberalization: Communicative Planning or Counter-Hegemonic Movements? *Planning Theory*, 8 (2), pp. 140–165.

Rabinow, P. and Sullivan, W. M. (1979). *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Raitio, K. (2008). *'You can't please everyone' conflict management practices, frames and institutions in Finnish state forests*. Diss. University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu.

Raitio, K. (2013). Discursive institutionalist approach to conflict management analysis: The case of old-growth forest conflicts on state-owned land in Finland. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 33, pp. 97–103.

Raitio, K. and Harkki, S. (2014). The disappearing chain of responsibility: Legitimacy challenges in the political governance of Finnish Forest and Park Service. *Land Use Policy*, 39, pp. 281–291.

Reckwitz, A. (2002). Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5 (2), pp. 243–263.

Rein, M. and Schön, D. (1991). Frame-reflective policy discourse. In: Wittrock, B., Weiss, C. H., Wollman, H. et al. (Eds.) *Social Sciences and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads*. Advances in Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 262–289.

Rein, M. and Schön, D. (1996). Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice. *Knowledge and Policy*, 9 (1), pp. 85–104.

Richardson, T. (1996). Foucauldian discourse: Power and truth in Urban and regional policy making. *European Planning Studies*, 4 (3), pp. 279–292.

Richardson, T. (2002). Freedom and Control in Planning: Using Discourse in the Pursuit of Reflexive Practice. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 3 (3), pp. 353–361.

Richardson, T. (2005). Environmental assessment and planning theory: Four short stories about power, multiple rationality, and ethics. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 25 (4), pp. 341–365.

Richardson, T. and Cashmore, M. (2011). Power, knowledge and environmental assessment: the World Bank's pursuit of 'good governance'. *Journal of Political Power*, 4 (1), pp. 105–125.

Rose, G. (1997). Situating knowledges: Positionality, reflexivities and other tactics. *Progress in Human Geography*, 21 (3), pp. 305–320.

Rydin, Y. (2019). Silences, categories and black-boxes: Towards an analytics of the relations of power in planning regulation. *Planning Theory*: DOI:10.1177/1473095219870559.

Sager, T. (1994). *Communicative Planning Theory*. Farnham: Avebury.

Sager, T. (2012). *Reviving Critical Planning Theory: Dealing with Pressure, Neo-Liberalism, and Responsibility in Communicative Planning*. New York: Routledge.

Scharpf, F. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmidt-Thomé, K. and Mäntysalo, R. (2014). Interplay of power and learning in planning processes: A dynamic view. *Planning Theory*, 13 (2), pp. 115–135.

Schön, D. A. (1983). *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action*. New York: Basic Books.

Schön, D. A. and Rein, M. (1994). *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*. Washington DC: Lexington Books.

Schusler, T. M., Decker, D. J. and Pfeffer, M. J. (2003). Social Learning for Collaborative Natural Resource Management. *Society & Natural Resources*, 16 (4), pp. 309–326.

Schwartz-Shea, P. and Yanow, D. (2013). *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*. Abingdon: Routledge.

SKL (2009). *11 tankar om medborgardialog i styrning*. Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting.

SKL (2013). *10 steg för dialog vid konflikter*. Sveriges Kommuner coh Landsting.

SKL (2019a). *Medborgardialog i komplexa frågor: erfarenheter av utvecklingsarbete 2015−2018.* Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting.

SKL (2019b). *Medborgardialog i styrning: för ett stärkt demokratiskt samhälle.* Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting.

SLU (2019). *Transformative Environmental Communication in Wicked Times: Reframing Communication for Sustainability*. Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

Storbjörk, S. and Isaksson, K. (2005). Kommunalt Hållbarhetsarbete i gränslandet mellan politik och planering. Roller, relationer och avvägandets problematik. In: Asplund, E. and Skantze, A. (Eds.) *Hållbar Utveckling i Praktiken: Möten, Gränser, Perspektiv*. Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, pp. 63–93.

Strömgren, A. (2007). *Samordning, hyfs och reda: Stabilitet och förändring i svensk planpolitik 1945-2005*. Diss. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Throgmorton, J. A. (1992). Planning as Persuasive Storytelling About the Future: Negotiating an Electric Power Rate Settlement in Illinois. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 12 (1), pp. 17–31.

Tunström, M. (2009). *På spaning efter den goda staden: Om konstruktioner av ideal och problem i svensk stadsbyggnadsdiskussion*. Diss. Örebro: Örebro University.

Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. *Science*, 211 (4481), pp. 453–458.

van Hulst, M. and Yanow, D. (2016). From Policy "Frames" to "Framing": Theorizing a More Dynamic, Political Approach. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 46 (1), pp. 92–112.

von Essen, E. (2016) *In the gap between legality and legitimacy*. Diss. Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

Watson, V. (2002). The Usefulness of Normative Planning Theories in the Context of Sub-Saharan Africa. *Planning Theory*, 1 (1), pp. 27−52.

Watson, V. (2003). Conflicting Rationalities: Implications for Planning Theory and Ethics. *Planning Theory and Practice*, 4 (4), pp. 395−407.

Westin, M. and Hellquist, A. (2018). Vad är rätt när folk tycker olika? En berättelse om medborgardialog, makt och kritisk pragmatism. *Tidskriften PLAN*, (4–5), pp. 53–69.

White, J. D. (1992). Taking Language Seriously: Toward a Narrative Theory of Knowledge for Administrative Research. *The American Review of Public Administration,* 22 (2), pp. 75–88.

Wibeck, V., Hansson, A. and Anshelm, J. (2015). Questioning the technological fix to climate change: Lay sense-making of geoengineering in Sweden. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 7 (May), pp. 23–30.

Wiberg, S. (2016). Medborgardialogens politiska organisering. *Scores rapportserie 2016:3*. Stockholm: Stockholms centrum för forskning om offentlig sektor.

Wiberg, S. (2018). *Lyssnandets praktik: Medborgardialog, icke-vetande och förskjutningar.* Diss. Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology.

Wittgenstein, L. (1967). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yanow, D. (2009). Ways of Knowing: Passionate Humility and Reflective Practice in Research and Management. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 39 (6), pp. 579–601.

Yanow, D. and Schwartz-Shea, P. (2006). *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Yanow, D. and Tsoukas, H. (2009). What is Reflection-In-Action? A Phenomenological Account. *Journal of Management Studies*, 46 (8), pp. 1339–1364.

Popular science summary

High hopes for democracy and sustainability are placed on participatory planning. Policy makers and researchers argue that citizens' participation in decision making can revitalise democracy and contribute to sustainable development. Participatory planning is intended to give citizens influence over decisions, which are of importance for their communities. In participatory planning, politicians and planners engage in dialogue with citizens on development plans, which matter to health, equality and the environment. Sometimes planning is non-controversial, but often processes and decisions are contested.

Power relations with citizens can be difficult to manoeuvre for planners. Many planners would like to have more equal relationships with citizens. Yet their position in the democratic system inevitably provides them with different responsibilities and different possibilities to exercise power. Planners play a key role in preparing and performing participatory planning. They influence how the interactions with citizens play out and what kind of decisions are made. In some situations, it might be possible for planners to use their power to provide citizens with increased influence. While in other situations, planners must contribute to decisions where some citizens will not get it their way. What is the right thing to do for planners in the contested and ambiguous situations they face in participatory planning? There is no general and clearcut answer to that question. Instead, planners must reflect and develop their ability to make good judgements under difficult circumstances.

The problem is that the theories, which are most influential in participatory planning, define power too narrowly. Rational planning theory defines planners as value-neutral experts who merely implement decisions made by politicians. While communicative planning theory, which underpins participatory planning, tells planners that they ought to create conditions for power sharing and inclusive dialogue. Both these views provide important insights, but neither offers planners the nuanced language they need to make sense of the difficult situations they are confronted with in power relations with citizens.

To solve this problem, I rethink power in participatory planning by developing new power concepts. I define power as a family resemblance concept. This means that different understandings of power are seen as members of the same family of concepts, rather than mutually exclusive. The advantage of this way of seeing power is that it carries potential for providing planners with a broad vocabulary to reflect on power. Through the research, I develop a set of concepts, which can be used to understand what power is and to determine when power is exersiced in acceptable ways.

The first concept is *power to*. This concept shows how a social order is necessary for the predictability planning actors need to act in concert. This concept helps us see that those who wish to change power relations must accept that there is no escape from power; not even in participatory planning. Next, *power with* is used to cover situations when planning actors are operating together to reach shared objectives. This is the form of power, which the proponents of participatory planning hold dear. Yet, the research tells us that conditions for *power with* must often be created through the exercise of *power over,* the kind of power needed to order relationships and actions when there is conflict. So, instead of merely critiquing *power over,* planners and other actors ought to focus on separating acceptable from unacceptable exercises of *power over*.

The findings from the research can be used by planners to reflect on power relations in order to decide how to act in participatory planning. The power concepts, which I develop, are useful in planning education, in-service training, guidance, handbooks and planning policy. Thus, the thesis contributes with potential to strengthen the competence needed for realising the democratic promise of participatory planning.

Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning

Det finns höga förväntningar på medborgardialoger. Beslutsfattare och forskare menar att dialogerna kan bidra till fördjupad demokrati och hållbar samhällsutveckling. Medborgardialogerna är till för att ge medborgare möjlighet att delta i demokratiska processer och få inflytande över beslut som rör deras närmiljö. I medborgardialoger möter politiker och tjänstepersoner medborgare för att diskutera byggplaner som har betydelse för hälsa, jämlikhet och miljö. Ibland är dialogerna okontroversiella, men inte så sällan är det omstridda frågor som behandlas. Konflikter kan till exempel uppstå när avvägningar ska göras mellan bevarande av grönområden och bostadsbyggande, vid lokalisering av flyktingbostäder eller vid skolnedläggningar. I den här avhandlingen utvecklas ett nytt sätt att se på maktrelationer i medborgardialoger. Den kunskap som utvecklas är avsedd att användas av de tjänstepersoner (planerare) som leder medborgardialoger.

För planerare kan maktrelationer med medborgare vara svårnavigerade. Många planerare skulle vilja att relationerna med medborgare var mer jämlika. Samtidigt medför deras roll i det demokratiska systemet att de oundvikligen har ett annat ansvar och andra möjligheter att utöva makt. Planerare har en nyckelroll i förberedelser och genomförande av dialogerna och påverkar därmed vad dialogerna ska handla om, hur de ska genomföras och vilka som ska vara med. De har därmed inflytande över hur dialogerna blir och vilka beslut som fattas efteråt. I vissa situationer är det möjligt för planerare att använda sin makt för att stärka medborgares inflytande, medan de i andra situationer behöver medverka i beslut där vissa medborgare inte kan få igenom sin vilja. Vad ska planerarna göra med sin makt i medborgardialogerna? Det finns inget generellt och entydigt svar på den frågan. Istället behöver planerare reflektera och utveckla ett gott omdöme så att de kan agera klokt i svårtydda situationer.

Problemet är att de teorier som används mest i medborgardialogens praktik definierar makt för ensidigt. I den rationella planeringsteorin ses planerare som värderingsfria experter som endast genomför demokratiskt fattade beslut. Medan den kommunikativa planeringsteorin, som ligger till grund för medborgardialoger,

anger att planerare bör medverka till att orättvisa maktskillnader ersätts med jämlika dialoger. Båda synsätten ger värdefull insikter, men de erbjuder inte det nyanserade språk som planerare behöver för att reflektera över vad som är rätt att göra i svårtydda situationer.

För att lösa det problemet utvecklar jag ett nytt synsätt på maktrelationer i medborgardialoger. Makt definieras som ett "familjelikhetsbegrepp". Olika förståelser av makt ses därmed som medlemmar i samma begreppsfamilj. Fördelen med detta synsätt är att det ger planerare tillgång till en rik uppsättning av olika maktbegrepp, istället för ensidiga definitioner. I avhandlingen utvecklas begrepp som kan användas för att förstå vad makt är och värdera när makt utövas på ett acceptabelt sätt. Det första begreppet *makt att*, visar att maktordningar är nödvändiga för att sociala relationer ska ges den förutsägbarhet som krävs för att aktörer ska kunna agera gemensamt. Detta begrepp hjälper oss att förstå att även de som vill förändra maktrelationer inte kan fly från makt. Inte ens i medborgardialoger. *Makt tillsammans* betecknar situationer där medborgardialogens aktörer agerar för att nå gemensamma mål. Denna form av makt är hett eftertraktad av medborgardialogens förespråkare. Men *makt tillsammans* kräver ofta att *legitim makt över* utövas för att ordna relationer mellan politiker, planerare och medborgare på ett sätt som möjliggör dialog och beslutsfattande. Så istället för att endast kritisera *makt över* behöver planerare och andra aktörer fokusera på att avgöra i vilka situationer utövning av *makt över* är acceptabel.

Forskningens resultat kan användas av planerare när de reflekterar över maktrelationer och bestämmer hur de ska agera i medborgardialoger. De maktbegrepp som utvecklas är användbara i utbildning, kompetensutveckling, vägledningar, handböcker och i planeringspolicy. Därmed ger avhandlingen ett bidrag med potential att stärka den kompetens som behövs för att medborgardialoger ska kunna infria de högt ställda förväntningarna på att fördjupa demokratin.

Appendix 1. Interview guide

About the background and experiences of the respondent

Potential questions:

1. For how long have you been working with participatory planning? Can you tell me what you are doing in your current position?
2. Why did you start working as a planner? What did you do before you started to work in your current position? What is your educational background? What would you like to achieve with your work?
3. Can you please tell me about important people/mentors who have inspired you to do the work you are currently doing?
4. Can you please tell me about important events in your life that have led you to do the work you are doing today?
5. Are there any books, articles or other texts that have been especially important for your profesional development and can you tell me about them?

About the participatory planning episode

Potential questions:

6. Please give me an overview of the chosen process.
7. Please tell me about what you did during the process.
8. Who were the most important people during the process, can you tell me about them?
9. Which relationships were most important to you during the process?
10. How did you see the purpose of the participatory process? Which problems was the processes intended to deal with? How did you see the causes of these problems? Did you think that someone was to blame for the problems? If yes who and why? Were there any controversies around the purpose and problem descriptions? If yes, tell me about them.
11. How did you see the process as dealing with the problems? What did you think would happen if the design was not done in the way you saw as proper?
12. Which were the most important design choices during the process? How did you argue for or against the choices? Which problems were these choices intended to deal with and how? Were there any differences or conflicts around the choices?
13. Did you meet any resistence against your ideas during the process? If yes can you tell me about it?
14. Can you tell me about any other important events or turning points?

Reflections

15. How did the design influence the collaborative process?
16. How did the design influence the outcome of the planning?
17. Who were the winners and the losers on the outcomes of the planning?
18. Which were the most important lessons learned, for someone who is interested in process design practice?
19. If you could do this piece of work again, would you do anything differently? If yes, tell me about it.
20. What did you learn from the people you worked with? What do you think they learned from you?
21. Do you think your work was successful? If yes, in which way(s)?
22. What does this piece of work tell us about participatory processes, the possibilities and limitations?
23. When you are thinking about future work with participatory processes, what do you see as hopeful and what is of concern to you?
24. What is the next step in your work? What are you looking forward to?

Power in itself is not evil. In this thesis, Martin Westin problematises the reductive understanding of power in participatory planning. As an alternative, he develops a set of power concepts with the intention to support planners with tools for reflective practice. The research includes analysis of notions of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. An interpretive research approach underpins the development of concepts that can enable reflections on what power is and when it is legitimate.

Martin Westin earned a Master of Science with a major in Political Science at Uppsala University in the year 2000. He carried out his doctoral studies in Environmental Communication at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. This thesis was enabled through a collaboration between the Swedish International Centre of Education for Sustainable Development (SWEDESD) at Uppsala University and the Department of Urban and Rural Development at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

SWEDESD